Owner-manager Agency Research Articles

Family Ownership and Value of Takeover: Evidence from India

We examine how family-ownership influences takeover probability and takeover public announcement abnormal return of Indian publicly traded firms between 2003 and 2019. We find that family ownership has a significantly negative effect on target takeover probability at various levels of family ownership, viz. 20%, 40%, and 51%. Announcement period abnormal returns for target firms are positive at a lower level of family ownership of 20% and negative at a higher level of family ownership of 51%. These results are consistent with the agency cost explanation where family ownership reduces owner-manager agency conflict but exacerbates conflict between majority and minority shareholders. Our results hold for Heckman two-stage model.

The price of sinful behavior window dressing: Cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages and financial reporting quality

Using hand-collected data from China, we examine whether cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages affects corporate financial reporting quality, and further investigate the moderating effect of foreign directors. The findings reveal that firms in provinces with more cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages exhibit significantly higher extent of discretionary accruals. This finding suggests that cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages as a tobacco-related sinful behavior window dressing shapes unethical social atmosphere, elicits unethical managerial behavior, brings out information distortion, and eventually reduces financial reporting quality. Moreover, the positive relation between cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages and discretionary accruals is less pronounced for firms with foreign directors than for their counterparts. Furthermore, our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests using alternative proxies for cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages and financial reporting quality, and further our conclusions still stand after employing the difference-in-difference approach, two-stage least square regression procedure and two-stage Heckman method to address the endogeneity problem. Lastly, pictorial health warnings on cigarette packages are significantly negatively related with country-level smokers, but cultural embeddedness on cigarette packages is significantly positively associated with tobacco consumption at the province level and owner-manager agency costs in China, providing supportive evidence to our findings.

Foreign currency hedging and firm productive efficiency

This study assesses whether foreign currency (FC) hedging improves firm productive efficiency. Using a unique sample of French non-financial listed firms belonging to the CAC All-Tradable index (former SBF250 index) index over the period 2004–2012, we employ a non-parametric method—data envelopment analysis—to estimate a firm’s efficiency frontier and analyze the role of financial hedging in addressing agency conflicts in France. The empirical results show that FC hedging has a significant positive effect on efficiency. This finding supports the theoretical view that hedging is a disciplinary device that can mitigate the owner–manager agency conflicts, leading to a better firm efficiency. The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

Revenge of the Steamroller: ABCP as a Window on Risk Choices*

Abstract We use credit-arbitrage asset-backed commercial paper vehicles as a laboratory to empirically examine financial institutions’ motivations to take bad-tail systematic risk. By comparing the characteristics of global banks that sponsored credit-arbitrage vehicles prior to the global financial crisis to those that did not, we show that owner–manager agency problems, government safety nets, and government ownership of banks are associated with bad-tail systematic risk-taking. Although good governance is associated with less risk-taking on average, well-governed banks that also have a high ex ante expectation of being bailed out by the government take more risk. Lastly, we find mixed evidence that tougher bank capital regulation deters bad-tail risk-taking.

Revenge of the Steamroller: ABCP as a Window on Risk Choices

We empirically examine financial institutions' motivations to take systematic bad-tail risk in the form of sponsorship of credit-arbitrage asset-backed commercial paper vehicles. A run on debt issued by such vehicles played a key role in causing and propagating the liquidity crisis that began in the summer of 2007. We find evidence consistent with important roles for both owner-manager agency problems and government-induced distortions, especially government control or ownership of banks.

Corporate governance, external control, and environmental information transparency: Evidence from emerging markets

Using a sample of 4195 observations from 19 emerging markets, we investigate how internal corporate governance, external monitoring, and legal and business environment jointly affect a firm’s managerial effectiveness in environmental information transparency in an international setting. The empirical results show that in emerging economies, firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms tend to adopt an external control strategy in order to mitigate owner-manager agency conflicts. Furthermore, internal corporate governance mechanisms are found to directly increase firm transparency concerning environmental damage and to indirectly do so through external control device. The legal and business environments of countries in which firms operate moderate these relationships.

