N RECENT YEARS, few institutions have impressed Western politicians and economists more than the indicative methods developed over the past two decades in France. French economic planning has been widely acclaimed as proof that democratic planning is possible in market-oriented economies, and that public and private sectors can harmoniously co-exist in a mixed economy. It has also been held up as an example of how well the Western world has digested the lessons of Lord Keynes as well as those of the entire twentieth century. But time often plays rude tricks. For lately, at the height of its fame and prestige, French planning seems caught at a crossroads. There is real question whether le will survive the next few years at all in its original essence. The plan's chief attraction has been its unique manner of combining the virtues of central economic direction with those of an autonomous, competitive market sector. Plan drafts are drawn up in terms of aggregate goals (rate of growth of national product, increase in private consumption, rate of investment, distribution of income), and these goals are achieved largely by the cooperation of private industry; there has been no expansion of the nationalized sector since 1946. Of course any such plan benefits from the sheer size of the public sector in France. Nationalized industries already embrace much of the commanding heights: railroads, airlines, gas and electricity, coal, the Banque de France, the four largest deposit banks, and the principal insurance companies, as well as major portions of the chemical, automobile, aviation equipment, and petroleum refining industries. It is estimated that roughly one-third of all annual capital investment is done by these nationalized industries, whose adherence to plan goals provides that necessary head start toward success. Yet the plan does go further, to draw the private sector as well into the process of centralized decision-making. Using as enticement the possibilities of turning to mutual advantage the market interdependencies that always exist among all industries and firms, the planners bring together, ideally, representatives of industry, labor, agriculture, and government for a dual purpose. This consultation procedure produces (1) estimates of output, capacity, and productivity on the part of the participants, and (2) an independent forecast for the entire economy supplied by the planners themselves. The forecast is normative, insofar as it seeks to foster reciprocal relationships that can guide the economy toward specific plan objectives. Its basis is some predetermined rate of economic growth that embodies a set of optimum conditions. Estimates and forecast are then compared, and any serious discrepancies are resolved (hopefully, more in favor of what the planners desire). The result is a plan for the over-all level and composition of economic activity a plan whose aggregate and sectoral goals are consistent since they have been established by group agreement.