Ottoman Troops Research Articles

Russian Advancement into the Balkans and the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774)

Undoubtedly, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union played an important role in modern Balkan history. In international politics, the treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774) is considered as one of the most significant points for Russian advancement into the Balkans. This article outlines the significance of this treaty by analysing its background and stipulations.After the Ottoman Empire lost its predominance over the West European countries and Russia at the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, the Habsburg Empire and the newly emerging Prussia coexisted in the first half of the following century and these four countries gradually strengthened their ties. In this situation, Russia attempted to expand its influence into the Balkans. However, at that time the Ottoman control over the Balkans was still so firm that such attempts were unsuccessful.This situation, however, changed when the Russo-Ottoman war broke out in 1768. In this war, the Russian troops defeated the Ottoman troops at most fronts including Greece and the Danubian principalities. As Russia's victory continued, the orthodox subjects in the Balkans began to expect Russian protection. Consequently, the Habsburg Empire and Prussia sensed an impending crisis due to the expansion of the Russian influence into the Balkans, and they began to intervene in this war as mediators. In the peace negotiations, although Russia occupied most of the territory of Wallachia and Moldavia, it was obliged to return both countries to the Ottoman Empire because of immense pressure from both the mediators. Nevertheless, Russia attempted to maintain its influence on the Danubian principalities and to obtain some clues for its advancement into the Balkans in the future. In 1774, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed a peace agreement at Kuchuk Kainardji.Then, we analyse the contents of this treaty. We consider that there were three articles that enabled Russian advancement into the Balkans. Firstly, Article 16 stipulates Ottoman protection for the local subjects in Wallachia and Moldavia and in this article Russia obtained a voice concerning the affairs of both principalities. This right allowed Russia to officially involve itself in the issues pertaining to the Danubian principalities, and these two countries provided the base for Russia's further advancement into the Balkans. Secondly, some researchers have conjectured that owing to this treaty, Russia obtained the right to protect the orthodox Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire; however, this is not true. Article 7 states that the orthodox Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire must be protected by the Porte and not by Russia. The above-mentioned misunderstanding was caused due to Russia's exaggerated insistence on the eve of the Crimean War that in this treaty, it had obtained the right to protect the orthodox Ottoman subjects. However, it is true that this treaty was indirectly the beginning for Russia's insistence. Thirdly, Article 11, which stipulates the activities of merchants, provides Russia the right to open consulates anywhere within the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Using this right, Russia opened consulates and vice-consulates in the Danubian principalities in the 1780s, followed by those in the other Balkan areas in the nineteenth century. These consulates played an important role in Russian advancement into the Balkans by collecting information, maintaining contact with local leaders, ecclesiastics and other local influential men.Thus, this treaty was of great significance for Russian advancement into the Balkans.

Il dipinto della battaglia di Cialdiran in Sicilia

A large painting of the Chaldiran’s battle (1514) is exhibited in a historical palace of noble families in Sicily. Beneath the war scene a long inscription describes the battle between Sultan Selīm I and Shāh Esmā‘īl I, as well as the position and number of the Ottoman forces. The inscription is in the Italian language and seems to be written by an observer. The number of the different Ottoman troops is very detailed but it is not found nor mentioned in the historical sources of that epoch. The scene seems realistic and true to the reality represented. This painting is indeed a rarity and possibly unique in Europe. It may well be the only evidence regarding this historical event, so important to the Ottoman, Persian and Kurdish history. The painting beats no date nor author’s signature. It probably originated towards the end of the 16th or the first half of the 17th century. The painter was probably from middle Europe, possibly around Germany. Why is this painting in Palazzo Mirto? The archives of the noble families (Spucches, Filangeri, Lanza) do not contain any reference of this painting. All explanations are valid: the painting being commissioned a century after the battle from a member of the family based on a draft of an ancestor who was present in Chaldiran, or the painting having been acquired in the following centuries. The most important questions are: who could possibly have some interest in exalting the Sultan of Costantinople in Palermo, and for what reasons?

Early Turkish Naval Activities

Without effective control of the Straits there would have been no Otto man empire, for the survival of this state, with lands in both Europe and Asia, required a secure ability to transport forces constantly between the two sections of its territory. From the time of the first Ottoman entry into Europe in the mid-14th century, Ottoman troops were shuttled back wards and forwards between Europe and Asia. It therefore follows that the Ottomans must have had some sort of na

Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the rebirth of the ottoman empire

For more than three decades Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz played a crucial role in the development of military relations between the German and Ottoman Empires. He trained and advised the Ottoman army, and commanded Ottoman troops in the First World War. He was a firm believer in the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's political and military revival, this belief reflecting his own conservative, militarist ideology. From 1898 onwards he was also a firm advocate of a German‐Ottoman alliance in a future war against Britain, arguing that Ottoman expeditionary forces sent against Egypt and India could deal mortal blows to Britain's world power.

Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul: Charles V, Sultan Suleyman, and the Habsburg Embassy of 1533-1534

AbstractThree prophecies current in Istanbul in the summer of 1533 pointed toward the imminent destruction of the Ottoman empire by Christian powers. One of the predictions stated that Alvise Gritti, the bastard son of the doge of Venice, would bring about the ruin of the Ottomans. A confidant of Sultan Srlcyman and the grand vizier, Gritti was deeply involved in the war of the Ottomans against Charles V of the Spanish-Habsburg empire, as a commander of Ottoman troops, advisor on Western affairs, and governor-general of the Hungarian kingdom. Widely detested by Ottoman officials, however, Gritti felt that his power was waning in 1534. In response, he perhaps was inspired to play out his prophetic role, for he told an ambassador of Charles V that he would help the emperor's forces capture Istanbul while Sultan Süleyman was away at war. Millenarian speculation was widespread in the early sixteenth century, but sometimes it had direct consequences inasmuch as it came to figure in the calculations of political actors. Examination of the prophecies of 1533 within the context of the time nicely illustrates how prophecy and politics could have a reciprocal relationship, with the former being tailored to the occasion and the latter responding to apocalyptic foreboding.

Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in Postwar Beirut

For many westerners the dominant image of Beirut, its buildings reduced to bombed-out shells riddled with bullet holes, freezes the city in time. Although the memory of Lebanon's civil-war landscape looms large in the collective consciousness, the nation has moved forward and seeks a revived economic role in the Middle East. And Beirut is being rebuilt. The society and government confront the dual tasks of reconstructing the physical infrastructure of the city while attempting to create interreligious societal harmony to ensure peace. In light of the major demographic and political shifts that initiated and sustained intersocietal hostilities, it is imperative to place reconstruction plans for Beirut within Lebanon's social and political context. Although armed conflict has ended, many of the issues that aggravated relationships among the country's various confessional groups remain unresolved.(1) The physical and economic reconstruction of Beirut thus holds enormous implications for the future of Lebanon. The greatest challenge is to use the reconstruction process to weld the divergent sectors of the multireligious society and to create, along with economic prosperity, a stronger sense of national unity. Yet reconstruction also has the potential to aggravate old tensions between groups and to renew internal strife. Although the case of Beirut has unique aspects, the problem of joining divergent sectors of society while repairing the built environment is not limited to Lebanon. The apportionment of representative space for ethnic or religious groups will surely be raised during the reconstruction of Sarajevo and throughout the republics of the former Yugoslavia as well. Issues of economic and cultural integration face East European cities as they try to attract investment and create a regional economic presence. A unified Berlin, specifically, faces the challenge of integrating Ossies and Wessies economically and culturally. Admittedly, though, the stakes may be higher in Lebanon, where reconstruction is assumed to be the foundation for future stability and where the propensity for violence is certainly great. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Though not as monumental an Arab city as Cairo or Damascus, Beirut has held an important and occasionally central role in the Levant for 2,000 years. Much of its historical prominence derived from a favorable maritime location that allowed creation of a trade-based economy. Its important role as a broker for trade between Europe and the Middle East expanded in the fifteenth century with the return of Europeans (they had twice seized the city during the Crusades but were lastingly repelled in 1291) (Boulanger 1965). Beirut's central role in the economy of Greater Lebanon was solidified during the last stage of Ottoman rule (1840-1920).(2) In a period marked by rapid growth, the city's population increased from 6,000 in 1820 to 120,000 by the close of the nineteenth century (Reed and Ajami 1988, 16). Newly created infrastructure, including a major addition to the port of Beirut, facilitated economic growth and drew additional immigrants. The city expanded beyond its old walls as immigrants and refugees arrived, fleeing a civil war between the country's Maronite Christians and Druze sectarians. Members of each religion tended to live among their own, creating Beiruti suburbs that were distinctly homogeneous (Reed and Ajami 1988). Following the defeat of Ottoman troops in 1918 by British and Arab troops, control of Lebanon and Syria was given to France under the newly established League of Nations mandate system. During French control, which lasted from 1920 to 1943, economic and cultural links were forged between Lebanon and Europe that would persist long after French rule ended. Economic and educational opportunities further facilitated the growth of Beirut, the center of French administration, and its population. In the twentieth century Beirut absorbed waves of immigrants, ranging from Armenians to Kurds, who increased both the size and the diversity of its population (Khalaf and Khoury 1993). …

