On June 9, 1832, in the aftermath of the Polish Revolution of 1830, Pope Gregory XVI addressed the brief Cum primum to the bishops of Russian Poland, reminding them of their duty to obey legitimate authority and to instruct the faithful in that obedience! The brief was among the most controversial acts of the nineteenth-century Papacy. It stirred up a firestorm of criticism, not only from the Poles, but from both liberal and Catholic opinion in western Europe, as well as later historians. This paper will examine the motives that led Gregory first to issue the brief and then gradually to retreat from it, with a particular focus on the role of the Austrian chancellor, Prince Metternich. The prime mover behind the brief was Tsar Nicholas I, for very good reasons. In 1772-1795, Poland had disappeared from the map, partitioned among Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The Poles, bitterly resentful, had welcomed Napoleon, who in 1807 won their loyalty by creating a Duchy of Warsaw in a small part of the former Kingdom of Poland. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Tsar Alexander I obtained most of the Duchy; but in hopes of placating Polish opinion, he had given it a separate status as the Kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland) with himself as king. The experiment failed to satisfy the Poles while arousing the hostility of the Russians, and after Nicholas I became Tsar in 1825, he set about restricting the rights and special status of the Kingdom. He thereby provoked the Polish Revolution of November, 1830, put down only with difficulty. Among the reasons for the strength of the revolution was the strong support given it by the Polish clergy. It seemed obvious to Nicholas that the best way to end the clergy's support for the Polish cause would be a Papal directive to them to obey his legitimate authority; such a declaration would also be discouraging for the Poles in general. Nicholas made his first move immediately after Gregory XVI's election in February, 1831, ordering his minister at Rome, Prince Gregori Ivanovich Gagarin, to complain of the aid that Polish clergy were giving the rebels and asking him to remind them that they had no right to interfere in political matters, much less aid revolt against legitimate authority.' The request put the Pope in a difficult position. He could see reasons to agree, even aside from the normal Papal wish not to offend a powerful ruler whose anger could do great harm to the Church. He already knew of the part that the clergy were playing in the revolt, which offended his deep conviction that the Church should not become involved in political affairs, as well as his dislike of revolution, now being reinforced by the outbreak of revolt in the Papal States; he knew too that many of the Polish leaders were anticlericals whose revolt was inspired by liberal ideals rather than religious devotion.' At the same time, he was not without sympathy for the Poles and was well aware of the Tsar's persecution of Catholicism. In the end, he decided on a limited compliance: a brief, Impensa caritas, to the Polish bishops admonishing them in general terms to remember that they are ministers of the God of peace and should not take part in secular affairs, except to counsel the faithful to submit to lawful authority:'4 Limited to such platitudes, the brief is such as not to compromise us, the Secretary of State declared with satisfaction.5 However, for that very reason, the brief was too mild to satisfy the Tsar, who never published it.6 Meanwhile, the Poles too had begun to seek Papal support. In June a Polish emissary, Count Sebastian Badeni, arrived in Rome to ask the Papacy to persuade the Powers to hold a conference to discuss Polish independence. The Pope felt that compliance would take him too far away from his spiritual realm into the political. However, he decided that a second request, to urge Austria to use its influence to bring about a peaceful settlement, was in keeping with his spiritual character, especially since it was a question of the Poles,so praiseworthy for their fervent Catholicism, and since he had already addressed their bishops on the duties of obedience to a legitimate sovereign even if schismatic: Metternich, however, had no wish to embroil himself with the Tsar, whose alliance was vital to Austria, for the sake of a revolution whose victory would have been a major blow to the conservative order and a threat to Austria's position in Galicia. …
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