Outbreaks In Poultry Research Articles

Vaccination with recombinant Lactococcus lactis expressing HA1-IgY Fc fusion protein provides protective mucosal immunity against H9N2 avian influenza virus in chickens

BackgroundH9N2 virus is mainly transmitted through the respiratory mucosal pathway, so mucosal immunity is considered to play a good role in controlling avian influenza infection. It is commonly accepted that no adequate mucosal immunity is achieved by inactivated vaccines, which was widely used to prevent and control avian influenza virus infection. Thus, an improved vaccine to induce both mucosal immunity and systemic immunity is urgently required to control H9N2 avian influenza outbreaks in poultry farms.MethodsIn this study, we constructed a novel Lactococcus lactis (L. lactis) strain expressing a recombinant fusion protein consisting of the HA1 proteins derived from an endemic H9N2 virus strain and chicken IgY Fc fragment. We evaluated the immunogenicity and protective efficacy of this recombinant L. lactis HA1-Fc strain.ResultsOur data demonstrated that chickens immunized with L. lactis HA1-Fc strain showed significantly increased levels of serum antibodies, mucosal secretory IgA, T cell-mediated immune responses, and lymphocyte proliferation. Furthermore, following challenge with H9N2 avian influenza virus, chickens immunized with L. lactis HA1-Fc strain showed reduced the weight loss, relieved clinical symptoms, and decreased the viral titers and the pathological damage in the lung. Moreover, oropharyngeal and cloacal shedding of the H9N2 influenza virus was detected in chicken immunized with L. lactis HA1-Fc after infection, the results showed the titer was low and reduced quickly to reach undetectable levels at 7 days after infection.ConclusionOur data showed that the recombinant L. lactis HA1-Fc strain could induce protective mucosal and systemic immunity, and this study provides a theoretical basis for improving immune responses to prevent and control H9N2 virus infection.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI A H5N1) outbreak in Spain: its mitigation through the One Health approach - a short communication.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI A H5N1) has occurred over the past few years, especially during the 1918-1919 Spanish Flu pandemic, which wiped out many people in the world. It caused acute illness in about 25-30% of the world's population, which led to the deaths of up to an estimated 40 million people. Of recent, public health authorities in Spain reported the detection of avian influenza A in two poultry workers on a single farm, following an outbreak in poultry confirmed on 20 September which was likely to be due to exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments and poor interprofessional collaborations among the Spanish health workers. This is a public health challenge for the Spanish government and the world at large. Thus, we believed that through the One Health approach in Spain, there would be a stop to and prevention of further spread of the recent outbreak of avian influenza A in Spain, as well as other infectious diseases and future outbreaks in the country and the world at large.

The pathogenesis of a 2022 North American highly pathogenic clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 avian influenza virus in mallards (Anas platyrhynchos)

Highly pathogenic (HP) avian influenza viruses (AIVs) of the clade 2.3.4.4 goose/Guangdong/1996 H5 lineage continue to be a problem in poultry and wild birds in much of the world. The recent incursion of a H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b HP AIV from this lineage into North America has resulted in widespread outbreaks in poultry and consistent detections of the virus across diverse families of birds and occasionally mammals. To characterize the pathobiology of this virus in mallards (Anas platyrhynchos), which are a primary reservoir of AIV, a challenge study was conducted with 2 week-old birds. The 50% bird infectious dose was determined to be <2 log10 50% egg infectious doses (EID50) and all exposed ducks, including ducks co-housed with inoculated ducks, were infected. Infection appeared to be subclinical for 58.8% (20/34) of the ducks, 1 duck was lethargic, about 20% developed neurological signs and were euthanized, and 18% developed corneal opacity. The mallards shed virus by both the oral and cloacal routes within 24-48hr post-infection. Oral shedding substantially decreased by 6-7 days post-infection, but 65% of the ducks continued to shed virus cloacally through 14 days post-exposure (DPE) for the direct inoculate and 13DPE for contact exposed ducks. Based on the high transmissibility, high virus shed titers, and mild-to-moderate disease, mallards could serve as efficient reservoirs to amplify and disseminate recent North American clade 2.3.4.4b viruses.

