This study concludes seven years of international discussion that followed publication of my book on in France. The experience ofthe controversy has taught me that a debate can only be fruitful if interlocutors share same concern for exactness and truth, and agree upon ways to achieve it. What is most needful today if criticism of interpretations is to go forward on a solid basis is fundamental research supported by philological examination of manuscript sources. That is why, for last few years, I have given my most significant lectures in German universities. Indeed, for about last fifteen years, that country has recognized and accepted a field of research focusing on relations between philosophers and National Socialism under Third Reich.1 In France, on other hand, there is practically no in-depth, systematic research on that subject, with exception of work of two or three individuals: Nicolas Tertulian comes to mind. Due to these circumstances, question - even though a very important one - of relation between thought of Martin and his National Socialism is reduced at best to a matter of opinion, and at worst it is presented as something scandalous. Everybody thinks they have a right to decide, with a self-assurance in inverse ratio to time they have spent studying question. An example that is at once comic and regrettable ofthat state of mind may be seen in little work published in 2010 by Alain and Barbara titled Heidegger, le nazisme, les femmes, la philosophie [Heidegger, Nazism, Women, and Philosophy]. Both authors think that respective positions in philosophical field give weight to fact that, on this question (as formulated by title of their work) they are of same opinion.2 In short, Badiou and Cassin [our authors speak of themselves in third person] share same opinion on Heidegger affair,3 and that is all that matters. Now, what is that opinion? Heidegger is certainly a great philosopher, who was, and at same time, a very ordinary Nazi. That's way it is. Let philosophy deal with it!4 These declarations are symptomatic. According to and his interlocutor, it is not so much who has to bear responsibility and burden of his Nazism as it is philosophy itself! This transfer of responsibility, as unjust as it is fatal, appears as off-hand effect of a whole strategy put in place by after Nazi defeat and passed on more or less consciously by his various students and disciples. It is therefore one of main points I will come back to, but first let me finish contextualizing my remarks. Again, present study concludes a series of lectures that were first given in German universities (Bremen, Frankfurt, Siegen, Berlin), then in universities of other countries, such as Spain, Italy, Belgium, United States, Mexico, and Brazil. I will speak only ofthe two main lectures. In first, given at university of Bremen during a UNESCO World Day, in December 2007, titled Being, History, Technology and Extermination (Vernichtung) in Heidegger's works,5 I symbolically took up opposing position of famous lecture given by at Bremen Club on December 2, 1949 and divided by him for publication into four different texts: Das Ding, Das Gestell, Die Gefahr, Die Kehre [The Thing, The Enframing, The Danger, The Turn]. I particularly wanted to show that Heidegger's rejection of global technology understood as a Gestell did not call into question his repeated praise - repeated on two occasions after 1945, namely, in 1953 (the publication ofthe Introduction to Metaphysics with addition of a parenthesis emphasizing his praise of the internal truth and greatness of National-Socialist movement) and in 1976 (in posthumous publication of Spiegel interview of 1966) - ofthe satisfying relation instituted by National Socialism between man and the essence of technology. …