Ordinary Speech Research Articles

Husserl, Derrida, and the Phenenology of Expression

Does expression resemble more closely this extreme exposure [of the face] than it does some supposed recourse to a code? -Emmanuel Levinas In the Logical Investigations Husserl distinguishes between and in order to locate that aspect of linguistic comportment that can be detached from empirical and psychological factors and so enter into the theory of pure logic. Expressive reveal the stratum of meaning (bedeuten), an act that informs and exhibits structures that underlie logical concepts and laws. The same interest in the logically and epistemologically relevant aspects of the linguistic order found throughout Husserl's works. In Formal and Transcendental Logic, for example, Husserl continues to leave out of consideration the pointing tendencies belonging to in favor of their quality of expressing a meaning. The spoken or written phenomenon is something we distinguish from the word itself' (FTL 20); the word a type, an ideal unity, and its meaning only as an ideal unity. Thus language has the Objectivity proper to the objectivities making up the socalled or cultural world, the Objectivity proper to bare physical Nature (FTL 20). Experience and Judgment develops the same view. All objectivities, including those of bare physical nature, have objective (i.e., are noematic unities of meaning), but is not, in the true sense, a predicate of the object.2 Linguistic objects, however, exhibit sense as a predicate, as a determination . . . belonging to their being itself, while at the same time, it belongs to the essence of linguistic objects not to be otherwise than in real embodiments whose significance they constitute (EJ 268). Such being a fusion, an animation: To the verbal articulations and forms of the locution there correspond articulations and formations of the or meaning. The latter, however, does lie externally beside the words; rather, in speaking we are continuously performing an internal act of meaning, which fuses with the words and, as it were, animates them. The effect of this animation that the words and the entire locution, as it were, embody in themselves a meaning, and bear it embodied in them as their sense. (FTL 22) The phenomenologist, then, never questions whether as best understood in terms of the concepts of sign and expression, concepts which implicate in a double ideality. On the one hand, there the ideality belonging to the sign as such; the token/type relation that sustains the possibility of iteration and repetition. On the other hand, there the ideality belonging to expression or meaning as such, i.e., the ideality of spiritual formations that neither reduce to physical embodiment nor exist apart from embodiment. Husserl tends to concentrate on the ideality of expressed meaning and thus to efface the sign as sign. Jacques Derrida, on the contrary, has argued that sign and meaning are intertwined in a way that the indicative function of linguistic a condition for the supposedly independent expressive function. He sees this as reasserting the rights of the body over the spirit, the letter over the logos; as rejecting Husserl's subordination of to the metaphysics of presence (spirit, being, intuition). As I will suggest in this essay, the upshot of the Husserl-Derrida debate appears to be a stalemate.3 Judging by Husserl's published works, one might assume that expression exclusively the province of linguistic signs. The Logical Investigations, for example, defines as meaningful signs in a way as to exclude much that ordinary speech would call an `expression' (such as facial expressions and the various gestures that involuntarily accompany speech) since such `expressions' are phenomenally one with the experiences made manifest in them in the consciousness of the man who manifests them, as the case with speech. …

Gender and Genitals: Constructs of Sex and Gender

Ruth Hubbard Of late, conservatives in science have been railing against social constructionism because it runs counter to the credo that, by its rigorous objectivity, science reveals the Truth about Nature. Fortunately, at the same time, other, more progressive natural and social scientists are deepening the analysis of biases that enter into the ways scientists conceptualize nature and that therefore shape the questions we ask about it and the answers we accept as plausible or true. Built-in biases are usually most blatant (though unfortunately not most obvious) in relation to questions that involve the interplay of biology and society, hence in relation to most questions having to do with human biology and medicine. They are especially prevalent, but also especially well concealed, when it comes to our understandings of sex and gender, since in Western societies sex and sex differences are linchpins of the way we conceptualize ourselves and our culture. Rather than bewail the conservative backlash against modern science studies, I would like to take the opportunity offered by this issue of Social Text to discuss some recent insights into the way the social and biological sciences have constructed sex and gender. In so doing, I accept the usual distinction between these concepts by which sex-whether we are male or female, men or women-is defined in terms of chromosomes (XX or XY), gonads (ovaries or testes), and genitals (the presence of a vagina or a penis-or, more usually, merely the presence or absence of a penis). Gender, specified as masculine or feminine, denotes the psychosocial attributes and behaviors people develop as a result of what society expects of them, depending on whether they were born female or male. However, as Kessler and McKenna and Barbara Fried have pointed out, the concepts of sex and are often overlapping and blurred, not only in ordinary speech but also in the scientific literature.1 Thus, note that Money and Ehrhardt's classic, Man and Woman, Boy and Girl, which popularized the distinction between the terms sex and gender, confuses them in the subtitle-Differentiation and Dimorphism of Gender Identity from Conception to Maturity-since, surely, conception is too early to speak of gender identity.2 Not all languages have two different words comparable to sex and gender. The fact that both terms are in common use in English may have encouraged American scientists to try to disentangle the biological aspects

The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context.