Human death due to H5N1 amid the COVID-19 pandemic and Mpox outbreak: A call for action.

Human death due to H5N1 amid the COVID-19 pandemic and Mpox outbreak: A call for action.

Clostridium botulinum type C, D, C/D, and D/C: An update.

Clostridium botulinum is the main causative agent of botulism, a neurological disease encountered in humans as well as animals. Nine types of botulinum neurotoxins (BoNTs) have been described so far. Amongst these "toxinotypes," the A, the B and E are the most frequently encountered in humans while the C, D, C/D and D/C are mostly affecting domestic and wild birds as well as cattle. In France for instance, many cases and outbreaks are reported in these animal species every year. However, underestimation is very likely at least for avifauna species where the detection of dead animals can be challenging. Knowledge about BoNTs C, D, C/D, and D/C and the diseases they cause in animals and humans is still scarce and unclear. Specifically, the potential role of animal botulism outbreaks in cattle and poultry as a source of human illness needs to be further assessed. In this narrative review, we present the current knowledge about toxinotypes C, D, C/D, and D/C in cattle and poultry with, amongst various other aspects, their epidemiological cycles. We also discuss the zoonotic potential of these toxinotypes and some possible ways of risk mitigation. An adapted and effective management of botulism outbreaks in livestock also requires a better understanding of these less common and known toxinotypes.

Avian influenza overview September - December 2022.

Between October 2021 and September 2022 Europe has suffered the most devastating highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic with a total of 2,520 outbreaks in poultry, 227 outbreaks in captive birds, and 3,867 HPAI virus detections in wild birds. The unprecedent geographical extent (37 European countries affected) resulted in 50 million birds culled in affected establishments. In the current reporting period, between 10 September and 2 December 2022, 1,163 HPAI virus detections were reported in 27 European countries in poultry (398), captive (151) and wild birds (613). A decrease in HPAI virus detections in colony-breeding seabirds species and an increase in the number of detections in waterfowl has been observed. The continuous circulation of the virus in the wild reservoir has led to the frequent introduction of the virus into poultry populations. It is suspected that waterfowl might be more involved than seabirds in the incursion of HPAI virus into poultry establishments. In the coming months, the increasing infection pressure on poultry establishments might increase the risk of incursions in poultry, with potential further spread, primarily in areas with high poultry densities. The viruses detected since September 2022 (clade 2.3.4.4b) belong to eleven genotypes, three of which have circulated in Europe during the summer months, while eight represent new genotypes. HPAI viruses were also detected in wild and farmed mammal species in Europe and North America, showing genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, two A(H5N1) detections in humans in Spain, one A(H5N1), one A(H5N6) and one A(H9N2) human infection in China as well as one A(H5) infection without NA-type result in Vietnam were reported, respectively. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.

Molecular identification and virological characteristics of highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N5 virus in wild birds in Egypt.

Multiple incursions of different subtypes of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A/H5NX viruses have caused widely considerable outbreaks in poultry and hundreds of human infections. Extensive reassortment events associated with currently circulating clade 2.3.4.4b of A/H5NX viruses have been widely recorded. Wild migratory birds contribute to the spillover of diverse viruses throughout their migration flyways. During our active surveillance of avian influenza in Egypt, we successfully isolated and fully characterized HPAI A/H5N5 virus of clade 2.3.4.4b that was detected in a healthy purple heron. The Egyptian H5N5 virus is genotypically similar with the same subtype that was detected in the far east of Russia and several European countries. The antigenic analysis showed that the Egyptian H5N5 virus is distinct from HPAI A(H5N8) viruses in Egypt. The virus preferentially binds to avian-like receptors rather than human-like receptors. Our results showed that the virus caused 100% and 60% lethality in chicken and mice respectively. Increasing active surveillance efforts, monitoring the dynamics of emerging AIVs, and risk assessment implementation should be globally applied especially in hot spot regions like Egypt.