Feeding the Ottoman Troops on the Danube, 1768–1774

Provisioning of armies of 100,000 and more was one of the great challenges of all the states of Europe in the eighteenth century, forcing the coordination of production and supply of foodstuffs, and contributing to the incorporation of the military systems into the early modern state.1 Mobilisation and provisioning of the army were likewise the prime economic motivators of the Ottoman Empire, which had a long and distinguished history of the production and distribution of war supplies over vast distances, originally for the Janissary corps, and subsequently for the irregulars (levendler), the bulk of the fighting forces in the eighteenth century. Focussing on the production of biscuit, or hardtack (peksimet), for the Danubian battlefront during the 1768-74 Russo-Ottoman War, this article examines the costs and methods of financing its production, the success and failure of distribution, as well as the benefits and hazards of participation in Ottoman military fiscalism. The Ottoman government had come to rely on a provincial class of notables, consistently called ayans in the documentary evidence, for the oversight and completion of transactions driven by the exigencies of a war economy. Although the emergence of this class of officials has been corroborated by a number of studies, no one has yet considered the impact of war on these 'stewards of redistributions',2 who both profited and were coopted as the state 'reached directly into communities and households to seize the wherewithal of war'. 3 One estimate for the problems facing the armies of Europe during the later seventeenth century indicates that 60,000 soldiers and 40,000 horses required close to one million pounds of food a day.4 Costs of such demands on the society at large are extremely hard to calculate, even in western Europe, which has been far more extensively studied in this regard than the Ottoman Empire.5 One recent study of the Russian army acknowledged that the lack of data on prices combined with existing contradictory evidence makes estimating costs for the eighteenth century practically impossible.6 The Ottoman case may prove similarly intractable, but few attempts have been made even to pose the question.

Enver Pasha: the formative years

In the summer of 1908, Enver, an Ottoman army officer serving in Macedonia, became a hero of the Young Turk revolution. At that time his daring moves in the Balkans against the despotism of Sultan Abdulhamid II attracted the attention of an international audience. His exploits also earned and the Middle East in the early 1900s, he nevertheless became and has remained an enigma in history. Enver was born in Istanbul in 1881. At the age of six, Enver accompanied his father, a civil engineer, to Monastir (Bitolj), an important administrative center for Ottoman rule in Macedonia. After attending the elementary and military preparatory schools in Monastir, Enver returned to Istanbul and entered the elite imperial academy of military science, the Harbiye.' Enver excelled in both the regular cadet and advanced general staff educational programs and graduated in 1902, second in the class of twelve general staff officers.2 He was ordered to field duty in the Balkans, where he obtained experience in each of the combat branches: artillery, cavalry and infantry. He skirmished with guerrillas, became familiar with the terrain of European Turkey, and involved himself in the anti-Hamidian Union and Progress movement that culminated in the Young Turk revolution of 1908. In April 1909 he hurried from his military attache's post in Berlin to help suppress a revolt of political, military and religious dissidents in Istanbul; in late 1911 and most of 1912, he directed Arab-Turk resistance against the Italian occupation of Ottoman territory in North Africa. During the Balkan Wars, Enver participated in the Unionist coup d'etat of January 1913 in Istanbul and, later that year, led victorious Ottoman troops into the city of Edirne (Adrianople), which had been held for a short time by the Bulgarians. In 1914, as minister of war, Enver helped guide the Ottoman empire into the First World War on the side of the central powers. Although the catastrophe that war brought to Turkey did force Enver to flee his homeland, he continued to flirt with danger and with elusive goals until his death in 1922 at the hands of Bolsheviks operating in Turkestan.3 The above highlights of Enver's career reflect what Enver did; but they do not explain why Enver acted as he did. In order to understand Enver's actions, we must turn to his formative years and consider the influences upon

Political Conflict and Military Strategy: The Case of Crete as Exemplified by Basilicata's Relatione of 1630

Although there are very many documentary sources available for the study of the Venetian occupation in Crete, relatively little use has yet been made of them. One such source is the Relatione of 1630 by Basilicata. This manuscript contains a detailed account of the military defences of Crete, including its fortresses and troops. It also includes a discussion of contemporary military strategies relative to the distinctive topography of Crete, special attention being given to defence needs in the event of invasion. By 1630 the extent and influence of the Venetian republic had diminished, while that of the Ottoman Empire had greatly increased. In 1645 Ottoman troops invaded Crete and the island was taken. THERE exists at present no comprehensive and detailed account of Crete during the period of the Venetian occupation, from approximately 1207 to 1645. An outline of its main features, however, may be pieced together from a variety of sources. These include many wider studies within the field of history, such as La Romanie Vdnitienne au Moyen Age by Thiriet (1959) and a few geo- graphical works, such as Crete by Clutton and Kenny (1976). There exist also a number of more specialized works, amongst which those of Gerola (1905-32), Noiret (1892), Spanakis (1957) and Xanthoudidis (1939) may be mentioned as being of particular value. Several of these works refer to and make use of contemporary documentary sources, but as yet there has been very little attempt to study in depth the detailed information contained in the routine annual reports and in the special reports of the colonial administration which governed in Crete on behalf of the Most Serene Republic of Venice for a period of four and a half centuries. Much of the material has been lost, some during the month-long sea voyage between Crete and Venice, and more during the subsequent three centuries, but much still survives. One of the surviving manuscripts which is of particular interest is that discussed in this paper. It is a lengthy special report, written by a Venetian who had been resident in Crete for a number of years, and contains, inter alia, a detailed geographical account of the island, in a