Ontological Disputes Research Articles

Rearticulating Realism: Chains of Reference and Epistemic Success in the Sciences

In recent decades, the long-standing debate about the scientific status of the social sciences and their explanatory nature has been rearticulated through perspectivist, interpretivist, and mechanistic approaches. Whereas mechanistic approaches advocate for realism in sociological models, perspectivist and interpretivist perspectives challenge this by emphasizing the multiple interpretations and meaningful nature of social reality, as opposed to the natural sciences. Currently, the metatheoretical discussion centers on competing views regarding the relationship between theories and the objects they address. In contrast to this focus on theories, I propose a rearticulation of Hacking’s interventionist argument. I argue that all sciences share a common epistemic activity—the construction of chains of reference—which points to shared notions of success. This paves the way for realism through a practice-based argument that does not originate from ontological disputes, suggesting that our best theories are those literally embedded in scientific practice.

CRITICISMS ON ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVISM OF MODERN SCIENCE BY SYED MUHAMMAD NAQUIB AL-ATTAS AND SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR

Postmodern approaches to science introduce various methods, and result in multiple explanations and competing theories. This has exacerbated the science war in philosophy of science. The ongoing disputes known as ‘science war’ is a consequence of ontological disputes within the philosophical branch of metaphysics. Even though science had denied the importance of metaphysics in its practice, this paper argues that the recognition of philosophy specifically that in regards to metaphysics is a solution to the confusion arising from relativism of knowledge. As part of a preliminary attempt to confront this problem, this paper focuses on the criticisms of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas and Seyyed Hossein Nasr on the ontology of modern science, which issues from the denial of metaphysics by modern scientists. Their views on ontology are part of both scholars’ Islamic philosophy of science. This is a qualitative research based on historical, doctrinal and comparative analysis of the primary works by the two scholars. The arguments are presented within the scope of philosophy of science based on the framework of the Islamic intellectual tradition. Thus, we find that a wider and transcendental epistemology is possible for understanding the multiple levels of reality subsumed within the metaphysics of Islam, which opens the door to reality and truth.

Existence and the existential quantifier

AbstractThis paper draws a distinction between the existential quantifier and the symbol ‘∃’ used to express it, on the one hand, and existence and ‘exists’, on the other. It argues that some popular arguments in metaphysics, including arguments against vague existence and arguments against deflationary metaontology (which views ontological disputes as lacking substance), are guilty of fudging this distinction. The paper draws some lessons for metaphysical debate about existence and highlights some heretofore ignored and attractive positions in logical space.

Ontological disagreements, reference, and charity: A challenge for Hirsch's deflationism

AbstractEli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between “equivalent” languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language's semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue whereby ontologists who speak “equivalent” languages can only argue about syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self‐conception of the disputants – and particularly what I will call the weak self‐conception. As a result, Hirsch's deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it.

Lo común y lo público en el avance de las fronteras territoriales: controversias entre territorialidad quilombola y estructuras logísticas en Maranhão

This analysis of territorial border expansion resulting from the installation of logistics structures to ship commodities in the Santa Rosa dos Pretos quilombo community highlights notions of public and common, moving between discursive spaces that institutionalize truths and places for affirming principles generated from local practices. We pay attention to enunciative possibilities within ontological disputes in an effort that may help reverse hierarchical divisions in these discussions, in these spaces for discourse, while also critically analyzing the use of violence.elocation-id: e2230113Received: 11.15.2021 • Accepted: 04.06.2022 • Published: 05.20.2022Original article / Blind peer review / Open access

Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

AbstractThe reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying explanation is available of how one can have true ontological beliefs, given that the relevant belief‐forming methods are noncausal (for example, not perception based or memory based). This paper first presents a version of the reliability challenge against realist approaches to ontology, put forward by Jared Warren. It then explores a response to the challenge on behalf of the realist that appeals to the use of abduction. This response does not satisfactorily deal with the reliability challenge, though, and even leads to a further epistemic impasse. At this point, a version of ontological pluralism is presented, according to which all the competing theories in a certain ontological dispute can be true—in a sense of “true” to be articulated. The final step shows how this version of pluralism deals with the reliability challenge, especially with the complaint that we lack an explanation for our true ontological beliefs.

The Eventful Character of Bibikhin's Philosophical Thought

The article deals with the event-related aspects of V.V. Bibikhin's philosophical activities on the material of his lectures, texts and communication with contemporaries (S.S. Horuzhy, S.S. Averintsev and A.V. Akhutin). The eventfulness of the transfer of knowledge from teacher to student, as well as the unity of thought, word and life are the principles of teaching philosophy derived from the pedagogical experience of V.V. Bibikhin. He was a follower of A.F. Losev and M. Heidegger focusing his thoughts on clarifying ontological problems. Ontological thought is paradoxical in its own nature. This is revealed in the reading and interpretation of Bibikhin's writings, as well as in the evidence of his polemical communication with colleagues. One of the brightest ontological disputes of recent times is the discussion of V.V. Bibikhin and S.S. Horuzhy about the concept of energy which is an essential ontological category. These prominent Russian thinkers had a long-term friendship that included an element of intellectual rivalry. The author calls such communication “friendship in struggle” which has a paradoxical character. The philosophical definition of friendship presented in the book “The Pillar and Statement of Truth” by P.A. Florensky which has an antinomic character is used in the text. The paradoxical event and the polemic nature of V.V. Bibikhin's thought manifests itself in his works and correspondence with friends. The article provides illustrative examples of these moments of his intellectual creativity. V.V. Bibikhin is one of those thinkers who preserve the Russian philosophical tradition in the context of its disputes with other national traditions.

