Orderly Liquidation Authority Research Articles

Who Determines Customer Property

Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act gives the government the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) to seek the liquidation of failing financial companies with the appointment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“the FDIC”) as receiver. When applied to securities broker-dealers, the OLA calls into question the incorporation of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”) that provides for the orderly liquidation of an insolvent broker-dealer under the oversight of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“the SIPC”). The result is a conflict of control between the FDIC and the SIPC in the event of an OLA broker-dealer liquidation and investor uncertainty regarding the incorporation of SIPA protections for customer property. Problematically, the OLA and its implementing rules leave the FDIC with discretion to modify SIPA protections for customer property.

Single point of entry doctrine in the United States as a form of corporate liability: Рossibilities of legal adoption in the Russian Federation

The article analyzes various aspects of the single point of entry bank resolution strategy in the United States and seeks to determine the viability of legally adopting this approach in the Russian Federation. The single point of entry strategy provides an alternative to “bailing out” large bank groups and bankruptcy proceedings via controlled liquidation of the parent company with simultaneous financial rehabilitation of the subsidiary bank. Orderly Liquidation Authority detailed by Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides a legislative framework for the single point of entry strategy, but due to the doctrine only existing as a guideline and not directly regulated by legislation, there are several gaps in legislation that cause various problems in both the practical implementation of the single point of entry doctrine and its scientific evaluation. The insufficiently studied topic of single point of entry doctrine as a form of corporate liability is also examined in the article. Russian legislation and court practices regarding bank rehabilitation and the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” are examined to determine the possibility of legally adopting the single point of entry doctrine due to similarities between doctrines. The flaws and merits of the single point of entry doctrine are studied while accounting for potential ways to overcome the legal gaps in the strategy. The article reaches the conclusion that while the single point of entry doctrine is far from perfect, the basic principles can be applied to Russian legislation and serve as a viable alternative to the prevalent “bailout” practice.

Risk-Shifting, Regulation, and Government Assistance

This paper examines an episode when policy response to a financial crisis effectively incentivized financial institutions to reallocate their portfolios toward safe assets. Following a shift to a regime of enhanced regulation and scaled-down public assistance during the savings and loan crisis in 1989, I find that thrifts with a high probability of failure increased their composition of safe assets relative to thrifts with a low probability of failure. The findings also show a shift to safe assets among stock thrifts relative to mutual thrifts, thereby providing evidence of risk-shifting from equity-holders to debt-holders of stock thrifts prior to the regulatory reforms. These findings suggest that for recent policies aimed at reducing moral hazard to succeed (such as the Orderly Liquidation Authority under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act), credible signals around government assistance should be provided to shareholders of financial institutions. To identify the effect of the policy change I develop a new Bayesian estimation method for causal studies.

Risk-shifting, Regulation and Government Assistance

This paper examines an episode when policy response to a financial crisis effectively incentivized financial institutions to reallocate their portfolios toward safe assets. Following a shift to a regime of enhanced regulation and scaled-down public assistance during the Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis in 1989, this paper finds that S&Ls with a high probability of failure increased their composition of safe assets relative to S&Ls with a low probability of failure. The findings also show a shift to safe assets among stock S&Ls relative to mutual S&Ls, thereby providing evidence of risk-shifting from equity-holders to debt-holders of stock S&Ls prior to the regulatory reforms. These findings show that credible signals to shareholders around government assistance will be crucial for the policies aimed at reducing moral hazard (such as the Orderly Liquidation Authority under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act) to succeed. This paper identifies the effect of the policy change by developing a new Bayesian estimation method for causal studies.

