Paradigmatic Sense Research Articles

Arguing about Psychiatry: Natural Selection, Austinian Conservatism, and Finding Our Way to the Best

Arguing about PsychiatryNatural Selection, Austinian Conservatism, and Finding Our Way to the Best Joseph Gough (bio) Professors Murphy and Lieberman have offered two generous and interesting commentaries on my article, each very insightful and helpful in its own way, and each offering an interesting alternative characterization of the subject matter of psychiatry. I found each extremely thought-provoking, hence this rather bloated response. I strongly disagree with each. In brief, I disagree with the 'preliminaries' of each commentary, struggle to see the tension between Hull's view of science and my view of psychiatry, reject Lieberman's appeal to the history of mind-like and mental-illness-like concepts, and finally, believe my position neither suffers from the instability of psychiatry, nor blocks the route to best practice, nor counsels despair. Metaphysical Precision and Conceptual Evolution: Response to Murphy Murphy begins by offering some helpful context for the debate, and for our disagreement within that debate. Partly it is helpful because it raises a cluster of questions, which I agree with him, are related to the topic at hand. Partly it is helpful because it lays out Murphy's background metaphysics, with which I broadly agree, but where I think it is important to be more pedantic than Murphy himself is. Murphy and I agree that there are animate objects, importantly different from inanimate objects; we also agree that there is no object in nature that is a mind. However, in that [End Page 45] opening paragraph, there are a few things that look to me a little like conflations—and while I am happy to grant this as pedantry, I am not happy to deny its importance. First, not everything animate is intelligent and unpredictable—a presumably accidental implication of Murphy's use of 'these' throughout the paragraph. Second, intelligence and unpredictability do not in my view cluster in the way that Murphy suggests in the passage—a highly intelligent system may be exceptionally predictable at least so long as its goals and knowledge are fixed, and a highly unpredictable system may, of course, be entirely unintelligent. Of course, when some systems behave other than we expect, we count this as a failing of the system; but this is a feature of artifacts as well as animate systems, and perhaps also of objects that are neither artifacts nor animate (think of a farmer whose crops fail to go—might they not think there is something wrong with the soil?). The class of 'predictions' Murphy identifies is what I would describe as a class of normative expectations, that, of course, must be somewhat in line with the way things actually are, but are not 'predictions' in the paradigmatic sense of guesses about what will happen. This pedantry matters because this implied (or perhaps less charitably, enforced) alignment between non-coextensive categories in this picture of Murphy's is leveraged, I think, to gesture towards an objection. First, Murphy claims that this class of systems has required a special vocabulary, 'mental' vocabulary. Second, it is, I think, suggested in Murphy's set-up (and perhaps in Murphy's work; Murphy & Stich, 1999) that at some level this vocabulary anchors what we are talking about when we are talking about 'mental illness.' But here, of course, I disagree—or at least, I might disagree if I were clear what is being claimed. Which class of systems is that gives rise to this 'special vocabulary? Several have been mentioned. It should also come as no surprise that I think it is deeply unclear what counts as 'mental' vocabulary. Is it the vocabulary of animacy? Of normative expectation and function-ascription? Perhaps of intentionality? Or of consciousness? Maybe it is defined 'ostensively' with respect to terms like belief and desire? After these preliminaries, Murphy offers an objection to my position, and a brief defense of his own. I would like to begin with his defense of his own position: the best way to think about the claim that mental illnesses are brain diseases … is to see them as committing us to a form of explanation that treats psychiatry as continuous with other sciences of mind, in...

Categorizing Smells: A Localist Approach.

Humans are poorer at identifying smells and communicating about them, compared to other sensory domains. They also cannot easily organize odor sensations in a general conceptual space, where geometric distance could represent how similar or different all odors are. These two generalities are more or less accepted by psychologists, and they are often seen as connected: If there is no conceptual space for odors, then olfactory identification should indeed be poor. We propose here an important revision to this conclusion: We believe that the claim that there is no odor space is true only if by odor space, one means a conceptual space representing all possible odor sensations, in the paradigmatic sense used for instance for color. However, in a less paradigmatic sense, local conceptual spaces representing a given subset of odors do exist. Thus the absence of a global odor space does not warrant the conclusion that there is no olfactory conceptual map at all. Here we show how a localist account provides a new interpretation of experts and cross-cultural categorization studies: Rather than being exceptions to the poor olfactory identification and communication usually seen elsewhere, experts and cross-cultural categorization are here taken to corroborate the existence of local conceptual spaces.

