Pacific Tuna Fishery Research Articles

Sustainable natural resource use and economic development in small states: the tuna fisheries in Fiji and Samoa

AbstractThis paper is concerned with the sustainable management of the Western Pacific tuna fishery given its critical contribution to the economies of many small island developing states in the region. The paper focuses on contrasting the operation, regulation and management of the tuna fisheries in two Pacific island states, Fiji and Samoa, in the light of progress in regional fishery co‐operation, and is based upon research undertaken in 2003. The analysis identifies critical shortcomings in implementation and enforcement of sustainable management policies in Fiji, which compare unfavourably with Samoa's attempts to ensure the long‐term sustainability of a crucial economic sector. The principal differences in the effectiveness of these policies can be ascribed to the quality of governance as well as the general coherence of national economic policies. The paper attempts to highlight some of the problems faced by small developing states in ensuring the long‐term sustainability of an important migratory marine resource. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

The catch in trading fishing access for foreign aid

Abstract The Pacific island countries depend heavily on bilateral aid. Much of this aid is provided by distant water fishing nations in exchange for cheap access to the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery. Japan access fees (approximately US $8 million) are comparable to about 5% of Japanese aid to the region (approximately US $150 million). If access fees were maximised, there is potential for the access fees to match, possibly double, total Japanese aid to the region. It is argued that aid dependency is decreasing the transparency of fishing treaties, decreasing the flexibility of government spending, exposing the Pacific island countries to large financial risks associated with possible aid withdrawal, and stifling the region's own efforts for fisheries, and broader economic, development.

Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: Management and Cooperation in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries

The tuna resources of the Western and Central Pacific are the world's largest and most valuable fisheries of their type and are of significant economic importance to the Pacific island countries through whose waters they migrate. Two major concerns exist with the current governance of this fishery. First, Pacific island countries receive only a small share of the resource rents from the tuna fisheries. Second, the current management structure of the fisheries will not ensure the long-term sustainability of the resources. This paper derives a model to show that the sustainability of the resource can be improved when a single policymaker acts as Stackelberg leader and sets a tax, or an equivalent quantity instrument, to maximize rents from the resource. A practical institutional mechanism is presented that mimics the model's rent maximization outcome and that offers substantial benefits to both Pacific island countries and distant water fishing nations.

Multicriteria analysis of log-set strata closures to reduce the mexican tuna fishery incidental catch

Concordance analysis, a multicriteria technique, was used as a decision-making tool. To exemplify the use of this tool, five closure options were evaluated to decrease incidental catch of mahi-mahi or dolphin-fish, Coryphaena spp., by the Mexican eastern Pacific tuna fishery using log-sets. The options consist of combinations of spatial and temporal strata subject to closures, and were evaluated using four eco-biologic and techno-economic criteria. A set of solutions was generated using 286 parametric representations of the weights-vector due to the difficulty of knowing the real preferences of decision-makers. The option with the highest probability of being chosen (almost 0.6) closes three large areas throughout the year for log-sets. This option would reduce mahi-mahi incidental catch in just over 85%, and almost 92% that of other species. However, this option represents the highest cost in terms of lost gross revenues and leaves only eight strata open for the log-set fishery.

Establishing a regional fisheries management organisation for the Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries

On the 4th of September 2000 coastal States and fishing nations of the Western and Central Pacific adopted the “Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean” by a majority vote. It is the first agreement to be negotiated on the basis of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement following its adoption in 1995. This article analyses the process leading up to the adoption of the tuna convention in the Western and Central Pacific by applying regime theory. The formation of international regimes is generally understood to comprise of three stages; agenda formation, negotiation and operationalisation. The analysis tests the validity of hypotheses based on power, interests and cognitive factors in explaining the formation of the tuna convention for the Western and Central Pacific. It concludes that different theoretical approaches have relevance during the stages of regime formation.

Managing tuna fisheries: a new strategy for the Western and Central Pacific Ocean

The paper describes a bioeconomic model of the western and central Pacific tuna fisheries in which three main gear types exploit four main tuna species following migratory paths through the Exclusive Economic Zones of 12 Pacific Island nations. The results of the model suggest that the net value of the fisheries can be increased substantially by reducing the overall amount of fishing effort and altering the balance of effort towards gear types which exploit older age classes of fish.

Science arrangements for the regional management of tuna fisheries

Pacific, metropolitan and distant-water fishing nations are negotiating a regional regime for managing the western and central Pacific tuna fishery. The regime will require an arrangement that delivers high-quality scientific advice. But regional science arrangements have often developed without the benefit of planning and without close attention to management requirements. We use the western and central Pacific fishery to highlight the types of science functions and attributes required for effective regional fishery management. In establishing science arrangements, nations will need to balance national interests, such as participation in stock assessments, against the wider interests of resource management which requires unbiased scientific advice.

Maximizing Resource Rent From the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries

Rent generated by the tuna fisheries occurring in the waters of Pacific Islands Nations is estimated for various levels and combinations of purse-seine, pole-and-line, frozen tuna longline, and fresh tuna longline fishing effort, using a multi-species, multi-fleet bioeconomic model. The underlying population model integrates available information on the population dynamics of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye, and Southern albacore tunas in the Pacific Ocean. The economic model utilizes the most recent data on fishing effort costs for the purse seine, pole-and-line, and longline fleets operating in the western and central Pacific Ocean, along with recent estimates of prices by species, method of capture and market, and estimates of demand elasticities. The results of the model indicate that fishery rent could be increased substantially above the current level by decreasing the size of all fleets, with the possible exception of the tuna longline fleet. The results also suggest that the countries of the region co...

Modeling the spatial dynamics of the U.S. purse-seine fleet operating in the western Pacific tuna fishery

Two qualitative choice models of the location decisions of U.S. purse-seine vessels operating in a total of sixty-five 5° grids in the western Pacific tuna fishery are developed and compared. A nested logit model in which decisions are first made about where to fish in the east-west plane, followed by a choice of grid in the north-south plane, performs better than a nonnested model in which all grids are considered simultaneously. The nested model can be used for the allocation of purse-seine fishery effort in a spatially disaggregated bioeconomic model of the regional tuna fishery.

Modeling the spatial dynamics of the U.S. purse-seine fleet operating in the western Pacific tuna fishery

Modeling the spatial dynamics of the U.S. purse-seine fleet operating in the western Pacific tuna fishery

Management of the South Pacific tuna fishery

South Pacific tuna is worth some $US1.5 billion and the economic future of many Pacific islands is dependent upon the conservation of the region's tuna stocks. The entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994 and the Implementing Agreement of 1995 have focussed attention on the management of South Pacific tuna, as have regional economic trends. However, the deficiencies apparent in fisheries management systems elsewhere are likely to be exacerbated in the South Pacific. The article suggests that a practical alternative to the direct control of tuna catches, while other methods are being researched, is area closures. This system is already in place in some island countries and requires only limited financial resources to implement.

Resource rent rivalry in the western pacific tuna fishery: Cooperative and non-cooperative solutions

The ability of coastal states to extract economic benefit from the management of fish stocks within their Exclusive Economic Zones depends on the structure of the markets for fishing rights and fish products. The countries of the South Pacific Forum have some monopoly power in the allocation of tuna fishing rights, while the distant water fishing nations have some monopsony power in the market for fish products. These countries can exercise their market power in an attempt to maximize their individual economic benefits, or they can cooperate in exploiting the resource. This paper uses a Nash-Cournot model to show that cooperation will yield greater total benefits than non-cooperative exercise of market power.