Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Research Articles

Worst-case scenarios: Modeling uncontrolled type 2 polio transmission.

In May 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated the cessation of all use of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2), except for emergency outbreak response. Since then, paralytic polio cases caused by type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses now exceed 3,000 cases reported by 39 countries. In 2022 (as of April 25, 2023), 20 countries reported detection of cases and nine other countries reported environmental surveillance detection, but no reported cases. Recent development of a genetically modified novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) may help curb the generation of neurovirulent vaccine-derived strains; its use since 2021 under Emergency Use Listing is limited to outbreak response activities. Prior modeling studies showed that the expected trajectory for global type 2 viruses does not appear headed toward eradication, even with the best possible properties of nOPV2 assuming current outbreak response performance. Continued persistence of type 2 poliovirus transmission exposes the world to the risks of potentially high-consequence events such as the importation of virus into high-transmission areas of India or Bangladesh. Building on prior polio endgame modeling and assuming current national and GPEI outbreak response performance, we show no probability of successfully eradicating type 2 polioviruses in the near term regardless of vaccine choice. We also demonstrate the possible worst-case scenarios could result in rapid expansion of paralytic cases and preclude the goal of permanently ending all cases of poliomyelitis in the foreseeable future. Avoiding such catastrophic scenarios will depend on the development of strategies that raise population immunity to type 2 polioviruses.

The Fight against Poliovirus Is Not Over.

Poliovirus (PV), the virus that causes both acute poliomyelitis and post-polio syndrome, is classified within the Enterovirus C species, and there are three wild PV serotypes: WPV1, WPV2 and WPV3. The launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988 eradicated two of the three serotypes of WPV (WPV2 and WPV3). However, the endemic transmission of WPV1 persists in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2022. There are cases of paralytic polio due to the loss of viral attenuation in the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), known as vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV). Between January 2021 and May 2023, a total of 2141 circulating VDPV (cVDPV) cases were reported in 36 countries worldwide. Because of this risk, inactivated poliovirus (IPV) is being used more widely, and attenuated PV2 has been removed from OPV formulations to obtain bivalent OPV (containing only types 1 and 3). In order to avoid the reversion of attenuated OPV strains, the new OPV, which is more stable due to genome-wide modifications, as well as sabin IPV and virus-like particle (VLP) vaccines, is being developed and offers promising solutions for eradicating WP1 and VDPV.

Halting vaccine-derived poliovirus circulation: the novel type 2 oral vaccine might not be enough

Halting vaccine-derived poliovirus circulation: the novel type 2 oral vaccine might not be enough

Poliovirus antibodies following two rounds of campaigns with a type 2 novel oral poliovirus vaccine in Liberia: a clustered, population-based seroprevalence survey

Novel oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 (nOPV2) was administered in Liberia in response to an outbreak of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) in 2021. We conducted a serological survey of polio antibodies after two national campaigns with nOPV2. This clustered, cross-sectional, population-based seroprevalence survey was conducted in children aged 0-59 months, more than 4 weeks after the second nOPV2 vaccination round. We used a clustered sampling method in four geographical regions of Liberia, followed by a simple random sampling of households. One eligible child was randomly selected per household. Dried blood spot specimens were taken and vaccination history was recorded. The antibody titres against all three poliovirus serotypes were assessed using standard microneutralisation assays done at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, GA, USA. Analysable data were obtained from 436 (87%) of 500 enrolled participants. Of these, 371 (85%) children were reported via parental recall to have received two nOPV2 doses, 43 (10%) received one dose, and 22 (5%) received no doses. The seroprevalence against type 2 poliovirus was 38·3% (95% CI 33·7-43·0; 167 of 436 participants). No significant difference was observed between type 2 seroprevalence in children aged 6 months or older who were reported to have received two doses of nOPV2 (42·1%, 95% CI 36·8-47·5; 144 of 342), one dose (28·0%, 12·1-49·4; seven of 25), or no doses (37·5%, 8·5-75·5; three of eight; p=0·39). The seroprevalence against type 1 was 59·6% (54·9-64·3; 260 of 436), and the seroprevalence against type 3 was 53·0% (48·2-57·7; 231 of 436). Unexpectedly, the data showed low type 2 seroprevalence after two reported doses of nOPV2. This finding is probably affected by the lower oral poliovirus vaccine immunogenicity previously demonstrated in resource-limited settings, with high prevalence of chronic intestinal infections in children and other factors discussed herein. Our results provide the first assessment of nOPV2 performance in outbreak response in the African region. WHO and Rotary International.

Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication - Worldwide, January 2021-March 2023.

Since the World Health Assembly established the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988, two of the three wild poliovirus (WPV) serotypes (types 2 and 3) have been eradicated, and global WPV cases have decreased by more than 99.9%. Afghanistan and Pakistan remain the only countries where indigenous WPV type 1 (WPV1) transmission has not been interrupted. This report summarizes progress toward global polio eradication during January 1, 2021-March 31, 2023, and updates previous reports (1,2). In 2022, Afghanistan and Pakistan reported 22 WPV1 cases, compared with five in 2021; as of May 5, 2023, a single WPV1 case was reported in Pakistan in 2023. A WPV1 case was reported on the African continent for the first time since 2016, when officials in Malawi confirmed a WPV1 case in a child with paralysis onset in November 2021; neighboring Mozambique subsequently reported eight genetically linked cases. Outbreaks of polio caused by circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) can occur when oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) strains circulate for a prolonged time in underimmunized populations, allowing reversion to neurovirulence (3). A total of 859 cVDPV cases occurred during 2022, an increase of 23% from 698 cases in 2021. cVDPVs were detected in areas where poliovirus transmission had long been eliminated (including in Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States). In addition, cocirculation of multiple poliovirus types occurred in multiple countries globally (including Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Israel, Malawi, Mozambique, Republic of the Congo, and Yemen). The 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan targeted the goal of detecting the last cases of WPV1 and cVDPV in 2023 (4). The current global epidemiology of poliovirus transmission makes the likelihood of meeting this target date unlikely. The detections of poliovirus (WPV1 and cVDPVs) in areas where it had been previously eliminated underscore the threat of continued poliovirus spread to any area where there is insufficient vaccination to poliovirus (3). Mass vaccination and surveillance should be further enhanced in areas of transmission to interrupt poliovirus transmission and to end the global threat of paralytic polio in children.

Immunogenicity of novel oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 administered concomitantly with bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine: an open-label, non-inferiority, randomised, controlled trial

Novel oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 (nOPV2) was developed by modifying the Sabin strain to increase genetic stability and reduce risk of seeding new circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 outbreaks. Bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV; containing Sabin types 1 and 3) is the vaccine of choice for type 1 and type 3 outbreak responses. We aimed to assess immunological interference between nOPV2 and bOPV when administered concomitantly. We conducted an open-label, non-inferiority, randomised, controlled trial at two clinical trial sites in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Healthy infants aged 6 weeks were randomly assigned (1:1:1) using block randomisation, stratified by site, to receive nOPV2 only, nOPV2 plus bOPV, or bOPV only, at the ages of 6 weeks, 10 weeks, and 14 weeks. Eligibility criteria included singleton and full term (≥37 weeks' gestation) birth and parents intending to remain in the study area for the duration of study follow-up activities. Poliovirus neutralising antibody titres were measured at the ages of 6 weeks, 10 weeks, 14 weeks, and 18 weeks. The primary outcome was cumulative immune response for all three poliovirus types at the age of 14 weeks (after two doses) and was assessed in the modified intention-to-treat population, which was restricted to participants with adequate blood specimens from all study visits. Safety was assessed in all participants who received at least one dose of study product. A non-inferiority margin of 10% was used to compare single and concomitant administration. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT04579510. Between Feb 8 and Sept 26, 2021, 736 participants (244 in the nOPV2 only group, 246 in the nOPV2 plus bOPV group, and 246 in the bOPV only group) were enrolled and included in the modified intention-to-treat analysis. After two doses, 209 (86%; 95% CI 81-90) participants in the nOPV2 only group and 159 (65%; 58-70) participants in the nOPV2 plus bOPV group had a type 2 poliovirus immune response; 227 (92%; 88-95) participants in the nOPV2 plus bOPV group and 229 (93%; 89-96) participants in the bOPV only group had a type 1 response; and 216 (88%; 83-91) participants in the nOPV2 plus bOPV group and 212 (86%; 81-90) participants in the bOPV only group had a type 3 response. Co-administration was non-inferior to single administration for types 1 and 3, but not for type 2. There were 15 serious adverse events (including three deaths, one in each group, all attributable to sudden infant death syndrome); none were attributed to vaccination. Co-administration of nOPV2 and bOPV interfered with immunogenicity for poliovirus type 2, but not for types 1 and 3. The blunted nOPV2 immunogenicity we observed would be a major drawback of using co-administration as a vaccination strategy. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Metagenomic sequencing, molecular characterization, and Bayesian phylogenetics of imported type 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus, Spain, 2021.

