Ordinary Beliefs Research Articles

Parish Studies and the Debates on Religious Life in the Low Countries (Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period)

Only very recently has the parish church gained more serious interest among the public and academics in the Low Countries. Until a few years ago, historians studying religious life in the Low Countries ascribed little agency to the parish or parishioners. If the parish was studied, it was usually from an institutional or an art historical point of view. Furthermore, as this strong top-down approach has persisted in the historiography of religion throughout the 20th century, the idea of medieval decline has remained central in the study of religious change. Debates on Reformation and Counter-Reformation have also been influenced by this idea of medieval decay. International parish studies and recent studies on religious life during the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern period have, however, illustrated that ordinary believers and communities had an important role in shaping religion. Parish studies that use a perspective from below might just be the key to understanding how religion and religious life changed in the Low Countries during this turbulent period.

ВПЛИВ «ВЕЛЕСОВОЇ КНИГИ» НА ІДЕОЛОГІЮ РІЗНИХ ТЕЧІЙ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО РІДНОВІРСТВА В КРАЇНАХ ЗАХОДУ В 1960–1980 РОКАХ

У статті розглядаються матеріали, які засвідчують, що ідеологія рідновірських конфесійних течій зазначеного періоду була сформована без впливу «Велесової книги». Перші видавці й популяризатори «ВК» не були сповідниками рідновір’я. Л. Силенко та інші лідери громад Рідної Віри, які проповідували монотеїстичний культ Дажбога, добре знали «ВК», проте залучали її тексти вибірково, як додаткові або другорядні аргументи поряд із історичними джерелами. Лише В. Шаян змінив власне віровчення під впливом «ВК» і оголосив головним богом Сварога. Характерно, що в цей самий час він вступив в ідеологічний конфлікт із Л. Силенком, який успішно проповідував віру в Дажбога. Простим віруючим «ВК» подобалася тим, що там позитивно подавалась давня цивілізація, релігія й боги. The article proves that the ideology of Ukrainian Native Faith religiosity trends of that period was established out of “The Book of Veles” influence. The first editors and popularizes of “The Book of Veles” were not the confessors of Ukrainian Native Faith. L. Sylenko and other leaders of Ukrainian Native Faith who propagated monotheistic cult of Dazhbog knew “The Book of Veles” very well, but used its materials selectively, making them additional or not so important along with historical sources. V. Shayan made his own religious doctrine different being influenced by “The Book of Veles” and declared Svarog as the chief God. In that time he was in the ideological conflict with L. Sylenko who preached the faith in Dazhbog successfully. The ordinary believers liked “The Book of Veles” because it described the ancient civilization, religion and gods in positive manner.

Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements

AbstractImplicit attitudes are mental states that appear sometimes to cause agents to act in ways that conflict with their considered beliefs. Implicit attitudes are usually held to be mere associations between representations. Recently, however, some philosophers have suggested that they are, or are very like, ordinary beliefs: they are apt to feature in properly inferential processing. This claim is important, in part because there is good reason to think that the vocabulary in which we make moral assessments of ourselves and of others is keyed to folk psychological concepts, like ‘belief’, and not to concepts that feature only in scientific psychology: if implicit attitudes are beliefs there is a prima facie case for thinking that they can serve as the basis for particular kinds of moral assessment. In this paper I argue that while implicit attitudes have propositional structure, their sensitivity and responsiveness to other mental representations is too patchy and fragmented for them to properly be considered beliefs. Instead, they are a sui generis kind of mental state, a state I dub patchy endorsements.

Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification

Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen masseby exposing as apparently unjustifiable fundamental propositions which are closely related in their linchpin role to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. In the first instance, the result is a more complex account of both a deeper affinity between Wittgenstein’s approach to hinge propositions and Sextus’ approach to what I termarchaipropositions and a divergence between the two. In the second instance, I suggest how the comparison withOn Certaintycan be illuminating for the interpreter of Sextus. In particular, it can help us to see how the Pyrrhonist’s everyday conduct—common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding—involves rational procedures of justification, in line with a naturalism reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Furthermore, it can help us to reflect on the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to what Wittgenstein would have called her ‘worldview’. Throughout, I suggest that the comparison with Wittgenstein is interesting, although it must be cashed out differently, not only on the interpretation—or, perhaps, strand—of ancient Pyrrhonism which has the sceptic exempt ordinary beliefs from her suspension of judgement, but also on the interpretation (or strand) which has her disavow all beliefs categorically.