The (Il-)Legitimacy of the EU Post-Crisis Bailout System

Despite the strong political rhetoric against taxpayer-funded bailouts, in reality the government will always intervene when the distributional effects of a pre-determined loss allocation regime are deemed to be unacceptable. A number of commentators have argued for the development of a structured bailout framework that ensures the political legitimacy and efficiency of bailouts whilst minimizing their potentially harmful effects. The recent Treasury Report to the President on Orderly Liquidation Authority and Bankruptcy Reform embraces a similar approach. Unlike OLA, the EU post-crisis bailout system has already been tested. This system consists of three elements: the BRRD/SRM resolution framework reflecting the post-crisis reform effort; national corporate insolvency law as the default option; and the overarching and non-sectorial EU State aid regime. Combining system analysis and the concept of regulatory legitimacy, this article examines the complex trifurcated EU post-crisis bailout system. Its central claim is that the current system calibration invites bailout decisions that are lacking in legitimacy because the system is unlikely to produce outputs that match the system’s goal of limiting bailouts to those that are likely to be ‘pie-increasing’ and desirable. These shortcomings should be addressed primarily through re-calibrating interconnections in a way that would elevate the BRRD/SRM resolution framework’s status and transform it into the EU’s Bank Resolution and Insolvency Code; with national corporate insolvency law and the EU State aid regime resigned to supporting roles within the resolution framework. The modification of system elements, notably through the appropriate setting of MREL, could further enhance overall output legitimacy.

Safe Harbor for Derivatives in Bankruptcy: Overstayed Its Welcome?

The safe harbor for derivatives in bankruptcy has developed over the course of the last four decades into a very powerful tool for derivatives counterparties. The safe harbor’s overall effect is to allow counterparties to terminate their derivatives instruments and immediately collect their collateral upon the debtor’s initiation of a bankruptcy. This effect flies in the face of the Bankruptcy Code’s overarching principles, which are to ensure debtor rehabilitation and equality of distribution amongst creditors. By allowing derivatives counterparties to immediately terminate and close out their positions while the other creditors are stayed, both the debtor and other creditors are severely harmed. As the safe harbor contravenes the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, it is important to consider why it was enacted into the law. This paper begins with a detailed look at the creation of the safe harbor over time. It all began with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, which contained a narrow safe harbor for certain derivatives instruments. Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in 1982, 1984, and 1990 all served to dramatically increase the breadth, scope, and power of the safe harbor provisions. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 as well as the Financial Netting Improvements Act of 2006 were the final modifications to the safe harbor, and continued the pattern of enlarging its power. Overall, the safe harbor has consistently grown over time as the derivatives market increased in size and complexity. The paper next takes a detailed look at the legislative history over the decades to ascertain the purposes behind the safe harbor provisions. The legislative history paints a relatively consistent picture over all of the various amendments to the safe harbor about why this legal regime was created. The primary purpose behind the safe harbor provisions is, and has always been, to eliminate systemic risk. There has long been a fear that the size, complexity and interconnectedness of the derivatives market were so great that without special treatment it would all eventually come crashing down. However, there is also a discernible secondary purpose behind the safe harbor provisions, which is to clarify the protections for all market participants and create consistent, settled expectations for all so that the market may function effectively. As derivatives developed in complexity over time, industry participants clamored for legislation to clarify what protections extended to these new instruments and players, and Congress acquiesced to their requests. Having deduced the purposes behind the safe harbor, the next step is to determine whether those purposes were fulfilled in relation to the Financial Crisis of 2007-09. Substantial evidence from the collapses of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and the entire residential mortgage-backed securities market suggests that not only did the safe harbor fail to achieve its stated goal of reducing systemic risk, but actually backfired and increased systemic risk, and thereby worsened the financial crisis. In light of this evidence, the paper ends by discussing two routes for reform. The first option is to repeal the safe harbor in light of the creation of the Orderly Liquidation Authority under the Dodd-Frank Act. The Orderly Liquidation Authority is a financial resolution system created specifically for the largest institutions capable of producing systemic risk. However, this paper supports the second option, which is less drastic and the one less likely to upset settled expectations. That second option proposes to narrow the safe harbor provisions in various ways so that they are more appropriately targeted at achieving their goal of reducing systemic risk.