Virus Quantification Methods with Focus on Marek's Disease Viruses

Marek's disease (MD) is a significant concern in the poultry industry, causing neoplastic disease and substantial economic losses. MDV-1, MDV-2, and MDV-3 are the three serotypes of the herpesvirus that cause MD, each with unique traits and interactions with the host. Vaccination is the primary preventive measure, but some vaccinated flocks still experience losses, often due to suboptimal vaccine dosages. Accurate quantification of the virus is crucial for understanding its dynamics, evaluating vaccine efficacy, and ensuring the health and productivity of poultry populations. Virus quantification methods fall into two main categories: infectivity assays and chemical/physical assays. Infectivity assays detect active, infectious virions, such as plaque, focus formation, and endpoint dilution. Chemical/physical assays, including the hemagglutination assay, transmission electron microscopy, flow cytometry, and qPCR, target specific components of the virion. However, these methods cannot distinguish between infectious and inactivated virions, potentially leading to overestimating viable viral populations. Marek's disease viruses (MDVs) can be quantified using in vitro plaque assays in susceptible cell cultures. The viral plaque assay determines the number of plaque-forming units (pfu) in a virus sample. Titration procedures for vaccine strains are similar to those for pathogenic variants. It is crucial to assess the dose of reconstituted MD vaccine (in PFU per chicken) to identify potential vaccine inefficacies and prevent outbreaks in the field. Accurate virus quantification is pivotal in understanding viral kinetics, optimizing therapeutic interventions, evaluating vaccine effectiveness, and preventing Marek's disease outbreaks in poultry.

Evolutionary dynamics of the clade 2.3.4.4B H5N8 high-pathogenicity avian influenza outbreaks in coastal seabirds and other species in southern Africa from 2017 to 2019.

From late 2017 to early 2018, clade 2.3.4.4B H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses caused mass die-offs of thousands of coastal seabirds along the southern coastline of South Africa. Terns (Laridae) especially were affected, but high mortalities in critically endangered and threatened species like African Penguins (Spheniscus demersus) caused international concern and, exactly a year later, the disease recurred at a key African Penguin breeding site on Halifax Island, Namibia. Twenty-five clade 2.3.4.4B H5N8 HPAI viruses from coastal seabirds and a Jackal Buzzard (Buteo rufofuscus) were isolated and/or sequenced in this study. Phylogenetic analyses of the full viral genomes and time to the most recent common ancestor (tMRCA) analyses of the HA, NA, PB1 and PA genes determined that the South African coastal seabird viruses formed a monophyletic group nested within the South African genotype 4 viruses. This sub-lineage likely originated from a single introduction by terrestrial birds around October 2017. Only the HA and NA sequences were available for the Namibian penguin viruses, but the phylogenetic data confirmed that the South African coastal seabird viruses from 2017 to 2018 were the source and the most closely related South African virus was found in a gull. tMRCA analyses furthermore determined that the progenitors of the five genotypes implicated in the earlier 2017 South African outbreaks in wild birds and poultry were dated at between 2 and 4months prior to the index cases. tMRCA and phylogenetic data also showed that the novel genotype 6 virus introduced to South Africa in 2018, and later also detected in Nigeria and Poland in 2019, most likely arose in late 2017 in West, Central or East Africa. We propose that it continued to circulate there, and that an unidentified reservoir was the source of both the South African outbreaks in early 2018 and in Nigeria in mid-2019.