In 2021, a type 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV2) was isolated from the stool of a patient with acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) admitted to Spain from Senegal. A virological investigation was conducted to characterize and trace the origin of VDPV2. We used an unbiased metagenomic approach for the whole-genome sequencing of VDPV2 from the stool (pre-treated with chloroform) and from the poliovirus-positive supernatant. Phylogenetic analyses and molecular epidemiological analyses relying on the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo methodology were used to determine the geographical origin and estimate the date of the initiating dose of the oral poliovirus vaccine for the imported VDPV2. We obtained a high percentage of viral reads per total reads mapped to the poliovirus genome (69.5% for pre-treated stool and 75.8% for isolate) with a great depth of sequencing coverage (5,931 and 11,581, respectively) and complete genome coverage (100%). The two key attenuating mutations in the Sabin 2 strain had reverted (A481G in the 5'UTR and Ile143Thr in VP1). In addition, the genome had a recombinant structure between type-2 poliovirus and an unidentified non-polio enterovirus-C (NPEV-C) strain with a crossover point in the protease-2A genomic region. VP1 phylogenetic analysis revealed that this strain is closely related to VDPV2 strains circulating in Senegal in 2021. According to Bayesian phylogenetics, the most recent common ancestor of the imported VDPV2 could date back 2.6 years (95% HPD: 1.7-3.7) in Senegal. We suggest that all VDPV2s circulating in 2020-21 in Senegal, Guinea, Gambia, and Mauritania have an ancestral origin in Senegal estimated around 2015. All 50 stool samples from healthy case contacts collected in Spain (n = 25) and Senegal (n = 25) and four wastewater samples collected in Spain were poliovirus negative. By using a whole-genome sequencing protocol with unbiased metagenomics from the clinical sample and viral isolate with high sequence coverage, efficiency, and throughput, we confirmed the classification of VDPV as a circulating type. The close genomic linkage with strains from Senegal was consistent with their classification as imported. Given the scarce number of complete genome sequences for NPEV-C in public databases, this protocol could help expand poliovirus and NPEV-C sequencing capacity worldwide.

Outbreak management strategies for cocirculation of multiple poliovirus types

Prior modeling studies showed that current outbreak management strategies are unlikely to stop outbreaks caused by type 1 wild polioviruses (WPV1) or circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) in many areas, and suggested increased risks of outbreaks with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. The surge of type 2 poliovirus transmission that began in 2019 and continues to date, in conjunction with decreases in preventive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) for poliovirus types 1 and 3, has led to the emergence of several countries with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. Response to these emerging cocirculation events is theoretically straightforward, but the different formulations, types, and inventories of oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) available for outbreak response present challenging practical questions. In order to demonstrate the implications of using different vaccine options and outbreak campaign strategies, we applied a transmission model to a hypothetical population with conditions similar to populations currently experiencing outbreaks of cVDPVs of both types 1 and 2. Our results suggest prevention of the largest number of paralytic cases occurs when using (1) trivalent OPV (tOPV) (or coadministering OPV formulations for all three types) until one poliovirus outbreak type dies out, followed by (2) using a type-specific OPV until the remaining poliovirus outbreak type also dies out. Using tOPV first offers a lower overall expected cost, but this option may be limited by the willingness to expose populations to type 2 Sabin OPV strains. For strategies that use type 2 novel OPV (nOPV2) concurrently administered with bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) emerges as a leading option, but questions remain about feasibility, logistics, type-specific take rates, and coadministration costs.

