Park Regime Research Articles

The Major Powers of Northeast Asia: Seeking Peace and Security (review)

154KOREAN STUDIES, VOL. 23 the growing power of the chaebol, despite the fact that the state was becoming even more interventionist in the economy (pp. 137-152). Kim's analysis of the 1980s is equally, if not more, persuasive. It is ironic, then, that the evidence she uses to support her argument on the "decline of the developmental state" in chapter 6—such as growing collusion ("shady deals") between the chaebol and government officials; chaebol involvement in policy-making; and business' open defiance of important state policies, like fair trade legislation—was not unique to this period. It is ironic because the same things happened in the 1960s. Take the example of the Fair Trade and Anti-Monopoly Law of 1981: Kim points to the open defiance of this act by the chaebol to underscore the fundamentally changed nature of state-business relations in the 1980s (pp. 194-195). Yet, Kim neglects to point out that, in 1966, the state introduced similar legislation and was compelled to back down due to the "open defiance" of big business. This process, in fact, was repeated in 1969 and 1972. It is also fairly clear that the chaebol were involved in policymaking from the very beginning of the Park regime: the shift to EOI, as I noted above, almost certainly reflected the influence of the chaebol on state planners. It is even more certain that "shady deals" permeated state-business relations in the 1960s every bit as much as they did in the 1980s. The fact that Kim ignores these aspects of state-chaebol relations in the 1960s, but highlights them in the 1980s, only goes to buttress my point that the dominance of the state was never as complete or one-sided as we have been led to believe. Despite my obvious misgivings, I believe that Big Business, Strong State is a valuable and much-needed contribution to the literature on capitalist development in South Korea. Kim's book, at the least, will serve as an important building block: she has opened up new ways of thinking about state-business relations in Korea, and she has admirably illuminated the inherent limitations and contradictions of the "developmental state." Timothy C. Lim California State University, Los Angeles The MajorPowers ofNortheastAsia: Seeking Peace andSecurity, edited by Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward A. Olsen. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1996. 264 pp. $52.00 cloth. This well-produced conference volume is in many ways a sterling example of the genre. Despite the inevitable erosion of its timeliness in a fast-changing region ofthe world, it holds up well to current needs ofteachers and researchers, for the basic reason that the editors have paid particular attention to the dimensions of that very dynamism. BOOK REVIEWS155 Before turning to some of the highlights of the earlier chapters, it is worth touching on the themes of the brief conclusion. Here, the co-editors hold that the changing world in which Northeast Asia must function "is no longer as clearly influenced by the United States"; rather the region is confronting a "Sino-Japanese balance of power possessing political, economic and military dimensions" (p. 244). It is reasonable to assert that the current Asian financial crisis has placed such an analytical viewpoint under a harsh spotlight. Bruce Cumings, to cite one of the more controversial critics, has recently stated in an article in New Left Review (no. 231, September 1998, pp. 43-72) that "the deep meaning of the Asian crisis . . . lies in the American attempt to bring down the curtain on late development of the Japanese-Korean type" (p. 45). Cumings need go no further than the columns of the mainstream press to find evidence of direct influence of U.S. decision makers (see his subheading "How Robert Rubin Rewrote the Rules of Korean Political Economy"). While he concludes that "Washington's enduring regional configuration is suddenly shaky," Cumings's point is that the International Monetary Fund has tilted the game back in favor of the United States and the advanced industrial countries. While Kwak and Olsen may not have anticipated this precise development , they foresaw something of the kind: "readers . . . who know how the United States resolved its debate about...