The Resolution of Distressed Financial Conglomerates

One of the most elegant legal innovations to emerge from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is the FDIC’s single-point-of-entry (SPOE) initiative, whereby regulatory authorities will be in a position to resolve the failure of large financial conglomerates (corporate groups with regulated financial entities as subsidiaries) by seizing a top-tier holding company, downstreaming holding-company resources to distressed subsidiaries, wiping out holding-company shareholders while simultaneously imposing additional losses on holding-company creditors, and allowing the government to resolve the entire group without disrupting the business operations of operating subsidiaries (even those operating overseas) or risking systemic consequences for the broader economy. Although there is much to admire in the creativity underlying SPOE, the approach’s design also raises a host of novel and challenging questions of implementation. This chapter explores a number of these questions and elaborates upon the following points. First, in contrast to traditional approaches to resolving financial conglomerates, SPOE is premised on the continued support of all material operating subsidiaries, thereby potentially extending the scope of government support and thus posing the possibility of mission creep and expanded moral hazard. Second, SPOE contemplates the automatic downstreaming of resources to operating subsidiaries in distress, but effecting that support is likely to be more difficult than commonly understood. If too much support is positioned in advance, there may be inadequate reserves at the top level to support a single subsidiary that gets into an unexpectedly large amount of trouble. Alternatively, if too many reserves are retained at the holding-company level, commitments of subsidiary support may not be credible (especially to foreign authorities) and it may become difficult legally and practically to deploy those resources in times of distress. SPOE is most easy to envision operating in conjunction with the FDIC’s expanded authority under its Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) established under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the act’s preferred regime for resolving failed financial conglomerates is the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (where Lehman was resolved) and not OLA. Several complexities could arise were a bankruptcy court today called upon to implement an SPOE resolution plan. While many legal experts are working on legislative proposals to amend the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate SPOE resolutions, there are a number of legal levers that federal authorities could deploy under current law to increase the likelihood that the SPOE strategy could be effected through traditional bankruptcy procedures. The task would be challenging and would require considerable advanced planning. But there are substantial benefits to be had from taking steps now to increase the likelihood that the bankruptcy option represents a viable and credible alternative for effecting SPOE transactions without resort to OLA and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The Resolution of Distressed Financial Conglomerates

One of the most elegant legal innovations to emerge from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is the FDIC’s single-point-of-entry (SPOE) initiative, whereby regulatory authorities will be in a position to resolve the failure of large financial conglomerates (corporate groups with regulated financial entities as subsidiaries) by seizing a top-tier holding company, downstreaming holding-company resources to distressed subsidiaries, wiping out holding-company shareholders while simultaneously imposing additional losses on holding-company creditors, and allowing the government to resolve the entire group without disrupting the business operations of operating subsidiaries (even those operating overseas) or risking systemic consequences for the broader economy. Although there is much to admire in the creativity underlying SPOE, the approach’s design also raises a host of novel and challenging questions of implementation. This chapter explores a number of these questions and elaborates upon the following points. First, in contrast to traditional approaches to resolving financial conglomerates, SPOE is premised on the continued support of all material operating subsidiaries, thereby potentially extending the scope of government support and thus posing the possibility of mission creep and expanded moral hazard. Second, SPOE contemplates the automatic downstreaming of resources to operating subsidiaries in distress, but effecting that support is likely to be more difficult than commonly understood. If too much support is positioned in advance, there may be inadequate reserves at the top level to support a single subsidiary that gets into an unexpectedly large amount of trouble. Alternatively, if too many reserves are retained at the holding-company level, commitments of subsidiary support may not be credible (especially to foreign authorities) and it may become difficult legally and practically to deploy those resources in times of distress. SPOE is most easy to envision operating in conjunction with the FDIC’s expanded authority under its Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) established under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. However, the act’s preferred regime for resolving failed financial conglomerates is the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (where Lehman was resolved) and not OLA. Several complexities could arise were a bankruptcy court today called upon to implement an SPOE resolution plan. While many legal experts are working on legislative proposals to amend the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate SPOE resolutions, there are a number of legal levers that federal authorities could deploy under current law to increase the likelihood that the SPOE strategy could be effected through traditional bankruptcy procedures. The task would be challenging and would require considerable advanced planning. But there are substantial benefits to be had from taking steps now to increase the likelihood that the bankruptcy option represents a viable and credible alternative for effecting SPOE transactions without resort to OLA and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.

