Palestinian Leadership Research Articles

The Wadi al-Hawarith affair (Emek Hefer): disputed land and the struggle for ownership: 1929–33

ABSTRACTThe Wadi al-Hawarith (Emek Hefer) affair was considered to be one of the prominent land disputes between Jews and Arabs in Palestine during the British mandate period. The region in which the dispute broke out was found south of Hadera in Emek Hefer.The purchase of lands of Wadi al-Hawarith, by Jewish bodies, had already started at the end of the nineteenth century and continued for four decades, and during this there were disputes between the Jews and Arabs, which were accompanied by legal hearings.The Jewish National Fund tried to reach an arrangement by means of compensation for the Bedouin tenants who dwelled on the lands of the valley, in exchange for their willingness to leave the territory. From time to time, the Bedouins agreed to this, but they went back on their agreement.Despite the effort to reach compensation arrangements with the Bedouins, the Palestinian political leadership was interested in inflaming the opposition of the Bedouins to leaving the land. This is what caused a long string of trials, which continued for many years.

On Political Islam in Palestine

Abstract: This article deals with analyzing the place and the political Islam occupies on the Palestinian territories. The author tries to prove that despite the “Arab spring” and growing popularity of Islamism in the neighbor Arab countries its popular support among Palestinians is low. The main reason for this is Israeli total control of political, economic and - partially - social processes taking place in the West Bank. Position of the officials in Ramallah who together with Tel-Aviv strictly contain spread of Islamism throughout the West Bank also has a strong suppressing effect. Central Palestinian leadership may be called one of the few secular political establishments that are still in power in the Arab countries. The main explanation for this is the desire to make a positive effect on the international community, which Palestine totally depends on in political and financial terms. Also one should keep in mind secular beliefs of the current political elite in Palestine. President Mahmoud Abbas with his counterparts from FATAH and PLO represent old type of Arab nationalist politicians, almost all of who were stripped from power after the beginning of “Arab spring” in 2011. Finally, Palestinian society itself still feels united by the idea of national liberation from the Israeli occupation. This helps Palestinians to put aside the issue of religious self-identification. According to the surveys, most of Palestinians still rank their national identity number while describing their identity, while religion comes only second (despite the strong stable tendency for growing Islamization of their views). The only Palestinian enclave where political Islam has gained ground is isolated Gaza Strip. However ruling there “Islamic Resistance Movement” (HAMAS), despite declared anti-Zionism and Islamism, in reality show pragmatic readiness for certain coordination of its actions with Israel and central government in Ramallah. Nowadays one can witness the deepening conflict within the Islamist camp - between HAMAS and more radical Salafists, who support “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria. In the final end the fate of Political Islam in Palestine will depend on the success of Middle East peace process.

Lost in the Chaos: The Palestinian Leadership Crisis

The latest upsurge in Palestinian-Israeli violence has raised familiar questions about the possibility of a “third Intifada,” or Palestinian uprising against the Israeli military occupation. Often ...

Repenting for What Israel Did to Gaza—Without Condoning the Wrongs Committed by Hamas

Repenting for What Israel Did to Gaza—Without Condoning the Wrongs Committed by Hamas

Palestine’s Membership in the Commonwealth as a Contribution to a Lasting Peace in the Middle East

With the re-election of Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu for another four-year term as prime minister of Israel there is a real danger that the peace process has reached an irrevocable impasse. It is argued that bold moves must be considered by the international community to breathe life back into the peace process. To coax Netanyahu into negotiations real pressure must be brought to bear on his government to respect the international consensus on Palestinian statehood and to halt settlement activity in occupied territory. To coax the Palestinian leadership back into a negotiation process with Israel, membership in the Commonwealth should be considered as a stepping stone to membership in the United Nations, to be followed by Israel’s membership in the Commonwealth—but on condition that Israel agrees to abide by international law, and respect the international consensus on the two-state solution, completely freeze settlement activity, including in East Jerusalem, and on condition that Palestine agrees to enter into final status negotiations with Israel to conclude a peace treaty to resolve all remaining disputes.

Belief in the malleability of groups strengthens the tenuous link between a collective apology and intergroup forgiveness.

