Ownership Norms Research Articles

Restitutions of Cultural Property: The Transnational Production of Frames of Reference and Norms of Ownership for Cultural Property

Restitutions of Cultural Property: The Transnational Production of Frames of Reference and Norms of Ownership for Cultural Property

Cultural and contextual variation in first mover norms of ownership: evidence from an Achuar community

The proposal that humans possess an evolved psychology of ownership is a highly plausible one. But what, if any, features of human ownership psychology might be universal? Psychologists have proposed that human ownership psychology might contain rules or norms for determining ownership, some of which might be universal. Here we explore first mover norms, in which an individual who acts first or exerts higher initial effort towards an object is recognized as its owner. Developmental studies in North America and Europe have provided evidence that first mover intuitions, especially about first possession, reliably develop in childhood, and some cross-cultural studies have supported this. Ethnographic research, however, provides mixed evidence about the universality of first-mover norms across cultures and domains. Here we report results from an experimental study comparing judgments of Achuar adults in Ecuador with those of an online U.S. sample. Achuar judgments leaned weakly in favor of first possessors in the domain of hunted game, but not for land. For land, a principle of use took precedence over first possession. U.S. participants, on the other hand, exhibited strong first possessor intuitions across both domains, consistent with prior results in the psychological literature. Together these findings suggest that first mover norms for assigning ownership may be more culturally and contextually variable than prior psychological research has suggested.

Ownership and convention

The basis of property rights is a central problem in political philosophy. The core philosophical dispute concerns whether property rights are natural facts, independent of human conventions. In this article, we examine adult judgments on this issue. We find evidence that familiar property norms regarding external objects (e.g., fish and strawberries) are treated as conventional on standard measures of authority dependence and context relativism. Previous work on the moral/conventional distinction indicates that people treat property rights as moral rather than conventional (e.g., Dahl & Waltzer, 2020; Nucci & Turiel, 1993; Tisak & Turiel, 1984). However, these studies explicitly assume that one person owns property that another steals. Study 1 explores judgments of authority dependence regarding ownership in cases that explicitly appeal to stealing and prior ownership as compared to cases that omit such explicit appeals. We find that participants tend to treat ownership as authority dependent when explicit appeals to stealing are absent, but not when the explicit appeals are present. Study 2 examines intuitions about authority dependence of ownership violations as compared to canonical conventional and harm-based moral violations. We find that ownership violations are treated as more authority dependent than harm-based moral violations. This all suggests that some central property norms are treated as conventional. However, we also find that the conventionality of property norms is restricted in several ways. In study 3, we find that people do not treat norms of self-ownership as conventional. Other people cannot take your hair or skin cells even if the teacher says it's okay. Study 4 uses a measure of context relativism to examine the conventionality of ownership norms, comparing different possible norms of ownership. We find that participants regard takings that are violations in their own culture as permissible in other cultures; however, only some foreign norms are deemed acceptable. In study 5 we find another limitation – participants think it's impermissible to take resources from someone based on a new property norm that is retrospectively imposed. Finally, in study 6 we explore whether some takings might be judged to be morally (non-conventionally) wrong as a function of scarcity. We find that when asked about another culture that allows taking, participants tend to say that taking a food item from the person who caught it is permissible when the food is plentiful, but not when the food is scarce.

The biogeography and evolution of land ownership

AbstractAimLand ownership norms are well documented and play a central role in social–ecological systems. Yet only recently has the spatial and temporal distribution of land ownership been examined using biogeographical and evolutionary approaches. We incorporate biogeographical and evolutionary modelling to test associations between land ownership and environmental, subsistence and cultural contact predictors.LocationAfrica.TaxonBantu and Bantoid ethnolinguistic groups (73 societies).MethodsBased on ethnographies for 73 societies, we coded land ownership norms as none, group, kin or individual. We paired these data with language phylogenies, and measured phylogenetic and geographical signal and modelled alternative evolutionary trajectories using maximum likelihood methods. We tested the influence of environmental, subsistence and cultural predictors on spatial variation in land ownership, using a multi‐model inference approach based on logistic regression.ResultsBantu land ownership norms likely evolved on a unilinear trajectory (i.e. societies progress or regress along a series of ownership types), but not one requiring consistent increase in exclusivity (i.e. restrictions towards ownership by smaller groups) as suggested by prior theory. Our biogeographical analyses suggest land ownership is more likely where neighbours also own land and resource productivity is predictable. Reliance on agriculture has relatively small effect sizes and low importance in the model.Main ConclusionsWe find support for multiple evolutionary pathways. Lack of resolution may be due to localized horizontal transfer of norms consistent with the influence of neighbours we find from biogeographical analyses. We cannot rule out other untested mechanisms. Although long‐standing theories propose links between subsistence practices and land ownership, our results suggest subsistence plays only a modest role. Our results also support resource defensibility theory (i.e. land ownership is more likely where environmental productivity is predictable). Overall, we demonstrate the value of combining analytical approaches from evolution and biogeography to test hypotheses on the spatial and temporal variation of human cultural traits.

