GRACE AND FREEDOM IN THE SOTERIOLOGY OF JOHN WYCLIF By IAN CHRISTOPHER LEVY The popular portrayal of John Wyclif (d. 1384) is that of the inflexible reformer whose views of the Church were driven by a strict determinism that divided humanity into two eternally fixed categories of the predestined and the damned. In point of fact, however, Wyclif's understanding of salvation is quite nuanced and well worth careful study. It may be surprising to find that Wyclif's soteriology has not received a thoroughgoing analysis, one that would pull together the many facets involved in medieval conceptions of the salvific process. Instead, one finds some insightful, but abbreviated, analyses that tend to focus more on specific aspects, rather than offering a comprehensive view. The best sources are Lechler,1 Robson,2 and Kenny,1 all three of whom offer valuable appraisals. Actually, Lechler comes the closest to a broad view within his study of Wyclif, but well over a century has passed since it was first published. Needless to say, there has been an enormous amount of research done on late medieval thought since then, research that enables us to situate Wyclif more thoroughly within the discussions of his day. Even Robson's work is more than forty years old by now. And, while Kenny's treatment is comparatively recent at twenty years old, he tackles the subject only as part of a more strictly philosophical discussion of necessity and contingency. We will, of course, consider the views of each of these scholars in the course of this essay, the purpose of which is to offer a full appraisal of Wyclif's soteriology in its many facets. This means that we will first discuss the related questions of divine will and human freedom, and their impact upon his soteriology. Then we will examine his views on sin, grace, merit, justification, faith, and predestination, all within the larger medieval context. What we should find is that Wyclif's soteriology makes quite a lot of room for human free will even as he insists on the leading role of divine grace in all good works. Futhermore, Wyclif will emerge as a subtle thinker who most often presents a God who is at once just and merciful, extending grace and the possibility of salvation to all. Gotthard Lechler, John Wyclif and His English Precursors, trans. P. Lorimer (London, 1904), 288-314. 2 J. A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools (Cambridge, 1961), 196-217. 1 Anthony Kenny, Wyclif (Oxford, 1984), 31-41. 280traditio Divine Power and Human Freedom The Divine Will Here it may be helpful to begin with Hugh of Saint Victor, for much of what he says in the 1130s will be echoed by others in later centuries, and specifically by Wyclif. Hugh contends that nothing in God's kingdom may avoid his regulation. As it is for providence (providentia) to give each its own, so sin receives death and justice life; to what is blameworthy God gives punishment, and to what is virtuous glory.4 As for the place of evil in the cosmos, Hugh insists that God is not the author (audor) of evil itself, but rather the orderer (ordinaior) of all things, including evil.5 Hence God made the good and permitted the evil, though he then brings good from evil.6 Hugh also draws what will become a classic distinction: when Scripture speaks of God's will, it sometimes refers to what is truly in God, identical and coeternal with him, while at other times it is meant figuratively, referring to a sign of his will (signum voluntatis).7 What is known as the will of God's good pleasure (beneplacitum) is eternal; it is fixed and certain and cannot be frustrated. In this sense, all that God wills he always wills to be done, though not always at the time he wills it.8 But the signs of God's will, such as his prohibitions and precepts, do not always correspond to God's good pleasure, and thus are not always in keeping with what will actually occur.9 In the following century, Thomas Aquinas also noted that God's will is single and identical...
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Sep 14, 2011
Clifford B Saper 
Open Access