Pathogenesis and infection dynamics of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) H5N6 (clade 2.3.4.4b) in pheasants and onward transmission to chickens

High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses clade 2.3.4.4 H5 have spread among wild birds worldwide during recent years causing annual die-offs among wild birds and outbreaks in poultry in multiple European countries. The outbreaks significantly impact the poultry and game bird sectors. Infected game birds may act as a bridging species potentially enabling spread of virus into commercial and backyard premises. In this study, the pathogenesis and transmission of a HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4b H5N6 virus was investigated in pheasants and chickens. Efficient virus transmission was detected between pheasants over multiple rounds of naïve pheasant introductions and onwards to chickens. Mortality of up to 100% was observed for both infected pheasants and chickens. Intra-species transmission from chicken to chicken was less efficient. The study confirmed that clade 2.3.4.4b H5N6 HPAIV is highly virulent in pheasants and emphasises the role of pheasants as a bridging host for the infection of commercial poultry.

Public Health Response to Outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1)

Abstract Aim Human infections from highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 are associated with significant morbidity and mortality internationally. This study aimed to use routinely available data to examine key strategies to prevent H5N1 transmission to humans during outbreaks in poultry in residents in Cavan, Louth, Meath and Monaghan. Study design Cross-sectional based study. Methods Data were obtained from Health Protection Team (HPT) in the Department of Public Health (DPH), HSE North-East and Department of Agriculture, Food, and the Marine (DAFM). Data entry and analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel 2016. Results The public health response focussed on contact tracing, monitoring, and follow-up for household, farm-workers, and DAFM staff exposed on the affected farms. A total of 157 contact episodes were identified. Contacts received advice about active monitoring from their last exposure. A total of 111 (80%) were recommended chemoprophylaxis for exposure to HPAI H5N1. During the active monitoring period, two contacts developed acute respiratory symptoms, and parainfluenza 3 and rhino/enterovirus were identified in these individuals respectively. Conclusions The findings of this study, using routinely gathered data, highlighted that collaboration between public health and DAFM at regional and national level was key to rapid response to these outbreaks of HPAI in domesticated poultry. In addition, the public health response was successful in preventing H5N1 transmission from domesticated birds to humans. Key messages • HPAI H5N1 virus infections transmissions from poultry to humans is low. • Effective public health measures are crucial to further mitigate the risks to an absolute minimum.

Avian influenza overview June - September 2022.

The 2021–2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic season is the largest HPAI epidemic so far observed in Europe, with a total of 2,467 outbreaks in poultry, 47.7 million birds culled in the affected establishments, 187 outbreaks in captive birds, and 3,573 HPAI virus detections in wild birds with an unprecedent geographical extent reaching from Svalbard islands to South Portugal and Ukraine, affecting 37 European countries. Between 11 June and 9 September 2022, 788 HPAI virus detections were reported in 16 European countries in poultry (56), captive (22) and wild birds (710). Several colony‐breeding seabird species exhibited widespread and massive mortality from HPAI A(H5N1) virus along the northwest coast of Europe. This resulted in an unprecedentedly high level of HPAI virus detections in wild birds between June and August 2022 and represents an ongoing risk of infection for domestic birds. HPAI outbreaks were still observed in poultry from June to September with five‐fold more infected premises than observed during the same period in 2021 and mostly distributed along the Atlantic coast. Response options to this new epidemiological situation include the definition and rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures and surveillance strategies for early detection in the different poultry production systems. The viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b with seven genotypes, three of which identified for the first time during this time period, being detected during summer. HPAI A(H5) viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in Europe and North America and showed genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, two A(H5N6), two A(H9N2) and one A(H10N3) human infections were reported in China. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.

Public health response to outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) among poultry in Northeast of Ireland, November 2021 to January 2022

