Ordinary Concept Research Articles

The Effects of Ordinary and Coordinate Concept Nonexamples on First-Grade Students' Acquisition of Three Coordinate Concepts

Abstract Prior research indicates that nonexamples facilitate the acquisition of single concepts by preventing overgeneralization errors. The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of ordinary and coordinate concept nonexamples on first-grade students' acquisition of three concepts. Sixty-seven subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups and were taught the coordinate concepts of land, air, and water pollution. Results of ANCOVA indicated that the group that received both coordinate and ordinary nonexamples scored significantly higher than the group that received only coordinate concept nonexamples.

Causes, Causity, and Energy

Our ordinary concept of causality is—as David Hume wisely underscored—the concept in which an event or change produces another event or change. This production is the central core of causation, and the objective component of it Hume analyzed as constant conjunction. As is well known, Hume emphasized that our notion of production or causation has a subjective component, namely, the illusion of a certain necessity in the connection between cause and effect. Typically, the critique of Hume has centered on his attack upon, and on his theses about, necessity. But the core idea of production has been generally kept out of the dialectical stage. Here I will put necessity aside and bring this very idea of production to the center of the stage. I propose to explore the most general logical and ontological features of production. The most intriguing feature is the deep connection between production and energy. But as it will become apparent from the ensuing discussion, that deep connection is mediated by a more general concept of world-orderliness that I shall dub causity. Thus, the general principles here formulated belong to the philosophical foundations of thermodynamics.

Electric field gradient tensor in modulated ionic crystals

Abstract When calculating the Electric Field Gradient (EFG) of a displacively modulated crystal, sums over the modulated atom positions have to be evaluated. This can be done by an extension of the method of Nijboer and De Wette for computing perfect lattice sums. Explicit formulae and a detailed derivation for the EFG in displacively modulated structures are given within the point atom approximation. The symmetry properties of the EFG tensor are then examined in the framework of the superspace formalism, and applied to sodium carbonate. At a given atomic position the superspace symmetry of the corresponding modulation line imposes restrictions on the EPG tensor. This replaces the ordinary concept of local point symmetry and leads to a specific form of the EPG tensor, when developed into powers of the amplitude of the modulation wave.

Special Relativity and Space-like Time

I It is a commonplace in certain circles that the Special and General Theories of Relativity require us to regard time as being like space. Of course, expressions such as 'spacetime' and 'the fourth dimension' have become familiar to all. But quite apart from the casual use of these vague phrases, many scientists and philosophers have held explicitly that if Relativity is true, the nature of time must indeed be very similar to that of space. Unfortunately, equally explicit arguments for this conclusion are seldom given; at least, this writer has run across little of substance on the point. Perhaps the reasons seem too obvious to require mention. In any case they deserve a careful look, and it is the purpose of this paper to explore arguments that might be given to the effect that the Special Theory, in particular, requires 'space-like' time. A second thing that is generally not made clear is just what it means, or ought to mean, to say that time is like space. This is itself a very complex matter, which cannot be pursued in any depth here. It will have to suffice to mention one or two aspects that are essential to the notion of space-like time, as I see it-aspects without which time would have to be regarded as being radically different from space. In the ordinary concept of time, as this writer understands it, there is a big difference between a certain few of the events and states of affairs of history-the ones we call 'present'and all the others: the former exist-they are occurring, they are realwhereas the latter do not, merely having been real, or being yet to exist. For example, one difference between (say) the reader's studying of his first-grade reader and (say) his perusing of this paper is as fundamental a difference as one can imagine: the one event is real, it is occurring, and the other is not. In contrast to this common-sense view, it seems clear that under the concept of time as being like space there would be no existential difference among any of the events of history. They differ from one another in their temporal locations, they are temporally distant from one another by various amounts, but that is all. The events of one temporal location are no more real than those of another: the reader's perusing of this paper is occurring, World War II is occurring, World War III is (perhaps) occurs ring, and so on, all in the same sense of the word. It follows from this that

