Ontological Monism Research Articles

Making a difference with matter in researchers’ positionality dynamics in qualitative inquiry

Scholars have increasingly highlighted the usefulness of new materialist theories and methodologies in attempts to address the perceived shortcomings of conventional theories inspired by social constructionism and post-structuralism. Contributing to these discussions, we utilize a new materialist theory which rests on a monistic ontology drawn from Spinozian and Deleuzian assemblage theory to examine the constitutive role of material elements (e.g. audio recorders, video cameras, and dress/shirts worn during interviews), spatial, and discursive forces in co-creating fluid nonstatic researcher positionalities in qualitative research process. This article is part of a larger ethnographic study conducted by the first author among fisherfolk in Ghana's coastal fishing communities. Our results show that the researcher's fluid positionalities during interview encounters were brought to bear and sustained in space and time through the joint effort of material, discursive, and spatial forces. As qualitative researchers seek ways to ensure better understanding of their study communities through intimate interactions, an attention to the assemblage of material-discursive forces in interview encounters may highlight some of the opportunities and obstacles in qualitative inquiry beyond human agency and negotiations.

Ontological and Axiological Foundations of the Meaning of Human Life in Nicolai Hartmann's Philosophy

The subject of this article is Nicolai Hartmann's conception of the ontological and axiological foundations of the meaning of human life. Referring to both Hartmann's major and minor, I analyze his conception of human meaning in the dimension of individual life and in the historical dimension. I begin my discussion with a brief overview of Hartmann's relation to the earlier metaphysics of meaning. Then, I focus on identifying the ontological foundations of meaning. In this section, I specifically present Hartmann’s understanding of the laws of real being, his critique of ontological monism, and, of particular importance, his critique of teleological monism. I also reconstruct the most important elements of Hartmann’s conception of man as a spiritual being, comprising the personal spirit of the objective spirit and the objectified spirit. Another point of consideration is the question of the axiological basis of meaning. For Hartmann, humans construct their specific position in the world by introducing axiological criteria and axiological points of view into the real world. As Hartmann argues, man is the intermediary between ideal values and the real world. The final point of consideration is the problem of historical meaning.

A transcendental materialist frame for neuropsychoanalysis: rethinking dual-aspect monism

ABSTRACT As the philosophical basis for neuropsychoanalysis, dual-aspect monism is fundamental to the entire neuropsychoanalytic project. However, dual-aspect monism has been criticized not only from without but also from within neuropsychoanalysis. This paper considers criticisms of dual-aspect monism from within neuropsychoanalysis. These might be summed up as a concern that the difference at the level of epistemology (neuroscience, psychoanalysis) and phenomena (objectivity, subjectivity) must not be washed away by an appeal to a common ontology. In response, I propose to supplement dual-aspect monism with the philosophical framework of Transcendental Materialism. In this view, epistemological difference between the dual aspects is secondary to antagonism at the level of monistic ontology. Transcendental Materialism begins with the question: what sort of nature must nature be to give rise to two irreducible perspectives such as neuroscience and psychoanalysis? I argue for supplementing dual-aspect monism with Transcendental Materialism through a review of Mark Solms’s work on the hard problem of consciousness via Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle. Within the Solms-Friston framework, the informatic mechanisms that give rise to dual-aspect epistemologies rely upon ontological antagonism. Principles of a transcendental materialist dual-aspect monism for neuropsychoanalysis are put forward.

Capitalism and the ‘commercial determinants of health’: A more-than-human micropolitics

This paper argues that studies of the ‘commercial determinants of health’ (CDoH) need to acknowledge fully the part the capitalist mode of commodity production and exchange plays in producing negative health outcomes. This proposition is supported by recourse to a recent development in political economy that has established a more-than-human, relational and monist (or ‘flat’) ontology of capitalism, in place of the more conventional neo-Marxist perspective. This ontology reveals a dynamic to capitalism that operates beyond human intentionality, driven by the supply of, and demand for the capacities of commodities. This dynamic determines the production and consumption of all commodities, some among which (such as tobacco, alcohol and processed foods) contribute to ill-health. A case study of food consumption reveals how these supply and demand affects drive ‘unhealthy’ food choices by consumers. Ways to undermine this more-than-human dynamic are offered as an innovative approach to addressing the effects of commerce and capitalism upon health.