Focus: Mobility – A Bridge between the Past and the Present

What follows is the result of a workshop on ‘mobility’ organized by the History & Archaeology Section of the Academia Europea at the AE Wrocław Knowledge Hub on 3 and 4 September 2018. The topic of ‘mobility’ is understood here in its paradigmatic sense. It takes into account the mobility of human beings, goods, animals and plants, diseases or knowledge, including infrastructure, effects on environment, societies and politics, gender issues, transport, etc. At the same time, a historical dimension may serve to bestow upon such a paradigm the perspective given by time when applied to different patterns of mobility. However, the bridge is not only between past and present, but also between disciplines, both within and beyond the realm of humanities and social sciences. The purpose of this workshop, therefore, was to consider strengthening the links between the two component disciplines of the Section concerned, namely History and Archaeology, while at the same time consolidating our disciplinary voice within the Academia Europaea and establishing a constructive dialogue with other sections of the Academia.

The associative copulative and expression of bodily discomfort in Northern Sotho

This article discusses one of the meanings expressed by the associative copulative construction with -na le, ‘have’ in Northern Sotho, namely to ‘physically experience discomfort’, ‘suffer from’ or ‘be ill with’ something. In light of alternative available verbs that are employed to express the same concept in specific ways, this article aims to investigate the occurrence of such alternative verbs, their semantic relationship with -na le ‘have’ and with each other. A lexical semantics investigation involving verb classes, selectional restrictions and paradigmatic sense relations reveals that -na le ‘have’ functions as a superordinate in a troponymy relationship with these verbs. It also shows that these verbs are not on the same level in the hierarchical scheme, placing -bolaya ‘kill’, -tshwenya ‘trouble’ and -swara ‘catch’/ ‘hold’ just below -na le ‘have’ as they select both body-part and affliction arguments. The rest of the verbs are positioned on a lower level, selecting either body-part or affliction.

Waiting for the event

Abstract By paraphrasing the title of Samuel Beckett's key dramatic text in the title of this article, we indicate the capacity of art to define time. To what extent its influence extends to reality is a question inscribed in the very foundations of its social meanings, which, at the same time, also stimulates the emergence of artistic events. Starting from the introductory layout of concepts in the relationship between art and politics in Miško Šuvakovi?'s book Art and Politics [Umetnost i politika], we are interested in the concept of event developed (non)definitively by Alain Badiou. The politics of art is an epistemological problem rather than an aesthetic one. At numerous intersections of social, power- and production-related practices, art and politics serve one another as the medium of waiting for the event. Speaking of various definitions of the relationship between art and life, the Dadaist movement proves relevant for subsequent times in a paradigmatic sense.

Talents and Interests: A Hegelian Moral Psychology

AbstractOne of the reasons why there is no Hegelian school in contemporary ethics in the way that there are Kantian, Humean and Aristotelian schools is because Hegelians have been unable to clearly articulate the Hegelian alternative to those schools’ moral psychologies, i.e., to present a Hegelian model of the motivation to, perception of, and responsibility for moral action. Here it is argued that in its most basic terms Hegel's model can be understood as follows: the agent acts in a responsible and thus paradigmatic sense when she identifies as reasons those motivations which are grounded in his or her talents and support actions that are likely to develop those talents in ways suggested by his or her interests.

African philosophy and the method of ordinary language philosophy

One of the vibrant topics of debate among African and non-African scholars in the 20th and 21st centuries centered on the existence of African philosophy. This debate has been described as unnecessary. What is necessary is, if African philosophy exists, we should show it, do it and write it rather than talking about it, or engaging in endless talks about it. A popular position on the debate is that what is expected to be shown, done and written is philosophy tailored along the stereotyped and paradigmatic sense peculiar to Western Philosophy. Interestingly, a non-African scholar, Barry Hallen argues that using the method of ordinary language philosophy, African philosophy is philosophy per se, and should be recognised as such. The focus of this study is to analyse what Hallen refers to as ordinary language philosophy and explain how it authenticates African philosophy as unique ‘species’ of philosophy, thus, putting an end to the controversy on the ontology of African Philosophy. Key words: African philosophy, language philosophy.