From the Publisher: Electronic communications are new language experiences in part by virtue of electrification. But how are they different from ordinary speech and writing? And what is the significance of this difference? This book explores these differences and in particular considers various theoretical perspectives that might be useful for opening new interpretive strategies for critical social theory in relation to these differences.

Modelling voice variations in female speech synthesis

The voice source is an important factor in the production of different voice qualities. These different voice qualities are used in speech to convey, among other things, different suprasegmental aspects, e.g., emphasis, phrase boundaries and also different speaking styles such as an authorititave or a submissive voice. Voice source variations are also an important means of conveying extralinguistic information of various kinds in ordinary speech. In the present study, voice source variations in normal speech by female speakers have been investigated using inverse filtering. The results of the inverse filtering are given in voice source parameters appropriate for controlling speech synthesis. Accordingly, the resulting descriptions have been utilized to produce voice variations in our new synthesis system.

The World Is Not a Novel

L. B. Cebik THE WORLD IS NOT A NOVEL For at least the last two decades, many literary theorists have sought to find the ultimate ground of fictional literature in the fictional nature of reality itself. If fictional literature is (somehow) an extension of our fictional reality, then that literature gains an order of epistemic prestige. Moreover, it acquires the special ability to tap into reality, a talent that science and similar pursuits lack by virtue of their delusions regarding truth. By deriving from the relationship offictional literature to fictional reality the particular and unique epistemic capacities of literature, we restore the centrality of literature to academic study, to education, to life and living themselves. The near historical impetus for the effort to relate fiction and reality in this manner perhaps owes more to Nietzsche than anyone else. The starding beginning to Beyond Good and Evil asks, "Granted we want truth: why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance?"1 Therefore, "the falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment. . . . The question is to what extent it is lifeadvancing , life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even speciesbreeding "; moreover, "our fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest judgments (to which synthetic judgments a priori belong) are the most indispensable to us," in other words, to "recognize untruth as a condition for life. . . ."2 Untruths in the name of truth—i.e., fictions— correspond in function to Nietzsche's Apollonian dream imagery and Dionysian ecstasy, which he had postulated as potentially life-giving and destructive in the early work, The Birth ofTragedy. In that work, Nietzsche had viewed fundamental human urges as "artistic."3 Literature, as we understand that term today, is both artistic and fictional. It meets the two most basic Nietzschean criteria for coming Philosophy and Literature, © 1992, 16: 68-87 L. B. Cebik69 close to, if not into, the core of what it is to be human. It replicates— or phenomenologically speaking, duplicates—the most fundamental ontological human act of positing a livable world. Such a view of fictional literature is surely tempting. Wolfgang Iser has succumbed to the temptation in his several analyses ofreading fictional literature. Examining his formulations may be more productive than probing Nietzsche's aphorisms. First, Iser typifies many literary theorists who wish to associate fiction with the fictions of life itself, although he uniquely argues his case with thoroughness. Second, unlike Nietzsche, Iser writes with a degree of clarity that offers some hope ofmore precisely specifying the questions raised by the association of literature and ontology. With that precision comes some hope of reasonable answers. Finally, Iser refers to some root sources—most notably Bentham and Vaihinger—which may assist in the effort to understand the relationship between fictions and fiction. Should we find Iser's account defective, no immediate consequences hold for other attempts to relate ontological and literary fiction, unless such attempts directly parallel Iser's. However, the lines of questions posed here may form abasis for the variant techniques needed to inquire into other arguments. That alone, and not any detailed critique of a small part of Iser's theories, justifies the size of the effort. In The Act of Reading, Iser does not so much develop his point of departure for the idea of fiction as he uses it to portray crucial elements about fictional literature and its interpretation. Beginning by rejecting the notion that "fiction is an antonym of reality," he adopts the view that fiction and reality are linked in terms of communication: "fiction is a means of telling us something about reality."4 Iser finds the communicative linkage in an extension of Austin-Searle speech acts. He takes exception to the dismissal offictionalliterarylanguage—in contrast to functional pragmatic language—as lacking "conventions, procedures, and guarantees of sincerity" (AR, p. 60). The Austin-Searle analysis treats fictional literary language as merely "an imitation of and not a deviation from ordinary speech," despite the fact that such language does not produce "similar consequences to those of normal use" (AR, p. 63). That very fact should have alerted speech-act analysts to the inadequacies of treating parasitic language solely in terms of imitation, which...

