Oregon Health Division Research Articles

Hair smoothing treatments: Perceptions and wrong practices among females in Saudi Arabia

Introduction: In the last few years, smoothing hair treatments has taken the Saudi cosmetic industry by storm, all containing various levels of formaldehyde, a classified carcinogen by The World Health Organization (WHO), International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division (Oregon OSHA). With the lack of studies –in Saudi Arabia and worldwide- the level of public awareness and their malpractice is questionable. Materials and Methods: Online and paper self-administered questionnaires were distributed over 1039 females. Including questions assessing knowledge on hair treatments, previous experiences and side effects. Results: (60%) of participant had a poor knowledge score. When asked if formaldehyde is a carcinogen, (70.5%) did not know and (5.1%) answered incorrectly. (33.5%) of participants had done hair treatments before, but (52.3%) didn't read about them prior. The major motive was to facilitate hair management (76.1%). (57.5%) of participants said their hair wasn't examined before the treatment, and only (31%) applied scalp barriers. Flat irons were used in most cases (83.6%). Most importantly, (55.2%) did not know if the product used contains formaldehyde, and (15.2%) used formaldehyde-containing products. The majority (74.7%) reported having side effects, mostly hair fall (56.9%) and dandruff (30.5%). When asked if they would consider using hair treatments again, (61.2%) said no, mainly because of the damage and side effects (90.6%). Limitations: Majority of participants being from the central region of Saudi Arabia and the limited older age group (9.6%). Conclusion: Recently, in 2016, the Saudi Food and Drug Authority published a warning article on four products found in local markets containing high levels of formaldehyde. This shows the lack of industrial supervision and consumers protection and the need of strict monitoring regimens in stores and beauty salons. Future studies should be applied in assessing the public's misconceptions and practices, along with campaigns and social media efforts to raise the overall knowledge.

Evaluation of microcystin contamination in blue-green algal dietary supplements using a protein phosphatase inhibition-based test kit

The cyanobacterium Aphanizomenon flos-aquae (AFA), from Upper-Klamath Lake, Oregon, are used to produce blue-green algal (BGA) dietary supplements. The periodic co-occurrence of hepatotoxin-producing contaminant species prompted the Oregon Health Division to establish a limit of 1 μg/g microcystin (MC) for products sold in Oregon in 1997. At the federal level, the current good manufacturing practice (CGMP) regulations for dietary supplements require manufacturers establish a specification, and test, for limits on contaminants that may adulterate finished products. Despite this, several previous international surveys reported MC in BGA supplements in excess of 1 μg/g. The objectives of this study were (1) identify a reliable, easy to use test kit for the detection of MC in dried BGA materials and (2) use this kit to assess the occurrence of MC contamination in AFA-BGA dietary supplements in the U.S. A commercial protein phosphatase inhibition assay (PPIA), based on the enzyme PP2A, was found to have acceptable relative enzyme inhibition and accuracy for the majority of MC variants tested, including those most commonly identified in commercial samples, making the kit fit for purpose. Using the PPIA kit, 51% (26 of 51) distinct AFA-BGA products had MC ≥0.25 μg/g (the detection limit of the kit), 10 products had MC concentrations between 0.5 and 1.0 μg/g, and 4 products exceeded the limit (1.1–2.8 μg/g). LC-MS/MS confirmed PPIA results ≥0.5 μg/g and determined that MC-LA and MC-LR were the main congeners present. PPIA is a reliable method for the detection of MC contamination in dried BGA dietary supplements produced in the U.S. While the majority of AFA-BGA products contained ≥0.25 μg/g MC, most were at or below 1.0 μg/g, suggesting that manufacturers have adopted this level as a specification in these products; however, variability in recommended serving sizes prevented further analysis of consumer exposure based on the concentrations of MC contamination found.

Releasing pre-adoption birth records: the impact of Oregon's experience on its vital records department.