Dynamic Capital Structure Adjustments and Business Group Affiliations: Indian Evidence

This study examines the asymmetries in capital structure adjustment speed depending on firms’ affiliation to business groups. Using partial adjustment framework on a dataset of 2001 listed Indian non-financial firms over the period of 2005–2013, it was found that Indian firms annually adjusted about 37 percent of their deviation from target leverage. Groups firms, in general, adjust their leverage ratio slower than the stand-alone firms, suggesting lesser net benefits of adjustment for the former than the latter. The results are persistent irrespective of firms’ extent of deviation from their target leverage. However, the net benefits of adjustment and consequently the adjustment speed for both the groups of firms, irrespective of their extent of deviation from target leverage, seem to be alike, when they are over-levered and lower for group firms than the stand-alone firms, when they are under-levered. These findings indicate that both group and stand-alone firms face identical threats, when they are over-levered, whereas group firms possibly have alternative arrangements to reduce the owner–manager agency conflicts and tax liability, when they are under-levered. These findings are expected to prove helpful for financial managers in designing their capital structure based on ownership structure, and the nature and extent of deviation from the target leverage.

Cash holdings between public and private insurers ‒ a partial adjustment approach

Abstract Cash holdings of financial institutions, especially private firms, have been understudied in existing literature. This paper fills that gap by examining the cash holdings of US property-liability insurers in order to analyze the difference in cash holdings and cash adjustments between public and private stock insurers and between mutual and stock insurers within the private insurer category. We find that public insurers hold much less cash than private stock insurers, which differs from the findings for non-financial firms. Additionally, we find that mutual insurers hold less cash than private stock insurers. Public insurers adjust their cash holdings much faster toward their target cash levels than private stock insurers do when facing an extreme cash shortfall, but their adjustment speed is indifferent from that of private stock insurers when both having excess cash. Mutual insurers are able to adjust cash holdings slightly faster than private stock insurers when there is an extreme cash shortfall but are indifferent in adjustment speed from private stock insurers when having excess cash in hand. Overall, our results are more consistent with the financing frictions hypothesis of cash holdings and are inconsistent with the owner-manager agency problems of free cash flow.

Religious influence, blockholder ownership, and corporate over-investment: evidence from Chinese Buddhism

This study extends recent literature about religious influence on corporate decisions by investigating the impact of Buddhism, the most influential religion, on corporate over-investment. Using a sample of 12,820 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2001–2012, we document that Buddhism is significantly negatively associated with over-investment, suggesting that Buddhism as a set of social norms can reduce owner-manager agency conflicts, alleviate managers’ opportunistic behaviour and overconfidence, and thus mitigate over-investment. Moreover, blockholder ownership attenuates the negative association between Buddhism and over-investment. The above results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and are still valid after controlling for the endogeneity between Buddhism and over-investment.

Culture, Marketization, and Owner-Manager Agency Costs: A Case of Merchant Guild Culture in China

This study explores cultural influence on corporate behavior employing the case of merchant guild culture in China and further the moderating role of Marketization. Using hand-collected data on merchant guild culture, we find that merchant guild culture is significantly negatively associated with owner-manager agency costs, suggesting that merchant guild culture in ancient China still has its continuous and remarkable effects on managerial behavior in contemporary corporations. This finding also implies that merchant guild culture motivates managers to upgrade the efficiency of controlling operating costs, reduces agency conflicts between management and shareholders, and eventually mitigates owner-manager agency costs. Moreover, provincial Marketization level attenuates the negative association between merchant guild culture and owner-manager agency costs. Above results are robust to a variety of alternative measures of merchant guild culture and owner-manager agency costs. Furthermore, our findings are still valid after controlling for the potential endogeneity between merchant guild culture and owner-manager agency costs.

The Influence of Family Ownership on Long-Lived Asset Write-Offs

Building on agency theory, this article investigates whether family firms’ accounting behavior regarding long-lived asset write-offs differs from that of nonfamily firms. We provide evidence that nonfamily firms use write-offs for earnings management purposes, while family firms report write-offs coherent with the firm performance. Family firms experience dwindling sales and lower profitability in the years following the write-offs, consistently with an effective decline in their assets value. The findings are consistent with reduced owner-manager agency conflicts in family firms. We find no indication of family entrenchment, which is consistent with family owners being concerned with the reputational damage associated with a loss of a firm’s asset value.

