Regions of War and Peace. By Douglas Lemke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 252 pp., $65.00 cloth (ISBN: 0-521-80985-1), $23.00 paper (ISBN: 0-521-00772-0). Before the current popularity of strategic models, the study of world politics in the United States after World War II was dominated by structural approaches. Structural arguments took the centrality of the major powers as determinants of the international system as a given. Indeed, relative capabilities among the major powers supposedly held the key to international stability (Waltz 1979; Thompson 1988). The dominant parity school of thought held that the international system was stable when major power capabilities were in rough equivalence, with stability being the absence of system-changing major power war (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1959, 1979). Even though parity scholars held much sway in academic circles, they did not go unchallenged. At the end of the 1950s, A. F. K. Organski developed his power transition theory, which held, contrary to the parity argument, that a preponderance of capabilities in the hands of one dominant power is coincident with system stability, and that movements toward rough equivalence lead to war (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; Kugler and Organski 1989). The power transition theory, however, is not just another structural approach to international stability. It also speaks to issues of political and economic development, and even state strategy. Indeed, whereas parity scholars talk about system change resulting from the fluidity of alliance patterns, Organski and his followers look domestically at the major states themselves as the source of system change. Although the economic potential for growth exists in most societies, the political organization to harness that potential varies across both time and space. The states that become better organized politically can better harness, direct, and guide economic production, which creates growth. Growth in turn creates power or enhanced …
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