Externalism and Inference

Recent work in the theory of mental content has persuaded a large number of philosophers that many of the propositional attitudes attributed in ordinary speech and in psychology cannot be individuated wholly individualistically, without regard to the physical and/or social environment in which those attitudes are tokened. Even a Cartesian conception of thought could, of course, accommodate the claim that a person's de re attitudes might vary while his behavior and behavioral dispositions, his physical acts and states, and his qualitative feels, remained fixed. But de dicto attitudes, attitudes attributed with that-clauses forming oblique contexts, were traditionally held to be determined by facts wholly internal to the thinker whose attitudes they were. No more:

Donald Davidson and section 2.01 of themodel penal code

Section 2.01 of Model Penal Code sets out Code's version of notoriously difficult or requirement of an actus reus. A number of philosophers of law have commented upon confusion which surrounds notion of an act as a requirement for criminal liability. Hyman Gross holds that ...acts are not bodily movements. Those who talk as though they were do not reflect common sense, but simply resolve summarily by fiat an important problem that all of us in a more thoughtful moment perceive as difficult and obscure.[1] Later he tells us that the act itself, or rather very idea of an act, still remains veiled in mystery.[2] Glanville Williams has also stated: Considerable confusion reigns, both in ordinary speech and in legal speech, on what is meant by an act.[3] And D. O'Connor has added that the thoroughgoing analysis of actus reus necessary for criminal liability has yet to arrive,[4] a claim that Douglas Husak cites with approval and agreement.[5] Problems Stemming From Act Requirement This issue is not merely a definitional one. There are several traditional legal problems surrounding act requirement. One involves omissions. If an affirmative act is paradigm for criminal liability, how can one be liable for not acting? A standard account of an act for purposes of act requirement in criminal law is that it be a muscular contraction. This is John Austin's[6] account, as it is Holmes's[7] and J.S. MNill,s.[8] This view of a criminal act has been roundly criticized by H.L.A. Hart, among others.[9] Hart's criticism turns on two points, one of which is precisely ours.[10] Omissions are not muscular contractions of any sort, willed or otherwise. In this sense, they are non-events. Hart tells us...it is absurd even to attempt to fit omissions into such a picture....[11] A broader, but essentially simpler, definition is exemplified by Model Penal Code (hereinafter Code), where wer are told 'act' or 'action' means a bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary.[12] But this definition is faulted by Meir Dan Cohen precisely because it fails to include omissions (as well as possession).[13] A second, even more serious, problem is posed by negligence and strict liability. So-called involuntary actions, such as muscle spasms or movements while unconscious, must be excluded if act requirement is to mean anything. And they are excluded in Code.[14] Yet, unintentional action must be able to create liability in cases of negligence or strict liability, without throwing out act requirement. That is, if I negligently run over an infant in my car, it fails to be murder precisely because killing, indeed collision, was unintentional. How is this different from an involuntary act? The acts of driving, colliding, and killing are mine, and, based on a negligence doctrine, I can be held liable for them. But I cannot be held responsible if I lapse into unconsciousness at wheel (so long as it is not through earlier fault of my own). Intuitively, we sense a difference between an unintentional and an involuntary act, but how can we explain it? In neither case was I guilty of performing act of intentionally running over someone. What is conceptual difference between unintentionally driving over an infant and behavior of unconsciously doing so? And why should that conceptual difference make a moral and legal difference? In a way similar to negligence, but totally dissimilar to involuntary acts, actions giving rise to strict liability are unintentional. If I am liable, under a strict liability statute, for harm done to persons by my explosive demolition work, it is assumed that harm was unintentional, lest it be battery or murder, that is, an intentional wrong. Yet, I am responsible for effects of demolition, that is, of effects of my act. …

TSUBOUCHI SHOYO AND KOIZUMI YAKUMO

My object in writing this paper is to disclose the process of the literary intercourse between Shoyo and Yakumo chiefly by Shoyo's diary, the letters which had passed between Shoyo and Yakumo and some pieces of writing in the then Yomiuri newspaper and discuss what meaning their literary intercourse may have today in the era of the international cultural exchange.Yakumo was given the professorship in English literature at Tokyo Imperial University in September, 1896. He, however, was forced to resign his post against his will and left the university in the end of March, 1903, because of the new policy adopted by the university.In 1904 Yakumo accepted a call to the professorial chair of English literture at Waseda University. According to Shoyo's diary, Shoyo first met Yakumo on 9th of March, 1904. After that Shoyo and Yakumo cultivated a close acquaintance with each other rapidly. Shoyo earnestly wished Yakumo to translate some pieces of the Japan's Kabuki dramas into English and introduce them into the Western countries.When Yakumo sent his letter to Shoyo asking him what of the Japan's plays he should translate into English, Shoyo advised Yakumo to translate Chikamatsu's Shinju Ten no Amijima, or The Loue Suicide at Amijima into English by writing Yakumo a long letter in English and by visiting him with Prof. Shiozawa of Waseda University as interpreter for Shoyo in the early evening of July 6th besides. On the other hand, Shoyo learned Yakumo's own view of translating Shakespeare from someone who, I should say, was one of the students whom Yakumo taught at Tokyo Imperial University that the works of Shakespeare should be translated into ordinary speech of Japanese language. After Yakumo's death, Shoyo succeeded in translating Hamlet into colloquial style.Yakumo died feeling in his mind the problem of translating Shinju Ten no Arnijima into English on 26th of September, 1904. Shoyo and his wife are said to have been the first callers for condolences on the day of Yakumo's death. Shoyo deeply grieved over Yakumo's sudden and early death to know that his plan was left unfinished by his death. Probably Shoyo thought, it seems to me, that we, the Japanese, lost our best interpreter of the classical Kabuki dramas to the West in the death of Koizumi Yakumo.