Immunogenicity and Safety of a Hexavalent DTwP-IPV-HB-PRP~T Vaccine Versus Separate DTwP-HB-PRP~T, bOPV, and IPV Vaccines Administered at 2, 4, 6 Months of Age Concomitantly With Rotavirus and Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccines in Healthy Infants in Thailand.

This study investigated the immunogenicity and safety of a fully liquid, hexavalent, diphtheria (D)-tetanus (T)-whole-cell pertussis (wP)-inactivated poliovirus (IPV)-hepatitis B (HB)-Haemophilus influenzae b (PRP-T) vaccine compared to licensed DTwP-HB-PRP~T, IPV, and bivalent oral poliovirus (bOPV) vaccines following co-administration with other pediatric vaccines [pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13) and rotavirus vaccine]. Phase III, randomized, open-label study in Thailand. Healthy infants received DTwP-IPV-HB-PRP~T at 2, 4 and 6 months of age (N = 228), or DTwP-HB-PRP~T and bOPV (2, 4 and 6 months of age) and IPV (4 months of age) (N = 231). All participants received PCV13 (2, 4 and 6 months of age) and rotavirus vaccine (2 and 4 months of age). Immunogenicity for all antigens was assessed using validated assays, and noninferiority post-third dose was evaluated for anti-D, anti-T, anti-pertussis [anti-pertussis toxin (anti-PT) and anti-fimbriae 2/3 (anti-FIM)], anti-polio 1, 2, 3, anti-HB, and anti-PRP~T. Safety was assessed using parental reports. Noninferiority was demonstrated for each antigen, and overall noninferiority of DTwP-IPV-HB-PRP~T versus DTwP-HB-PRP~T+bOPV+IPV was concluded. Similarity in each group was observed for the GMC ratio for antirotavirus antibodies (20.9 and 17.3, respectively) and anti-PCV13 antibodies (range: 8.46-32.6 and 7.53-33.1, respectively). Two serious adverse events were related to DTwP-IPV-HB-PRP~T (febrile convulsion and acute febrile illness) and 1 was related to DTwP-HB-PRP~T+bOPV+IPV (febrile seizure), but overall there were no safety concerns with similar rates of participants experiencing solicited (99.1% and 98.3%) and unsolicited (19.3% and 19.5%) adverse events in each group. This study confirmed the suitability of DTwP-IPV-HB-PRP~T primary series vaccination in combination with rotavirus and PCV13 vaccines.

Threat of resurgence or hope for global eradication of poliovirus?

Recent outbreaks of poliomyelitis in countries that have been free of cases for decades highlight the challenges of eradicating polio in a globalized interconnected world beset with a novel viral pandemic. We provide an epidemiological update, advancements in vaccines, and amendments in public health strategy of poliomyelitis in this review. Last year, new cases of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) were documented in regions previously documented to have eradicated WPV1 and reports of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) and 3 (cVDPV3) in New York and Jerusalem made international headlines. Sequencing of wastewater samples from environmental surveillance revealed that the WPV1 strains were related to WPV1 lineages from endemic countries and the cVDPV2 strains from New York and Jerusalem were not only related to each other but also to environmental isolates found in London. The evidence of importation of WPV1 cases from endemic countries, and global transmission of cVDPVs justifies renewed efforts in routine vaccination programs and outbreak control measures that were interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. After the novel oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 (nOPV2) received emergency authorization for containment of cVDPV2 outbreaks in 2021, subsequent reduced incidence, transmission rates, and vaccine adverse events, alongside increased genetic stability of viral isolates substantiates the safety and efficacy of nOPV2. The nOPV1 and nOPV3 vaccines, against type 1 and 3 cVDPVs, and measures to increase accessibility and efficacy of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) are in development. A revised strategy utilizing more genetically stable vaccine formulations, with uninterrupted vaccination programs and continued active surveillance optimizes the prospect of global poliomyelitis eradication.