Ownership is (likely to be) a moral foundation.

Boyer presents a compelling account of ownership as the outcome of interaction between two evolved cognitive systems. We integrate this model into current discussions of moral pluralism, suggesting that ownership meets the criteria to be a moral foundation. We caution against ignoring cultural variation in ownership norms and against explaining complex, contested moral phenomena using a monist approach.

The Building as a Home: Housing Cooperatives in Barcelona

The recent growth of cooperative housing in Spain questions existing design standards and regulations as well as cultural norms of ownership, management and current housing typologies. This paper analyzes the design opportunities and challenges emerging from this. It studies the transformative capacity of housing cooperatives and how the realization of new social, spatial and economic demands is restricted by regulatory and administrative frameworks that limit collective ownership and use. Based on a case study analysis of recent projects in Barcelona, the paper discusses how regulations condition housing design, but also why changing ideas of ownership, household and dwelling structures require a review of how regulations are formulated and implemented. It examines this in the context of designing with housing cooperatives and their ethos defined by engagement in and responsibility for all decision-making processes and self-management. In cooperative housing, architecture is a process, not a product, one that extends beyond the completion of a building. This gives credibility to the claim of cooperative housing not just as a grassroots response to housing failures, but also as a political project of democratization and social transformation.

Convention and the Origins of Ownership

We examine contemporary game-theoretic accounts of ownership as a convention. New results from dynamic networks complicate matters, suggesting that if ownership is conventional, it should not be as prevalent as it seems to be. In fact, such models reveal a tendency toward antiownership norms. The value of resources may be crucial: low stakes lead to conventional ownership, but ownership norms rarely evolve; high stakes lead to a predominance of ownership at the cost of its conventionality. We argue that conventional ownership norms can originate in nonconventional ways and discuss some philosophical implications.

Drivers of global variation in land ownership

Land ownership shapes natural resource management and social–ecological resilience, but the factors determining ownership norms in human societies remain unclear. Here we conduct a global empirical test of long‐standing theories from ecology, economics and anthropology regarding potential drivers of land ownership and territoriality. Prior theory suggests that resource defensibility, subsistence strategies, population pressure, political complexity and cultural transmission mechanisms may all influence land ownership. We applied multi‐model inference procedures based on logistic regression to cultural and environmental data from 102 societies, 71 with some form of land ownership and 31 with no land ownership. We found an increased probability of land ownership in mountainous environments, where patchy resources may be more cost effective to defend via ownership. We also uncovered support for the role of population pressure, with a greater probability of land ownership in societies living at higher population densities. Our results also show more land ownership when neighboring societies also practiced ownership. We found less support for variables associated with subsistence strategies and political complexity.

Conflict and convention in dynamic networks.

An important way to resolve games of conflict (snowdrift, hawk-dove, chicken) involves adopting a convention: a correlated equilibrium that avoids any conflict between aggressive strategies. Dynamic networks allow individuals to resolve conflict via their network connections rather than changing their strategy. Exploring how behavioural strategies coevolve with social networks reveals new dynamics that can help explain the origins and robustness of conventions. Here, we model the emergence of conventions as correlated equilibria in dynamic networks. Our results show that networks have the tendency to break the symmetry between the two conventional solutions in a strongly biased way. Rather than the correlated equilibrium associated with ownership norms (play aggressive at home, not away), we usually see the opposite host-guest norm (play aggressive away, not at home) evolve on dynamic networks, a phenomenon common to human interaction. We also show that learning to avoid conflict can produce realistic network structures in a way different than preferential attachment models.

Who owns the flows? Distinguishing ownership of resource flows from ownership of resource stocks clarifies debates about property bundles, commons tragedies, and degrowth

Theories of ownership have long focussed on the institutions governing resource stocks such as land, and largely neglected the ownership of resource flows such as the crops that flow from that land. Originating among early modern legal scholars, the assumption that the paradigm form of ownership was of land has been inherited by later theorists. The 'tragedy of the commons' thesis, for example, conflates the absence of stock ownership with the absence of flow ownership, and several commons scholars have now started to move away from a stock-centric conception of ownership. The same assumption has also been inherited by theorists applying Heinsohn and Steiger's 'property economics' to theories of degrowth. Here, I recast their theory to include ownership of flows as well as stocks, answering critics who point out that their theory cannot account for unsecured debts. This recasting places greater focus on the different ways in which ownership institutions not only assign an owner to a resource, but also motivate the transfer of resources between individuals. This prompts a new way to frame a key question for theorists of degrowth: in a nongrowing economy where fewer transfers can be motivated by the likelihood of receiving returns on loans, will this result in more possessive behaviours, in more communal ownership norms of reciprocity, or in more command ownership through coercion and status? Existing theory, focussed on stocks, groups these different institutions together as 'private' or 'nonproperty' ownership. This article suggests that disambiguation of the different 'nonproperty' institutions that govern the ownership and transfer of resource flows is key to better understanding the political and institutional implications of degrowth.