Revenge of the Steamroller: ABCP as a Window on Risk Choices

We empirically examine financial institutions' motivations to take systematic bad-tail risk in the form of sponsorship of credit-arbitrage asset-backed commercial paper vehicles. A run on debt issued by such vehicles played a key role in causing and propagating the liquidity crisis that began in the summer of 2007. We find evidence consistent with important roles for both owner-manager agency problems and government-induced distortions, especially government control or ownership of banks.

Does Religion Matter to Owner-Manager Agency Costs? Evidence from China

In China, Buddhism and Taoism are two major religions. Using a sample of 10,363 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2001–2010, I provide strong and robust evidence that religion (i.e., Buddhism and Taoism on the whole) is significantly negatively associated with owner-manager agency costs. In particular, using firm-level religion data measured by the number of religious sites within a radius of certain distance around a listed firm’s registered address, I find that religion is significantly negatively (positively) associated with expense ratio (asset utilization ratio), the positive (reverse) proxy for owner-manager agency costs. This finding is consistent with the following view: religiosity has remarkable effects on the way how an individual thinks and behaves, and thereof can curb managers from unethical business practices. Moreover, my findings suggest that the negative association between religion and owner-manager agency costs is attenuated for firms with strong external monitoring mechanisms such as higher Marketization and high-quality auditors. Furthermore, after separating Buddhism from Taoism, my finding indicates that above conclusions are only available for Buddhism, suggesting that different religions may have asymmetric influence on owner-manager agency costs. Above results are robust to various measures of religiosity and a variety of robustness checks.

An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms

Family firms without able and willing family successors are frequently sold to non-family managers through management buy-outs (MBOs). Whether MBOs create value is thought to be dependent upon the ability to reduce owner–manager agency costs. In this article we examine the agency costs of MBOs that acquire family firms. We contribute to theory by arguing that in such situations, value creation by reducing agency costs will depend upon pre-MBO agency costs, the ability to solve the double agency problem, and the relationship between the cost of agency control mechanisms and the residual losses from opportunism before and after the MBO.

Income Smoothing in Family-Controlled Companies: Evidence from Italy

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper focuses on the relationship between one of the main corporate governance dimensions – ownership structure – and income smoothing. The paper investigates whether family-controlled companies differ from non-family-controlled companies with respect to income smoothing. Due to different incentives of management and owner investment horizons, we hypothesize that income smoothing is less likely among family-controlled companies than among non-family-controlled companies. Additionally, we hypothesize that among family-controlled firms income smoothing is less likely when CEO and Board Chairman are members of the controlling family. Various definitions of “family control” are applied. A sample of Italian listed companies is used for the empirical analysis. Research Findings/Insights: We find evidence that income smoothing is less likely among family-controlled companies than non-family-controlled companies. Moreover, among family-controlled companies, income smoothing is less likely for firms whose CEO and Board Chairman are members of the controlling family. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper fills a gap in the literature, suggesting that not only the level of ownership concentration or insider ownership but also the nature of the dominant shareholder (family versus non-family) should be considered when addressing the motivations for income smoothing. Furthermore, our findings indicate that agency theory and stewardship theory are complementary in explaining the role played by family control in income smoothing decisions. While in non-family-controlled companies the traditional owner-manager agency problems tend to prevail and motivate income smoothing, in family-controlled companies such agency issues become less relevant and a stewardship attitude emerges, rendering income smoothing less likely. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study is of interest to financial statement users, including analysts and investors, as it shows that different company types (e.g., family versus non-family) have a different attitude towards income smoothing. In particular, these results aid users in interpreting the company's reported profitability and its potential variability. The conclusions also are of interest to auditors when evaluating the reliability of the reported income of companies characterized by various ownership structures.