In November 1998, Oregon voters passed Ballot Measure 58, which allowed Oregon adoptees > or = 21 years of age access to their original birth records, which are sealed at adoption. The objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of the measure on the Oregon Health Division (since renamed Oregon Health Services) by assessing procedures used and resources needed after implementation of Measure 58. Vital records employees were interviewed about processing, storage, and archive retrieval procedures for pre-adoption birth records before, during, and after the implementation of Measure 58 and the effect on their usual workload. Personnel time, space, and fiscal resources used to process requests for pre-adoption records were also calculated. The Oregon Health Division began to receive requests from adoptees immediately following the passage of Measure 58 in November 1998, but due to legal challenges, they could not be processed until May 31, 2000. From June 2, 2000, through October 20, 2000, 12 staff members and two supervisors issued more than 4,700 pre-adoption birth records while also processing their normal workload, which averages more than 135,400 vital record orders annually. Due to the need for retrieval from archives, requests for pre-adoption birth records were estimated to take 75 hours to process vs. 2-3 minutes for standard requests. Each batch of approximately 75 pre-adoption birth records required approximately 12.5 person-hours from vital records staff and 3-4 person-hours from archive personnel; in addition, supervisors spent time responding to incomplete orders, informing the public and the media, and responding to concerns of adoptees, birth parents, and adoptive parents. Fewer than 1% of requests went unfilled. Implementation of Measure 58 utilized substantial resources of the Oregon Health Division. States contemplating similar legislation should consider increasing personnel and resources, preparing for intense public and media interest, and reorganizing the storage of adoptees' original birth records so they are easily retrieved.

The Feasibility of Using Skin Protectant Products and Education to Prevent Poison Oak

Poison oak and poison ivy are common in the Pacific Northwest. Poison oak often grows in dense clusters of bushes, with vines up to 30 feet that can twine around tree trunks or other plants, making it difficult for field and woodland workers to avoid contact.1,2 The oil (urushiol) found in the leaves, roots, stalks, and berries of these plants causes an allergic reaction, with catechols as the active allergens.1–6 Exposure to the oil can occur by direct skin contact with the plants, by contact with or inhalation of soot or smoke particles from burning plants, by contact with aerosolized urushiol released during chain sawing, or by contamination or penetration of clothing, boots, work gloves, and tools.2,3 Among agricultural workers, exposure commonly occurs during brush cutting, land clearing, or burning activities. Among forestry workers, exposure commonly occurs during timber cruising and marking, tree felling, climbing and bucking, yarding and loading, tree replanting, and firefighting.3,7,8 Exposure to poison oak or poison ivy is the most common cause of allergic contact dermatitis resulting in accepted Oregon workers’ compensation claims. The Oregon Health Division’s analysis of Oregon workers’ compensation claims data showed that 106 (13%) of 800 accepted claims for dermatitis were caused by poison oak or poison ivy from October 1, 1992, to September 30, 1999. Of these 106 claims, 28 (26%) were submitted by agricultural and forestry workers. The pattern of occupational dermatitis from poison oak/ivy that we observed in Oregon is similar to that observed by the US Department of Agriculture Department of Forestry in California and Washington for forestry workers and firefighters where these plants also exist.2,6–8 Because of the impact of allergic contact dermatitis

DERIVATION OF SHELLFISH HARVEST REOPENING CRITERIA FOLLOWING THE NEW CARISSA OIL SPILL IN COOS BAY, OREGON

Oil spills in Alaska, California, Maine, and other states have raised concerns regarding potential contamination of fish and shellfish, and have led to temporary closures of seafood harvests while health risks are assessed. Lacking standardized protocols, these assessments are generally ad hoc, site-specific efforts, with significant differences in risk evaluation criteria. This article describes the response of a state health agency to shellfish contamination following an oil spill on the Oregon coast, and discusses some of the factors that can complicate the evaluation of potential health risks from consumption of oil-contaminated shellfish. On 4 February 1999, the Japanese-owned cargo ship M/V New Carissa, carrying an estimated 400,000 gallons of light diesel and heavy fuel oil, ran aground 2 miles north of Coos Bay, Oregon. Damage to the ship?s hull from the grounding and pounding surf caused the release of an estimated 25,000 to 70,000 gallons of oil. Concern for potential contamination of local recreational shellfish and commercial oyster beds prompted the Oregon Department of Agriculture (ODA) to close shellfish harvesting in Coos and Douglas counties. ODA requested assistance from the Oregon Health Division in the derivation of risk-based criteria for reopening the shellfish harvest. Criteria were developed for the primary contaminants of concern, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) expressed as total benzo[a]pyrene (BaP) equivalents. "Safe (<10 µg/kg) and "unsafe" (>45 µg/kg) BaP equivalent levels were derived based on upper end (32.5 g/d) and average (7.5 g/d) estimates of shellfish consumption, respectively. Composite samples of oysters, clams, and mussels (15?20 per composite) were collected from target areas and analyzed for PAHs by gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy (GC/MS). Carcinogenic PAHs were converted to total BaP equivalents (wet weight) and compared with criteria. Two oyster samples, collected from a slough off of Coos Bay, contained 33.9 and 34.5 µg/kg BaP equivalents; all other samples had less than 10 µg/kg BaP equivalents. An evaluation of the PAH profiles in the two higher oyster samples indicated a primary source other than the New Carissa oil. Because shellfish sample BaP equivalents attributable to the New Carissa oil spill did not exceed 10 µg/kg, shellfish harvesting was reopened on 4 March 1999. This study revealed some of the inherent difficulties in attempting to quantify health risks from contaminated shellfish following an oil spill and demonstrated the clear need for standardized protocols for responding to such events.