Ce que parler veut dire dans ce monde et dans l'autre. De l'usage de la métaphore en Santal

Carrin-Bouez Marine - "What is meant by speaking here below and in the other world. On the use of metaphor among Santals". Analysing metaphoric processes among Santals gives some insight into their own view of what speaking is about. This analysis reveals two registers opposing : the register of "earthly speech", unfurled within ordinary speech as well as in the oratory of spokesmen and priests ; the register of Bongas, threatening and deceitful divinities's speech. Whether in an ordinary or solemn context, the register of enunciation of twisted speech (bentha katha) needs to be recognized : as earthly speech, they rely upon substitution in a natural series ; as Bonga's (or witche's) speech, they act as a "translation" - reported speech into the other world, where a substitution of speaker induces a semantic shift.

Sterne's fiction and the double principle

The author of Tristram Shandy made frequent use of literary fragments from other writers, as part of his own style. Laurence Sterne's quotations, plagiarisms and allusions were often employed in the service of the pleonasm, or 'performed pun'. Jonathan Lamb describes Sterne's operation of the pleonasm as his 'double principle'. He sees this style not as the key to some clever puzzle whose clues we go on solving in the hope of total disclosure of meaning (as some critics have claimed); rather the opposite, that it is a consoling reminder that neither we nor the text can ever be complete. Lamb severs Sterne from the Locke tradition and frees him from the 'influence' oriented studies which have aimed to authenticate him through his borrowings. This allows us to read him as a writer eagerly exploring the turns and paradoxes of associationist thought and adapting the rhetoric of the sublime to the stutterings of ordinary speech.

Words without Things: The Mode of Information

An increasing segment of communications is mediated by electronic devices. People watch television; make phone calls; listen to radio; go to movies; use computers, fax machines, VCRs, and stereos. Such communications occur in every institution and in every social group. Politics, work, consumption, family, military, church, education, leisure activities-in varying degrees all employ electronic mechanisms in their communications. In each instance, symbols are exchanged, messages are sent and received, information is retrieved just as they have been since human beings began using language. And yet something has changed as well. Electronic communications are new language experiences in part by virtue of electrification. But how are they different from ordinary speech and writing? And what is significance of this difference? How is distinction between public and private affected by these innovations? I believe that humanities have an important role to play in making intelligible an emerging new culture. This paper outlines a theoretical perspective, the mode of information, that might be useful for opening new interpretive strategies for critical social theory in relation to these new developments. Some observers argue that introduction of electronic devices makes no substantial difference in nature or consequence of a communication. The politician who speaks in a TV ad campaign still attempts to gain votes according to rules of constitutional democracy. The worker who uses a computer to control an assembly process or type a letter is paid for his or her labor as in past, according to contract of employment. The consumer who merely watches TV gains information about products that might be bought in a store, much like reading a newspaper. The soldier who uses a computer to guide a projectile to its target, like archer who visually aims his arrow, is practicing art of destroying enemy. The electronic device simply increases efficiency of communication in question. From this perspective language appears as a tool for purposes of acting human subjects, clearly subordinate in importance to positional intentions of individuals in determinate institutional frameworks.

