To degree that world is now made up of divergent series . . . crapshooting replaces game of Plenitude.-Gilles Deleuze1IntroductionWhen Spinoza wrote The Ethics in 1600s world was largely a wild place. Intense human settlement occupied only a quarter of globe.2 We now live in a very different world. In 1600s world was largely comprised of biomes: contiguous area[s] with similar climatic conditions, and communities of plants, animals, and soil organisms.3 By year 2000, only 20 percent of world might be considered semi-natural and 25 percent wild. But no place is leftuntouched by anthropogenic transformations; we live in a world of anthromes.4 Spinoza was largely concerned with questions of association between humans as they relate to a causal understanding of human body.5 Today, forms of governance, indeed choice between socialism or barbarism, is an ever more pressing question, but it is complicated by concerns about species extinction, loss of biodiversity and anthropogenic threats to global stability, unevenly felt in global north and global south. With these concerns in mind, many scholars are calling for a reframing of question of association to include our relations to non-human others.6In this paper I explore question of ways we might form enabling assemblages with non-human others, by returning to Spinoza's theory of composite individual. The challenge, as I see it, is less that of a need to move beyond a romanticized view of Nature as a harmonious whole, Nature as a perpetual threat, or Nature as motivated by a final cause (whether good or evil). The problem that confronts us, rather, is a problem of composition-which Nature do we ally with, what components? How do we understand or define, much less defend, localized ecosystems which are supported (and threatened) by a dizzying and infinite array of intensive and extensive properties? This is a problem of monstrous infinite.To outline contours of problem I turn to a brief description of Baroque to mark its coordinates, specifically ways in which monstrous infinitude surfaces as an ontological horizon first in seventeenth and again in twenty-first century. Drawing on a Deleuzian distinction between Baroque strategy of closure and neo-Baroque strategy of capture as different responses to this monstrous infinitude, I explore a growing contemporary movement around the of which, though laudable, illustrates dimensions of problem by virtue of its current limitations. My premise is that a restrictive vision of a rights of is in a sense inadequate, an inadequate idea-a baroque response to a neo-baroque world: it is predicated on a strategy of closure, idea that a harmony of nature might be restored, re-established against infinite incursions of human indiscretion. My argument simply put is this: that those who attempt to protect nature and those who would simply exploit natural systems while envisioning, even generating incompossible worlds, partake of same presumption of a human-nature divide (in Deleuzian terms an aleatory point in a disjunctive synthesis).In order to investigate what capture might look like I explore premises of this movement through a Spinozist lens, turning to writings of Baruch Spinoza-not as a Baroque but rather a thinker of Baroque.7 We might ask-why turn to Spinoza? Genevieve Lloyd for instance declares, Anyone who looks to Ethics for a viable, coherent metaphysical system to ground a belief in of non-human will look in vain.8 And Spinoza himself was somewhat disparaging in his attitude towards non-human others.9Spinoza's usefulness here lies not in his writings on humans or non-human nature per se, but his thinking about composite individual. The few short passages on composite individual are a heavily contested terrain, a battleground between neo-liberal scholars who enlist Spinoza in their promotion of a vision of methodological individualism and thinkers of more complex collaborations in relation between individuation as a process and individuals as effect of that process. …