Complexity of options related to restarting oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in national immunization programs after OPV cessation.

Background: The polio eradication endgame continues to increase in complexity. With polio cases caused by wild poliovirus type 1 and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses of all three types (1, 2 and 3) reported in 2022, the number, formulation, and use of poliovirus vaccines poses challenges for national immunization programs and vaccine suppliers. Prior poliovirus transmission modeling of globally-coordinated type-specific cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) assumed creation of Sabin monovalent OPV (mOPV) stockpiles for emergencies and explored the potential need to restart OPV if the world reached a specified cumulative threshold number of cases after OPV cessation. Methods: We document the actual experience of type 2 OPV (OPV2) cessation and reconsider prior modeling assumptions related to OPV restart. We develop updated decision trees of national immunization options for poliovirus vaccines considering different possibilities for OPV restart. Results: While OPV restart represented a hypothetical situation for risk management and contingency planning to support the 2013-2018 Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan, the actual epidemiological experience since OPV2 cessation raises questions about what, if any, trigger(s) could lead to restarting the use of OPV2 in routine immunization and/or plans for potential future restart of type 1 and 3 OPV after their respective cessation. The emergency use listing of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) and continued evaluation of nOPV for types 1 and/or 3 add further complexity by increasing the combinations of possible OPV formulations for OPV restart. Conclusions: Expanding on a 2019 discussion of the logistical challenges and implications of restarting OPV, we find a complex structure of the many options and many issues related to OPV restart decisions and policies as of early 2023. We anticipate many challenges for forecasting prospective vaccine supply needs during the polio endgame due to increasing potential combinations of poliovirus vaccine choices.

Update on Vaccine-Derived Poliovirus Outbreaks - Worldwide, January 2021-December 2022.

Circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks* can occur when oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV, containing one or more Sabin-strain serotypes 1, 2, and 3) strains undergo prolonged circulation in under-vaccinated populations, resulting in genetically reverted neurovirulent virus (1,2). Following declaration of the eradication of wild poliovirus type 2 in 2015 and the global synchronized switch from trivalent OPV (tOPV, containing Sabin-strain types 1, 2, and 3) to bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 only) for routine immunization activities† in April 2016 (3), cVDPV type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks have been reported worldwide (4). During 2016-2020, immunization responses to cVDPV2 outbreaks required use of Sabin-strain monovalent OPV2, but new VDPV2 emergences could occur if campaigns did not reach a sufficiently high proportion of children. Novel oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 (nOPV2), a more genetically stable vaccine than Sabin OPV2, was developed to address the risk for reversion to neurovirulence and became available in 2021. Because of the predominant use of nOPV2 during the reporting period, supply replenishment has frequently been insufficient for prompt response campaigns (5). This report describes global cVDPV outbreaks during January 2021-December 2022 (as of February 14, 2023) and updates previous reports (4). During 2021-2022, there were 88 active cVDPV outbreaks, including 76 (86%) caused by cVDPV2. cVDPV outbreaks affected 46 countries, 17 (37%) of which reported their first post-switch cVDPV2 outbreak. The total number of paralytic cVDPV cases during 2020-2022 decreased by 36%, from 1,117 to 715; however, the proportion of all cVDPV cases that were caused by cVDPV type 1 (cVDPV1) increased from 3% in 2020 to 18% in 2022, including the occurrence of cocirculating cVDPV1 and cVDPV2 outbreaks in two countries. The increased proportion of cVDPV1 cases follows a substantial decrease in global routine immunization coverage and suspension of preventive immunization campaigns during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022) (6); outbreak responses in some countries were also suboptimal. Improving routine immunization coverage, strengthening poliovirus surveillance, and conducting timely and high-quality supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) in response to cVDPV outbreaks are needed to interrupt cVDPV transmission and reach the goal of no cVDPV isolations in 2024.