I Share, Therefore It's Mine

Uniquely interconnecting lessons from law, psychology, and economics, this Article aims to provide a more enriched understanding of what it means to “share” property in the sharing economy. It explains that there is an “ownership prerequisite” to sharing of property, drawing in part from the findings of research in the psychology of child development to show when and why children start to share. They do so only after developing what psychologists call “ownership understanding.” What the psychological research reveals then is that the property system is well-suited to create recognizable and enforceable ownership norms that include the rights to acquire and retain ownership of property (parting with it only on terms defined by the owner), thereby also providing necessary economic incentives to share. Along the way, this article bridges the psychology research with Hohfeld’s description of the nature of rights, explaining the corresponding rights characterizations appropriate to describe each step in a child’s development of ownership understanding.When we have a well-developed ownership regime — with a high reliability of enforcing ownership norms — we create the confidence in ownership that “ownership understanding” reveals is necessary for individuals to feel secure in sharing. So too does the development of the right to exclude and the corresponding right to include in property law track the underlying psychology to create the prerequisites in law to effect what might be called a “legal ownership understanding” that feeds the sharing economy, with sharing being simply an exercise of the right to include. The Article concludes with an ownership-sensitive definition of sharing that should prove useful to courts, regulators, and scholars alike, while remaining largely agnostic on the scope of desirable regulation of the sharing economy.

Disturbance, Complexity, Scale: New Approaches to the Study of Human–Environment Interactions

New approaches to human–environment interactions are beginning to move beyond a narrow focus on individuals and simple (patch-level) predatory or competitive interactions. These approaches link nonequilibrium theory from community and landscape ecology with theories of individual decision making from behavioral ecology to explore new ways of approaching complex issues of diachronic change in behavior, subsistence, and social institutions. I provide an overview of two such approaches, one to understand long-term hunting sustainability among mixed forager-horticulturalists in the wet tropics and the other to understand how foragers act as ecosystem engineers in a dry perennial grassland in Australia. I conclude by describing the implications of new approaches that incorporate anthropogenic “intermediate” disturbance (an emergent property of human–environment interaction) as a force shaping environments through time and space, and in so doing patterning the sustainability of subsistence, ways of sharing, ownership norms, and even structures of gendered production.

Prosocial signaling and cooperation among Martu hunters

Among immediate-return societies, cooperative social relationships are maintained despite the lack of centralized authority, strong norms of ownership and the punishment of free-riders. The prosocial signaling theory of cooperation solves the puzzle of social cohesion in such societies by suggesting that costly forms of generosity can function as an honest signal of prosocial intent, and that the reputations for prosociality signalers build generate trust between individuals, supporting the formation of cooperative partnerships. However, not all forms of costly generosity are prosocial: we contrast two types of generosity, aggrandizing and prosocial, and suggest that only prosocial generosity provides benefits through cooperation. Prosocial generosity is accompanied by pecuniary distancing: the payment of a higher relative cost to share, and a manner of sharing that disengages the acquirer from ownership over the rights to benefit from his or her harvest. We test the prosocial sharing hypothesis among Martu hunters and find that there is a significant association between the propensity of an individual to share a higher proportion of her income and centrality in the cooperative hunting network. Those who consistently pay higher costs to share, not necessarily those who are better hunters, are preferred partners for cooperative hunting. While many have emphasized the direct, status enhancing, competitive aspects of generosity, we suggest here that prosocial generosity produces benefits indirectly, through the formation of trusting, cooperative partnerships.

Understanding adolescents’ intentions to commute by car or bicycle as adults

This study focuses on the intentions of adolescents to commute by car or bicycle as adults. The behavioral model is based on intrapersonal and interpersonal constructs from the theory of planned behavior extended to include constructs from the institutional, community and policy domains. Data from a survey among Danish adolescents is analyzed. It is found that car use intentions are related to positive car passenger experience, general interest in cars, and car ownership norms, and are negatively related to willingness to accept car restrictions and perceived lack of behavioral control. Cycling intentions are related to positive cycling experience, willingness to accept car restrictions, negative attitudes towards cars, and bicycle-oriented future vision, and are negatively related to car ownership norms. Attitudinal constructs are related to individual characteristics, such as gender, residential location, current mode choice to daily activities, and parental travel patterns.