Is Shepherd a Monist?

For Shepherd, how many things exist? On the one hand, it looks like the answer is going to be many. It is a central tent of Shepherd's philosophical system that causation is a relation whereby two or more objects combine to create a third. Since there are many instances of this causal relation, there must be many objects in the world. On the other hand, there are several moments throughout her writing where Shepherd indicates that the distinction between causes and effects is in some sense unreal, and that while the world appears to us to consist of many distinct objects interacting causally, really there is just one thing and its merely nominally distinct parts. I argue that Shepherd is an ontological pluralist, and the texts that appear to express a commitment to ontological monism are best understood as expressing ontological holism instead.

Capitalism and the state: A new materialist perspective

This article considers how the relational, post-anthropocentric and monist ontology of the new materialisms can inform a theory of the contemporary capitalist state, and how this perspective offers a distinctive resolution of some of the negative consequences of a capitalist mode of production. It summarises Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of capitalism as an international/ecumenical social formation, founded upon a ‘capitalist axiomatic’: namely, the free flows of capital and labour required for the everyday workings of the capitalist market. The state is a material realisation of this capitalist axiomatic. The article then undertakes a more-than-human analysis of capitalist production and markets, supply and demand, in terms of affects and assemblages. The article invokes the metaphor of a ‘black hole’ to suggest that capitalism is not merely exploitative of workers, but a formation from which neither worker nor entrepreneur can escape once a participant. Furthermore, it is these more-than-human affects that produce undesirable consequences including uncertainty, waste and social inequalities. This second analysis further refines a monist understanding of the capitalist state and suggests immediate measures to counter the unintended consequences of a market economy.

Lukács’s Theory of Metabolism as a Foundation of Ecosocialist Realism

The Anthropocene is characterized by the definitive failure of the Promethean dream of capitalism about the absolute domination over nature. As a response to the deepening of global ecological crisis, new philosophical discussions have emerged that pivot around the ontological relationship between humans and nature in the Anthropocene. In this context, Marxian ecology that draws upon Marx’s concept of “metabolic rift” is often accused of its outdated “Cartesian dualism” of Society and Nature. Against “hybridism” and “monism,” which have become increasingly dominant in critical theory of nature thanks to Bruno Latour and Noel Castree, this article examines the legacy of Lukács’s theory of “metabolism” in order to defend the contemporary validity of Marxian ecology. Although Lukács is also often criticized for his exclusion of nature from his dialectical analysis of society in History and Class Consciousness, this article shows that there is nothing wrong with categorically separating society and nature. A careful analysis of Lukács’s little-known manuscript Tailism and the Dialectic demonstrates that “ontological monism” and “methodological dualism” are unique to his historical materialism. Based on this distinction, Lukács convincingly argues that the one-sided monist understanding of the social and the natural falls into fetishism, and this is exactly why his “methodological dualism” is essential to any ecosocialist critique of capitalism.

Virtuality and immanence in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty

In this paper we aim to find a definition of virtual which fits the latest developments of digital technology, but also applies to the analog world. We consider the virtual as related to immanence, taking inspiration from Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and Merleau-Ponty’s last work. We first analyze Deleuze’s idea of immanence, from which virtuality emerges, then we focus on Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh and its virtual center. We argue that both philosophers see immanence as a dynamic medium of virtuality, overcoming the traditional concept of substance and theorizing a deep intertwining of bodies and technology. Our analysis shows that the virtual is defined by the following features: it implies an epistemological and ontological monism, relationality, and entanglement with reality. The virtual clearly emerges in digital technologies, but also belongs to analog reality, as a general condition for our knowing and being in the world as such.

Ontološki pluralizam i ontološka kategorija

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being. Historically, ways of being are aligned with the ontological categories. This paper is about to investigate why there is such a connection, and how it should be understood. Ontological pluralism suffers from an objection, according to which ontological pluralism collapses into ontological monism, i.e., there is only one way to be. Admitting to ontological categories can save ontological pluralism from this objection if ways of being ground ontological categories.