Landscapes lost

In practical life a landscape will function as a bridge between the factual and the normative. Landscapes are part of the identity and ‘memory‐bank’ of social groups, and can function as a tool for public sector management. Landscapes can be given a semiotic interpretation, from which flows the idea that several landscapes may cover the same area. It also follows that landscape change must be kept analytically separate from material change in an area. A national park regime is viewed as an attempt to preserve a small number of the landscapes within an area. A national park policy diverts attention from what is happening outside the parks, as has been the case in Norway. Landscapes outside are lost in the sense that due attention is not paid to the natural and social changes taking place. The national parks policy in Norway is heavily biased towards area protection in remote mountain regions. It is argued that one reason for this, is the definition of the ‘original’ Norwegian landscape found in the national‐romantic painting tradition in Norway that dates back about 100 years.

The National Park Management Regime in Bhutan: Historical Background and Current Problems

AbstractThis paper gives an account of the recent history and the international and national policy background with respect to the planning and administration of Bhutan's nine national parks, nature reserves and sanctuaries, and sheds light on their current problems. Although more than 25 per cent of Bhutanese territory has been declared protected area over the last three decades, little data is available on the local population's perception of the aims, present status and the benefits of national parks, and their future role in the regional political setting and national resource use policy. Local communities are exposed to the legal limitations of resource use. A national park regime faces the problems of integrating issues of local management with the international community's demands on biodiversity preservation and conservation, and with the objectives of a national resource use concept.

Intellectuals in the South Korean labor movement in the 1980's

A labor movement is a movement of human beings seeking dignity and equality; the process of establishing a better society for human beings. It is meaningful to study how a country's labor movement has rapidly de veloped, because it can suggest some important factors through which not only the development of a labor movement but also the establishment of a better society can be expedited. Since 1948 (Chun Pyung's1 elimination), the Korean labor movement had been weak and politically dependent. Labor unions had always been controlled by dictatorial governments from the Rhee regime (1948-1960) through the Park regime (1961-1979) to the Chun regime (1979-1987). Throughout these three governments, the FKTU (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions) was unfailingly loyal to the dictatorship. However, in the late 1980s the workers not only economically confronted the capitalists for the improvement of their working conditions, but also politically challenged the authoritarian government for the establishment of a truly democratic society and a democratically oriented economy. Before 1987, labor strikes slightly increased in number from 88 in 1982 to 276 in 1986. However, the number of strikes increased explosively from 276 in 1986 to 3,749 in 1987. As a result of the active labor movement, the level of real wages also increased dramatically since 1987. It rose from 6.4 percent in 1986 to 17.2 percent in 1987, 13.5 percent in 1988, and 17.5 percent in 1989. The 1987 revolt also contributed significantly to the regime transition from an authoritarian government toward a semi-democratic one. What has made for such a rapid development of radical labor move ment? Several factors could be considered. Much has been written about

Party Identifiers in South Korea: Differences in Issue Orientations

Democracy finally arrived in South Korea in the late 1980s at the end of the third wave of democratization,1 overcoming 30 years of direct or indirect control of the political process by the military and soldiers-turned-politicians. By 1992 South Korea had open elections, legal opposition parties, and procedures that allowed winners of elections to assume control of the government. The 1992 presidential election, considered to be the turning point in Korean political history, was peaceful and fair, unlike past presidential polls that were marred by vote frauds and tampering. The transfer of power from a military to a civilian politician was also smooth, as observed in Western democracies, thus lending support to the optimistic view that South Korea would continue to progress toward democratization. This transition has also created an environment in which citizens can freely express opinions and feelings about sensitive issues, including political legitimacy and corruption, with little fear of political retaliation. Although previously citizens had demonstrated for political liberalization and opposition parties withheld their support of regimes largely because they perceived them to be illegitimate, the military governments successfully manipulated the political environment and achieved legitimacy, mainly through good economic performance. In fact, the Park regime (1961-79) was very successful in achieving legitimacy by transforming a traditional agrarian economy into

<i>Offspring of Empire: The Kochang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945</i> (review)

