Parliamentary Accountability Research Articles

Conjuring Up a King

Conjuring Up a King

The Political Behavior of Defense Ministers: A Study of Portugal, 1976-2015

ABSTRACT Defense ministers have not received the scholarly attention commensurate with the resources they command in national executives. This paper develops and tests propositions regarding the behavior of different types of defense ministers (military, pure experts, partisan experts, and purely partisan). Blending organizational theory and military psychology, our analysis investigates ministerial turnover in defense portfolios and relations with the legislature and the branches of the armed forces. Propositions are tested using a combination of original and secondary data on Portugal (1976-2015), an ideal case for this study, as well as cross-national evidence. Our findings indicate that military ministers from the army are associated with a higher army budget and larger land force, less accountability vis-à-vis the legislature, and a longer tenure in office. Experts, overall, are associated with a higher-quality army and a lower tenure in office, with mixed results for parliamentary accountability, depending on the type of the expert. These results have significant implications for the study of defense policy, civil-military relations, and cabinet politics, particularly in consolidating democracies featuring a relatively high share of either military officers or experts heading the defense ministry.

The Independence of Morocco's Competition Council

AbstractMorocco's Competition Council has undergone major reform since 2011. New legislation has elevated the Council from its former role as a consultative authority to an independent, financially autonomous, decision-making authority. Despite these changes, however, many questions have been raised with regard to the Council's independence, and its duty to monitor and enforce free and fair competition, as well as the sufficiency of the guarantees concerning the statutory impartiality and powers that enable the Council to fulfil its mandate independently. The Council's independence merits discussion in the debate on the optimal implementation of a competition authority, as it is relevant to good governance and the rule of law. To regulate competition effectively, it is essential that the competition regulator remains independent. However, within a democratic framework, the Council's independence must be balanced by parliamentary accountability and budgetary control.

Parliament, the Pandemic, and Constitutional Principle in the United Kingdom: A Study of the Coronavirus Act 2020.

Constitutions come under pressure during emergencies and, as is increasingly clear, during pandemics. Taking the legislative and post‐legislative debates in Westminster and the Devolved Legislatures on the Coronavirus Act 2020 (CVA) as its focus, this paper explores the robustness of parliamentary accountability during the pandemic, and finds it lacking. It suggests that this is attributable not to the situation of emergency per se, but to (a) executive decisions that have limited Parliament's capacity to scrutinise; (b) MPs’ failure to maximise the opportunities for scrutiny that did exist; and (c) the limited nature of Legislative Consent Motions (LCMs) as a mode of holding the central government to account. While at first glance the CVA appears to confirm the view that in emergencies law empowers the executive and reduces its accountability, rendering legal constraints near‐futile, our analysis suggests that this ought to be understood as a product, to a significant extent, of constitutional actors’ mindset vis‐à‐vis accountability.

The Constitutional Role of Independent Fiscal Institutions in the Eurozone

AbstractThe new European economic governance has made the creation or reform of independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) compulsory, in particular for Eurozone countries. While these institutions have been subject to extensive investigation by the economic literature, a constitutional analysis of their prospective and actual impact on national legal systems is lacking. In fact, depending on their design and powers, they could alter the ordinary inter-institutional dynamics on budgetary decisions. IFIs could redress the marginalization of parliaments in budgetary procedures in so far as they are able to offer reliable and independent information from the executive, and should mechanisms of “comply or explain” be put in place. By contrast, in the event an IFI operates within the executive branch and is not autonomous in the exercise of its mandate, parliamentary accountability could be further jeopardized. IFIs could also affect democratic rule-making over the budget, should their technocratic determinations be able to replace those of the budgetary authorities. Through a comparative constitutional analysis and based on selected case studies—France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands—the article aims to assess the constitutional impact of IFIs on parliaments and on the problem of information asymmetry on the budget.

The Parliamentary Accountability of EMU Decisions: Between Informality and Fragmentation

The Parliamentary Accountability of EMU Decisions: Between Informality and Fragmentation

Do Independent Fiscal Institutions Enhance Parliamentary Accountability in the Eurozone?

Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) have been established or reformed in all eurozone countries following the reform of economic governance. As they are expected to counter the deficit bias of the governments and the information asymmetry of the legislatures and the public over the management of the budget, IFIs may support or even strengthen parliamentary accountability. This hypothesis is tested with regard to three IFIs, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, the Italian Parliamentary Budget Office, and the Spanish Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility. Although the economic context in which the IFIs were created was similar in the three eurozone countries, as was their mandate, these institutions have a rather different institutional positioning, being within the Parliament, in Italy; within the Executive, in Spain; and a stand-alone body in Ireland. This is likely to influence the IFIs’ contribution to parliamentary accountability, we hypothesize that the closer the position of an IFI and its contacts to the parliament, the stronger is the scrutiny of the executive on budgetary policies. The analysis of parliamentary questions, hearings, and of the activation of the ‘comply or explain’ procedures shows that, overall, the IFIs’ potential role to enhance parliamentary accountability has remained underexploited by the three legislatures, with no significant differences as for the institutional positioning of the IFI.

Rising to a Challenge? Ten Years of Parliamentary Accountability of the European Semester

As a result of the euro crisis, EU economic governance has been reformed and EU institutions have gained new competences regarding national budgets, with the European Semester (the annual cycle of economic surveillance of the member states) being the most prominent example. With the Commission and the Council being the main actors, and the European Parliament playing only a minor role, a debate about the democratic legitimacy of the Semester and the role of national parliaments (NPs) in this regard has unfolded. This thematic issue, therefore, addresses the question of how parliamentary accountability of the European Semester has evolved: Have NPs met the challenge by adapting to the new situation in a way that allows them to hold the executive accountable? While the contributions to this thematic issue show significant variation across NPs, overall they reveal a rather pessimistic picture: Despite several institutional innovations concerning the reforms of internal rules and procedures, the rise of independent fiscal institutions, inter-parliamentary cooperation, and hearings with the European Commissioners, NPs have remained rather weak actors in EU economic governance also ten years after the Semester’s introduction. Whether recent changes linked to the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility introduced in response to the Covid-19 crisis will change the picture significantly remains to be examined.

Routine or Rare Activity? A Quantitative Assessment of Parliamentary Scrutiny in the European Semester

The European Semester is an EU procedure, designed to facilitate coordination between national and EU actors in planning and implementing economic and fiscal policies and contribute to sustained economic convergence and employment in the EU. Scholars have highlighted this procedure as a crucial area of EU politics for national parliaments since its introduction in 2011. However, national parliaments participate differently in the European Semester. This article investigates which factors (institutional, political, economic) are more likely to intensify parliamentary engagement at the national stage of the procedure, based on a comparative quantitative analysis of parliamentary scrutiny activities across 35 parliaments/chambers in the EU over the 2014–2017 period. The article offers new insights about prospects for greater parliamentary accountability in the European Semester in practice.

Democracy, accountability and audit: the creation of the UK NAO as a defence of liberty

PurposeThe study focusses on explaining why advocates for reform to state audit in the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1980s, focussed on improving the links between the new National Audit Office (NAO) and Parliament, rather than on traditional notions of audit independence. The study shows how this focus on the auditor's link to Parliament depends on a particular concept of liberty and relates this to the wider literature on the place of audit in democratic society.Design/methodology/approachUnderstanding the issue of independence of audit in protecting the liberties and rights of citizens needs addressed. In this article, the authors investigate the creation of audit independence in the UK in the National Audit Act (1983). To do so, the authors employ a neo-Roman concept of liberty to historical archives ranging from the late 1960s to 1983.FindingsThe study shows that advocates for audit reform in the UK from the 1960s to the 1980s were arguing for an extension to Parliament's power to hold the executive to account and that their focus was influential on the way that the new NAO was established. Using a neo-Roman concept of liberty, the authors show that they believed Parliamentary surveillance of the executive was necessary to secure liberty within the UK.Research limitations/implicationsThe neo-Roman republican concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, the preservation of liberty and democracy.Practical implicationsPublic sector audit can be a fundamentally democratic activity. Auditors should be alert to the constitutional importance of their work and see parliamentary accountability as a key objective.Originality/valueThe neo-Roman concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, preservation of liberty and democracy.