Ignore AIDS and it will bury the rest of you.

A poster entitled Ignore AIDS and It Will Bury the Rest of You was designed to rally the public to take the AIDS outbreak seriously. The poster was created for the Oregon Health Division by Pihas Schmidt and Westerdahl in 1987 the image plays off the common saying about ostriches burying their heads in the sand and darkens it with the possibility of death. It portrays an endless succession of people reaching to the horizon hinting at the consequences of willful isolation and ignorance. The poster subtly carries messages at three levels: 1) it prompts individuals to take precautions against infection; 2) it promotes communal efforts to contain the outbreak; 3) it points to the need for research to battle the illness.

Butyltins in shellfish, finfish, water and sediment from the Coos Bay estuary (Oregon, USA)

Butyltin was measured in tissue, water and sediment samples collected throughout Coos Bay estuary between 1986 and 1997. Butyltin-induced shell deformation in commercial oysters prompted this assessment. Butyltins are released from tributyltin oxide (TBTO)-containing boat paint. Clams from three sites contained tributyltin (TBT) levels ranging from 168 to 457 μg/kg in 1992–1994. Consequently, Oregon Health Division (OHD) issued a shellfish consumption advisory in 1995; it was rescinded in 1997 after US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revised the TBTO oral reference dose (RfD). The revised RfD changed the tissue screening level from 112 to 1120 μg TBT/kg. Fifty percent of sediment samples collected during 1991–1997 and analyzed for total butyltins (TotBT) exceeded the Puget Sound Dredge Disposal Analysis Screening Level (PSDDA SL) of 73 μg TBT/kg dw. TotBT at three shipyards selected for site assessment by EPA ranged from 24 to 68,613 μg/kg dw. Sediment and tissue butyltins have been decreasing in all but one area of the estuary.

Assessing potential health risks from microcystin toxins in blue-green algae dietary supplements.

The presence of blue-green algae (BGA) toxins in surface waters used for drinking water sources and recreation is receiving increasing attention around the world as a public health concern. However, potential risks from exposure to these toxins in contaminated health food products that contain BGA have been largely ignored. BGA products are commonly consumed in the United States, Canada, and Europe for their putative beneficial effects, including increased energy and elevated mood. Many of these products contain Aphanizomenon flos-aquae, a BGA that is harvested from Upper Klamath Lake (UKL) in southern Oregon, where the growth of a toxic BGA, Microcystis aeruginosa, is a regular occurrence. M. aeruginosa produces compounds called microcystins, which are potent hepatotoxins and probable tumor promoters. Because M. aeruginosa coexists with A. flos-aquae, it can be collected inadvertently during the harvesting process, resulting in microcystin contamination of BGA products. In fall 1996, the Oregon Health Division learned that UKL was experiencing an extensive M. aeruginosa bloom, and an advisory was issued recommending against water contact. The advisory prompted calls from consumers of BGA products, who expressed concern about possible contamination of these products with microcystins. In response, the Oregon Health Division and the Oregon Department of Agriculture established a regulatory limit of 1 microg/g for microcystins in BGA-containing products and tested BGA products for the presence of microcystins. Microcystins were detected in 85 of 87 samples tested, with 63 samples (72%) containing concentrations > 1 microg/g. HPLC and ELISA tentatively identified microcystin-LR, the most toxic microcystin variant, as the predominant congener.