ObjectivesHuman infections from highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 are associated with significant morbidity and mortality internationally. This study aimed to use routinely available data to examine key strategies to prevent H5N1 transmission to humans during outbreaks in poultry in residents in Cavan, Louth, Meath and Monaghan. Study designThis was a cross-sectional based study. MethodsData were obtained from Health Protection Team in the Department of Public Health, HSE North East and Department of Agriculture, Food, and the Marine (DAFM). Data entry and analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel 2016. ResultsThe public health response focussed on contact tracing, monitoring and follow-up for household, farm workers and DAFM staff exposed on the affected farms. A total of 157 contact episodes were identified. Contacts received advice about active monitoring from their last exposure. A total of 111 (80%) were recommended chemoprophylaxis for exposure to HPAI H5N1. During the active monitoring period, two contacts developed acute respiratory symptoms, and parainfluenza 3 and rhino/enterovirus were identified in these individuals, respectively. ConclusionsThe findings of this study, using routinely gathered data, highlighted that collaboration between public health and DAFM at regional and national levels was key to rapid response to these outbreaks of HPAI in domesticated poultry. In addition, the public health response appears to have been successful in preventing H5N1 transmission from domesticated birds to humans.

The Sialyl Lewis X Glycan Receptor Facilitates Infection of Subtype H7 Avian Influenza A Viruses.

Subtype H7 avian influenza A viruses (IAVs) are enzootic in wild aquatic birds and have caused sporadic spillovers into domestic poultry and humans. Here, we determined the distribution of fucosylated α2,3 sialoglycan (i.e., sialyl Lewis X [SLeX]) in chickens and five common dabbling duck species and the association between SLeX and cell/tissue/host tropisms of H7 IAVs. Receptor binding analyses showed that H7 IAVs bind to both α2,3-linked (SA2,3Gal) and α2,6-linked sialic acids (SA2,6Gal), but with a higher preference for SLeX; H7 IAVs replicated more efficiently in SLeX-overexpressed than SLeX-deficient MDCK cells. While chickens and all tested dabbling ducks expressed abundant SA2,3Gal and SA2,6Gal, SLeX was detected in both respiratory and gastrointestinal tissues of chickens and mallard ducks and in only the respiratory tissues of gadwall, green-wing teal, and northern shoveler but not in wood ducks. Viral-tissue binding assays showed that H7 IAVs bind to chicken colon crypt cells that express SLeX but fewer bind to mallard colon crypt cells, which do not express SLeX; H7 IAVs bind efficiently to epithelial cells of all tissues expressing SA2,3Gal. High viral replication was identified in both chickens and mallards infected with an H7 virus, regardless of SLeX expression, and viruses were detected in all cells to the same degree as viruses detected in the viral-tissue binding assays. In summary, this study suggests that SLeX facilitates infection of H7 viruses, but other types of SA2,3Gal glycan receptors shape the tissue/host tropisms of H7 IAVs. IMPORTANCE In addition to causing outbreaks in domestic poultry, subtype H7 IAVs can cause sporadic spillover infections in lower mammals and humans. In this study, we showed that SLeX expression varies among wild dabbling ducks. Although it facilitated virus binding and affected infection of H7 IAV in cells, SLeX expression is not the only determinant of viral replication at either the tissue or host level. This study suggested that access to heterologous SA2,3Gal glycan receptors, including fucosylated α2,3-linked sialoglycans, shape tissue and host tropism of H7 IAVs in aquatic wild birds.

Development and Evaluation of an Inactivated Influenza A(H5N8) Vaccine

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses are circulating in lots of avian species, causing major outbreaks in both wild and domestic poultry. Since its first emergence in 2014, clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 viruses widely spread in the world resulting in enormous economic losses. In Egypt, the newly emerging high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8 viruses have been detected in domestic poultry and in wild birds since the 2016/2017 winter season. AI H5N8 is cocirculating with LP H9N2 and HP H5N1 in the Egyptian environment. Poultry vaccination strategy in Egypt is based on commercially available H5 vaccines as an essential control policy, while the majority of commercial avian influenza H5 vaccines utilized in Egypt are not effective against H5N8 viruses. The present study included 3 experimental H5N8 inactivated vaccines based on the 2 major antigenic proteins of the currently circulating strain A/chicken/Egypt/Q16684C/2019 (H5N8), and the internal segments of the A/PR/8/1934 (H1N1) virus. Then, the protective efficacy of the three forms of inactivated vaccines (HAH5N8+7PR8, NAH5N8+7PR8 and HA, NAH5N8+6PR8) were compared regarding the parental PR8 virus in vaccinated specific pathogen free chickens. The NAH5N8+6PR8 as well as HAH5N8+7PR8 and HA vaccines showed the highest protection capacity of challenged SPF chickens and were able to elicit the highest titers of virus-neutralizing antibodies. Thus, a continuous active surveillance strategy is needed to determine the most dominant circulating strain and updating of vaccine seed strains.