Positive Side Effects? The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties in Government on the Media Visibility of the Austrian Parliament

Abstract This article takes up the scholarly debate on the relationship between populism and democracy and analyses the effect populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in government have had on the representative function of the Austrian parliament. Building on insights from theories of newsworthiness, we expect these parties to positively affect the visibility of parliament due to the increased conflict between governing and mainstream opposition parties, thereby increasing parliamentary accountability. Our analysis covers the period from 1994 to 2020, with PRRPs in government from 2000 to 2007 and again from 2017 to 2019. Empirical inference is based on the weekly coverage of the Austrian parliament’s first chamber (Nationalrat) in a sample of four daily newspapers. The findings show that the first term in government did indeed have a positive and significant effect on media coverage. However, that this effect is not found for the second term suggests that its existence and size depend on the concrete political circumstances under which governments and media outlets operate.

Managing expectations with emotional accountability: making City Hospitals accountable during the COVID-19 pandemic in Turkey

PurposeThis paper explores the role of the COVID-19 pandemic in the financial and parliamentary accountability mechanisms of public-private partnership (PPP) “City Hospitals” in Turkey. Diverse and changing accountability mechanisms are explored regarding budgetary, affordability and emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic.Design/methodology/approachThis is a case study of City Hospitals in Turkey. Empirical data are collected and analyzed qualitatively from publicly available government and related sources, Turkish National Audit reports (Sayistay), strategic healthcare investment plans, relevant laws, decrees and NGO reports and news articles.FindingsExisting accountability mechanisms for arranging and/or delivering value-for-money (VfM) in Turkish PPP hospitals are weak. This provided policy makers with more flexibility to manage expectations of its citizens in dealing with COVID-19 pandemic. Political decision makers, through PPPs, created political capital for themselves by engaging in emotional accountability at the expense of better financial and parliamentary accountability.Originality/valueThis article contributes to the literature by articulating how roles of accountability change in crisis and introduces the concept of emotional accountability during a period of heavy infrastructure investments in City Hospitals in Turkey.

Ministerial Turnover and Why Reshuffles Matter for Parliament

AbstractReshuffles are a relatively common occurrence in British politics. We expect to see them whenever a new Prime Minister enters Downing Street, after elections and following ministerial resignations. Recent research from the Institute for Government warns that the regular churn of ministers has negative consequences for policy making and for parliamentary accountability. This article summarises their latest research and what this tells us about the potential implications of Boris Johnson’s February 2020 reshuffle on government and Parliament.

Canada’s top public servants meet agency theory in the Harper years (2006–2015)

A survey of Canada’s top public servants was used to test the effects on them of the agency version of the public service bargain held by the Conservative government of Stephen Harper (2006–2015). Most results were as expected: increasing politicization and prime ministerial influence added much complexity to the deputy minister’s job; and ministers’ political staffers acted as guardians of the agency bargain. However, the survey led to the observation of a decline in ministers’ powers and to the surprising increase of the parliamentary accountability of deputy ministers, as well as to some challenge to the concept of public service bargains. Points for practitioners It is a good idea to consider what the main components of the public service bargain are in any public workplace, that is, what expectations exist about duties, competencies, criteria of evaluation, rewards, and discipline for permanent employees and political staffers. Too strong an agency bargain creates confusion about responsibilities, accountability, and a culture of risk avoidance. Staffers should not disrupt the chain of command and should treat public servants with respect and courtesy.

The EU in the Central Mediterranean: Impact and Implications of the Comprehensive Approach

Abstract The implications of the comprehensive approach to the EU refugee crisis are becoming apparent in the current actions of different players in the central Mediterranean, where a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operation is present alongside Frontex’s joint operation Triton. Both cooperate closely with Libyan border authorities and the European Migrant Smuggling Centre of Europol. But this not only poses humanitarian problems as to how the EU should cooperate on these matters with Libyan officials, it also leads to a confusing meddling of different EU actors from distinct policy areas in matters of crucial importance to the Union. Against this background, the article delineates the competences and powers of the different actors. Another issue is the role of the European Parliament in the situation: it has little influence in the CSDP but strong links to the agencies. In this context the article will discuss the influence of the cooperation on parliamentary accountability.