Towards a moderate realist foundation for ontological knowledge organization systems: The question of the naturalness of classifications

Several authors emphasise the need for a change in classification theory due to the influence of a dogmatic and monistic ontology supported by an outdated essentialism. These claims tend to focus on the fallibility of knowledge, the need for a pluralistic view, and the theoretical burden of observations. Regardless of the legitimacy of these concerns, there is the risk, when not moderate, to fall into the opposite relativistic extreme. Based on a narrative review of the literature, we aim to reflectively discuss the theoretical foundations that can serve as a basis for a realist position supporting pluralistic ontological classifications. The goal is to show that, against rather conventional solutions, objective scientific-based approaches to natural classifications are presented to be viable, allowing a proper distinction between ontological and taxonomic questions. Supported by critical scientific realism, we consider that such an approach is suitable for the development of ontological Knowledge Organisation Systems (KOSs). We believe that ontological perspectivism can provide the necessary adaptation to the different granularities of reality.

An Analysis of Deleuze's Concept of Potentiality

"Potentiality" (virtuel) can be seen as Deleuze's conception of "existence," and understanding potentiality is key to understanding Deleuze's monist ontology. In Deleuze's understanding, "potentiality" refers to the inner possibilities or potentials that are not limited or determined by reality or external factors. He believes that we should focus on the potentiality rather than being limited by reality or surface appearances. In this paper, I will explore Deleuze's concept of potentiality, analyze its role in Deleuze's philosophy, and consider its impact on philosophy, social sciences, and cultural studies.

CONVIVIALITY AND BECOMINGS WITH-IN DIFFERENCE. MORE-THAN-HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS IN CANDOMBLÉ

In Candomblé, existence and the continuation of life are dependent on a complex dynamic of interactions involving humans and non-humans (objects, artifacts, the environment, animals, plants, minerals, the ancestors, spiritual beings, forces). It is an ontological monism, based on the concept of àṣẹ, the life force that constitutes life in its manifestations; a conception of human beings as a composition of spiritual and material components (in which ancestors, elements of nature and divine particles participate); ways of communicating and connecting with natural phenomena, the ancestors and the spiritual world; the forms of conceiving of, living with and treating health and disease; and ways of making kin all express a mode of existence, of inhabiting the world and developing along lines of life in which all more-than-human beings participate.
 The centrality of water, breath and blood – all of which have the ability to flow inside and outside of the body and from one body to another and are the major expressions of life – in rituals, transmission of knowledge, daily care and social relations, expresses fluidity and networks of connectivity and conviviality, as well as the incompleteness of all beings. Furthermore, the centrality of Èṣù, òrìṣà of crossroads and encounters, which ensures movement, communication and the dynamic balance of forces in the Cosmos and society, is the foundational principle of Candomblé cosmogony.
 The current study is based on an ethnographic study carried out at the Àṣe Idasilẹ Ọdẹ of Bàbá Marcelo Monteiro Odearofa, a Candomblé terreiro in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

The critical (micro)political economy of health: A more-than-human approach.

The critical political economy of health offers different explanations for the social causes of health and the social factors determining the distribution of these causes. However, the relational, post-anthropocentric and monist ontology of the new materialisms overcomes this complexity, while retaining a critical focus. In this perspective, the social, economic and political relations of capitalism act upon bodies and other matter in everyday events, rather than as 'social structures'. Using a conceptual toolkit of 'affect', 'assemblage', 'capacity' and 'micropolitics', the paper asks the question: 'what does capitalism do?' The re-analysis of the social and economic relations of capitalism in terms of a production-assemblage and a market-assemblage reveals not only the workings of capitalist accumulation, but also how previously-unremarked more-than-human affects in these assemblages simultaneously produce uncertainty, waste and inequalities. This micropolitical economy of health is illustrated with examples from recent research, including a critical assessment of health inequalities during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Scientific Approach to Law and the Role of Legal Consciousness

The present article constructs the concept of a scientific approach to law as consisting of non-cognitivism, monistic ontology, non-formalism, non-reductionism of law to linguistic outputs, a (two-level) description of reality, falsifiability and rationality. The article claims that: the scientific approach to law, as constructed in this article, presents the key element of Alf Ross’ theory on law; and that the concept of legal consciousness plays important methodological and explanatory roles in this scientific approach to law.

Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood

ABSTRACT Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni’s structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness – the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.

Posthumanism and Cross-species Becoming in Zhuang Zi

Posthumanism offers a fresh perspective to reconstructing productive relationships between human and non-human beings, but the prospect of posthumanist egalitarianism has its deficiency. Zhuang Zi’s concept of “cross-species becoming” is an edifying alternative: its monistic ontology resolves the contradiction of binary oppositions, its transversal subject replaces the enfolded self, and its integration of “equality of things” with becoming paves the way for egalitarian existence. Diachronically, “cross-species becoming” reflects cosmic development, the existence of zero boundary and fluid boundary. Rigid boundary corresponds to different stages of becoming. Synchronically, “cross-species becoming” interacts with myriad things to produce a polymorphic existence that is analyzed from three aspects: its definition, conditions, and manifestations. Zhuang Zi’s concept of “cross-species becoming” and posthumanism theory complement each other; together, they aspire us to reconstruct relationships between human and non-human species.

New Materialism and the History of Agribusiness

New Materialism and the History of Agribusiness

Freedom: Created or Uncreated

There are two reasons why Christian theology introduces the concept of the absolute nothing into its doctrine of creation. Firstly, unlike platonic non-being, the absolute nihil is not eternally co-existent with God and it does not limit His creative freedom. We notice that God’s freedom is identified with the freedom to create. Platonic non-being represented a necessity. To create, therefore, means to be able to overcome every form of necessity. The concept of the absolute nothing, therefore, needs to provide an ontological ground for the creation of the absolute novum. Sergius Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdyaev, the authors I am quoting in this essay, agree that the apology of the world is inconceivable on the level of monistic ontology, for which substance or ousia is the main category. They are aware that simultaneous communion and otherness between God and the world is imaginable only on the level of the person or hypostasis. Christian theology introduces absolute nothing to secure God’s creative freedom. God is free if He can overcome givenness and create a newness in being. But Bulgakov stresses that to “create out of nothing” means that God creates out of Himself. God can create only what is already given in Him. Berdyaev’s God does not create out of Himself but out of uncreated freedom. Berdyaev explicitly confirms uncreatedness of freedom by stressing that this freedom is outside of God. This is why God can break through the givenness of the world and create an absolute newness.

Between Eleatics and Atomists: Gorgias’ Argument against Motion

The aim of my paper is to investigate Gorgias’ argument against motion, which is found in his Peri tou meontos and preserved only in MXG 980a18. I tried to shed new light both on this specific reflection and on the reliability of Pseudo-Aristotle’s version. By exploring the so called “change argument” and the “argument from divisibility”, I focused on the particular strategy used by the Sophist in his synthetike apodeixis, which should be investigated in relation to the dispute between monistic and pluralistic ontology. In this regard, the puzzle from “divisibility everywhere” and its connection with the void as not-being can provide new elements to grasp the philosophical background in which the Sophist moves. On the one hand, Gorgias’ argument against motion is part of a broader dispute on the divisibility/indivisibility of being; on the other, his original elaboration of this puzzle seems to be perfectly understandable within the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent with the argumentative style of the Sophist.

‘Bolszewizm starożytności’, czyli chrześcijaństwo jako Rewolucja. Perspektywa Nowej Prawicy Alaina de Benoist – wybrane aspekty

“The Bolshevism of Antiquity” – Christianity as Revolution. The Perspective of Alain de Benoist’s New Right: selected aspects The topic of the article is the interpretation of Christianity by Alain de Benoist, thinker of the New Right. He believes that Christianity has brought about a revolution in the world-view of European peoples. Stating that it is ‘Paganism’ that was the original and authentic basis of European spirituality, mentality, and axiology, Benoist calls Christianity the “Bolshevism of Antiquity”. The article outlines the concepts of Christian desacralisation of the world, the inaugural dissociation, and the theory of progress. The analysis showed that the foremost revolutionary trait of Christianity is the radical dualism of the created and uncreated being, which is in direct contradiction with the pre- Christian / European ontological monism.