Radioactive Material Packages Research Articles

Assessing the Results of Receipt Monitoring Programs for Packages Containing Radioactive Materials

To assess the results of radioactive material package monitoring programs on a nationwide scale during calendar year 1997, a novel computer-based survey was conducted. A total of 49 respondents from a breadth of industry settings participated in the survey, reporting information on the receipt of 90,599 packages. The number of packages reported as exhibiting radiation levels in excess of those stated on the shipping container was 2,819, or 3% of the total. The number reported as exhibiting removable contamination levels in excess of permitted limits was 532, or 0.6% of the total. Other descriptive data regarding the actual package receipt procedures employed and the types of packages encountered were also assembled. The results of the survey serve to validate the impressive safety record associated with the transport of radioactive materials and suggests that both package recipients and the national regulatory authorities would benefit from a reassessment of the package receipt processes and regulations currently in place. The novel method in which the survey was actually conducted also served as an informative experience, and the description of the lessons learned will be of assistance to others wishing to utilize this survey modality.

ANSI Standards Development for the Packaging and Transport of Radioactive Materials

This brief note describes the history of the development of a number of ANSI Standards devoted to the packaging and transport of radioactive materials.

Crush Loadings to Radioactive Material Transport Packages During Ship Collisions

Accident-resistant Type B packages are used to transport radioactive materials such as spent fuel and vitrified high level waste in all surface modes, in accordance with national and international regulations. As with other modes, a sea-goingconveyance (vessel) carrying radioactive material (RAM) may be involved in a collision accident. If the vessel is struck byanother commercial vessel with sufficient tonnage and velocity, the RAM package may be impacted by the penetrating bow ofthe striking ship. The impact on the RAM package by the bow is less damaging to the package than the regulatory 9 m droptest. This is because the velocity is always lower and the bow always less rigid than the essentially unyielding target requiredfor the drop test. Thus, the only remaining mechanism for gross damage to the package is crush loading. For the package to becrushed, forces must act on two opposing sides. In this paper, the bow of the impacting ship is assumed to be able to impartan infinite force to one side of the package. The opposing force is supplied by the hull of the struck ship on the side away fromthe collision. Resistance of this hull to penetration by the package determines the maximum magnitude of the crush force. Workdescribed in this paper is aimed at determining an upper bound for this force.

Experimental Measurement of Shipboard Fire Environments for Simulated Radioactive Material Packages on a Break-Bulk Freighter

Typical accidental fire exposure conditions for radioactive material packages on cargo ships have been measuredwith the use of pipe calorimeters and other instrumentation. The experiments, conducted aboard an actual break-bulk cargo ship,simulate conditions for both fires in adjacent ship holds and for cargo fires in the same hold with the hazardous cargo. Followinga description of the experimental arrangement, typical results are presented, and then compared with results from computationalfluid dynamics simulations. Comparisons between the shipboard fire environment and land based fires are discussed, and conclusionsregarding shipboard fires and their simulation are drawn.

IAEA Transport Regulations—what has Changed in 40 years

AbstractThe IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials were first published in 1961. It was stated in the foreword of the first edition that the transport of increasing amounts of radioactive materials posed technical problems because of the hazards involved and it also stated that the procedures to be complied with should not be too complex and should apply to any mode of transport. The requirements for the packaging of radioactive materials for transport were expressed in terms of provisions and were described in general qualitative terms. Satisfying these requirements would provide safety for the transport of radioactive materials. Since 1961 the regulations have been revised on a number of occasions in order to add clarity and provide detail to the various requirements. These revisions have added a greater complexity to the provisions but the underlying principles used to provide for safe transport are still the fundamental bases for the regulations. This paper looks at some key ...

Complex Tests of Transport Packagings for Nuclear Fissile Materials

AbstractThe Russian regulation system and the test methods and facilities used for radioactive material package testing are described.

The Radioactive Materials Packaging Handbook: an overview

Abstract The Radioactive Materials Packaging Handbook provides information on the design, operation, and maintenance of shipping packages. The 500-page document was published in June 1998 and will serve as a replacement for the Cask Designers Guide. The Handbook, written by experts in their particular fields, is a compilation of technical chapters that address the design aspects of a package intended for transporting radioactive material in normal commerce; it was prepared under the direction of M. E. Wangler of the US Department of Energy (DOE) and provides a wealth of technical guidance that gives designers a better understanding of the regulatory approval process, preferences of regulators on specific aspects of package design, and the types of analyses to be considered when designing a package to carry radioactive materials. Even though the Handbook is concerned with both small and large packagings, most of the emphasis is placed on large packagings that are capable of transporting fissile, radioactiv...