Although it is widely assumed that collective apologies for intergroup harms facilitate forgiveness, evidence for a strong link between the two remains elusive. In four studies we tested the proposition that the apology-forgiveness link exists, but only among people who hold an implicit belief that groups can change. In Studies 1 and 2, perceived group malleability (measured and manipulated, respectively) moderated the responses to an apology by Palestinian leadership toward Israelis: Positive responses such as forgiveness increased with greater belief in group malleability. In Study 3, university students who believed in group malleability were more forgiving of a rival university's derogatory comments in the presence (as opposed to the absence) of an apology. In Study 4, perceived perpetrator group remorse mediated the moderating effect of group malleability on the apology-forgiveness link (assessed in the context of a corporate transgression). Implications for collective apologies and movement toward reconciliation are discussed.

Moshe Shertok and the Arab Problem: First Steps, 1931–1933

Moshe Shertok’s nomination in 1931 as secretary of the Political Department and head of its Arab Bureau earmarked him as the Zionist movement’s leading figure in regard to the Arab subject. Shertok built the primary political foundations for the relationships established between the Zionist movement and Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan. He laid the groundwork for the Yishuv’s intelligence system in the field of running agents and informers. During this period, up to his nomination as head of the Political Department in 1933, Shertok formulated the Yishuv’s Arab strategy. He soon became aware that the Mufti’s growing power and the rise of the Istiklal party would necessitate that the Yishuv manage the conflict in light of the fact that there was no Palestinian leadership with which any agreement could be reached.

The Implications of Joining the ICC after Operation Protective Edge

Since the summer 2014 Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip, the calls have grown louder for Palestine to ratify the Rome Statute and join the International Criminal Court (ICC). Palestinian factions across the political spectrum have indicated that they would support such a move. But in spite of gaining the status of an observer-state at the United Nations, Palestine has yet to join the ICC. While acceding to the Rome Statute and filing the application to the ICC is a relatively straightforward process, there are numerous risk factors involved. This article investigates a variety of possible scenarios and their likely outcomes, including the legal mechanisms necessary for acceding to the Rome Statute, and alternative measures that the Palestinian leadership might envisage.

Between Myth and Reality: The Palestinian Political Elite and the Two-State Solution

Although the two-state solution originated as a concession to preponderant political realities (specifically Israeli military superiority and international political pressures), it has subsequently become detached from any semblance of reality. While the two-state framework remains an article of faith for the Palestinian leadership, the day-to-day existence of West Bank Palestinians approximates more closely with an apartheid (one-state) reality. In interrogating this Janus-faced construction, the subsequent article seeks to establish whether the peace process should be re-interpreted as a manifestation of deeper divides and splits within the Palestinian body politic

The Poets of Marj al-Zuhur: Poetry as the Psychological, Political, and Ideological Weapon of the Hamas Members Deported to Lebanon in 1992

In December 1992, after the kidnapping and murder of a policeman, Israel deported 415 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Lebanon. Most were affiliated with the Hamas political apparatus and had not been involved in terrorism. The deportees decided to stay together and set up a camp in Marj al-Zuhur in southern Lebanon. Here they engaged in study and various cultural pursuits—including poetry writing. Roughly a dozen of the deportees wrote poetry. The poems were read aloud at gatherings in the camp and published in the Arab press. Their main function was to raise the residents’ spirits and keep their plight in the public eye. They incorporate the expected political messages: anger at Israel and criticism of the international community, the Palestinian leadership, and the Arab states, which were prodded to work harder for the deportees’ return. The poetry was part of a successful media and information campaign, which annoyed Israel so much that it allowed all the deportees to return home by December 1993. Some of the poems were later published and helped cultivate the myth of the Marj al-Zuhur deportation, which Hamas viewed as a victory and symbol of steadfast resistance to Israel.