Tollensing van Inwagen

Van Inwagen (1990) has an ingenious argument for the non-existence of human artefacts (and other non-living complex things). But the argument cannot be accepted, since human artefacts are everywhere. However, it cannot be ignored. The proper response to it is to treat it as a refutation of its least plausible premise, i.e., to ‘tollens’ it. I first set out van Inwagen’s argument. I then identify its least plausible premise and explain the consequence of denying it, that is, the acceptance of a plenitudinous, pluralist ontology. I argue that denying it is not so difficult, since its denial is an easy consequence of ordinary beliefs. I finish by explaining why van Inwagen has not persuaded me that it may be that artefacts do not exist and conclude that nothing stands in the way of tollensing van Inwagen and accepting the consequence of doing so.

Delusions: A Different Kind of Belief?

Abstract: Delusions are typically considered to be beliefs and analyzed as propositional attitudes, under constraints of rationality and coherence. But, whereas factual beliefs are assessed in terms of falsity and conviction, but other beliefs are not so clear-cut. The characteristics of delusions are considered here in the light of philosophical approaches to belief, and they are compared with other strongly held, nonfactual beliefs. Approaching delusions as beliefs has several drawbacks: (i) It implies that psychiatry is in the business of determining and regulating the acceptable limits of human belief; (ii) it may result in the misidentification of other strong belief as delusion; and (iii) it fails to explain the often debilitating nature of delusions. If delusions are organized and integrated into the psyche in ways that differ from ordinary beliefs, their influence on, and incongruence with, a person’s other thoughts, emotions, and behavior become more explicable, as do the persistent theoretical problems of definition and distinction in the face of a relatively robust diagnostic practice. We argue that, although accepting that delusions might reasonably be considered as a kind of belief, their wider role in the life of a psychotic patient and the ways that they seem to differ from more ordinary belief merits scrutiny.

The Ikhwanization of the Salafis: Piety in the Politics of Egypt and Kuwait

This article discusses how to make sense of the seeming paradox of the hitherto apolitical salafis forming parties and joining the competitive political scene. A dominant salafi attitude has been that Islam dictates for the ordinary believer absolute obedience to the ruler, the wali al-amr, even when that ruler is a less-than-pious Muslim and may deviate from the word of God. At the outset of the movement that led to the fall of Husni Mubarak, this attitude led salafis openly to criticize the demonstrations as impious rebellion against the wali al-amr. Yet, as the new political set-up after the revolution took shape, large segments of the salafi movement exhibited a newfound belief in the legitimacy of competition for elected political power. The article argues that Salafism best can be seen as a movement for moral purity and individual piety in a rapidly changing society, much akin to the early Muslim Brothers and to the early beginnings of the Egyptian Islamic student movement of the 1970s. And once the step into active political engagement is taken, the salafis come to deal with strong forces pushing them along the path earlier traversed by the Muslim Brothers, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, leading to a more pragmatic understanding of what it means to further the cause of Islam.

Cartesian Skepticism and Internal Realism

The Cartesian skeptic’s strategy is to tell a story about the world that is entirely consistent with all of the empirical evidence that we do, or can, have, but according to which many or all of our ordinary beliefs are false. He then suggests that, since we cannot show that his story is false, we ought to surrender those beliefs. In this paper I offer a decisiontheoretic response to skepticism. Say that a cognitive attitude is a propositional attitude that may be true or false. I argue that rejecting the skeptic’s story, and so retaining our ordinary opinions, will yield for us true cognitive attitudes, no matter whether the skeptic’s story is true or false, and that the best any alternative can do is yield no cognitive attitudes at all. Hence, it is rational to retain our ordinary opinions. One may be concerned that I can maintain this surprising conclusion because the cognitive attitudes at issue are not real beliefs, and do not represent the real world. I conclude the paper by arguing that this concern is misplaced.

Caviar and Friendship: Sensational Trials and the Reinvention of Public Space

Sensational trials are a venue for the performance of social knowledge—the kind of knowledge that does not regularly make an appearance on the front pages of national newspapers. if sensational trials routinely catapult private matters into the public sphere, it is less such exciting revelations that concern me here, than the dross kicked up in their wake. Sensational trials, I contend, are a point of entry into everyday life, that far more elusive zone of ordinary beliefs and practices situated between the institution and the bedroom, in the interstices of the scripted and chronicled domains of private and public life. To address the everyday is to confront those undocumented procedures and forms of knowledge that exist beyond the realm of official discourse, practices that cultural theorists are increasingly eager to explore and increasingly sceptical of finding. As Barry Sandywell recently observed, ‘Like the omnipollent term “community”, “everyday life” is in continuous use within lay and theoretical discourse and yet continuously evades definition. Perhaps ... we should ask “where is everyday life”?’ This paper argues that one answer to this question lies in the study of sensational trials.