Accident with Packages for RAM on a German Autobahn

This brief note describes a car accident in which three packages for radioactive materials were involved.

A Survey of Codes and Standards in the USA Relevant to the Prevention of Brittle Fracture in Cask Containment Boundaries

The use of non-austenitic materials in cask containment boundaries requires consideration of the potential for brittle fracture under severe loading conditions. In the USA, such guidance for service conditions which containment boundaries must withstand is provided in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, ‘Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material’, paragraph 71.73, ‘Hypothetical accident conditions’. The hypothetical accident conditions include a ‘free drop’ of the package at a temperature of −29°C, ‘…onto a flat, essentially unyielding, horizontal surface…’ from a height of 9 m. Such an event could potentially result in brittle fracture of a non-austenitic material containment boundary. Nevertheless, motivation exists for utilising ferritic materials or titanium alloys for containment applications. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 7.6, ‘Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels’, specifically excludes consideration of brittle fracture in its design criteria. Regulatory Guides 7.11 and 7.12, ‘Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment With a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inches (0.1 m)’, and ‘Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment With a Wall Thickness Greater Than 4 Inches (0.1 m) But Not Exceeding 12 Inches (0.3 m)’, respectively, provide highly conservative criteria for selection of ferritic steel for containment based upon empirical correlations and materials tests suitable only for ferritic steels. Brittle fracture prevention criteria for cask containment based upon fracture mechanics principles remain non-codified in the USA. Methodologies for brittle fracture prevention routinely used in industry have yet to be implemented for cask design due to regulatory reticence. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (AS ME) has provided models for brittle fracture prevention in Section III (‘Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components’) Appendix G (‘Protection Against Nonductile Failure’), and Section XI (‘Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components’) Appendix A (‘Analysis of Flaws’), of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The ASME Subgroup on Containment Systems for Spent Fuel and High Level Waste Transport Packagings (NUPACK) has specifically addressed the issue of developing brittle fracture criteria for packages based upon fracture mechanics methodologies in the existing ASME Code but, to date, without resolution. This paper provides a detailed discussion of existing brittle fracture criteria in the USA and a status of new standards development.

The nuclear fuel cycle: radioactive materials packaging and transportation

The types of packaging used for transporting nuclear materials by different means are described. Some operational problems encountered are discussed and the means of solving them are outlined.

The 10th International Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials (PATRAM'92)

The 10th International Symposium on the Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials (PATRAM'92)

Plutonium Transport: Past, Present and Future

The transport of radioactive materials dates back to the beginning of the nuclear industry. The development of nuclear plants and the international trade in fuel cycle services has led to a transport infrastructure to service the industry. Advances in radioactive material package design and technology have been led by increasing emphasis on safety assurance and compliance with transport regulations which in many cases exceed those applied to other dangerous goods. In the case of certain materials security during transport has equal emphasis with safety, and plutoniwn. in its many forms, attracts the most onerous security requirements during transport. BNFL has safely and efficiently transported plutonium both nationally and internationally for 30 years. The Company is committed to the continuation of maintaining such transports in a safe, secure and cost effective manner.

Radioactive Material Package Seal Tests

General design or test performance requirements for radioactive materials (RAM) packages are specified in Title 10 of the US Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1983). The requirements for Type B packages provide a broad range of environments under which the system must contain the RAM without posing a threat to health or property. Seals that provide the containment system interface between the packaging body and the closure must function in both high- and low-temperature environments under dynamic and static conditions. A seal technology program, jointly funded by the US Department of Energy Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM) and the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), was initiated at Sandia National Laboratories. Experiments were performed in this program to characterize the behavior of several static seal materials at low temperatures. Helium leak tests on face seals were used to compare the materials. Materials tested include butyl, neoprene, ethylene propylene, fluorosilicone, silicone, Eypel, Kalrez, Teflon, fluorocarbon, and Teflon/silicone composites. Because most elastomer O-ring applications are for hydraulic systems, manufacturer low-temperature ratings are based on methods that simulate this use. The seal materials tested in this program with a fixture similar to a RAM cask closure, with the exception of silicone S613-60, are not leak tight (1.0 {times} 10{sup {minus}7} std cm{sup 3}/s) at manufacturer low-temperature ratings. 8 refs., 3 figs., 1 tab.

