The conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater is practiced worldwide as a measure to address water supply uncertainty. This paper focuses on a scenario in which an aquifer is open to multiple users and examines the impact of such an open-access environment on the stabilization function of conjunctive management. We construct a non-cooperative stochastic dynamic game model where multiple users utilize groundwater intake from a common aquifer as a complement to fluctuating surface water. We also propose a simpler baseline applicable to dynamic environments to compute the benefits of the stabilization function when users are unable to adjust groundwater intake to surface water uncertainties. We then apply the model to the real-world case of the water supply environment of the Cao’e River in China. Simulation results show that open access leads to diminishing stabilization values as higher pumping costs due to declining stocks lead to a weakening of users’ incentive to utilize groundwater flexibly. Furthermore, the stabilization function itself is destabilized as the number of users increases. This is because greater groundwater intake and a decline in stocks amplify variations in pumping costs caused by different patterns of surface-water fluctuation.
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