Art of War, Art of Resistance: Palestinian Counter-Cartography on Google Earth

Rarely discussed about the Israel–Palestinian conflict is the antagonism that exists between the Palestinian leadership and the refugees. With the advent of the Oslo “peace process” in the 1990s, the antagonism began to escalate, for the process's key assumption became that the leadership would relinquish the refugees' right to return home so that Israel would be preserved as a majority Jewish state in exchange for the Palestinian leadership's sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Because the refugees’ return home would upset the demographic balance of a Jewish-majority state, they have become impossible figures for both Israel and for the Palestinian leadership's political frame, an “impossibility” that is taken for granted in dominant maps of Palestine/Israel. This article highlights some ways the refugees have refused this erasure by mapping onto the land their historical presence. Taking their use of Google Earth as a case study, it begins by providing background on Google Earth, situating the software's prehistory within Cold War battles for surveillance and control. It then points to some “cracks” Google Earth's introduction has presented the post–Cold War political scene with: namely, that nation-states are today stumbling to control with whom maps are shared, who can make them, and what they will look like. It then moves on to show how the refugees have taken advantage of the State of Israel's (as well as the Palestinian leadership's) inability to control the map, in the process rendering the geoweb a new battlefield in the conflict. I conclude with an analysis of how cartographically placing Israel's founding and perpetual violence at the fore, as the Palestinian refugees' counter-cartography does, can help to move forward the refugees' demands for justice. Key Words: counter-cartography, geoweb, Google, Palestine, qualitative GIS, social movements.

Is Unilateralism Always Bad? Negotiation Lessons from Israel's “Unilateral” Gaza Withdrawal

Using the 2005 unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a case study, this article exposes an apparent paradox: circumstances may exist in which an outcome that serves the interests of parties to a conflict cannot be achieved through bilateral negotiation but can be achieved by unilateral action. Although the withdrawal was seen at the time as serving the interests of both the Israeli government and the Palestinians, we argue that the same result could not have been achieved through bilateral negotiations. “Behind‐the‐table” internal conflicts on each side would have made it impossible for the leaders to agree on the scope of these negotiations.Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's success in implementing his Gaza withdrawal was attributable in significant measure to his ability to maintain ambiguity about his long‐run plans for the West Bank. Only by focusing attention on Gaza was he able to build the necessary coalition to implement the controversial move. The Palestinian leaders, on the other hand, could never have agreed to come to the table to negotiate about Gaza alone — they would have insisted that the scope of any negotiations address a broad range of final status issues.In this article, we identify some of the lessons that the Gaza example teaches regarding the utility and limits of unilateralism as well as the benefits and potential costs of employing ambiguity as a strategy to help accomplish a controversial move. Finally, we also explore the aftermath of the withdrawal and its many missed opportunities for improving the outcome. We suggest that, even when acting unilaterally, leaders should carefully consider the probable impact of their actions on the internal conflicts of their adversaries.

Palestinian legislation and the freedom of movement: an appraisal in light of international human rights law

In a highly political context, this paper looks at the freedom of movement as a technical matter in Palestine. The objective of the paper is to support the efforts of the Palestinian legislator with regard to reforming the existing system in light of international human rights standards within the limits and the restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation. The paper comes at the time in which the Palestinian leadership is approaching the UN for Palestine’s membership in the organisation as a state. It may be viewed as a reminder on the obligations that would face this state after its admission to the UN and upon becoming party to international treaties.

What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process

Increasingly, scholars are applying Social Movement Theory to explore how radical Islamist groups strategically employ framing to legitimize the use of violence. What has not been explicitly examined, however, is under what conditions radical frames are more resonant with the public than more moderate alternatives. This article argues that the strength of a particular frame depends on the credibility of the competing claim-makers. Drawing on public opinion polls from the Palestinian Territories, the article shows that the resonance of Hamas’ frames vis-à-vis the peace process between 1993 and 2006 depended on the ability of the Palestinian leadership to maintain its legitimacy. Since the Gaza take-over and Hamas’ shift to a position of leadership rather than opposition party, the organization's inability to deliver in the economic realm or to even feign any progress regarding the peace process damaged its credibility and reputation. Accordingly, its frames vis-à-vis the peace process also started losing their resonance with the public. An understanding of the dynamics of credibility can also help explain the continued moves towards national reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.