Epidemiology of type 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus outbreaks between 2016 and 2020.

The number and geographic breadth of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreaks detected after the withdrawal of type 2 containing oral polio vaccine (April 2016) have exceeded forecasts.Using Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) investigations and environmental surveillance (ES) data from the Global Polio Laboratory Network, we summarize the epidemiology of cVDPV2 outbreaks. Between 01 January 2016 to 31 December 2020, a total of 68 unique cVDPV2 genetic emergences were detected across 34 countries. The cVDPV2 outbreaks have been associated with 1596 acute flaccid paralysis cases across four World Health Organization regions: 962/1596 (60.3%) cases occurred in African Region; 619/1596 (38.8%) in the Eastern Mediterranean Region; 14/1596 (0.9%) in Western-Pacific Region; and 1/1596 (0.1%) in the European Region. As the majority of the cVDPV2 outbreaks have been seeded through monovalent type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (mOPV2) use in outbreak responses, the introduction of the more stable novel oral poliovirus vaccine will be instrumental in stopping emergence of new cVDPV2 lineages.

Vaccine-derived poliovirus serotype 2 outbreaks and response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2017-2021.

Vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) can emerge from Sabin strain poliovirus serotypes 1, 2, and 3 contained in oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after prolonged person-to-person transmission where population vaccination immunity against polioviruses is suboptimal. VDPVs can cause paralysis indistinguishable from wild polioviruses and outbreaks when community circulation ensues. VDPV serotype 2 outbreaks (cVDPV2) have been documented in The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since 2005. The nine cVDPV2 outbreaks detected during 2005-2012 were geographically-limited and resulted in 73 paralysis cases. No outbreaks were detected during 2013-2016. During January 1, 2017-December 31, 2021, 19 cVDPV2 outbreaks were detected in DRC. Seventeen of the 19 (including two first detected in Angola) resulted in 235 paralysis cases notified in 84 health zones in 18 of DRC's 26 provinces; no notified paralysis cases were associated with the remaining two outbreaks. The DRC-KAS-3 cVDPV2 outbreak that circulated during 2019-2021, and resulted in 101 paralysis cases in 10 provinces, was the largest recorded in DRC during the reporting period in terms of numbers of paralysis cases and geographic expanse. The 15 outbreaks occurring during 2017-early 2021 were successfully controlled with numerous supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) using monovalent OPV Sabin-strain serotype 2 (mOPV2); however, suboptimal mOPV2 vaccination coverage appears to have seeded the cVDPV2 emergences detected during semester 2, 2018 through 2021. Use of the novel OPV serotype 2 (nOPV2), designed to have greater genetic stability than mOPV2, should help DRC's efforts in controlling the more recent cVDPV2 outbreaks with a much lower risk of further seeding VDPV2 emergence. Improving nOPV2 SIA coverage should decrease the number of SIAs needed to interrupt transmission. DRC needs the support of polio eradication and Essential Immunization (EI) partners to accelerate the country's ongoing initiatives for EI strengthening, introduction of a second dose of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) to increase protection against paralysis, and improving nOPV2 SIA coverage.

Analysis of population immunity to poliovirus following cessation of trivalent oral polio vaccine.