Question Time or Show Time? Analysing the Value of Question Time as a Parliamentary Accountability Mechanism

This paper analyses the value of question time in New Zealand as a parliamentary accountability mechanism. It uses Professor Mark Bovens’ definition of accountability as a social relation to develop a bespoke, criteria-based evaluative framework for assessing question time’s performance. Six aspects of question time are evaluated: supplementary questions, patsy questions, the rule governing the adequacy of replies, the power to transfer responsibility for questions, ministerial responsibility, and media reporting practices. Each of these aspects is found to hinder the House of Representative’s ability to hold Ministers to account in question time. Several recommendations for reform are proposed for each aspect. Unless Members of Parliament and Ministers are willing to implement meaningful change, question time will have little value as a parliamentary accountability mechanism, and the principle of responsible government will be diminished.

Political Accountability in the Republic of Kosovo

Political accountability is the most specific type of social accountability for the fact that it lacks a normative legal aspect and that it derives mainly from the behavior, not from an opportunistic attitude or disclosure of specific subject in relation to the expectations of the body or institution or the relevant electoral body. Political accountability is the conditio sine quo non (indispensable condition) to a democratic system of government. Hence the Kosovo Government on the merits of the constitutional aspect has accepted this institute. It is precisely this institute of political accountability that will be the topic of this paper taking into account the responsibilities of the executive government in relation to the legislative, as well as the political accountability of those elected in relation to the voters. The accountability of the President will be treated in the framework of constitutional accountability, and that of the Government in the framework of parliamentary accountability.

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

ABSTRACTHow has the new structure of European Union (EU) economic governance affected the ability of parliaments (national and European) to scrutinize and control economic policy? Departing from the premise that executive power needs to be matched by appropriate parliamentary control, this contribution argues that parliamentary powers have been compromised in EU economic governance. Although budgetary powers remain formally at the national level, governments’ decisions have become constrained and national parliaments find themselves on the losing side of a reinforced two-level game. This loss in parliamentary powers is not compensated at the European level, as at that level political authority is effectively left suspended between the national governments, who are unaccountable as a collective, and the European Commission, which lacks a political mandate of its own. Against this background, a final section identifies guidelines for organizing parliamentary accountability in settings, like EU economic governance, in which executive power has come to be shared across levels.

Combating corruption in Botswana: lessons for policy makers

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to assess the success and challenges of the government of Botswana in combating corruption, and the lessons that policy makers may draw from this experience.Design/methodology/approachA range of sources are used including on-line materials from Botswana Government websites, DCEC annual reports, reports and on-line materials of international organisations, press articles, conference papers, two theses, articles in journals and chapters in edited collections.FindingsThe paper considers the factors that contribute to the success of the Botswana Government in combating corruption. It finds that the role of the anti-corruption body, the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) has been crucial in this endeavour, including its investigative and enforcement work, and also its prevention and education programmes. The progress in combating corruption can also be attributed to procurement reform, measures to reduce red tape and bureaucratic procedures affecting businesses, competition regulation to reduce collusion and bribery, political and parliamentary accountability, and not least political will of Botswana’s leaders to stamp out corruption. In addition, challenges facing the anti-corruption programme are considered, including capacity constraints in the DCEC and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, and the failure of the courts in some cases to bring to book those in high places who have allegedly committed corruption offences. The paper identifies a number of lessons that can be drawn from Botswana’s experience. In conclusion, the paper points to the need for political will to be sustained in light of evidence that it may have recently weakened.Practical implicationsThe paper provides lessons for policy makers in tackling corruption.Originality/valueThe paper is a further contribution to the existing scholarly literature on the anti-corruption programme in Botswana.

House of the people? Afghanistan’s parliament in 2015

Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections in September 2005 marked the re-establishment of the legislature after a 30-year hiatus. Instead of connecting constituents to central government, however, it is argued here the Wolesi Jirga (lower house or WJ) has undermined accountability structures. This article analyses parliamentary processes by focusing on two examples of legislation that appeared in successive plenary debates in 2013 (the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law and the electoral law). It argues, first, that Members of Parliament deploy political ambiguity in order to keep their political options open, simultaneously evading mechanisms that could hold them to account for their actions in parliament. Second, that historically and today, MPs’ role in Afghanistan has been less one of advancing legislation than advocating on the behalf of localised support bases. Third, however, that most damaging to parliamentary accountability are elite attempts to control the political process amid free-flowing resources. The article discusses the implications of these features and how they are gendered in relation to women’s strategic interests as well as behavioural roles of women MPs.