On Saving Our Concept of a Person

In a trenchant and resourceful critical treatment, Dr Kathleen V. Wilkes ('Consciousness and Commissurotomy', Philosophy April I978) struggles to reinterpret the split-brain data so that my extrapolation from these to the normal human organism will not threaten to 'fracture' or 'fragment' the ordinary concept of a person. Similar concerns are beginning to emerge in other quarters1 as well. For the sake of accuracy, and in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings in future, I should like to set the record straight. First, a few niggling technical corrections. It is unnecessary to speak of 'commissurotomy surgery', since disrupting the commissural fibres between the half brains is of course going to be effected surgically (how else would it be done, by dynamite?). However, it is necessary to stipulate, at least at the beginning, that this is cerebral or forebrain commissurotomy, because commissural fibres at brainstem, cerebellar and spinal cord level are not transected in human beings (actually the fibres are not usually cut, but sucked out with a long aspirator). Also it is the case that visual stimuli impinging on the left half of each eye's retina do not go to the right, but to the left cerebral hemisphere (and vice versa), since the retina is concave and each half retina receives light from the contralateral side of the body. Furthermore, there is at least one split-brain patient who is a left-hander and has speech concentrated in the right hemisphere,2 but in fact most sinistral people have speech predominantly in the left half-brain just as dextrals do.3 So much for technicalities. At the heart of Wilkes's objections is the notion of 'unity of consciousness', which she thinks underlies the idea of a

Supremal points and generalized duality

In this paper the ordinary concept of supremum will be generalized. After wo have done so duality theorems concerning convex programming problems will be generalized.

Consciousness and Commissurotomy

Commissurotomy surgery has lately attracted considerable philosophical attention. It has seemed to some that the surgical scalpel that bisects the brain bisects consciousness and the mind as well; and that the ordinary concept of a person is thereby most seriously threatened. I shall assess the extent of the threat, arguing that it is overestimated. The argument begins with section III; section II, which describes the operation and its effects, should be omitted by those already familiar with these facts.

ON STRATEGIES OF CYBERNETIC MODEL‐BUILDING

Starting from the ordinary (i.e., not model‐theoretic) model concept, the basic notions of the model‐reality relationship are discussed. In particular, the functional and behavioural equivalence is studied. It is argued that although analytically fertile, the distinction between functional and behavioural equivalence overlooks problems of crucial methodological importance. From a methodological stand‐point the knowledge hierarchy of B. Zeigler seems promising. However, Zeigler's approach contains some important ontological commitments which should be given due attention in the process of model building and model validation. Som remarks of model building in economics are used as illustrations for Zeigler's method and the limitations contained therein.

III. On the concept of attitude

Evaluation is, as J. R. Maze has recently suggested, central to the concept of attitude. But it is argued that Maze's noncognitivist analysis of evaluation yields an inadequate account of our ordinary concept of attitude. A criteriological account of evaluation is sketched which allows for an objective dimension to evaluation and hence to attitudes. In the case of attitudes, it is argued that some criteria will be chosen at least in part for their consequences, and hence will not be chosen solely on the basis of interest, preference or affect.

On causal ω2-systems

Two-dimensional systems are considered as a generalization of ordinary concept in systems theory, and the unsolvability of some decision problems on the systems are shown.

The Paradox of the Stack

Since the time of Parmenides and Zeno of Elia, philosophers have wondered whether every way in which things ordinarily appear can be a way in which they really exist, because the Eliatics gave powerful arguments for the claim that some of these ways are self-contradictory. Philosophers sometimes express the puzzle like this: can every ordinary concept we have of things really apply to them? Why not? Because some of these concepts are self-contradictory. In this paper I will argue that our ordinary concept of a spatially extended object is self-contradictory.1 What is it for a concept to be self-contradictory? To have a concept involves understanding certain terms and believing certain basic propositions which use these terms (or closely synonymous terms) essentially. Suppose we call these concept-postulates. A concept is self-contradictory if its concept-postulates are inconsistent; that is, if they entail a contradiction.

DETECTION OF LOW INTENSITY EPIDEMICITY: APPLICATION TO CLEFT LIP AND PALATE.