The theological doctrine of the miracle and the concept of the initial nomology of the universe

Factors of a secularized world, among which, alongside with which there is Christian theology, encourage the latter to meet the high intellectual guidelines of the present culture, gain signs of persuasiveness, comprehensiveness, consistency and generally take into account the requirements and norms of common sense. However, trying to reflect reality, moreover, claiming Truth, religion and its ideas arise and function within the limits of subjective and accordingly can not be forced to adjust (such as, in particular, scientific hypotheses and theories). This is largely reflected in theology as its reflective presentation. However, not only the religious intellectual, but also any ordinary believer prefers to find in daily routine such arguments that it would undoubtedly point out that his faith is not an illusion that he meets the highest requirements of historical truth. In this sense, the well-known Catholic cleric and theologian Hans Kyung was not mistaken and even exaggerated, when he categorically reiterated: "Where faith is based on illusion, there is not faith, but superstition"

Responding to Ordinary Christology

This article uses empirical data from a previous study to explore how theological educators should respond to ordinary Christology as well as ordinary soteriology. It begins by addressing the question of how to respond to beliefs about Jesus that do not conform to the canons of official orthodoxy and proceeds to argue for the functional Christology of ordinary believers to be given a say in defining orthodoxy and enlarging normativity. Some of the implications for theological education of exemplarist soteriology, together with its corollary pluralism, are also discussed and a plea is made for ordinary theology to be taken seriously by those who are engaged in Christian education, as well as those involved in Christian mission and ministry. Finally, various pedagogical implications of ordinary Christology are briefly explored in the light of the findings from the previous study.

The Secular and the Religious in Tajikistan

The increasing practice of Islam in Tajikistan in the last few years has contributed to rising social and political tensions. Based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Northern Tajikistan between May and October 2010, this article intends to highlight underlying religious tensions in Tajikistan, which, I argue, are the result of the emergence of conflicting voices contesting current political spaces. My intention is to revisit two concepts abundantly used in the religious literature. First, I intend to deconstruct the dichotomous relation between the state and society and try to uncover the power relations that lie behind the making, dissemination and understanding of narratives addressing the place of Islam in society. Second, I reconsider the categories of the secular and the religious by illustrating the porous character of these concepts in the Tajik context. I do so by providing accounts of local perceptions of religious politics expressed by politicians and bureaucrats, ordinary believers and representatives of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan. Finally, I argue that the coexistence of different sets of religious and secular norms reveals that the struggle for political power in Tajikistan is now increasingly articulated around religious issues.

In the Eyes of Others. The Modern Devotion in Germany and the Netherlands: Influencing and Appropriating

Shortly after the spiritual reform movement Devotio Moderna had been founded by Geert Grote in the 1370s, it began to flourish, especially in the Low Countries and in Northern Germany. The humble mode of life in imitation of Christ and his first followers pursued by the new Devout met with an enthusiastic reception among religious, clerics, and lay people alike. From around 1420 onwards, local bishops and other prelates successfully involved the recently founded Congregation of Windesheim in their attempts to reform monasteries and abbeys belonging to different orders. The new Devout were also deeply concerned with the welfare of ‘ordinary believers,’ as is clearly shown by the widespread dissemination of vernacular books of hours and comparable prayer texts originating from Devout communities. This concern has prompted some Church historians to characterize the movement as ‘semireligious,’ or even as ‘lay movement.’ This introductory contribution attempts to modify this view, and it stresses that the early Modern Devotion should rather be seen as a movement that tried to bring religious communities closer to lay people, and simultaneously strove to give the life of ordinary believers a monastic touch. Together with the following contributions by Rijcklof Hofman, Ulrike Hascher-Burger, Judith Keßler, and Koen Goudriaan, it seeks to provide a better understanding of the manner in which the new Devout tried to share their spirituality with their contemporaries.

Teasing Out Clues, Not Kooks

Teasing Out Clues, Not Kooks

Personal Construct Theory and Human Values

Despite recognition as an important, potentially unifying construct within the social sciences and humanities, value lacks an overarching theoretical framework. One theory within the social sciences, personal construct theory, is suggested as a theoretical foundation for human values, and an attempt to situate values within this theory is presented. It is argued that human values are core constructs in the language of personal construct theory, while ordinary beliefs are peripheral constructs. Various implications and applications of this formulation are discussed.