Wörterbuch zu Goethes West-östlichem Divan (review)

Goethe Yearbook 353 — the creative motion of Goethe's poetry as a microcosm of the creativity of the universe (124). Lemmel concentrates on the political relevance of the poetry, its pedagogic purpose, its unifying objective and its analogous relationship to love. In many ways Lemmel builds upon HiUmann's observations concerning the poetological significance of the Divan poems and the centrality of love — its importance for both poetry in general and the Divan cycles (Hillmann 86). Beyond Hillmann, Lemmel offers a more comprehensive study and illustrates impressively just how many of Goethe's Divan poems have something to say about poetry. University of Rochester Susan E. Gustafson NOTES 1. Ingeborg Hillmann, Dichtung als Gegenstand der Dichtung-. Untersuchungen zum Problem der Einheit des West-östlichen Divan (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1965) 43. 2. Ehrhard Bahr, Die Ironie im Spätwerk Goethes (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1972) 57. 3. Gisela Henckmann, Gespräch und Geselligkeit in Goethes West-östlicher Divan (Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1975) 20. Dill, Christa, Wörterbuch zu Goethes West-östlichem Divan. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1987. Christa Dill's Wörterbuch is the most comprehensive contribution to Divan scholarship to date. It will without question become an indispensable tool for scholars and critics who have long struggled with the unusual mode of figuration, the lexical eccentricities and the complex poetic structure of Goethe's orientalizing cycle of poems. The Divan dictionary owes its existence at least partially to the special archives of the Akademie der Wissenschaft located in the DDR, Göttingen, Heidelberg, and Tübingen where the writing of articles for the monumental long-term undertaking of the Goethe-Wörterbuch has been in progress since 1963. This is not to say, however, that Christa Dill's dictionary merely repeats more comprehensively the Divan vocabulary already included in the fascicles of the GWb that have been or are yet to be published. There is a marked difference between the orientation and goals of these two enterprises. In an article entitled "Lexika zu einzelnen Schriftstellern" (Forschung und Fortschritt, 33, Heft 11, November 1959) and again in her introduction to the Divan dictionary, Christa Dili articulates the difference between these two projects. The goal of the general dictionary, she notes, is to provide an overview of Goethe's idiolect in its spatial and temporal dimension and development. The GWb features poetic language along with ordinary speech, for the lexical entries are drawn from Goethe's literary as well as non-literary texts. The entries thus record Goethe's own language development and reflect the general linguistic transformations that occurred during his lifetime. 354 Book Reviews With the wealth of material available for each entry, it becomes possible to indicate certain general tendencies in Goethe's development and use of language, but not to concentrate on the poetic and linguistic uniqueness of individual works. That becomes the explicit task of the Divan dictionary: Gerade diese Eigentümlichkeit zu erfassen," Dill emphasizes, "ist das Anliegen des Wörterbuchs" (VIII). Each lexical entry in the Divan dictionary is supported by enough textual evidence to serve also as a concordance. The individual articles generally begin with the literal meaning of the word as it is derived from the context in which it occurs. If a given word moves from the literal to the figurative, or within either of these orders, this shift is duly noted and in turn supported by appropriate citations. At the moment of registering such semantic shifts, the article inevitably becomes involved in an interpretive gesture. Wherever possible the contextual evidence is at this point supplemented by citations from and references to the major source and lexical studies which have preceded the dictionary and, in addition, the article refers the reader to thematically and/or figuratively related entries. In its microscopic focus on the semantic, figurative and structural function of the individual word, the dictionary succeeds in demonstrating that the unique quality one senses in reading the poems, i.e. that which distinguishes the Divan from the western-oriented poetics of Goethe's other works, results more from the nature of its language and its mode of figuration than from its thematic content. In the introduction...

Litigation and Society

Litigation, in ordinary speech, refers to actions contested in court; this involves a claim, a dispute or conflict, and the use of a specific institution, the court, to resolve the conflict or dispute. In the past most legal research has consisted of analysis of doctrine and theory about doctrine. But litigation is an important phenomenon in its own right and research lately has shown this. This chapter aims to sketch out a few major areas of research and theory and to add a few brief remarks about the significance of the work thus far. The topics covered include: dispute-centered and court-centered research; quantity of litigation and the so-called litigation explosion; and the impact of litigation on society.

Litigation And Society

Litigation, in ordinary speech, refers to actions contested in court; this involves a claim, a dispute or conflict, and the use of a specific institution, the court, to resolve the conflict or dispute. In the past most legal research has consisted of analysis of doctrine and theory about doctrine. But litigation is an important phenomenon in its own right and research lately has shown this. This chapter aims to sketch out a few major areas of research and theory and to add a few brief remarks about the significance of the work thus far. The topics covered include: dispute-centered and court-centered research; quantity of litigation and the so-called litigation explosion; and the impact of litigation on society.