Assessing Potential Health Risks from Microcystin Toxins in Blue-Green Algae Dietary Supplements

The presence of blue-green algae (BGA) toxins in surface waters used for drinking water sources and recreation is receiving increasing attention around the world as a public health concern. However, potential risks from exposure to these toxins in contaminated health food products that contain BGA have been largely ignored. BGA products are commonly consumed in the United States, Canada, and Europe for their putative beneficial effects, including increased energy and elevated mood. Many of these products contain Aphanizomenon flos-aquae, a BGA that is harvested from Upper Klamath Lake (UKL) in southern Oregon, where the growth of a toxic BGA, Microcystis aeruginosa, is a regular occurrence. M. aeruginosa produces compounds called microcystins, which are potent hepatotoxins and probable tumor promoters. Because M. aeruginosa coexists with A. flos-aquae, it can be collected inadvertently during the harvesting process, resulting in microcystin contamination of BGA products. In fall 1996, the Oregon Health Division learned that UKL was experiencing an extensive M. aeruginosa bloom, and an advisory was issued recommending against water contact. The advisory prompted calls from consumers of BGA products, who expressed concern about possible contamination of these products with microcystins. In response, the Oregon Health Division and the Oregon Department of Agriculture established a regulatory limit of 1 microg/g for microcystins in BGA-containing products and tested BGA products for the presence of microcystins. Microcystins were detected in 85 of 87 samples tested, with 63 samples (72%) containing concentrations &gt; 1 microg/g. HPLC and ELISA tentatively identified microcystin-LR, the most toxic microcystin variant, as the predominant congener.

The Oregon Report: Neutrality at OHD?

The Oregon Death with Dignity Act is a citizen's initiative that makes physician-assisted suicide a legal option for terminally ill, eligible state residents. The act mandates that the Oregon Health Division develop a reporting system to monitor adherence to specific statutory requirements of the act, and to issue to the an annual statistical report, while maintaining the confidentiality of who participate. The act does not authorize the Oregon Health Division, as Foley and Hendin suggest, to investigate how physicians determine their patients' diagnoses and prognoses, nor does it give us the mandate to conduct psychological autopsies of participating patients. The reporting system for the act relies on information provided by the physicians who write prescriptions and sign the death certificates. During the first year we also interviewed participating physicians to gain additional information regarding the circumstances surrounding the patients' deaths. We carefully considered how much additional intrusion into the lives of patients and their families was acceptable. Given the intense media scrutiny of physician-assisted suicide in Oregon in 1998, we were especially concerned about an inadvertent breach of confidentiality that might result from a more invasive approach involving interviews with other health care providers or family members. We believe that our decision to conduct additional in-depth interviews only with the prescribing physicians best balanced the need for immediate information with the need to respect the privacy and confidentiality of involved. The authors of the article incorrectly state that the Oregon Health Division has been conducting a public relations campaign and that those sanctioned by the government to analyze its operation have become its advocates. This is not true. The reality is that the Oregon Health Division's role is to provide accurate data to the regarding participation in the act, which is exactly what we have done. Because this is such a hotly debated topic, with intense media attention, we broadly and openly disseminated the first year's data to as wide an audience as possible. This included issuing a press release and holding a briefing at the National Press Club. We also, at the governor's request, held a briefing for congressional staffers on both sides of the aisle, with varying positions on the act. In these briefings, we presented the data; we didn't argue either for or against the law. For example, we presented data on the time of ingestion to death. Although the median duration was 26 minutes, we pointed out that one patient lived for 11.5 hours after taking the medications. This information can be interpreted in either a positive (most patients died quickly) or negative (the time until death is not always rapid or predictable) manner. Our job is to present the data; it is up to others to decide whether or not the data

Oregon's Toxic Household Products Law

In 1991, Oregon became the first state in the U.S. to require the addition of an aversive agent to ethylene glycol-containing antifreeze and methanol-containing windshield wiper fluid. This new law, entitled "Toxic Household Products (THP) Act," was designed to reduce pediatric and animal poisonings from accidental ingestion of these two potentially lethal consumer automotive products. While not the stated intention of the law, addition of aversive agents to consumer automotive products could also reduce adult poisonings associated with intentional (suicides or alcoholics ingesting methanol-containing windshield wiper fluid) or accidental exposures. This law went into effect April 30, 1995, following settlement of a lawsuit brought by the Chemical Manufacturing Specialties Association (CSMA), a trade group representing the five largest manufacturers of ethylene glycol-based antifreeze in the U.S. This paper discusses the major policy issues that arose following the passage of Oregon's THP Act. Major provisions of the law are provided along with a discussion of CSMA's opposition to the Act's implementation. A description of the eventual settlement that was reached with CSMA as well as the major components of Oregon Health Division's (OHD) enforcement program are also highlighted. Data are presented for 1987 through 1998 on the number of exposures and severity of effects for pediatric cases (children < 6 years old) following exposure to both of these potentially lethal automotive products. However, because of the low incidence of exposures each year, these data are insufficient to draw any conclusions on the impact of the THP Act.