Connect to Protect: Dynamics and Genetic Connections of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreaks in Poultry from 2016 to 2021 in Germany.

During autumn/winter in 2016–2017 and 2020–2021, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) caused severe outbreaks in Germany and Europe. Multiple clade 2.3.4.4b H5 HPAI subtypes were responsible for increased mortality in wild birds and high mortality and massive losses in the poultry sector. To clarify putative entry sources and delineate interconnections between outbreaks in poultry holdings and wild birds, we applied whole-genome sequencing and phylodynamic analyses combined with the results of epidemiological outbreak investigations. Varying outbreak dynamics of the distinct reassortants allowed for the identification of individual, putatively wild bird-mediated entries into backyard holdings, several clusters comprising poultry holdings, local virus circulation for several weeks, direct farm-to-farm transmission and potential reassortment within a turkey holding with subsequent spill-over of the novel reassorted virus into the wild bird population. Whole-genome sequencing allowed for a unique high-resolution molecular epidemiology analysis of HPAIV H5Nx outbreaks and is recommended to be used as a standard tool. The presented detailed account of the genetic, temporal, and geographical characteristics of the recent German HPAI H5Nx situation emphasizes the role of poultry holdings as an important source of novel genetic variants and reassortants.

Signalling and responding to zoonotic threats using a One Health approach: a decade of the Zoonoses Structure in the Netherlands, 2011 to 2021.

In the Netherlands, the avian influenza outbreak in poultry in 2003 and the Q fever outbreak in dairy goats between 2007 and 2010 had severe consequences for public health. These outbreaks led to the establishment of an integrated human-veterinary risk analysis system for zoonoses, the Zoonoses Structure. The aim of the Zoonoses Structure is to signal, assess and control emerging zoonoses that may pose a risk to animal and/or human health in an integrated One Health approach. The Signalling Forum Zoonoses (SO-Z), the first step of the Zoonoses Structure, is a multidisciplinary committee composed of experts from the medical, veterinary, entomology and wildlife domains. The SO-Z shares relevant signals with professionals and has monthly meetings. Over the past 10 years (June 2011 to December 2021), 390 different signals of various zoonotic pathogens in animal reservoirs and humans have been assessed. Here, we describe the Zoonoses Structure with examples from signals and responses for four zoonotic events in the Netherlands (tularaemia, Brucella canis, West Nile virus, and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)). This may serve as an example for other countries on how to collaborate in a One Health approach to signal and control emerging zoonoses.

Avian influenza overview March - June 2022.

The 2021–2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic season is the largest epidemic so far observed in Europe, with a total of 2,398 outbreaks in poultry, 46 million birds culled in the affected establishments, 168 detections in captive birds, and 2,733 HPAI events in wild birds in 36 European countries. Between 16 March and 10 June 2022, 1,182 HPAI virus detections were reported in 28 EU/EEA countries and United Kingdom in poultry (750), and in wild (410) and captive birds (22). During this reporting period, 86% of the poultry outbreaks were secondary due to between‐farm spread of HPAI virus. France accounted for 68% of the overall poultry outbreaks, Hungary for 24% and all other affected countries for less than 2% each. Most detections in wild birds were reported by Germany (158), followed by the Netherlands (98) and the United Kingdom (48). The observed persistence of HPAI (H5) virus in wild birds since the 2020–2021 epidemic wave indicates that it may have become endemic in wild bird populations in Europe, implying that the health risk from HPAI A(H5) for poultry, humans, and wildlife in Europe remains present year‐round, with the highest risk in the autumn and winter months. Response options to this new epidemiological situation include the definition and the rapid implementation of suitable and sustainable HPAI mitigation strategies such as appropriate biosecurity measures and surveillance strategies for early detection measures in the different poultry production systems. Medium to long‐term strategies for reducing poultry density in high‐risk areas should also be considered. The results of the genetic analysis indicate that the viruses currently circulating in Europe belong to clade 2.3.4.4b. HPAI A(H5) viruses were also detected in wild mammal species in Canada, USA and Japan, and showed genetic markers of adaptation to replication in mammals. Since the last report, four A(H5N6), two A(H9N2) and two A(H3N8) human infections were reported in China and one A(H5N1) in USA. The risk of infection is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to medium for occupationally exposed people.

