This paper studies a firm’s optimal dynamic pricing strategies for its experience goods in markets, where the distribution of consumers’ valuations is ex ante unknown. We find several interesting findings. First, a high-quality firm can signal its quality with either a skimming-pricing strategy or a penetration-pricing strategy in the early period. Second, though a firm with higher quality benefits more from learning market demand, in equilibrium the low-quality firm not the high-quality firm will learn demand if consumers have very different willingness to pay. This is because the high-quality firm may forgo the benefit of learning demand to convince consumers of its high quality. Third, although consumers have higher willingness to pay for the high-quality product, in the first period the high-quality firm may actually charge a lower price than the low-quality firm. Lastly, the firm may earn higher profits when its initial pricing decision is made under demand uncertainty than under no demand uncertainty. The underlying reason is that the presence of demand uncertainty can sufficiently lower the high-quality firm’s signaling cost, leading to a separating outcome and allowing it to make higher profits by setting future prices based on its high quality.