The first year of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act: Responses to the commentators.

This reaction article begins by differentiating the authors' data from the official Oregon Health Division Report on the Death with Dignity Act and then provides comments in response to each of the authors/teams who analyzed the original article. The authors use this opportunity to clear up some apparent misunderstandings, to highlight commonalities, and to emphasize a few fundamental differences of opinion.

The first year of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act: Responses to the commentators.

This reaction article begins by differentiating the authors' data from the official Oregon Health Division Report on the Death with Dignity Act and then provides comments in response to each of the authors/teams who analyzed the original article. The authors use this opportunity to clear up some apparent misunderstandings, to highlight commonalities, and to emphasize a few fundamental differences of opinion.

Mandated tuberculosis screening in a community of homeless people

Background: To examine the effects of a community program on tuberculosis incidence, prevalence, and transmission requiring users of public facilities to carry cards certifying their compliance with a tuberculosis screening, prophylaxis, and treatment program. Community knowledge of tuberculosis and costs and benefits of the program are described. Setting: A West Coast “skid row” community with historically high rates of tuberculosis, homelessness, poverty, and use of drugs and alcohol. Design: Analysis of tuberculosis activity in communities in Oregon using Oregon Health Division Tuberculosis Data Bank data. Description of community response and cost considerations. Main Outcome Measures: Rates of active disease, mortality, and skin-test response. Compliance with card use and understanding of tuberculosis control measures. Program expenditures. Results: An 89% drop in active disease in the highest-risk community in Oregon occurred over the first 10 years of the program. Compliance with the program permitting the use of public facilities, based on cooperation with skin testing, radiology, sputum collection, and therapy has been between 33% of converters completing prophylaxis in the worst year to 100% of active cases completing 4-drug therapy in the best. Facilities that provide services have been almost universal in requiring cooperation for participants. Costs have been reduced. Conclusion: A program of mandated compliance with tuberculosis skin testing, radiologic and sputum examination and treatment, coupled with education and outreach, succeeded in drastically reducing active tuberculosis, transmission, deaths, and cost in a homeless community.

The Oregon Report Don't Ask, Don't Tell

In a public document,[1] an article in the New England Journal of Medicine,[2] a National Press Club briefing, and visits to various congressional offices, the Oregon Health Division (OHD) has argued that assisted suicide is being carried out safely under the state's Death with Dignity Act. Unfortunately, the report is marked by its failure to address the limits of the information it has available, overreaching its data to draw unwarranted conclusions. Most striking, and least justified, is its contention without substantiating patient data that patients who were assisted in suicide were receiving adequate end-of-life care. In fact, we know nothing about the physical, psychological, and existential needs of the patients requesting assisted suicide. We know little of the capabilities of the physicians who are responding to those requests. And we know nothing of the context in which these patients live and are cared for. We opposed the legislation, but since it was passed both advocates and opponents share a responsibility to see to it that the law is administered so as to best protect patients. If insufficient data is being obtained in a flawed monitoring process, everyone should be concerned. Limited Data The data OHD has collected is largely epidemiological: the assisted suicide cases were divided between men and women, the median age of the patients was sixty-nine, all the patients were white, all but two of them had cancer, and the patients who chose assisted suicide were more likely to be divorced or never to have married. Physicians participating in assisted suicide are not asked to provide OHD with significant medical information about their patients. They are merely asked to check off a list on an OHD form indicating that such statutory requirements as a written request for a lethal dose of medication, a fifteen-day waiting period, and consultation with another physician have been met. Only one line is provided for both diagnosis and prognosis, although a diagnosis of terminal illness and prognosis of death within six months are the essential requirements for assisted suicide in the state. The form does not inquire on what basis the physician made the medical diagnosis--for example, review of x-rays, written material, pathology reports, or other information. Nor are physicians asked to report on what basis they made the prognosis--what tables they have used, what experts they have consulted. The form does not even inquire as to the patient's reasons for requesting assisted suicide. The data do not make it possible to know what transpired in any particular case. To supplement the meager information required by formal reporting, OHD asked physicians who participated in assisted suicide to respond in person or by phone to a questionnaire that was also given to physicians of a comparison (control) group of patients who died of similar illnesses without assisted suicide. OHD does not tell us who asked the questions, what their training was, and whether any follow-up questions were asked. But the questionnaire (published on the Internet)[3] and the report show that this effort was also flawed. Missing medical information was not asked for or provided. In the absence of medical data, how does OHD reach its conclusion that patients received adequate end-of-life care? From the facts--derived from the physician questionnaire--that the proportion of patients who had advance directives and were enrolled in hospice programs was comparably high for both the case and comparison groups, and that neither worry about pain control nor financial concerns drove patients' requests for assisted suicide. But neither advance directives nor enrollment in a hospice program provides proof of competent assessment and treatment--the essential components of adequate care--any more than does patients' apparent silence about palliative care or financial concerns. Such figures cannot substitute for direct knowledge of patients and their illnesses. …