The global withdrawal of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) (tOPV, containing Sabin poliovirus strains serotypes 1, 2 and 3) from routine immunization, and the introduction of bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing Sabin poliovirus strains serotypes 1 and 3) and trivalent inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) into routine immunization was expected to improve population serologic and mucosal immunity to types 1 and 3 poliovirus, while population mucosal immunity to type 2 poliovirus would decline. However, over the period since tOPV withdrawal, the implementation of preventive bOPV supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) has decreased, while outbreaks of type 2 circulating vaccine derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) have required targeted use of monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2). We develop a dynamic model of OPV-induced immunity to estimate serotype-specific, district-level immunity for countries in priority regions and characterize changes in immunity since 2016. We account for the changes in routine immunization schedules and varying implementation of preventive and outbreak response SIAs, assuming homogenous coverages of 50% and 80% for SIAs. In areas with strong routine immunization, the switch from tOPV to bOPV has likely resulted in gains in population immunity to types 1 and 3 poliovirus. However, we estimate that improved immunogenicity of new schedules has not compensated for declines in preventive SIAs in areas with weak routine immunization. For type 2 poliovirus, without tOPV in routine immunization or SIAs, mucosal immunity has declined nearly everywhere, while use of mOPV2 has created highly heterogeneous population immunity for which it is important to take into account when responding to cVDPV2 outbreaks. The withdrawal of tOPV and declining allocations of resources for preventive bOPV SIAs have resulted in reduced immunity in vulnerable areas to types 1 and 3 poliovirus and generally reduced immunity to type 2 poliovirus in the regions studied, assuming homogeneous coverages of 50% and 80% for SIAs. The very low mucosal immunity to type 2 poliovirus generates substantially greater risk for further spread of cVDPV2 outbreaks. Emerging gaps in immunity to all serotypes will require judicious targeting of limited resources to the most vulnerable populations by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI).

Outbreak response strategies with type 2-containing oral poliovirus vaccines.

Despite exhaustive and fully-financed plans to manage the risks of globally coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) containing type 2 (OPV2) prior to 2016, as of 2022, extensive, continued transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) type 2 (cVDPV2) remains. Notably, cumulative cases caused by cVDPV2 since 2016 now exceed 2,500. Earlier analyses explored the implications of using different vaccine formulations to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and demonstrated how different properties of novel OPV2 (nOPV2) might affect its performance compared to Sabin monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). These prior analyses used fixed assumptions for how outbreak response would occur, but outbreak response implementation can change. We update an existing global poliovirus transmission model to explore different options for responding with different vaccines and assumptions about scope, delays, immunization intensity, target age groups, and number of rounds. Our findings suggest that in order to successfully stop all cVDPV2 transmission globally, countries and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative need to address the deficiencies in emergency outbreak response policy and implementation. The polio program must urgently act to substantially reduce response time, target larger populations - particularly in high transmission areas - and achieve high coverage with improved access to under-vaccinated subpopulations. Given the limited supplies of nOPV2 at the present, using mOPV2 intensively immediately, followed by nOPV2 intensively if needed and when sufficient quantities become available, substantially increases the probability of ending cVDPV2 transmission globally.

Concurrent outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus types 1 and 2 affecting the Republic of the Philippines and Malaysia, 2019-2021.

Concurrent outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus serotypes 1 and 2 (cVDPV1, cVDPV2) were confirmed in the Republic of the Philippines in September 2019 and were subsequently confirmed in Malaysia by early 2020. There is continuous population subgroup movement in specific geographies between the two countries. Outbreak response efforts focused on sequential supplemental immunization activities with monovalent Sabin strain oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 (mOPV2) and bivalent oral poliovirus vaccines (bOPV, containing Sabin strain types 1 and 3) as well as activities to enhance poliovirus surveillance sensitivity to detect virus circulation. A total of six cVDPV1 cases, 13 cVDPV2 cases, and one immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 case were detected, and there were 35 cVDPV1 and 31 cVDPV2 isolates from environmental surveillance sewage collection sites. No further cVDPV1 or cVDPV2 have been detected in either country since March 2020. Response efforts in both countries encountered challenges, particularly those caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. Important lessons were identified and could be useful for other countries that experience outbreaks of concurrent cVDPV serotypes.

Assessing country compliance with circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 outbreak response standard operating procedures: April 2016 to December 2020.

Trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) was globally replaced with bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) in April 2016 ("the switch"). Many outbreaks of paralytic poliomyelitis associated with type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) have been reported since this time. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide countries experiencing cVDPV2 outbreaks to implement timely and effective outbreak response (OBR). To assess the possible role of compliance with SOPs in successfully stopping cVDPV2 outbreaks, we analyzed data on critical timelines in the OBR process. Data were collected on all cVDPV2 outbreaks detected for the period April 1, 2016 and December 31, 2020 and all outbreak responses to those outbreaks between April 1, 2016 and December 31, 2021. We conducted secondary data analysis using the GPEI Polio Information System database, records from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Polio Laboratory, and meeting minutes of the monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2) Advisory Group. Date of notification of circulating virus was defined as Day 0 for this analysis. Extracted process variables were compared with indicators in the GPEI SOP version 3.1. One hundred and eleven cVDPV2 outbreaks resulting from 67 distinct cVDPV2 emergences were reported during April 1, 2016-December 31, 2020, affecting 34 countries across four World Health Organization Regions. Out of 65 OBRs with the first large-scale campaign (R1) conducted after Day 0, only 12 (18.5%) R1s were conducted by the target of 28days after Day 0. Of the 89 OBRs with the second large-scale campaign (R2) conducted after Day 0, 30 (33.7%) R2s were conducted by the target of 56days after Day 0. Twenty-three (31.9%) of the 72 outbreaks with isolates dated after Day 0 were stopped within the 120-day target. Since "the switch", delays in OBR implementation were evident in many countries, which may be related to the persistence of cVDPV2 outbreaks >120days. To achieve timely and effective response, countries should follow GPEI OBR guidelines.

Global oral poliovirus vaccine stockpile management as an essential preparedness and response mechanism for type 2 poliovirus outbreaks following global oral poliovirus vaccine type 2 withdrawal.

Following the global declaration of indigenous wild poliovirus type 2 eradication in 2015, the world switched to oral polio vaccine (OPV) that removed the type 2 component. This 'switch' included the widespread introduction of inactivated poliovirus vaccine and the creation of a stockpile of monovalent type 2 OPV (mOPV2) to respond to potential polio virus Type 2 (PV2) outbreaks and events. With subsequent detection of outbreaks of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2), it was necessary to use this stockpile for outbreak response. Not only were more outbreaks detected than anticipated in the first few years after the switch, but the number of supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) used to stop transmission was often high, and in many cases did not stop wider transmission. Use of mOPV type 2 led in some locations to the emergence of new outbreaks that required further use of the vaccine from the stockpile. In the following years, stockpile management became a critical element of the cVDPV2 outbreak response strategy and continued to evolve to include trivalent OPV and genetically stabilized 'novel OPV type 2' vaccines in the stockpile. An overview of this process and its evolution is presented to highlight several of these management challenges. The unpredictable vaccine demand, fixed production and procurement timelines, resource requirements, and multiple vaccine types contributes to the complexity of assuring appropriate vaccine availability for this critical programmatic need to stop outbreaks.

Evaluation of the immunization effectiveness of bOPV booster immunization and IPV revaccination

To provide a basis for further optimization of the polio sequential immunization schedule, this study evaluated the effectiveness of booster immunization with one dose of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (bOPV) at 48 months of age after different primary polio immunization schedules. At 48 months of age, one dose of bOPV was administered, and their poliovirus types 1–3 (PV1, PV2, and PV3, respectively)-specific neutralizing antibody levels were determined. Participants found to be negative for any type of PV-specific neutralizing antibody at 24, 36, or 48 months of age were re-vaccinated with inactivated polio vaccine (IPV). The 439 subjects who received a bOPV booster immunization at the age of 48 months had lower PV2-specific antibody levels compared with those who received IPV. One dose of IPV during basic polio immunization induced the lowest PV2-specific antibody levels. On the basis of our findings, to ensure that no less than 70% of the vaccinated have protection efficiency, we recommend the following: if basic immunization was conducted with 1IPV + 2bOPV (especially Sabin strain-based IPV), a booster immunization with IPV is recommended at 36 months of age, whereas if basic immunization was conducted with 2IPV + 1bOPV, a booster immunization with IPV is recommended at 48 months of age. A sequential immunization schedule of 2IPV + 1bOPV + 1IPV can not only maintain high levels of antibody against PV1 and PV3 but also increases immunity to PV2 and induces early intestinal mucosal immunity, with relatively good safety. Thus, this may be the best sequential immunization schedule for polio in countries or regions at high risk for polio.