Natural rhythmic patterns in English verse: Evidence from child counting-out rhymes

Counting-out rhymes are part of an oral tradition whose primary participants are children. These facts are used to justify the claim that the rhythmic structure of counting-out rhymes can be attributed to natural preferences more readily than could the structure of formal verse considered alone. The first study uncovered a number of similarities between formal and counting-out verse. The rhythm of counting-out rhymes is constrained by the principle of rhythmic alternation, the nuclear stress and compound rules, and foot boundaries. In addition, both trochaic and iambic meters seem to exist as natural categories in counting-out rhymes. Finally, children appear to associate different grammatical categories with different degrees of stress, in a manner very similar to patterns found in adult verse. The second study explored the variants of one common counting-out rhyme and reports changes that preserve or improve the poetics of the rhyme. The discussion offers one definition of what a “natural” rhythmic pattern in verse might mean: A pattern that has parallels in the rhythmic structure of ordinary speech. This definition makes the study of verse attractive to psycholinguists for three reasons. First, factors that influence speech rhythm can be examined for their relevance to poetic rhythm, a possibility that renders tractable the psycholinguistic study of one form of language creativity. Second, hypotheses about the rhythmic structure of speech can be formulated from knowledge of poetic rhythm. Finally, studying the structure of child verse could foster understanding of the acquisition of prosodic rules, an area that has been relatively neglected in developmental psycholinguistics.

Language for God and Feminist Language: Problems and Principles

Language for God is not equivalent to the kinds of naming we use in ordinary speech. We say that what ‘we call a rose by any other word would smell as sweet,’ and we recognize that ordinary names for creatures are subject to human custom, choice, and change. According to biblical religion, on the other hand, only God can name God. Distinctive Christian experiences and beliefs are expressed through distinctive language about God, and the changes in that language proposed by feminist theologians do not merely add a few unfamiliar words for God, as some would like to think, but in fact introduce beliefs about God that differ radically from those inherent in Christian faith, understanding, and Scripture. Briefly stated, that is the argument this essay will systematically expand.

How Near Can a Cause Get to its Effect?

Are causes continuous with their effects, and, if so, how are they distinguished? Or are they discontinuous, and, if so, how are they connected? I think there are problems over this which have been obscured by traditional ways of talking about causation. It has been generally accepted, at least since Hume, that whatever else may need to be said about causation it involves succession and regularity (Hume spoke of 'constant conjunction'). In this paper I shall not be concerned with regularity, not because there are no problems over this, but because some problems over succession and conjunction will be sufficient for the day. Moreover, I shall only be concerned with what is sometimes called 'transeunt', and was traditionally called 'efficient', causation, where there is a before and after relation in which the cause is said to be the antecedent, sometimes the 'immediate antecedent', of the effect. 'Before and after' is a relation in a time series any time series with an accepted frame of reference. It is not necessary to assume a unique time series; all that I am wanting to exclude is backward causation, where causes would follow their effects.1 If, then, cause and effect are in a time series, will their continuity, if they are continuous, be that of the time series, i.e. dense? Density is continuity in a linear ordering, where, in the case of time, between any two instants there will always be another. Mathematically the time series is also continuous in the sense that it is represented not only by rational but also by irrational numbers. For the purpose of this paper this important distinction can be ignored. It would seem that cause and effect need to be continuous in some sense, and also that they need to be distinguishable units. In the recent literature it has been usual to speak of the units as 'events'. In ordinary speech we also tend to speak of causes and effects as events, and indeed as