The Encyclopaedia Americana defines an epi demic as a sudden excessive prevalence of a disease in a population. This is a typical definition, and although suddenness is not always considered an essential feature of an epidemic, most would agree that it refers to disease, and that it denotes an in creased prevalence. But there are two serious difficul ties in this concept which limit its usefulness and unless they are recognized they may prove a serious hindrance to the detection of epidemic properties in several classes of disease. The first is found when the occurrences are few in number, sparsely scattered in time, and widely sep arated in relationship to the frequency of any supposed fluctuations. This problem arises with uncommon illnesses such as congenital malformations when an apparent crop of cases poses the question how many cases can make an epidemic. The true difficulty seems to be the breakdown of the concept of prevalence upon which in turn the concept of an epidemic depends. The situation is analogous to the breakdown of the gas laws when very few molecules are involved and the inappropriateness there of the ordinary con cept of pressure; or the breakdown of the theory of wave propagation in the study of low intensity radia tion. Pressure, wave motion, prevalence, and epide micity, are terms appropriate to the study of high concentrations and when we are compelled to deal with low intensities special methods of examination must be devised. The second difficulty arises from the assumption implicit in the above definition, that an epidemic is recognized on a time base. However, it is clear that space must sometimes be taken into account as well as time. A feature of many epidemics is that the geographical region of maximum prevalence moves with change in time, or stated conversely, that the time of maximum prevalence changes with change of place. The result is that a disease which is manifestly epidemic on the time scale in each of a number of small regions, may over a sum of those areas show only equivocal evidence of epidemicity in the terms defined above. Conversely, a disease of which the incidence is geographically uneven during a short period may appear more evenly distributed when a longer period is considered. These difficulties are not serious with a frequently occurring disease; either the time scale or the geo graphical area may be divided into sufficiently small classes to demonstrate variations of prevalence in terms of the other. But with uncommon diseases such as leukaemia or congenital malformations the pro cedure of subdivision leads back into the problems of small numbers. It may be impossible to examine either the space or the time variations in prevalence, without at the same time impairing the applicability of the concept of prevalence. This may not be for lack of large numbers of events for analysis, but because they occur sparsely over a large area and over a long period of time, and accumulation of further data may do little towards solving the problem. For these reasons, no doubt, most of the statements to date of low intensity space-time clustering in particular disea ses have been based upon impressions and anecdotes rather than upon rigorous analysis. A previous attempt (Knox, 1959) has been made to analyse low intensity data on time base alone and the present paper is an attempt to extend this to space and time jointly. The two purposes of the present study are to suggest a method of analysing this class of data in a more discriminating manner than has so far been employed and to employ the technique in the investigation of a particular problem.

The Conceptual Machinery of Tamil—An Approach

One of the most dramatic features in the history of Indo-Aryan languages has been the utter collapse of the ancient prefixal system which had been used for expressing the various shades of human concepts. The dramatic nature of this break-down will be particularly appreciated when we take into account the fact that even for an ordinary concept such as ‘to come’, Sanskrit had to depend upon a prefix, viz. ā ‘hither’, so that ‘to come’ was indicated by ā-gam- or ā-yā, literally ‘hither—move’. This implies that the roots gam- or yā- by themselves denoted movement in general and during the formative period of Sanskrit a stage is conceivable when going and coming were linguistically undifferentiated. This supposition may perhaps be somewhat confirmed by a parallel occurring in two languages at the present day, viz.

ON THE PARAMAGNETIC ANISOTROPY OF SINGLE CRYSTALS OF CHROME ALUMS

The existence of anisotropy in paramagnetic cubic crystals has never been observed and it was only vaguely conjectured by Schlapp and Penney in 1932 for chrome alums. In this paper, a calculation based on P. R. Weiss's theory (1948) shows that the paramagnetic anisotropy does exist in the single crystals of chrome alums. Percentage differences (γ ) between the susceptibility along direction (χ) and that along direction (χ) in KCr alum single crystal at room temperature are given for several values of magnetic field. It is pointed out that the ordinary concept of principal susceptibilities along respectively three mutually perpendicular magnetic axes is no longer applicable to describe the paramagnetic anisotropy of the cubic crystals of chrome alums.