Desperately seeking social approval: Adam Smith, Thorstein Veblen and the moral limits of capitalist culture

Adam Smith and Thorstein Veblen shared much in matters of economic ontology. Both dismissed the very notion of an autonomous economic self and instead investigated the processes through which self and other are mutually constituted under changing cultural traditions of individual aspiration. Their strikingly similar critiques of status-oriented consumption and concern for the moral basis of the market economy are established in this manner. However, the political implications of their analyses point in different directions, with Veblen being the more radical. The Smithian individual can always use spectatorial insights to assert through genuinely praiseworthy behaviour personal moral distance from social norms of status-oriented consumption. The Veblenian individual, by contrast, has no such capacity for elevating abstract moral principles above socially-situated conduct, as mind and environment co-evolve in line with changing material circumstances of life. For Veblen, the rise of status-oriented consumption itself acted as a form of moral self-education that more deeply entrenched the social norms of ownership out of which it arose, thus the impossibility of an autonomous economic self was matched by the impossibility of an autonomous moral self. To his way of thinking, moral degradation in conspicuous consumption was irredeemably inscribed into the whole cultural structure of capitalism.

Political ecologies of wood and wax: sandalwood and beeswax as symbols and shapers of customary authority in the Oecusse enclave, Timor

The enclave of Oecusse-Ambeno, Timor Leste, was formed in part through struggles over controlling trade in sandalwood and beeswax, two forest products that continue to influence political and ritual allegiances, and the political history of Oecusse. These products are interwoven with the region's contacts with outsiders, influencing local political hierarchies and roles of kings, village heads, and ritual authorities. While wood and wax are recognized to be of Timorese origin, local myths posit that their use and value was unrecognized before the arrival of Chinese traders and Portuguese missionaries. Several narratives of the origins of trade in sandalwood, and the kings' annual beeswax candle tributes, illustrate the enduring connections among local authorities, forest resource control, religious symbolism, and ritual obligations surrounding harvests of sandalwood and beeswax. Customary practices contribute to forest conservation through local protection of beeswax-producing forests, and by circumscribing the harvest. While both beehives and sandalwood impede intensive agricultural land uses, farmers welcome beeswax as a profitable product that supports ritual. But they resent sandalwood's growth in their fields since it involves more regulation and increased labor requirements. The two products' different ecologies of disturbance and incidence contributed over time to distinct ownership norms and forms of control by customary authorities. This is the "political ecology of wood and wax" in Oecusse.Key words: Oecusse, Timor Leste/East Timor, sandalwood, beeswax, customary authority, colonialism.

Chimpanzee Autarky

BackgroundEconomists believe that barter is the ultimate cause of social wealth—and even much of our human culture—yet little is known about the evolution and development of such behavior. It is useful to examine the circumstances under which other species will or will not barter to more fully understand the phenomenon. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are an interesting test case as they are an intelligent species, closely related to humans, and known to participate in reciprocal interactions and token economies with humans, yet they have not spontaneously developed costly barter.Methodology/Principle FindingsAlthough chimpanzees do engage in noncostly barter, in which otherwise value-less tokens are exchanged for food, this lack of risk is not typical of human barter. Thus, we systematically examined barter in chimpanzees to ascertain under what circumstances chimpanzees will engage in costly barter of commodities, that is, trading food items for other food items with a human experimenter. We found that chimpanzees do barter, relinquishing lower value items to obtain higher value items (and not the reverse). However, they do not trade in all beneficial situations, maintaining possession of less preferred items when the relative gains they stand to make are small.Conclusions/SignificanceTwo potential explanations for this puzzling behavior are that chimpanzees lack ownership norms, and thus have limited opportunity to benefit from the gains of trade, and that chimpanzees' risk of defection is sufficiently high that large gains must be imminent to justify the risk. Understanding the conditions that support barter in chimpanzees may increase understanding of situations in which humans, too, do not maximize their gains.

Reporting Error and Single-Family Home Ownership Norms and Preferences: A Replication

The purpose of this research is to further test the hypothesis that apparent differences among income classes in home ownership preferences and reported norms are due to a correctable systematic reporting error supported by Morris, Winter, and Sward in Housing and Society, Volume 11, Number 2. The data are from interviews conducted with 485 households in the Omaha-Council Bluffs area during 1977. The data were analyzed by using a four-step regression procedure. Confirming the findings of Morris, Winter, and Sward, the results indicate that housing needs and preferences for tenure and structure type do not significantly differ by income when “corrected.” As in the original research, actual housing and constraints differ by income. It is the effect of these differences on the reported norms and preferences that produce the systematic measurement error.

Reporting Error and Single-Family Home Ownership Norms and Preferences

The purpose of this research is to test hypotheses about the differences among income classes in home-ownership preferences and reported norms. The first hypothesis is that households with differin...