Preventing with Peace Policies or Counterinsurgency - What Is at Stake?In Central Asia, the operates under the name IS Khorasan2 via Afghanistan. It has approximately 6,500 fighters from all of the Central Asian states under its command. division is an offshoot of under the leadership of Hafiz Saeed, a Pashtun appointed the Emir of the Khorasan Caliphate in Afghanistan by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS. In view of this danger and other risks, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), led by Russia, decided a range of measures in 2015 to secure the external borders of the Central Asia states with Afghanistan, particularly along the 1,300-km border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Likewise, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has also addressed military and security policy measures aimed at preventing from entering the region.The experience gained in the War on Terror and with counterinsurgency measures in the Middle East and Afghanistan may only have a limited value in the effort to prevent from spreading to the Eurasian OSCE area. first reason, according to the Peace Report 2015 published by the German peace research institutes, is that the primacy of military and security policy measures proved to be fatal in the fight against and other jihadist groups: The 'War on Terror' proclaimed after September 11, 2001 [...] to a large extent produced more of the terrorism that it was supposed to prevent.3 second reason is that this approach only has a limited effect in terms of deradicalization and, in some respects, can also be counterproductive because it leads to the disintegration of states and produces flows of refugees.However, the findings regarding the character, objectives and tactics of should not be neglected. First, this includes the understanding that is not only a brutal terrorist organization with a Salafist-jihadist orientation, but also an uprising and a movement at the same time.4 According to statements made at an expert hearing before US Congress, the organization's objective is to bring about revolutionary change of the existing political and order. Thus, the strategic challenge of our generation is not one characterized by its objective of establishing a Salafist state (caliphate) and abolishing artificial international borders, which it claims were drawn with the aim of dividing the Islamic community.5 Third, predominantly attacks weak states with a strong potential for internal conflicts, religious polarization and state failure. These characteristics mean that is much more dangerous than a mere terrorist organization, which could be targeted with countermeasures aimed specifically at the organization. However, the Eurocentric security initiative of combating Islamist terrorism to prevent it from spreading to Europe does not focus on preventing conflicts and tackling their causes, and therefore leaves room for Salafist-jihadist groups to operate in the OSCE area.What is at stake is that - as a violent and uncompromisingly Salafist revolutionary and social organization - would have a sustained influence on and could even forcibly change regimes, ongoing developments and the distribution of power in a key region of Eurasia. This particularly applies to the strengthening of governance in uncompleted nation-building processes, such as in Central Asia. Therefore, questions arise: Can secular states continue to exist, or will they be replaced by either moderate or radical Islamic states? Which interpretation of Islam will the populations follow when turning to Islam in huge numbers as in Central Asia - a modern Islamic or a radical interpretation?6 And finally: Will the common Eurasian region be divided by a belt of caliphates?Transregional Instability as a Gateway for ISThe Central Asian and the Caucasian transition regions are characterized by cross-generational discontent and insecurity. …