Allusions to Herbert in John Spencer and Edward Benlowes

Allusions to Herbert in John Spencer and Edward Benlowes by Richard F. Kennedy John Spencer's ????? ??? ??O?/?. THINGS New and Old (1658)1 contains three references to George Herbert not in Robert H. Ray's The Herbert Allusion Book: Allusions to George Herbert in the Seventeenth Century, and not elsewhere noted.2 Spencer's huge volume is a collection wherein the author presents an anecdote, simile, or some natural phenomenon taken from an ancient or a modern writer, and then draws a moral or religious lesson from it. There are 2004 entries in 679 pages, from sources as various as Pliny, Petrarch, Bacon, and Donne. Among the approximately 700 authors listed as sources at the beginning of the book is "George Herbert" (A2D). The second reference comes in entry 882, which is here quoted in its entirety: To make Christ our Lord and Master. It is said of Mr. George Herbert that divine Poematist [margin: "Preface to his Poems"], that to satisfie his Independency upon all others, and to quicken his diligence in Gods service; he used in his ordinary speech, when he made mention of the blessed name of Jesus, to add, my Master; And without all doubt, if men were unfeignedly of his mind, their respects would be more to Christ's command, to Christ's will, to Christ's pleasure; could they but lift up their eyes to God. to him that dwells in the Heavens; then as eyes ofservants look unto the hands of their Masters, and as the eyes of a Maiden [margin: "Psalm. 12. 32"] unto the hands of her Mistress, so would their eyes wait upon, and their hearts be in a dutiful frame of obedience unto the commands of Christ their Lord and Master, (p. 224) 46Richard F. Kennedy Spencer is citing Nicholas Ferrar's preface to The Temple: "To testifie his independencie upon all others, and to quicken his diligence in this kinde, he used in his ordinarie speech, when he made mention of the blessed name of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, to adde, My Master."3 The final allusion is also to Ferrar's preface, and occurs in entry 1 1 84, which is on the subject of the devotion various men have given to the name of Jesus, and which refers to Herbert as follows: "And My Master, saies Mr. Herbert, that divine Poet, as oft as he heard the Name ofJesus mentioned, [margin: 'Poems in preface']" (p. 320). Whereas Spencer names Herbert, Edward Benlowes pays silent tribute to the poet by borrowing from him without acknowledgement. To the three allusions in his Theophila, Or Loves Sacrifice (1652) pointed out by Ray4 one may add three more. The concluding verse, stanza "C," of the Prelibation (p. 14) is a framed pattern poem in the shape of an altar, like Herbert's famous poem, and is probably inspired by it, for both poems are prayers of praise, though there are no close verbal similarities.5 There are, however, several verbal echoes from "The Altar" in two later stanzas: LXIII. Vast Cares, long dumb, thus vent. Flow Tears, Souls Wine, Juice of an Heart opprest; Encline, LORD, to this heart-broke Altar cemented with Brine! LXIV. Remorseful! Clouds, dissolve in Showr's; 'Tis Blood Turns rocky Hearts into a Flood: Eyes, keep your Sluces ope; HEAVN besf by Tears is woo'd. (p. 31) Compare particularly line 3 of the first tercet with Herbert's opening couplet: A broken ALTAR, Lord, thy servant reares, Made of a heart, and cemented with teares: HERBERT ALLUSIONS47 The final parallel is between Benlowes' phrase "Man is a World, and more" (stanza XCVII, p. 205) and Herbert's "Man," where he states "For Man is ev'ry thing, / And more" and, later, "Man is one world" (II. 7-8, 47). Notes St. Thomas University 'The title page goes on to describe the work as "A Storehouse of Similies, Sentences, Allegories, Apophthegms, Adagies, Apologues, Divine, Morali, Politicali, &c. With their severall Applications. Collected and observed from the Writings and Sayings of the Learned in all Ages to this present." 2Robert H. Ray, The Herbert Allusion Book: Allusions to George Herbert in the Seventeenth Century, Texts...

Pirandello’s Use of Puppetry as Metaphor and Technique

P I R A N D E L L O ’ S U S E O P P U P P E T R Y AS M E T A P H O R A N D T E C H N I Q U E SIST E R CORONA SHARP Brescia College F o r some eighty years before World War II, Europe witnessed a culmina­ tion of puppetry, both as an age-old folk art and as a newly invented, sophisticated theatre art. Companies sprang up in important cities, perform­ ing mostly to adult audiences, while authors, painters, composers, and theatre people busied themselves with puppetry. The revolt against naturalism evoked a new interest in the mask and the marionette, both of which became props and symbols in the new Symbolist drama. Italy, probably the first European country to foster puppetry, developed her rich and manifold tradition still further during the nineteenth century. Many dynasties of pup­ peteers devoted their lives to the art. Puppets were especially numerous in the southern provinces. Farces, satires, melodramas, folk and religious tales, and plays of chivalry comprised the Italian repertories. A new form of pup­ petry had appeared in Sicily, the pupi, largely devoted to productions of the Charlemagne and Roland (Orlando) romances.1 Palermo and Catania be­ came the principal centres. Travellers in Italy recorded their impressions of Italian puppets.2 In the early 1900s, Gordon Craig lived in Florence and deeply admired Italian puppetry. Most critics recognize Pirandello’s comparison of man to a puppet, but the tendency has been to discuss this topic within parameters other than the art of puppetry.3 My purpose is to complement these analyses, because Piran­ dello’s uses of the metaphor seem to form a salient contribution toward an aesthetic of puppetry. His complete familiarity with this folk art appears in his thinking and writing. In this respect he has affinity with his fellow Sicilians and Italians, who have amassed a body of research and criticism dealing with puppetry, probably more extensive than that of any other nation.4 I will first survey Pirandello’s early fascination with puppetry and his later encounters with related influences; then I will briefly propose an aesthetic for puppetry, and finally apply it to three earlier works and then to Henry IV . Whereas in Six Characters in Search of an Author the metaphoric use of puppetry is partially concealed, in Henry IV it appears quite plainly and E n g l is h S t u d ie s in C anada, x iv , i , March 1988 affects dramatic technique in several ways: first, certain characters resemble the Sicilian pupi; second, the set is constructed like those on Italian puppet stages; third, the dialogue often conveys the puppet metaphor or images borrowed from puppetry; fourth, the dramatic conflict is shaped by alien forces, as if a giant puppeteer were pulling the wires. The Italians have several names for puppets: pupazzi, marionette, and fantocci (marionettes on strings or wires) ; burattini (hand puppets) ; and pupi (Sicilian marionettes, operated by an iron rod through the head, and another rod and a rope controlling the hands). The degree to which pup­ petry has pervaded the Italian consciousness is indicated by numerous idio­ matic expressions. For each of the four terms, burattino, fantoccio, marionetta , and pupazzo, there are at least two figurative uses in ordinary speech. In nearly all of them, the human being is compared to a puppet in a derogatory sense. Pirandello makes similar allusions in various writings.5 From childhood Pirandello imbibed the native Sicilian enthusiasm for the pupi, which he probably first saw in Girgenti, and later, as a student, in Palermo. The pupi were wooden figures a metre or so tall, very clumsy and heavy, with large, staring eyes and brightly painted faces. Chivalric heroism, violence and love, supernatural forces, monsters, the struggle of good and evil, and comedy were presented in continuous cycles amid grand dis­ plays of costumes, real armour, and noisy battles, with occasional fireworks and blood gushing from decapitated heads. Pirandello admitted having had a great “passion” for the pupi:6 In his autobiographical novella, The Choice (La scelta), he describes himself as...