Molecular Characterization and Antimicrobial Resistance Profiling of Salmonella spp. from Onion Leaves Collected from Wet Markets in Metro Manila, Philippines

Salmonella spp. is the causative agent of salmonellosis outbreaks in poultry and meats, but recent studies have implicated this pathogen in foodborne outbreaks associated with vegetables. Salmonellosis is commonly managed with antibiotics, but antimicrobial resistance has complicated the treatment of the disease. The pathogenesis of Salmonella spp. is based on virulence factors such as plasmid-encoded genes and lipopolysaccharide moieties, which can be detected by PCR and serotyping, respectively. Thirteen (13) isolates previously identified and confirmed as Salmonella spp. using invA gene-targeting assay were isolated from onion leaf samples collected from wet markets in Metro Manila, Philippines. The isolates were characterized based on the presence of plasmid-encoded virulence gene, serogroup and serotype, and antibiotic resistance profiles using the VITEK®2 system. All 13 Salmonella spp. isolates were spvC-negative. O-serotyping revealed the presence of isolates belonging to serogroups C1 (30.8%), C2 (23.0%), and E1 (30.8%). Two isolates (15.4%) did not belong to the serogroups examined in the study. Further, sequence analysis revealed the presence of serovars Newport, Weltevreden, Tennessee, and Anatum. All the isolates were resistant to at least five antimicrobial agents. To our knowledge, this is the first study in the Philippines to establish baseline data for the molecular features and antibiogram profiles of Salmonella spp. isolated in onion leaf samples from selected wet markets in Metro Manila, Philippines. Furthermore, this study is the first report on the occurrence of four different Salmonella serovars from onion leaves. The data obtained in this study could be used as baseline information and guidance in the implementation of the GAP, monitoring programs of the Department of Agriculture, and the formulation of laws and regulations by policymakers that will address safety issues in fresh produce and quality management principles in farm operations.

Genotype Uniformity, Wild Bird-to-Poultry Transmissions, and Farm-to-Farm Carryover during the Spread of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N8 in the Czech Republic in 2021.

In 2020–2021, the second massive dissemination of a highly pathogenic avian influenza of the H5Nx subtype occurred in Europe. During this period, the virus caused numerous outbreaks in poultry, including in the Czech Republic. In the present study, we provide an insight into the genetic variability of the Czech/2021 (CZE/2021) H5N8 viruses to determine the relationships between strains from wild and domestic poultry and to infer transmission routes between the affected flocks of commercial poultry. For this purpose, whole genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of 70 H5N8 genomes representing 79.7% of the cases were performed. All CZE/2021 H5N8 viruses belonged to the 2.3.4.4b H5 lineage and circulated without reassortment, retaining the A/chicken/Iraq/1/2020 H5N8-like genotype constellation. Phylogenetic analysis suggested the frequent local transmission of H5N8 from wild birds to backyard poultry and extensive spread among commercial poultry farms. In addition, the analysis suggested one cross-border transmission event. Indirect transmission via contaminated materials was considered the most likely source of infection. Improved biosecurity and increased collaboration between field veterinarians and the laboratory are essential to limit the local spread of the virus and to reveal and interrupt critical routes of infection.