SPOE Plus TLAC = More Bailouts for Wall Street

SPOE Plus TLAC = More Bailouts for Wall Street

Lehman's Derivative Portfolio

In the Fall of 2008, Lehman Brothers had a $35 trillion derivatives portfolio, representing about 5% of the worldwide derivatives market. It was a party to approximately one million trades, under more than 6,000 ISDA master agreements.Lehman’s derivatives were not the direct cause of its failure, but its derivatives, and the growth of the derivatives markets in general, led to the assumption of outsized risks and systemic weaknesses that did facilitate the crisis.In addition to the systemic problems caused by Lehman’s derivatives portfolio, derivatives have also been identified as a key source of value loss in the bankruptcy.The singular losses caused to Lehman’s bankruptcy estate by Lehman’s derivatives portfolio came from the safe harbors and the system of closeout netting the safe harbors support. While the safe harbors have been thoroughly studied and debated in the abstract, a close look at Lehman’s experience provides important insights for the future. In particular, the largest part of Lehman’s derivatives portfolio shows how financial institutions will again suffer when resolution is attempted in the traditional bankruptcy system. As such, I question the Dodd-Frank Act’s professed preference for “normal” bankruptcy process over specialized insolvency regimes like the new “Orderly Liquidation Authority.”And the abrupt closeout of Lehman’s cleared derivatives portfolio by CME, which Lehman’s examiner noted as the source of several obvious losses to the bankruptcy estate, also provides important insights, given Dodd-Frank’s strong preference for central clearing going forward.This paper looks at both issues, and suggests that the continuation of the safe harbors “as is” renders chapter 11 nonviable for larger financial institutions, and recent contractual attempts to work around the safe harbors are insufficient to solve the problem, while the increased role of clearinghouses in financial institution failures will force regulators to confront difficult choices. In short, the regulators will have to balance two competing systemic risks: the risk of an unruly resolution of the financial institution, balanced against increased risk to the clearinghouse.

Is Dodd Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority Necessary to Fix Too-Big-to-Fail?

The Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) has many legal issues that could prevent its use. Should there be a next financial crisis, regulators may again be forced to sell a large failing bank to a larger banking institution, creating yet another too-big-to-fail (TBTF) institution.Regulatory plans for using OLA focus on injecting parent holding company capital into the critical operating subsidiaries of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) to keep these subsidiaries open and operating. This goal can be achieved without OLA by imposing substantially higher minimum capital requirements on critical operating subsidiaries instead of imposing them on parent SIFIs. But, replacing OLA with this simple alternative, alone, will not solve the TBTF problem. Investor perceptions of TBTF arise naturally given flaws in the existing deposit insurance bank resolution process, and the predilection for regulatory forbearance created by conflicting responsibilities assigned to the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). The FRB duty to be the consolidated supervisor of largest BHCs and other designated SIFIs, the guardian of financial stability, and the lender of last resort make it rational for investors to expect large financial institution to receive special assistance to forestall their failure or protect their creditors from loss. In contrast, other institutions that offer similar financial services will be allowed to fail and impose losses on similarly situated creditors. To end TBTF, financial regulation must be refocused on: (i) ensuring the uninterrupted operation of important subsidiaries by increasing capital requirements on banks and critical functionally-regulated affiliates ― not parent holding companies; (ii) reforming the deposit insurance bank resolution process to mandate the break-up of large failing banks; (iii) removing the regulatory structure that creates TBTF investor expectations; and (iv) requiring SIFI parent companies to reorganize or liquidate using a judicial bankruptcy process in which similarly situated creditors are treated equally. The alternative approach of higher capital requirements at operating subsidiaries does not require OLA or new regulations to operationalize OLA — rules requiring minimum total loss absorbing capacity or contingent convertible debt. If higher capital requirements at critical subsidiaries are funded with debt issued by the parent holding company, there will be no reduction in SIFIs’ consolidated interest tax shields and consequently no increase in the cost of commercial and consumer credit. These reforms will simplify regulation, improve transparency, protect taxpayers from the expense of future SIFI bailouts and eliminate the TBTF subsidy without abridging property rights and legal protection for parent SIFI creditors.