Saint Augustine's Meter and George Herbert's Will

BOOK REVIEWS59 William H. Pahlka, Saint Augustine's Meter and George Herbert's Will. Kent, Ohio, and London: Kent State University Press, 1987. xxi + 241 pp. $26. by Mark Taylor In Saint Augustine's Meter and George Herbert's Will William Pahlka argues that Augustine, especially in his today often neglected De musica, "saw a clear analogy between the foundation of the universe and the foundation of versification" (p. 27), which means that versification offered a way of reproducing eternal meanings in otherwise ephemeral human language; that this connection is entirely consistent with much of verse theory in the English Renaissance; and that from a consideration of Augustinian pronouncements and later theory, and an examination of Herbert's poetic practice, an understanding of his meter, and of his prosody in general, can be derived. And although the meter is indeed understood in part through the actual achievement of Herbert's verse, once its outlines are grasped it yields an increased understanding of that verse, as Pahlka combines considerable practical criticism with his theory. The results are most illuminating. Following "the Pythagorean doctrine that number underlies all things," Pahlka writes, and that "Equality and proportion are . . . mathematical principles," Augustine believes "The more perfectly anything imitates the unity of God and its expression in the Logos, the more proportional and the more beautiful the thing is. . . . The maker of verse creates an object in which language, a human institution based on conventions, comes to be imitative in the same way the natural world imitates the Logos; that is, the poet imposes on language number, measure, proportion, self-likeness" (pp. 20-21). In doing so, the poet expresses or reaches toward truths, or truth, usually denied to language. One way or another Augustine's notions insinuate themselves into Renaissance theory. "Whether they came to the Elizabethan writers directly from Augustine or by way of intermediate sources, most of the general principles of De musica are discoverable in a variety of sixteenth-century texts 60BOOK REVIEWS on poetics, though often in more secularized and naturalized terms" (p. 36). Of Elizabethan theorists Pahlka sees Puttenham as the "most Augustinian" (p. 38); and in addition to sharing his distant predecessor's view of the importance of number and proportion, Puttenham saw also that in English verse "rhyme . . . performs the time-marking function of the quantities of classical verse" (p. 38). "For the Elizabethans," therefore, "verse was not simply superior in some vaguely esthetic way to ordinary speech or to prose; because of its numbers and proportions, it possessed a higher degree of being. It participated in the structure of divine creation in a way that plain English, an Idol of the Marketplace, could not" (p. 47). Although one might like to see some evidence of these large assertions in the verse of poets of the 1 580s or 1 590s, Pahlka is generally convincing in his reading of Augustine's presence in late sixteenth-century poetics. It follows from this reading that the meter of so deliberate an artist as George Herbert enacts a contract with "divine creation" as well as mere poetry. Pahlka's fifth chapter, on Herbert's meter, is particularly refreshing because it seeks to describe the metrical achievement of "The Church" in terms of the simplest available paradigm, instruments, and nomenclature. For Pahlka syllables are almost always either stresses or slacks (there are some instances of the "promotion" or "demotion" of a "medial syllable" because of its position in the line, but these are infrequent), from which follows the convenient and traditional vocabulary of iambs, trochees, and so forth. This means not only that his discussion is happily free of the terminology of linguistics (which Pahlka dismisses as "inappropriate to any study that emphasizes meter rather than spoken rhythms" [p. 76]), but also that it is far more manageable than, say, Arnold Stein's, in George Herbert's Lyrics, which (after Trager-Smith) postulates four levels of stress. Stein's scansion at first seems highly technical and "sophisticated," but in fact (as Pahlka almost says) there is something very arbitrary and unsophisticated about the assumption that one can always differentiate between levels two and three of stress. Pahlka's own results are...