Book Reviews243 after 1972, when public support began to dissipate, did such a response become increasingly necessary to maintain political power. Nor, however, can belief in a military threat from the north be dismissed out of hand. Surely both concerns for security were formidable forces in rallying public support for the Park regime. At least for this reviewer, the contributors also define human rights too narrowly, thereby tacitly presupposing a pervasively American ideological ideal. Human rights, as Chandra admits in the initial essay, constitute a long and varied list. To isolate almost exclusively those related to procedural due process and political reform — thus to ignore concern for economic and social welfare and the quality of community life — is to emphasize process over result. With per capita the largest number of persons in prison of any industrial nation in the world — double that of South Africa, number two on the list, and many times more than Korea — the United States should not claim too much for due process. Finally, although Shaw strives mightily to provide some theoretical underpinning, he and each of the other contributors fail to articulate a compelling rationale for their focus. Indeed, lost in the details of intellectual history and political events is any reference to economic change. Yet surely the postwar history of East Asia generally and Korea and Taiwan in particular provides persuasive evidence that human rights, especially constitutionally protected and judicially enforced politidal and procedural rights, are more likely to flourish in societies that manage to maintain a stable political regime and a growth-producing market-based economy. John O. Haley Law School, University of Washington Offspring of Empire: The Kochang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945. By Carter J. Eckert. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991. ix-xv, 388. $35.00 Carter Eckert's Offspring of Empire is a stunning scholarly accomplishment. Using a broad array of sources, published and unpublished, in Korean and Japanese, and bolstered by personal interviews, Eckert's study provides a provocative revisionist 244Journal of Korean Studies interpretation of the origins of Korean capitalism, rooting its emergence firmly in the colonial period. In doing so, Eckert swims against the strong main current in the historiography of modern Korea that argues that a nascent Korean capitalism was crushed by the forces of Japanese monopoly capital after 1910. Eckert's thesis is that capitalism emerged after the 1876 opening of Korea spurred by structural changes in the market and that full-blown industrial capitalism appeared finally during the period of Japanese rule. Moreover, it developed dependently in the context of Japanese colonialism supported by more advanced Japanese capitalism and the authoritarian state. Therefore, Korean capitalism was politically unstable and dependent on the perpetuation of an authoritarian state. This thesis leads to a rethinking of the colonial legacy in Korea and provides a historical precedent with which to explain the strong linkages between political authoritarianism and post-war Korean economic development. In part 1, "The Rise of Korean Capitalism," Eckert presents his bold thesis, and in the course of his exposition he takes, on virtually every current shibboleth in the exploitation school of the economic history of Korea. Eckert counters the "sprouts" theory of indigenous capitalist development by asserting that capitalism as a system was imported to Korea after the opening of the ports in 1876 and describes this period as one of transition during which traditional landed wealth began to find new outlets in commerce. By focusing on his primary case study, the Kochang Kim family and their subsequent industrial empire, Eckert provides a compellingly detailed analysis of how one wealthy landlord family reacted to shifting market forces and new entrepreneurial opportunities during this period. While the kaekchu and Kaesöng merchants formed a part of the emerging capitalist class by the end of the period, landlord elements were also important. In short, merchant and landlord capital provided the basis for an emerging Korean bourgeoisie after 1876, but the shift to industrial capitalism cannot be linked to traditional commercial roots. In chapter 2, Eckert asserts that the decisive break came after a decade of Japanese rule. A new generation of entrepreneurs, changed economic conditions, and altered colonial economic...

Policy-Making Process in Korea: The Enactment Process of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act

Three dominant perspectives on the origin of regulation (the public mterest model, the capture model, and the politics model) and four models of governmental decision-making (the rational actor model, the organizational process model, the governmental politics model, and the garbage can model) are utilized in order to investigate the enactment process. This article argues that the failure to enact monpoly regulation and fair trade legislation during the 1960's and 1970's can be attributed mainly to the faithful implementation of economic development plans by the Park regime and to the public endorsement of those plans. The enactment of the MRFTA in 1980, however, is ascribed less to a problem-solving kind of activity within the Korean government and more to a temporal simultaneity of the political needs of the new milltary leadership and a few reform-minded career bureaucrats within the EPB.