The Catholic Church in China Today: The Limitations of Autonomy and Enculturation

Since the 1950s, the ruling authorities in the People's Republic of China have insisted that Christian churches there cut their ties with foreign religious institutions and become “autonomous,” or self-governing. For the Catholic Church in China, this has required the rupture of at least the administrative or political ties with the Holy See. The church1 is administered by a Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association; bishops are “elected” through this association—in practice, appointed by the Chinese government and ultimately the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Vatican, for its part, continues to insist that the appointment of bishops is the prerogative of the pope. As a consequence, the Catholic community is divided into two groupings, an “official” church approved by the authorities and an “underground” church,2 although the distinction between the two has become increasingly blurred and, on a mundane basis in normal times, may no longer make itself obvious to the ordinary believer.3 But the disagreement on church governance has stood in the way of a normal relationship between the church in China and the universal church headed by the pope.4 In 2007, Benedict XVI issued a letter to all Chinese Catholics that urged reconciliation of the underground and official church and an accommodation between the universal church and the Chinese state. Despite some early signs of a thaw, in the subsequent years the pressures of the regime against the church became even more intense than they had been before.

The Artistic Disenfranchisement of Philosophy

AbstractAfter modernist formalism, contemporary artworks are often assigned a critic function: they are said to “question”, “reconsider”, “call for reflection” on the world… Such formulas refer to the Socratic foundation of philosophy, whereas the philosopher was the one who brought to light the fragility of opinions, discovered prejudices, undid ordinary beliefs and convictions that were not grounded in reason.Thus, after the preeminence of philosophy on art, as in the philosophical systems that dominated the 19 th century, we observe nowadays a predominance of art on philosophy’s very task, that is, critical questioning. This paper attempts to reconstruct the historical origin of this new theoretical attitude, and to evaluate its pertinence through an examination of the conditions under which art can carry out such critical programme.

The minimal A-theory

Timothy Williamson thinks that every object is a necessary, eternal existent. In defense of his view, Williamson appeals primarily to considerations from modal and tense logic. While I am uncertain about his modal claims, I think there are good metaphysical reasons to believe permanentism: the principle that everything always exists. B-theorists of time and change have long denied that objects change with respect to unqualified existence. But aside from Williamson, nearly all A-theorists defend temporaryism: the principle that there are temporary existents. I think A-theorists are better off without this added commitment, but I will not argue for that in any great detail here. Instead, I will contend that a very tempting argument for temporaryism is unsound. In the first half of the paper, I will develop the Moorean “common sense” argument for temporaryism and dispute its central premise, namely that temporaryism is the best generalization from our ordinary beliefs about creation, destruction, coming to be, and passing away. I will argue that given the pervasive vagueness in our ordinary beliefs and the background commitments of all A-theories, temporaryists cannot claim to have the common sense view because no party can accommodate most of our common sense beliefs. In the second half of the paper, I will propose a permanentist A-theory that explains all change over time as a species of property change. I call it the minimal A-theory, since it dispenses with the change in existence assumption. As we’ll see, the permanentist alternative performs well enough in explaining our ordinary beliefs, and it has better prospects for answering three objections commonly levied against A-theories.

What's the Use of Exclusivism?

The author examines the unique contributions of exclusivism to the Christian theological discussion of religious diversity. Exclusivist theologians develop epistemologically oriented approaches while inclusivist and pluralist theologians tend to work from soteriological orientations. The epistemological orientation leads exclusivists to regard religions as foundational for truth claims and believers as their agents. As such, exclusivists are more able to address how ordinary believers encounter and understand religious diversity, whereas inclusivists and pluralists are less able to do this.

The Perils of Progress

AbstractIn Contested Reproduction, John Evans outlines the results of a major piece of sociological research he has conducted. Evans suspects that reproductive genetic technologies will be a significant issue in coming cultural conflicts in the United States and that religious perspectives will play an important role in determining the shape these conflicts take. If one believes that we are hopelessly and bitterly divided on such issues, then the shape of our future conflicts may simply pit one entrenched side against another. Evans’ findings suggest that ordinary religious believers in the United States have rather complex views about these technologies—more shades of gray than black or white. He concludes that the coming conflicts may be neither as insuperable nor as hopeless as we sometimes suppose. Serious exchange, and not just caricature or dismissal, may characterize even our deep disagreements.Perhaps so. But a reading of Progress in Bioethics, a collection of essays edited by Jonathan D. Moreno and Sam Berger, might give one pause here, and not because of anything it reveals about the views of religious believers.