Audit quality and owner-manager agency costs: evidence from China

Agency theory suggests that conflict interests between managers and owners cause management shirking and associated agency costs. An audit is a monitoring mechanism that provides an independent check on accounting information and reduces agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, given severe owner-manager agency problems, higher audit quality should be associated with lower client company owner-manager agency costs. The purpose of this study is to empirically test this relation. In China, owner-manager agency problems are severe given extremely low or no management ownership. Moreover, there is a lack of variations in management holdings across Chinese public companies. Such an environment allows us to examine the role of audits in reducing owner-manager agency costs. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies, we find that observations with higher quality audits show lower owner-manger agency costs. Such a result suggests that in an emerging market, higher quality audits more effectively reduce agency costs.

Frugal Principals, Lavish Agents: CEO Compensation in Family-, Founder- and Other Firms

Using agency theory we formulate hypotheses about the executive compensation practices among lone founder firms and family firms. We argue that compensation schemes reflect attempts to reduce the agency costs inherent in the different ownership structures. Hence, lone founder-owned firms where owner-manager incentive alignment and monitoring advantages are great will exhibit the lowest levels of total and incentive CEO compensation. By contrast, family-owned firms, while enjoying owner-manager agency advantages over other companies, face unique owner-owner agency conflicts as family owners may pressure their CEOs to serve the family instead of the firm. Higher levels of total and incentive CEO compensation thus were expected to be paid to reduce the impact on the CEO of such pressure. These expectations were borne out in our study of S&P 500 companies. However, we also found contrary to the above rationales that despite their higher compensation packages diffusely held firms did not benefit more from higher CEO compensation than founder- or family-owned firms, nor did they outperform. Moreover, CEO compensation was negatively related to performance in the former. It appears therefore that founder- and family-owned firms employ more efficient compensation packages than more diffusely held public firms.

Small Business Borrowing and the Owner–Manager Agency Costs: Evidence on Finnish Data

This study investigates the impact that managerial ownership has on loan availability and credit terms. We find that managerial ownership is common in a sample of small and medium‐sized Finnish firms. Our results suggest that an increase in managerial ownership decreases loan availability. The results on loan interest rates suggest that though an increase in managerial ownership initially increases interest rates, the effect is reversed at higher levels of ownership. Collateral requirements increase monotonically with managerial ownership. Overall, the results suggest that banks view that there are agency costs involved with managerial ownership even in small and medium‐sized firms and that this is taken into account when lending to these firms.

Small Business Borrowing and the Owner-Manager Agency Costs: Evidence on Finnish Data

This study investigates the impact that managerial ownership has on loan availability and credit terms. We find that managerial ownership is common in a sample of small and medium sized Finnish firms. Our results suggest that an increase in managerial ownership decreases loan availability. The results on loan interest rates suggest that while an increase in managerial ownership initially increases interest rates, the effect is reversed at higher levels of ownership. Collateral requirements increase monotonically with managerial ownership. Overall, the results suggests that banks view that there are agency costs involved with managerial ownership even in small and medium sized firms and that this is taken into account when lending to these firms.

The existence and independence of audit committees in France

This paper uses an agency theory framework to investigate the determinants of audit committees in France. Empirical tests address a cross-sectional sample of 285 listed companies for the fiscal year 1997, which is two years after the first Viénot report recommending the creation of audit committees among listed companies. Multivariate analyses show that the existence of an audit committee, and the committee's independence, are both negatively correlated with insider ownership, consistent with the owner-manager agency theory that considers audit committees as devices aimed at strengthening the monitoring system, the quality of financial reporting and the whole corporate governance environment. The existence of an audit committee that complies with corporate governance recommendations (i.e., a minimum of three directors, all of whom are non-executive directors) also positively depends on leverage if the firm has a high-IOS (Investment Opportunity Set). The quality of accounting numbers thus seems important in shareholder-debtholder relationships if lenders are potentially more exposed to default risk and expropriation mechanisms. However, this result might be sensitive to the IOS measurement and classification of high- and low-IOS companies. Finally, the presence of an audit committee is found to be positively correlated with board size, firm size, auditor reputation, and with the diversity of the company's operations.