The potential Impact of palestinian Nonviolent Struggle on Israel: preliminary Lessons and projections for the Future

This article assesses the potential impact that a massive, organized, and sustained nonviolent Palestinian resistance movement can have on Israeli society. Based on the recognition of the growing success of nonviolent strategies internationally, the subjective Israeli perceptions due to a Jewish collective memory of victimhood, and the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions through the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, we conclude that such an unprecedented strategy has a strong likelihood of yielding an independent Palestinian state alongside a state of Israel. The nonviolent revolts against the long-ruling dictators in North Africa and the Middle East have spread like wildfire early in the second decade of the 21st century. At this time, many Palestinians have been considering how best to translate the strategies of such a spontaneous movement to meet their own needs. Clearly, there are some differences between what is in most cases a regime change with the massive support of the population, and the particular case of an uprising against the formidable military control of an Israeli government that has a large majority conditioned to support the suppression of an enemy's revolt. A realistic analysis of Israeli reactions to potential sustained Palestinian leadership and massive nonviolent struggle could be shaped mostly by the impact of three variables: a) recognition of the growing success of nonviolent strategies in the international context; b) subjective Israeli perceptions based on collective memory of victimhood and persecution in Jewish history, and c) the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent actions throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly from the experiences of the first and second Intifada. In this article we briefly discuss a) and b) but are mainly focusing on c), a variable whose effect the Palestinians can still determine. In analyzing the latter, three key elements will be emphasized. First, Jewish-Is- raeli perceptions and stereotypes of past Palestinian resistance will be briefly discussed. Second, based on the lessons learned and opinions gathered, we assess the potential impact that nonviolent resistance can have on official and societal Israeli behavior. In the concluding section, looking into the future, we assess the likelihood that a nonviolent strategy will create an environment for an eventual sustainable resolution with a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish State of Israel. Means and ends have an important correlation. Moderation in Arab aims has occurred since the 19th Palestinian National Council in 1988, which established the Declaration of Independence recognizing the State of Israel in its pre-1967 borders. This moderation became regionalized with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Additionally, amid Palestinian reconciliation efforts, if Hamas genuinely joins the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) - at least implicitly agreeing to the Oslo Accords - there would be a larger Palestinian mandate to uphold a potential peace agreement with Israel. If such steps can be accompanied by a massive, long-term struggle legitimated by nonviolent means, then growing support at the international level and dissonance with unchanged (Israeli) official policy are likely to indirectly impact Israeli public opinion and strengthen the peace camp in Israel. This article builds on previous research conducted with colleagues from the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace (Hebrew University, Jerusalem) and Palestinian Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND, Jerusalem) between 2002-2004.1 It draws on an analysis of the Israeli reactions to the first and second Intifadas, including public opinion polls; content analysis of the media and coverage of specific events; interviews with activists from nonviolent grassroot organizations; focus groups (academics, media, students); and the personal experience of one of the authors, having been actively involved with this issue since the mid-1980s. …

Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Haram al-Sharif: A Pan-Islamic or Palestinian Nationalist Cause?

The World Islamic Conference, held in Jerusalem in 1931 under the auspices of Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Supreme Muslim Council, marked a turning point in the Palestinian nationalist struggle as well as in the struggle between the two main factions—the more extremist one led by Hajj Amin and the more moderate Opposition—for control of the Palestinian leadership. The Conference, though co-sponsored by Shawkat ‘Ali and the Muslim Indian Congress, and ostensibly representative of the worldwide community of Muslims, was effectively dominated by Hajj Amin and his Palestinian supporters. Through his control of its proceedings, Hajj Amin was able to redefine the Palestinian nationalist cause as essentially a pan-Islamic one, in connection with the perceived need to defend the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem against Zionist encroachment. Contrasted here with the World Islamic Conference (and held concurrently with it) is the Second Arab Orthodox Congress. Whereas the World Islamic Conference sought to redefine an issue arguably specific to Palestine as pan-Islamic, the local Christian Orthodox community, in keeping with its desire to Arabise Palestine's Greek Orthodox Church (hence their self-designation as the Arab Orthodox Church in Palestine), sought to redefine what was essentially a religious matter—concerning the succession of the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem—in nationalist terms. It was not simply a matter of differing ideological perspectives; defining the cause of the Haram al-Sharif as a pan-Islamic one also served a political objective, namely the enhancement of Hajj Amin's position vis-à-vis his political rivals. Nonetheless, whatever the motivations involved, this development was a factor in the marginalisation of the Christian Arab component of the Palestinian nationalist movement. Whereas at the start of the British Mandate they had played a role disproportionately large relative to their actual numbers, by its end, their role in the nationalist movement had diminished almost to the point of near inconsequence, as evidenced, for instance, by their marginal involvement in the Arab Revolt (1936–1939).