Distributed Amplification

This paper presents a new principle in wide-band amplifier design. It is shown that, by an appropriate distribution of ordinary electron tubes along artificial transmission lines, it is possible to obtain amplification over much greater bandwidths than would be possible with ordinary circuits. The ordinary concept of maximum bandwidth-gain product does not apply to this distributed amplifier. The high-frequency limit of the distributed amplifier appears to be determined by the grid-loading effects. The distributed amplifier provides means for designing amplifiers either of the low-pass or band-pass types. The low-pass amplifiers can be made to have a uniform frequency response from dc to frequencies as high as several hundred Mc using commercially available tubes. The general design considerations included in this paper are: The effect of improper termination of transmission lines; methods for controlling the frequency response and phase characteristic; the design which provides the required gain with fewest possible number of tubes; and a discussion of high-frequency limitations. The noise factor of the amplifier is evaluated. Practical amplifiers, designed according to the principles described in this paper, have been built and have verified the theoretical predictions. Experimental work will be described in a forthcoming paper.

A Comparison of Flights of Four Species of Ants

Flights of ants are often conspicuous enough to attract the attention of biologists and non-biologists alike. Almost everyone has seen winged ants pour out from places where no ants had been noticed before, cover the ground and fill the air for a few hours and then disappear again. However, few studies have been made concerning the environmental conditions under which the flights take place, or the flight activities of different species of ants. This article compares the rather diverse types of flights of four species of ants belonging to four different genera. Myrmica schencki emeryana Forel, Formica pallidefulva schaufussi incerta Emery, and Lasius niger alienus americanus Emery-all nesting in the Talbot yard at Tiffin, Ohio, and Prenolepis impcaris Say, nesting in an apple orchard at St. Charles, Missouri. For all species the flight records used are those of 1943. Observations of other years, however, lead to the belief that these were typical. The ordinary concept of ant flights seems to be that there is one flight day each year for each species and that on this day all of the colonies of a large territory take part in one conspicuous swarm. But it was found that, for these four species at least, flights are spread over several days, not all of the colonies of an area are necessarily active on all of the days, and not all of the individuals of a colony need take part in any one flight. Flights may be inconspicuous as in the case of the Formica or Myrmica studied or very conspicuous as in the case of Lasius and Prenolepis.

On the Induced Current and Energy Balance in Electronics

With a given specification of the space-charge density and velocity functions for a general electron-tube system, the balance of instantaneous rates of energy change between the space and the external circuits has been derived here from Green's theorem. It is shown that the external currents can be completely accounted for by the changes brought about by moving charges and changing field intensity in space. The ordinary concept of current as the rate of direct transfer of charges represents the limiting case of this theory at low frequencies. The induced current for steady fields can be calculated simply by knowing the electrostatic field caused by a given electrode at unit potential, with all the other electrodes grounded, and the space-current density function. It is also shown that a direct-current source can supply power only when there is a direct flow of charges between the space and the electrode to which the source is connected. Net alternating-current power, however, can be exchanged between the space and the external circuits even in the absence of direct transfer of charges. A number of ultra-high-frequency phenomena can be qualitatively explained by the theory.

Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly

T IS pretty well agreed among economists that the ordinary concept of a demand curve is inapplicable to the study of oligopoly. What would be sold at various prices if everything else remained unchanged does not concern an entrepreneur when he knows that everything else, and in particular the prices charged by his rivals, is most unlikely to remain unchanged. What does concern him is his own estimate of what can be sold at various prices, making the best allowance he can for the probable reactions of his rivals. These estimates can conveniently be arranged in the form of a demand schedule, but the result must not, of course, be confused with the type of demand schedule which is commonly used in economic discussion. Mr. Nicholas Kaldor has suggested the name "imagined demand curve" for the concept which is applicable to the oligopoly case, and in this article I propose to follow this usage.I So far as I know no attempt has yet been made to investigate the characteristics of imagined demand curves, though it should be obvious that such an investigation is desirable. Oligopoly is probably the typical case throughout a large part of the modern economy, and yet the theory of oligopoly can scarcely be said to be in a very advanced state, consisting as it does of a number of special cases which allow of little generalization. My purpose in this note is to show that a very considerable degree of clarification might be introduced into the study of this subject by a systematic inquiry into the nature of imagined demand curves. The most important consideration in this connection seems to me to be the obvious fact that rivals react differently according to whether a price change is upward or downward. If producer A raises his price, his rival producer B will acquire new customers. If, on the other hand, A lowers his price, B will lose customers. Ordinarily the reaction to a gain in business is a pleasurable feeling calling for no particular action; the reaction to a loss in business, however, is likely to be some viewing with