Test Facilities for Radioactive Material Transport Packages (AEA Technology, Winfrith, UK)

Transport packages for radioactive materials are tested to demonstrate compliance with national and international regulations. The involvement of AEA Technology is traced from the establishment of the early IAEA Regulations. Transport package design, testing, assessment and approval requires a wide variety of skills and facilities. The comprehensive capability of AEA Technology in these areas is described with references to practical experience in the form of a short bibliography. The facilities described include drop-test cranes and targets (up to 700te); air guns for impacts up to sonic velocities; pool fires, furnaces and rigs for thermal tests including heat dissipation on prototype flasks; shielding facilities and instruments; criticality simulations and leak test instruments. These are illustrated with photographs demonstrating the comprehensive nature of package testing services supplied to customers.

Test Facilities for Radioactive Materials Transport Packages (Sandia National Laboratories, USA)

AbstractCompliance with regulatory requirements for normal conditions and hypothetical accident environments can be demonstrated by testing packages developed to transport radioactive material. A comprehensive testing capability has been developed at Sandia National Laboratories to simulate the required test conditions and provide response data. Several of the major facilities available to support testing of radioactive material packages are described.

Safety Testing and Evaluation of Radioactive Material Transport Packages

These tests adopt the packaging test programme of the IAEA's Type A packaging standard, including the water spray, free drop, puncture and stacking tests. The results of the tests on radioactive material packages under normal transport conditions show that the most frequent damage is indentation occurring at a rate of 36.7%. Splitting the outer shell is second at 6.6%, punctures occur at 4.3%, while the least frequent is deformation and breakage of the outer packaging. The total damage rate is 49.4%. The most serious cause of damage is perforation, causing 40% of cases. At the same time an on-the-spot investigation was made into the in-service damage occurrences. This showed that de-hooping of package casks was as high as 1.7% and the occurrence of splitting was 0.4%. There are few cases of holing and breaking. The total in-service damage rate was 2.2%.

Understanding Transport and Packaging Regulations — CARR can help

AbstractAbstractAs world-wide nuclear facilities continue to grow, the volume of movements between facilities, and the variety of physical forms, sizes, and activity levels, also continue to increase. With this growth there is a need for a better understanding of the regulations relating to the packaging and transport of radioactive materials, the categories and characteristics of the various groups of material, the types of package, and the responsibilities of Consignors and Competent Authorities. Interpretation of the regulations can be a long and involved task. Croft Associates, with the approval of the IAEA, have developed and marketed a search and find software package (Croft Associates Regulations Referencer — CARR) to enable users to locate quickly those parts of the regulations relating to a specific topic defined by the user.

A Medical Cyclotron, Facilities and Program at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

A new Cancer Therapy Institute at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia became fully operational in November 1982. The new building incorporates extensive facilities for the production of medically useful radionuclides and additional cancer treatment capability including two neutron therapy machines and an electron linear accelerator. A model CS30 medical cyclotron with 7 beam lines was supplied by The Cyclotron Corporation, Berkeley, California. The hot laboratory facilities include five hot cells and a radioactive gas processing station to deliver short-lived radioactive gases to a station in the positron emission tomography (PET) camera room. Facilities for radiopharmaceutical processing, quality control and packaging of radioactive materials are provided. A PDP 11/70 computer controls a fully automated air monitoring system while other computers control permission to operate equipment and monitor status of shielding doors and radiation levels both inside and outside the shielded rooms. A high level gamma irradiation facility for medical sterilization and other uses, designed to hold up to 2 million Curies of cobalt-60 is also provided. The new facility will produce short lived radionuclides for hospitals and other institutions in the Kingdom and the nearby area while also providing an opportunity to investigate the effectiveness of high energy neutrons in cancer treatment.

Portable radioactivity monitor for liquid effluents, surface contaminations, and bulk solid wastes

A versatile monitoring system is described which allows the nondestructive analysis of batch liquid samples, surface contaminations, and bulk waste packages for radioactive materials. The system uses the simplicity and extremely high sensitivity of NaI-based gamma-ray spectroscopy. As an example of the instrument's versatility, the simultaneous measurement of 235U, 238U, and thorium in liquids at sub-MPC (maximum permissible concentration) levels is described in detail. As a further demonstration of the system's capabilities, the assay of solid transuranic wastes at 10 nCi/g levels is discussed.