Abstract
The aim of my paper is to investigate Gorgias’ argument against motion, which is found in his Peri tou meontos and preserved only in MXG 980a18. I tried to shed new light both on this specific reflection and on the reliability of Pseudo-Aristotle’s version. By exploring the so called “change argument” and the “argument from divisibility”, I focused on the particular strategy used by the Sophist in his synthetike apodeixis, which should be investigated in relation to the dispute between monistic and pluralistic ontology. In this regard, the puzzle from “divisibility everywhere” and its connection with the void as not-being can provide new elements to grasp the philosophical background in which the Sophist moves. On the one hand, Gorgias’ argument against motion is part of a broader dispute on the divisibility/indivisibility of being; on the other, his original elaboration of this puzzle seems to be perfectly understandable within the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent with the argumentative style of the Sophist.
Highlights
Divisibility”, I focused on the particular strategy used by the Sophist in his synthetikē apodeixis, which should be investigated in relation to the dispute between monistic and pluralistic ontology
Gorgias’ argument against motion is part of a broader dispute on the divisibility/indivisibility of being; on the other, his original elaboration of this puzzle seems to be perfectly understandable within the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent with the argumentative style of the Sophist
The Peri tou me ontos (PTMO) of Gorgias has been preserved by two different versions: Sextus Empiricus (M. 7.65-87> 82B 3 DK> D26b LM) and the pseudo-Aristotelian Anonymous (MXG 979a12980b21> D26a LM> ≠ DK)
Summary
The Peri tou me ontos (PTMO) of Gorgias has been preserved by two different versions: Sextus Empiricus (M. 7.65-87> 82B 3 DK> D26b LM) and the pseudo-Aristotelian Anonymous (MXG 979a12980b21> D26a LM> ≠ DK). The one is refuted by an argument consistent with Zeno’s puzzles against plurality: according to Simplicius, we know that Zeno was the first to say that what has no magnitude is not.13 This last assertion was part of Zeno’s reasoning aimed at denying the existence of a plurality: for, once plurality is conceded, it leads to absurd consequences (see D6 and D7 LM, on which infra, p.22). The ancients had already noticed the point of weakness in his reasoning and realised that his arguments against the many could undermine the one too To overcome this drawback, some scholars suggest that he proposed a modified and independent version of the Eleatic doctrine, theorising a differentiation between unities: 14 on the one hand the absolute Parmenidean One, on the other the one as part of a multiplicity, first introduced with a dialectical end, denied in its empirical and having size or magnitude (μέγεθος). The MXG version introduces a new argument which is perfectly consistent with Gorgias’ methodology and can be – but not exclusively – read as an anti-pluralistic attack
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