In the absence of global emission regulation, production cost differences between regions are typically accentuated due to different emission charges, which may render offshore production in an unregulated region more attractive and result in “carbon leakage.” We study three anti-leakage policies including Border Tax (BT), Output-based Allocation (OB) and Grandfathering (GF). We investigate the problem from the perspective of an energy-intensive good producer subject to geographically asymmetric emission regulation and uncertainty in future emission cost. The producer has two ex-ante investment opportunities to mitigate its emission cost: investing in clean production technology in the regulated region and building production capacity in the unregulated region. It determines its production quantities in the two regions ex-post, after emission price uncertainty is resolved. We start from a Baseline case without an anti-leakage policy and then study the above three anti-leakage policies. We compare the effectiveness of the policies by exploring how they influence the producer decisions in both an analytical model and a numerical study with a full factorial design based on the European cement industry. We show that when off-shore production is feasible (a carbon leakage threat exists), a moderate rather than a very high emission price with low volatility helps encourage more technology improvement and less offshore production. The BT and the OB policies are both effective in reducing carbon leakage. Interestingly, the effect of the GF policy significantly depends on the allowance level chosen, which, if set improperly, may even lead to more severe carbon leakage than in the absence of an anti-leakage policy.