Two States or Not Two States? Leadership and Peace Making in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

The debate around the viability of the so-called ‘Two-State Solution’ and the perspective of an alternative ‘One-State Solution’ began to attract renewed the attention after the collapse of the Oslo process. We suggest that instead of debating the viability of rival constitutional schemes, a more fruitful approach to the issue of peace making in Israel/Palestine should focus on the structural elements of the picture more than on future possible outcomes of the diplomatic process. This article focuses on the role of the two leaderships by analysing their historical background, discourses and policies in order to understand to what extent the debate on the TSS/OSS dichotomy reveals the hidden logic of the alternatives. Our aim is to describe the ‘primordial soup’ that enables discussion and decisions with respect to the different scenarios addressed by the debate. We conclude that the TSS/OSS alternative hardly identifies meaningful coalitions for peace making and the attainment of either of the two solutions seems to be unlikely without a dramatic change the very identity of Palestinian and Israeli leadership; the rhetoric about the ‘missed opportunities’ of negotiation contributes instead to obscure the resilience of the status quo.

American Jews and Israel

Israel, for me, fills that hole. And even though I don't live there for a myriad of reasons that even I can't fully explain, I travel there as often as possible, and may yet live there, at least part time. I am entwined with the politics of Israel—advocating for it to normalize and live with a viable Palestine by its side. I feed off of its culture, its smells, and the rhythms of its craziness more than I do those of my homeland, America. It is my home away from home, but it is also my home, the place where I feel a deep sense of connection even in the midst of a jumble of its own contradictions and my own, too. Were I to lose that "home," the place for which I fight and keep my Jewish soul, I would finally be homeless. And, there is a chance that could happen—if Israel doesn't forgo its pyrrhic hold on the West Bank and its unwillingness to negotiate with what I believe to be true partners, the current Palestinian leadership. That's because this home for me isn't simply about nefesh, or about the smell of the sea lapping onto the Tel Aviv beach. It is also about politics and justice, that worn-out description of Israel as a "light unto the nations."

The Role of the External Factors in Constituting the Palestinian Elite in the Late Ottoman Empire (the 19th Century) and During the Mandate

This study tackles the issue of the Palestinian leaders and elite over two connected periods: the 19th century (the late Ottoman period), and the British mandate period. The study comes under the historical analytical studies that seeks to analyze and explain the historical events. It seeks to answer the following question: to what extent did the external factors contribute and affect the formation and the emergence of the Palestinian elite in the late ottoman period and during the British mandate period? The study is based on a hypothesis says that the political, social and economical transformations which the Palestinian community exposed to in the turn of the 19th century, came under the impact of the external factors and interventions, which highly affected the formation and the emergence of the Palestinian elite.

Repatriating Palestinian Patrimony: An Overview of Palestinian Preparations for Negotiations on Archaeology

This paper aims to shed some light on an often guarded and confidential subject matter: archaeology as it relates to permanent status negotiations between Israel and Palestine. During the Oslo negotiations, much of the discussion focused on political parameters while little discussion and preparation was done at the technical level. Since Oslo, the Palestinian side has formed a technical unit known as the Negotiations Support Unit (NSU) to assist the Palestinian leadership. There are several files that are continuously being prepared and advanced for the negotiations, one of which is the Archaeology file. تهدف هذه المقالة إلى إلقاء بعض الضوء على مواضيع رسمية تتصف بالسرية في كثير من الأحيان, وعلم الآثار من حيث صلته بالمفاوضات الدئمة بين اسرائيل وفلسطين. خلال مفاوضات أوسلو ، فإن الكثير من النقاشات ركزت على الثوابت السياسية في حين كان النقاش والتحضير على الصعيد التقني قليل جداً. منذ أوسلو, شكل الجانب الفلسطيني وحدة تقنية تعرف باسم (وحدة دعم المفاوضات ) لمساعدة القيادات الفلسطينية , وهناك العديد من الملفات التي يتم اعدادها بشكل مستمر لتقديمها للمفاوضات ,ومن بينها ملف الاثار