Political instability and economic fluctuations in the Republic of Korea

This paper investigates the interaction between political instability and economic fluctuations during the late President Chung Hee Park's regime. The timings and outcomes of the elections are juxtaposed with the phases of business cycles and analyzed. Since no Korean data that are comparable to Gallup poll popularity indices for the U.S. Presidents exist, indices to measure popular discontent with Park's regime and to measure international tensions are devised. These indices are statistically analyzed with economic indicators for the business cycles, and with economic policy measures.

A Reflection on the Demise of the Authoritarian Park Regime

A Reflection on the Demise of the Authoritarian Park Regime

Cuba: Forge of the Revolution

cursed regimes of Somoza, Smith and the Shah, regimes that for many seemed ironclad in their safety and endurance. revolution in Grenada has just celebrated its first anniversary under the leadership of Maurice Bishop and the struggle in El Salvador has risen to new levels against the rightwing military coup intended to shut down the peoples' struggle there. struggle in Korea against the Park regime has expanded. In South Africa, the two month old boycott of mixed students, the strikes of black workers, and the powerful actions of Uhkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the armed wing of the ANC, in blowing up three oil refineries 125 miles apart at the same time, have launched a new phase of struggle. As Sara Rodrigues of Guardian observed, The thick billowing black smoke from the destroyed fuel tanks . . . was truly symbolic, a graphic harbinger of the future of South Africa's racist settler regime. In the United States, the decade began on a note of savagery and cold war confrontation. President Carter

Locational Behaviors of the Park Regime in the Republic of Korea

After the establishment of the Park Regime, the development of the Korean economy, especially that of her manufacturing, has been remarkable; and its annual increasing rate in her first five-year economic development plan (1962-66) is 15%, higher than that of G.N.P.During the period, we see some changes in the composition of values added by province. Gyeonggi-do, with the City of Seoul, the core industrial area in Korea, is losing its ground, while Pusan city, the central city in the southern part of Korea, and its neigh-bouring Gyeongsangnam-do is on a fair way of development. Especially, the index of values added of Gyeongsangnam-do (100 as of 1963) zoomed up to 992 as of 1967, the highest ratio in Korea (Fig. 1 Table 1, 2).This development is caused mainly by the construction of Wulsan heavy industrial estate on the Japan Sea in Gyeongsangnam-do (Fig. 3). Then the Park Regime is going to construct the second in Yosu city on the Korea Strait in the eastern part of Jeonlanam-do, after the keen competition with Inchon city near the City of Seoul. And in addition to that, the schemes for Masan free port and Pohang iron and steel plant are going on. All these sites are situated in the Southern Economic Region in Korea (Fig. 4).From these facts, we can find out the following spatial principles of her locational behaviors and their basic conditions.The 1st principle of behavior is to avoid the risk of destruction by North Korea and her allies. So she constructed her first big industrial estate- the symbol of Korean development- in the area far from the communist countries. The experience of Korean War assured her the safety of the southeastern part of Korea.The 2nd principle of behavior is to organize herself into two selfsustaining economic regions, in view of dealing with difficult situations of war time. In the light of this principle, till now, the Southern Economic Region organized by Pusan city has been behind the Northern Economic Region organized by the City of Seoul in manufacturing (Table 2). That is why, she has been endeavoring to develop the manufacturing in the Southern Economic Region.The 3rd principle of behavior is to set up their plants within the area, favourable for the constructing of the industrial districts depending on foreign trades. In foreign trades, Japan is Korea's largest supplier, followed by the United States, and her second export market after the United States. For this reason, the southeastern districts along the Korea Strait, occupies a better position in constructing the seaside industrial estates, with the financial and technical aid of Japan. Moreover, chiefly because of the less range of tide, the harbour conditions along this coast is better than those of the northwestern coast.