Ostensive-inferential Communication Research Articles

“MeaningNN” and “showing”: Gricean intentions and relevance-theoretic intentions

A much discussed feature of Grice's (1957) account of intentional communication is the line he drew between showing and meaningNN, where meaningNN typically involves a linguistic convention or code. This distinction has had substantial effects on the development of pragmatics: pragmatists have focused on the notion of meaningNN and abstracted away from cases of showing. This paper explores the central differences between Gricean meaningNN intentions and relevance theory intentions. Firstly, relevance theory does not attempt to draw the line Grice drew, and recognizes both showing and meaningNN as instances of overt intentional or ostensive-inferential communication. Rather than there being a sharp cut-off point between the two notions, there is a continuum of cases in between. Secondly, in contrast to the kind of intention proposed by Grice, the relevance-theoretic informative intention is not characterized as an intention to modify the hearer's thoughts directly–“to produce a particular response r.” This intention, it is argued, is not always reducible to an intention to communicate simply a single proposition and propositional attitude (or even a small set). This second move sheds new light on how better to analyze some of the weaker, vaguer aspects of communication, including the communication of impressions, emotions, attitudes, feelings and sensations.

Verbal information transmission without communicative intention

Language use and communication cannot be equated entirely, since verbal communication is not the only form of language use. There are several other kinds of language use including the use of language to inform, think, memorize, learn, take notes, play, sing for fun or in psycholinguistic experiments, as has been exemplified and argued for in some grammatical and pragmatics traditions. The present paper attempts to characterize a non-communicative form of language use, namely, informative language use. First, with the help of re-analyses of various example types previously analyzed from different perspectives in the pragmatics literature, the paper illustrates the real, independent existence of informative language use. Second, relying on these re-analyses of examples, and also applying a definition of ostensive-inferential communication, informative language use and communicative language use are distinguished. Third, the paper characterizes informative language use in detail and demonstrates what similarities and differences informative versus communicative forms of language use have. The conclusion of the research presented here is, on the one hand, that people's verbal behavior cannot be evaluated independently of their intentions, and, on the other hand, that utterances in a verbal interaction should be analyzed individually, and relying on the speakers' intentions that can be identified only by considering various linguistic and non-linguistic factors. For example, one and the same utterance can be treated as a manifestation of communicative language use toward an addressee and at the same time, as a manifestation of informative language use toward another person. It should also be emphasized that making a distinction between the informative and communicative forms of language use, first, has indisputable advantages in explaining the phenomena in language use, and second, results in a more comprehensive modeling of pragmatic competence.

The principles of communicative language use

The paper aims to overview some typical principles of communicative language use in a cognitive pragmatic approach applying a reductionist method in order to demonstrate that the well-known principles can be reduced to a very general rationality (economy) principle. After briefly reviewing the principles the paper re-evaluates them and provides a new classification of them relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential communication. The principles which can be divided into rationality and interpersonality principles are really principles of effective information transmission on objects and selves. They refer to two kinds of language use: informative and communicative ones. The only principles valid for only communicative language use are the communicative principle of relevance and the principle of communicative intention suggested in the present article. Finally, the paper reduces all rationality and interpersonality principles to a very general rationality principle, i.e., the cognitive principle o...

Inference and Relevance in Paul's Allegory of the Wild Olive Tree

Relevance theory accounts for Paul's preference for 'the wild olive' tree in using horticultural practices of grafting to symbolise his mission to the Gentiles. The olive tree facilitates inclusive imagery. The principle of ostensive inferential communication also accounts for the violation of horticultural conventions. Relevance juxtaposes God who calls and Israel that fails. The remnant as cultivated olive is the balance of this process. Relevance 'roots' the symbolism in election and the covenant as origins of Israel. Israel obtains eschatological relevance and significance. Gentile Christians are drawn into eschatological Israel. The church is rooted in continuity with the historical Israel. The juxtaposition of different readings renders all interpretation relative. Yet, changing the cognitive environment of its readers guarantees the relevance of exegetical discourse.