Decline in Cigarette Consumption Following Implementation of a Comprehensive Tobacco Prevention and Education Program—Oregon, 1996-1998

In November 1996, residents of Oregon approved a ballot measure increasing the cigarette tax by 30 cents (to 68 cents per pack). The measure stipulated that 10% of the additional tax revenue be allocated to the Oregon Health Division (OHD) to develop and implement a tobacco-use prevention program. In 1997, OHD created Oregon's Tobacco Prevention and Education Program (TPEP), a comprehensive, community-based program modeled on the successful tobacco-use prevention programs in California and Massachusetts. To assess the effects of the tax increase and TPEP in Oregon, OHD evaluated data on the number of packs of cigarettes taxed before (1993-1996) and after (1997-1998) the ballot initiative and implementation of the program. Oregon's results also were compared with national data. This report summarizes the results of the analysis, which indicate that consumption of cigarettes in Oregon declined substantially after implementation of the excise tax and TPEP and exceeded the national rate of decline.

Modern Geographic Information Systems— Promise and Pitfalls

Alan L. Melnick, MD, MPH,is Assistant Professor at the Departments of Family Medicine and Public Health and Preventive Medicine, Oregon Health Sciences University, in Portland, Oregon. David W. Fleming, MD,is the State Epidemiologist. Oregon Health Division.

Oregon's SDWRLF gets under way

Oregon takes a step‐by‐step approach to setting up a state drinking water revolving loan fund.The 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act amendments established a Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) to help states and their community drinking water systems meet regulations. Oregon's efforts to secure and administer its share of the DWSRF led to the design and development of the state Safe Drinking Water Revolving Loan Fund (SDWRLF). The SDWRLF program was developed over the course of 18 months in close cooperation with the Oregon Drinking Water Advisory Committee, the Oregon Health Division, the Oregon Economic Development Department, and the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality. The design that emerged from their collaborative contributions represents a significant effort to improve and protect public drinking water systems in the state.

Adverse Ocular Reactions Following Transfusions—United States, 1997-1998

On December 23, 1997, the Portland region of the American Red Cross (ARC) notified the Oregon Health Division about a cluster of adverse ocular reactions among six patients who had received out-patient red blood cell (RBC) transfusions at a hospital in Washington; all patients experienced severe bilateral conjunctival erythema within 24 hours of transfusion. Since the initial report, 106 similar reactions in 74 patients in 14 states (Alabama, California, Connecticut, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin) have been identified. This report summarizes the preliminary findings from three of these states about the ongoing investigation of these reactions.

Methylmercury in fish from Owyhee Reservoir in southeast Oregon: scientific uncertainty and fish advisories

Data collected during 1987–1994 showed elevated levels of mercury (Hg) in fish tissue from the Owyhee Reservoir in southeastern Oregon. Sixty-five percent of the samples analyzed had total Hg levels exceeding the US Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) health screening value of 0.6 mg/kg. Eighteen out of 89 (20%) fish tissue samples also had total Hg levels greater than the US Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) mercury action level of 1.0 mg/kg. The overall mean Hg content for all fish collected from the reservoir was 0.75 mg/kg wet weight (wet wt.). Fish muscle taken from largemouth bass ( Micropterus salmoides), smallmouth bass ( Micropterus dolomieu) and channel catfish ( Ictalurus punctatus) had the highest mean Hg levels of 0.92, 0.87 and 0.82 mg/kg, respectively. In contrast, rainbow trout ( Salmo gairdneri) had the lowest mean Hg content of 0.37 mg/kg. Increases in total Hg concentrations were found to be positively correlated with size for rainbow trout and yellow perch. A weak but significant correlation was also observed between total mercury content and age for smallmouth bass. Based on these data, in 1994 the Oregon Health Division (OHD) issued a fish consumption advisory for the Owyhee Reservoir using a conservative risk-based approach. The process of defining and communicating these consumption limits is the subject of this paper.