Can the “Single Point of Entry” strategy be used to recapitalize a systemically important failing bank?

The Single Point of Entry (SPOE)—the FDIC strategy to implement its new Dodd–Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA)—promises to reduce the financial market turmoil caused by the failure of a large complex financial institution by using parent holding company resources to recapitalize its large failing subsidiary banks. We identify legal and financial impediments that may prevent the use of a SPOE strategy for this purpose. Dodd–Frank does not authorize bank recapitalizations through SPOE or otherwise, and the OLA cannot be invoked unless the failure of a subsidiary puts the parent in danger of default. The imprecise legislative language that authorizes OLA creates a new source of systemic risk. Regulations required to operationalize SPOE will require bank holding companies to issue a substantial volume of new subordinated debt, increasing these institutions’ leverage and financial fragility. Unless the Dodd–Frank Act is amended, OLA could well magnify and not reduce market instability in the next financial crisis.

Systemic Risk and Managerial Incentives in the Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority

Neither the FDIC’s recently announced resolution policy for failed financial institutions nor academic studies on systemic risk address the micro-level managerial incentives resulting from the Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority’s incapacity to respond to simultaneous balance-sheet insolvency rather than temporary illiquidity. By holding correlated asset portfolios and serving as counterparties to similarly situated financial institutions, managers can strategically increase the likelihood of a government bailout rather than receivership under the OLA. Three case studies—Lehman Brothers, AIG, and large European banks’ response to the 2011 bail-in proposals—demonstrate the implications of the OLA’s shortcomings and the inadequacy of the FDIC’s approach. In light of these strategic incentives, the FDIC should modify its intervention policy to respond effectively to illiquidity-driven systemic risk and prudential regulators should work to reduce the likelihood of correlated balance-sheet insolvency.

The Dodd-Frank Act: Key Features, Implementation Progress, and Financial System Impact

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) of 2010 provides for a wide variety of new regulatory and supervisory initiatives with the goal to promote a safer and sounder banking system. Our paper puts Dodd-Frank into a historical perspective, identifies its key features, discusses the implementation progress, and assesses whether the law will accomplish its objectives. We conclude that the approach in the law to financial regulatory reform is best described as a Band-Aid approach to financial regulation. A better approach in our view is one that strengthens market discipline on bank risk-taking and enhances competition so as to reduce the regulatory burden and enhance the efficiency and stability of the financial system. Dodd-Frank pays lip service to this objective with the creation of an Orderly Liquidation Authority and the Financial Stability Oversight Council, with the effectiveness of both these new bodies being very much in doubt.

Robust Political Economy and the Insolvency Resolution of Large Financial Institutions

This research applies the robust political economy framework to a comparative institutional analysis of large US financial institutions insolvency procedures. The regimes investigated will be the bailout of financial institutions, Dodd-Frank Act's Orderly Liquidation Authority, both through procedures that follow original intent and through a 'bail-in' route, and 3 bankruptcy possibilities including 11, a so-called Chapter 14, and a mandatory auction mechanism used as a benchmark. We study the robustness of these regimes' procedures through 5 criteria, both ex ante and ex post. These are the initiation of insolvency procedures, Too-big-to-fail moral hazard, the filtering mechanism, the allocation of resources, and their alleged systemic externalities containment abilities.

Systemic Risk and Managerial Incentives in the Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority

Neither the FDIC’s recently announced resolution policy for failed financial institutions nor academic studies on systemic risk address the micro-level managerial incentives resulting from the Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority’s incapacity to respond to simultaneous balance-sheet insolvency rather than temporary illiquidity. By holding correlated asset portfolios and serving as counterparties to similarly situated financial institutions, managers can strategically increase the likelihood of a government bailout rather than receivership under the OLA. Three case studies — Lehman Brothers, AIG, and large European banks’ response to the 2011 bail-in proposals — demonstrate the implications of the OLA’s shortcomings and the inadequacy of the FDIC’s approach. In light of these strategic incentives, the FDIC should modify its intervention policy to respond effectively to illiquidity-driven systemic risk and prudential regulators should work to reduce the likelihood of correlated balance-sheet insolvency.

