Ontological Justification Research Articles

Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence

In response to Hansson Wahlberg, this paper argues, first, that he misunderstands the redescription principle developed in my book The Causal Power of Social Structures, and second, that his criticisms rest on an ontological individualism that is taken for granted but in fact lacks an adequate ontological justification of its own.

Nondualism in Early Śākta Tantras: Transgressive Rites and Their Ontological Justification in a Historical Perspective

This paper examines the ritual and philosophical meaning of the term ‘nondual’ (advaya/advaita) in early Śākta Tantras (6th–9th centuries), including some early sources of the anti-ritualist kaula cult. It shows that nondualism denoted only ritual nondualism in the earliest texts, namely, the principle of seeing and using pure and impure substances in ritual without distinction, rejecting the pure-impure dichotomy of orthopraxy. The ontology these tantras presuppose is basically dualist, for they usually see the Lord and the created world as different and regard original impurity (mala) as a removeable material entity, similarly to the classical system of the dualist Śaiva Siddhānta. Nondual ontology evolves gradually, starting with scattered statements about the nature of the god and the phenomenal world, usually in a ritual context. It appears in a form similar to the classical one only in the Krama and related systems, as argued in Sanderson (in: Goudriaan (ed.) Ritual and speculation in early tantrism: studies in honour of Andre Padoux, 1992).

Resisting the obfuscation of ‘race’: The importance of acknowledging the sociopolitical in normative data research

The concept of ‘race’ is, rightly, associated with a myriad of discriminatory practices, including its ontological justification through the misuse of science, including that of Psychology. Seeking to distance the discipline and profession from such a problematic history, most psychologists have abandoned the notion of ‘race’ or, as in social psychology, have turned to the study of racism. Within the context of contemporary South Africa, now almost two decades beyond the legislated presence of apartheid, the abandonment of the term ‘race’ has been especially motivated. This article asks the apparently controversial question of whether such an urgent distancing is justified. This is especially salient given that it has resulted in some researchers turning to alternate terms such as ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ as though the simple exchange of these seemingly apolitical terms for ‘race’ will allow the business of traditional research to continue as usual. However, we cannot escape the effects of the past so easily; these terms are themselves not innocent but are in a complex relationship with each other and society. Furthermore, ‘race’ is more than a word, and its consequences lie well entrenched via past and present ideologically based social and material engineering. In this article, I argue that we need to return, as an ethically and conceptually sound act, to the concept of ‘race’ in normative data research. This requires that we abandon naïve notions of scientific practice and acknowledge both the sociopolitical context in which we conduct scientific research and the historically embedded and contingent nature of the concepts we utilise in our work and the data we produce.

Church and people's power: UGCC approach to defining democracy criteria

By sanctifying the rights and responsibilities of man as authorized by God, emphasizing the ontological justification for ensuring freedom of choice, the value of each person and its social character, the Catholic Church, including the UGCC, could not but express its position on specific forms of social order. The Second Vatican Council gave a significant incentive for the development of theological thought in this direction and for the implementation of its constructions into public practice. Since the Church is an institution to which, according to the results of sociological research, Ukrainians have been most trusted for many years, and the UGCC is one of the most active Churches in Ukraine, the study of its attitude towards democracy is one of the topical scientific topics.

Desenvolvendo Uma Ética-Ontológica para o Problema Ecológico a Partir de Paul Tillich

The ecological problem – the relationship between people and Nature – is today one of the most important source of anxiety to the human beings. A lot of solutions have been proposed, but only a few are concerned in elaborate an ontological justification. This paper seeks to develop an ontological ethic that makes possible the reconciliation between man and nature. The inspiration for such an ethic is found in Paul Tillich’s thought. Departing from the concept of life’s multidimensional unity and of Tillich’s realistic interpretation of nature, this paper elaborates an ontological ethic seeking to offer a solution for the ecological problem.

Religinis interesas ir tikėjimas

Straipsnis skiriamas ontologinių religijos prielaidų analizei. Remiantis egzistencine fenomenologija tvirtinama, kad kasdienėje bendražmogiškoje patirtyje galima nurodyti į religinę dimensiją kaip ribinį santykį su pasauliu, įgaunantį pamatinio rūpesčio būties prasmingumu klausimą arba, kitaip tariant, religinio intereso išraišką. Tikėjimas analizuojamas kaip dalyvaujančiojo tikrovėje tiesioginis būties priėmimas. Tačiau ribiniame tikėjimo santykyje pasaulis nėra pažintas ir užbaigtas, o veikiau tampantis, dar ne-esantis pasaulis. Remiantis D. Tracy ribinės patirties analize, nagrinėjamas religinės kalbos prasmės klausimas ir religijos bei pasaulietinės kultūros koreliacija.

Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory. By Stephen K. White. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 158p. $49.50 cloth, $15.95 paper.

A play on the legendary statement attributed to Stalin—“When I hear the word ontology I reach for my gun”—captures the anticipated reaction of some to Stephen White's provocative work. It would be better if these readers were slow to draw. For White demonstrates that, wittingly and unwittingly, poststructuralist, postmodernist, and other theoretical types who eschew foundationalism nevertheless commit themselves to ontologically “sustained” (prefigured) ethical and political “affirmations” (judgments, values, insights, theories). He documents their “turn” to a new form of ontological justification. “Weak ontology” produces strong political theory, an important discovery for all theorists who are also post-Stalinists.

Sartre's Existentialism and Social Work

Abstract The profession of social work is currently facing a crisis of authentic identity. Social work's persistent reliance on other social sciences for its ontological justification, and its tendency to change its mission in response to social reality is inconsistent with authenticity. Existentialism, as a philosophy that values human freedom, social praxis and mutual cooperation towards fulfillment of needs, offers a framework for individual and social transformation congruent with the ideals of social work. In addition, Sartre's existential evolution from unwavering individualism in Being and Nothingness to the necessity of cooperative action in the Critique of Dialectical Reason may help to unify social work practice on the micro and macro levels.

A Rhetorical Ontology for Modern Science

Abstract: In this paper I wish to ask whether philosophers have good grounds for elaborating rhetorics of science. By doing so they might seem to deny the distinction between the theoretical intellect and the practical intellect, which traditionally have reigned over scientific discourse and rhetorical discourse, respectively. I shall suggest that philosophers of rhetoric do indeed have a warrant for developing their rhetorics of science. We shall assume with Aristotle that we may distinguish the theoretical from the practical intellect by distinguishing objects which cannot be other than they are from objects which can be other than they are. What we shall find is that a stalwart of British empiricism, John Stuart Mill, develops a philosophy of science concerned with objects which can be other than they are. Mill thus provides us with an ontological justification for our new rhetorics of science.

Moral and ontological justification of legal reasoning

Moral and ontological justification of legal reasoning

Moral and Ontological Justification of Legal Reasoning

Moral and Ontological Justification of Legal Reasoning

Toward an anthropology of the life-world: Alfred Schutz's quest for the ontological justification of the phenomenological undertaking

Insofar as phenomenology in its original sense of a method is presuppositionless, it is self-contained, that is, not in need of metaphysical support. If it departs from the natural stance (natuerliche Einstellung) of the mundane ego, it rests on the given existential ground of the life-world. Husserl, with his demand to "return to the things" themselves and by declar? ing phenomenology a "rigorous science" intended to emphasize the anti-meta? physical character of his philosophy in the radical sense in which the creator of transcendentalism, Kant, had asserted his. Schutz definitely understood phenomenology in this sense. Why, then, did he speak in 1943 of the "courage to enter metaphysics"? (letter to Voegelin, November 11, 1943). The answer is simple: He felt uncomfortable with the foundations of phenomenology as he saw them. The existence of the life-world had to be taken for granted. Phenomenology could not go "below" it with the help of its methods. In this sense, it could not provide its justification. By this, I refer, first, to the reasons in terms of which I explain to myself the because motive which led me to the acceptance of the phenomenological method, and, secondly, to the philosophical reasons in terms of which 'we phenomenologists' justify the claim that phenomenology be taken seriously as the scholarly and philosophical undertaking it is. Schutz's "courage to enter metaphysics" was the courage to face the problem of justification and to

Brain death and personal existence: a reply to Green and Wikler.

It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them.

Ampère, the Etherians, and the Oersted Connexion

In 1826 André-Marie Ampère published the ‘Mathematical theory of electrodynamic phenomena, uniquely derived from experiment’, in which he showed how the mathematical law for the force between current elements could be derived from four ingenious equilibrium experiments. He made a great show of following a Newtonian inductivist methodology, and his law, like Newton's for gravitation, was presented as a purely descriptive mathematical expression for a certain class of phenomena, one for which its author did not provide any causal or ontological justification. Ampère's electrodynamics would accordingly seem to have been a solid contribution to the Laplacian-Newtonian approach to physics so actively pursued in France during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. It does not surprise us to read that his electrodynamic force law and his molecular-currents theory of magnetism were immediately and widely accepted by his French contemporaries. Ampère was, in this view, just another of the many great French mathematical physicists of the period.