Meaning in Language: An Introduction to Semantics and Pragmatics (review)

Reviewed by: Meaning in language: An introduction to semantics and pragmatics by Alan Cruse Huimin Ji Meaning in language: An introduction to semantics and pragmatics. By Alan Cruse. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xii, 424. Paper $24.95. Alan Cruse’s Meaning in language is a valuable contribution to the study of meaning. In his new book, C attempts ‘to survey the full range of semantic phenomena’ (x) without being bound to any one particular theory of meaning, and he succeeds admirably. Though primarily intended for undergraduate and beginning graduate students with some background in linguistics, the book will also serve well as a reference work for researchers in lexical semantics. In writing an introductory textbook, a writer has to be selective in the treatment of topics. C is no exception. Although the book encompasses lexical semantics, grammatical semantics, and pragmatics, C clearly focuses on lexical semantics. The book is divided into four parts. Part 1 (Chs. 1–4) introduces some fundamental notions. Ch. 1 provides an orientation to the study of meaning. Some notions from the field of logic are treated in Ch. 2. Ch. 3 surveys varieties of meaning (descriptive vs. nondescriptive) and dimensions of meaning. Modes of meaning combination and the validity of the principle of compositionality are discussed in Ch. 4. Part 2, which comprises nine chapters (Chs. 5–13) and is the longest (83–261), is devoted to word meanings. There is a detailed and insightful analysis of lexical relations. Topics examined in this part include: contextual variation of word meaning, the conceptual approach to word meaning, paradigmatic sense relations, word fields, two main strategies of meaning extension—metaphor and metonymy, syntagmatic sense relations, and the componential approach to semantics. Ch. 14, which constitutes Part 3, surveys meanings created by different grammatical elements. Part 4, consisting of Chs. 15–17, analyzes meanings related to situational contexts. The basic topics in pragmatics addressed in this part are reference and deixis, speech act theory, and conversational implicature, which are essential to understanding communication. C’s book has many strengths as a textbook. A wealth of telling examples throughout the book illustrate and clarify. All chapters (except Ch. 1 and Ch. 5—the two introductory chapters) have challenging and stimulating discussion questions and exercises with answers suggested, which offer the students an opportunity to check their understanding of the principles and concepts presented in the book. Each chapter concludes with suggestions for further reading, which is particularly useful for those interested students who intend to delve further into the topics discussed. Several careless printing errors are the only flaws this reader finds about the book. For example, on p. 281, the two sample sentences: John repaired his bicycle in the garage and John put his bicycle in the garage, are mistakenly reversed. Written in clear and concise language, this book offers comprehensive coverage of the topics in the study of meaning in language. Students will profit considerably by reading this excellent text. Huimin Ji University of Georgia Copyright © 2002 Linguistic Society of America

The foundations of linguistic theory: Selected writings of Roy Harris Ed. by Nigel Love (review)

BOOK NOTICES 655 In Ch. 1 L discusses the structure of the English lexicon and the varieties of English, and concludes with an informative survey of the most important monolingual English dictionaries . Dealing in Ch. 2 with the various aspects of the linguistic sign, L introduces three sign models—Saussure's, Ogden & Richards's, and Buhler's. After examining the meaning of signs and the different kinds of meaning, he defines and discusses the concepts of morpheme and lexeme. In general, L's conception of the morpheme and its nature derives from classical American structuralism. The main topics of Ch. 3 are word-formation processes, semantic features , and componential analysis. L advocates the integration of feature semantics and prototype semantics as the most urgent task of semantic theory and practice. He also presents his typology of semantic features, consisting of seven types: denotative, connotative, relational , transfer, deictic, inferential, and distinctive . All these types except the inferential function as distinctive features (the seventh, comprehensive type). Ch. 4 is primarily concerned with paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations between lexemes and lexical units. Among other things. L considers the distinction between homonymy and polysemy, the various kinds of paradigmatic sense relations, and linear and hierarchic lexical fields. Ch. 5 contrasts context (linguistic context) and context (extralinguistic setting), both of which contribute to the resolution of polysemy. L welcomes the growing attention contemporary linguists are paying to the lexicon. He gives the metaphor as an example: long excluded from purely linguistic studies, it has now become prominent and its study respectable. According to L, 'the function of words in context and the creative forces of lexical rules and semantic processes must be seen as the fundamental tools which help man to come to grips with the universe around him' (188). Lipka has contributed to the development of modern semantics and lexicology in his numerous writings over the past two decades. This work is a good introduction to and survey of English lexicology. It is supplemented by a listing of over fifty important monolingual English dictionaries, an extensive bibliography (195203 ), and indexes of subjects and names. The book is well printed and misprints have been kept to a minimum. [Zdenek Salzmann, Northern Arizona University.] The foundations of linguistic theory: Selected writings of Roy Harris. Ed. by Nigel Love. London & New York: Routledge, 1990. Pp. xv, 236. Cloth $65.00. This collection of thirteen essays and book excerpts from twenty years of Roy Harris's career as a Socratic gadfly on the back of autonomous linguistics supports Nigel Love's claim in his preface that H should be read more, not only by linguists who engage in autonomous linguistics but also by those who are looking for an alternate model of discourse with which to talk about language as a nonautonomous mode of social interaction. Love's helpful orienting 'Introduction' (1-21) argues that H's work as a whole is an analysis of the thesis that 'linguistics has been led astray by the fact that . . . "man is capable intellectually of decontextuahzing his own verbal behaviour "' (19). H's argument in the work represented in this volume is compelling, if for no other reason than the catholicity of his targets , which range over Ferdinand de Saussure, Leonard Bloomfield, Edward Sapir, Zelig Harris , Charles Hockett, John Lyons. Noam Chomsky , John Searle, and William Labov, among many others. Regardless of the target, H seems to have in mind not a personal attack on any individual, but a direct attack on the isolation of linguistic form from meaning and communication. For example , H argues that post-Bloomfieldian concerns with distributional linguistic analysis not based on meaning usually relied on post-hoc rationalization for an analysis already reached by the use of meaning ('Synonymy and morphological analysis', 22-43). Linguistic arguments which analyze meaning explicitly within an autonomous framework fare no better with H. In 'Truth-conditional semantics and natural languages' (96-111), he attacks the assumption in truth-conditional semantics that there is a 'universal communication situation with universal purposes' (109), such that analytic sentences like Triangles have three sides and synthetic sentences like Triangles are unlucky are analyzed with the same context-neutral truth conditions (106-7). H turns his...