Nationalize the Clearinghouses!

Given the vital place of clearinghouses in Dodd-Frank, it is perhaps surprising that Dodd-Frank makes no provision for the failure of a clearinghouse. Indeed, it is arguable that the United States is not in compliance with its commitment to the G-20 on this point.Clearinghouses are presently excluded from the new Orderly Liquidation Authority under title II, title II and titles VII and VIII do not work well together in any event, and the notion that a derivatives clearinghouse might file a regular bankruptcy petition is farcical, given that Congress previously decided to exclude derivatives, and most securities trades, from the most important parts of the Bankruptcy Code. A clearinghouse might file, but there would be little point.And because clearinghouses are oddly defined as commodities brokers under the Bankruptcy Code, they are only permitted to file a chapter 7 liquidation cases. In this paper I suggest two likely outcomes upon the onset of clearinghouse financial distress. First, Congress will be tempted to adopt an ad hoc statutory solution. The fate of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two mortgage companies who were placed in a conservatorship in September 2008, shortly after Congress had created that possibility under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, looms large here. But ad hoc solutions simply exacerbate uncertainty in times of financial distress, and are subject to litigation risk too. And the sudden creation of a specialized resolution process is really not anything more than a bailout, since any solution will require massive capital injections to save the clearinghouses. Again consider the mortgage companies, and the U.S. Treasury’s large preferred share holdings therein.So there will be a temptation to engage in direct bailout, despite Dodd-Frank’s claim to have ended bailouts. Bailouts of individual financial institutions may end, but bailouts of clearinghouses might become more common in a post-Dodd-Frank world. Given that most clearinghouses are themselves publicly traded companies, with strong connections to all the major banks, there are good reasons to wonder if we will not simply be bailing out a new type of financial institution in the future.What to do? I suggest that the government should nationalize the clearinghouses upon failure, and the intention to exercise this option should be made clear ex ante. That is, the government should expressly state that clearinghouses designated under title VIII of Dodd-Frank that ultimately fail will be nationalized, with specific consequences to investors, and an expectation of member participation in the recapitalization of the clearinghouse, once that becomes systemically viable. This should provide stakeholders in the clearinghouses with strong incentives to oversee the clearinghouse’s management, and avoid such a fate.

Wishful thinking or effective threat? Tightening bank resolution regimes and bank risk-taking

We propose a framework for testing the effects of changes in bank resolution regimes on bank behavior. By exploiting the differential relevance of recent changes in U.S. bank resolution (i.e., the introduction of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, OLA) for different types of banks, we are able to simulate a quasi-natural experiment using a difference-in-difference framework. We find that banks that are more affected by the introduction of the OLA (1) significantly decrease their overall risk-taking and (2) shift their loan origination toward lower risk, indicating the general effectiveness of the regime change. This effect, however, does (3) not hold for the largest and most systemically important banks. Hence, the introduction of the OLA in the U.S. alone does not appear to have solved the too-big-to-fail problem and might need to be complemented with other measures to limit financial institutions’ risk-taking.

Thoughts on Single Point of Entry

This comment letter was recently submitted to the FDIC in response to their Single Point of Entry (SPOE) Strategy for implementing Dodd Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (Federal Register/Vol. 78, No. 243).In the comment letter, I describe SPOE as a promising first start, but urge the agency to develop an more realistic description of the process that includes financial distress at the operating subsidiary level.Holding companies are unlikely to be the direct source of financial distress that would warrant the use of OLA, yet the SPOE proposal as explicated is almost exclusively focused on holding companies. Certainly resolving holding companies is much easier than resolving operating companies, but if the SPOE is to provide a realistic roadmap for future use of OLA, it must engage in a full discussion of a more realistic, and specific scenario.

An Orderly Liquidation Authority within a Disorderly Supervisory Framework: Looking into the Dodd-Frank Act from Europe

Article An Orderly Liquidation Authority within a Disorderly Supervisory Framework: Looking into the Dodd-Frank Act from Europe was published on March 1, 2014 in the journal European Company and Financial Law Review (volume 11, issue 1).