A case of conflicting paradigms: nursing and reproductive technology.

This article addresses the paradigm conflict between nursing and reproductive technology. This technology is discussed as a conceptual system emphasizing fragmentation and distance, in contrast to the philosophical foundation of nursing, which aspires to holism and connection. The sensory modalities of sight, the paradigmatic sense of distance, and touch, the paradigmatic sense of connection, are considered as they highlight the conflict between nursing and reproductive technology. Particular attention is given to the techniques of ultrasonography and amniocentesis.

"Hate in Heav'n": Milton and the Odium Dei

In his recent discussion of Paradise Lost, John T. Shawcross formulates what he feels to be underlying theme of Milton's epic. According to Professor Shawcross, the theme in simplest terms is love. We see it in providence of God which poem asserts, in of Son for God Father and thus for man, and in realization of Adam in Book XII, which thus justifies God's ways. By contrast, we see hate of Satan and its generation of revolt, revenge, and deceit. Love leads to eternal life; hate, to eternal death. ' As a succinct and cogent statement of theme of Milton's epic, foregoing observation has support of Milton's God, who declares that Heav'nly shall outdo hate, / Giving to death, and dying to redeem, / So dearly to redeem what hate / So easily destroy'd (3.298-301). At very thematic center of Paradise Lost, then, one discovers all-important triumph of Heav'nly love over Hellish hate. In its assertion of eternal providence, Milton's epic represents a veritable celebration of that triumph. Despite paradigmatic sense through which theme of Paradise Lost is articulated in triumphant assertion of God's over Satan's hate, one must nevertheless come to grips with an aspect of Milton's epic that has received little or no attention in history of Milton scholarship. This aspect might be called odium Dei, a phenomenon that finds its fullest expression in Son's statement to Father just before Son ascends The Chariot of Paternal Deitie to overwhelm rebel angels in book 6 of Paradise Lost. Responding to his Father's directive to Pursue these sons of Darkness, drive them out / From all Heav'ns bounds into utter Deep (715-16), Son says, whom thou hat'st, I hate, and can put on / Thy terrors, as I put thy mildness on, / Image of thee in all (734-36). As this response suggests, it is not only through an encounter with Satan that Adam and Eve come to discover things to thir thought / So unimaginable as hate in Heav'n (7.53-54). One must likewise acknowledge that this discovery includes an encounter with a Being who is customarily

Empathy and sympathy as tactile encounter.

Empathy and sympathy are feeling-acts which bring the self into direct encounter with other persons. In empathy a self grasps the affective act of another self; in sympathy xn persons apprehend a common object while immersed in similar feeling acts. Since touch is the paradigmatic sense for bringing what is felt into proximity with feeling, structural affinities between touch and these feeling acts can be shown. This relationship has been obscured by classical theories of touch in which it is interpreted on analogy with the other senses. When the subject of touch is seen as the living body in a whole, the full range of its possible relationships to affective states can be explored. In this connection the theories of touch of Aristotle, Berkeley and Condillac are critically evaluated. While none recognizes the uniqueness of touch, each sees difficulties in incorporating touch in a general theory of sense. In the course of the exposition pity is distinguished from empathy and sympathy and a criticism of Nietzsche's ressentiment theory offered.