Событийный характер философской мысли В. Бибихина

The article deals with the event-related aspects of V.V. Bibikhin's philosophical activities on the material of his lectures, texts and communication with contemporaries (S.S. Horuzhy, S.S. Averintsev and A.V. Akhutin). The eventfulness of the transfer of knowledge from teacher to student, as well as the unity of thought, word and life are the principles of teaching philosophy derived from the pedagogical experience of V.V. Bibikhin. He was a follower of A.F. Losev and M. Heidegger focusing his thoughts on clarifying ontological problems. Ontological thought is paradoxical in its own nature. This is revealed in the reading and interpretation of Bibikhin's writings, as well as in the evidence of his polemical communication with colleagues. One of the brightest ontological disputes of recent times is the discussion of V.V. Bibikhin and S.S. Horuzhy about the concept of energy which is an essential ontological category. These prominent Russian thinkers had a long-term friendship that included an element of intellectual rivalry. The author calls such communication “friendship in struggle” which has a paradoxical character. The philosophical definition of friendship presented in the book “The Pillar and Statement of Truth” by P.A. Florensky which has an antinomic character is used in the text. The paradoxical event and the polemic nature of V.V. Bibikhin's thought manifests itself in his works and correspondence with friends. The article provides illustrative examples of these moments of his intellectual creativity. V.V. Bibikhin is one of those thinkers who preserve the Russian philosophical tradition in the context of its disputes with other national traditions.

Why Composition Matters

AbstractMany say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are themselves substantive.

Teaching and Learning Guide for: “Ontological disputes and the phenomenon of metalinguistic negotiation: Charting the territory”

Teaching and Learning Guide for: “Ontological disputes and the phenomenon of metalinguistic negotiation: Charting the territory”

Ontological disputes and the phenomenon of metalinguistic negotiation: Charting the territory

AbstractParadigmatic cases of ontological disputes are taken to concern whether or not certain objects exist. Some theorists, however, prefer to view ontologists as really debating about what we should mean with the term “exist” (or other cognate terms). This implies interpreting ontological disputes as metalinguistic negotiations, in keeping with a recent trend to interpret other philosophical disputes along these lines (Plunkett and Sundell. Philosopher's Imprint; 2013;13:1–37). A number of issues arise from such proposal. The first is what counts as evidence that an object‐level dispute is actually a metalinguistic negotiation. The second regards the dialectical relevance of considering metalinguistic negotiation as even just a possible interpretative option. The third issue concerns whether, and why, certain object‐level disputes (and especially ontological ones) should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations.

Quantification in the Ontology Room

There is a growing movement towards construing some classic debates in ontology as meaningless, either because the answers seem obvious or the debates seem intractable. In this paper, I respond to this movement. The response has three components: First, the members of the two sides of the ontological debates that dismissivists have targeted are using different quantifiers. Second, the austere ontologist is using a more fundamental quantifier than her opponent. Third, the austere ontologist's more fundamental quantifier is a restriction of her opponent's quantifier. This response takes seriously the intuition that there is something wrong with the ontological disputes, but does not entail dismissivism.

Resolving Scheffler and Chomsky’s Problems on Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitments

This paper resolves the problems raised by Israel Scheffler and Noam Chomsky against Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. I call Scheffler’s and Chomsky’s problems as (1) the problem of inexorable ontological commitments and (2) the problem of false existential inferences. I extend their problems to a third one, which is called as the problem of extended inexorable ontological commitments to rival entities. In order to present the third problem, two ontological disputes are considered: Russell–Meinong dispute from the context of the referential theory of meaning and David Lewis–Meinong dispute from the context of modal metaphysics. In order to work out a resolution to these three problems, I emphasize the distinction between meta-ontology/meta-theory and object theory. Then, it is explained that there is a functional difference between Quine’s criterion of ontological commitments (meta-theory) and the object theories to which this criterion is applied. Here, considering the functional difference, I introduce different kinds of commitments: direct commitments and indirect commitments. Using Strawson’s views on the notion of presupposition, the distinction between direct commitments and indirect commitments is characterized further. Employing this distinction, I resolve the problem of inexorable ontological commitment to the entities, the problem of false existential inferences and the problems of extended inexorable ontological commitment to the rival entities.

Developing Metalogic to Formalize Ontological Disputes of the Systems in Metaphysics by Introducing the Notion of Functionally Isomorphic Quantifiers

A general meta-logical theory is developed by considering ontological disputes in the systems of metaphysics. The usefulness of this general meta-logical theory is demonstrated by considering the case of the ontological dispute between the metaphysical systems of Lewis’ Modal Realism and Terence Parsons’ Meinongianism. Using Quine’s criterion of ontological commitments and his views on ontological disagreement, three principles of metalogic is formulated. Based on the three principles of metalogic, the notions of independent variable and dependent variable are introduced. Then, the ontological dispute between Lewis’ Modal Realism and Terence Parsons’ Meinongianism are restated in the light of the principles of metalogic. After the restatement, Independent variable and dependent variables are fixed in both Lewis’ Modal Realism and Terence Parsons’ Meinongianism to resolve the dispute. Subsequently, a new variety of quantifiers are introduced which is known as functionally isomorphic quantifiers to provide a formal representation of the resolution of the dispute. The specific functionally isomorphic quantifier which is developed in this work is known as st-quantifier. It is indicated that how st-quantifier which is one of the functionally isomorphic quantifiers can function like existential quantifier. It is also shown that there is some kind of inconsistency which is unavoidable in stating the ontological disagreement and therefore, paraconsistent logic is a requirement in stating the ontological disputes.

Defending stance voluntarism

In this paper, I argue that stance voluntarism is a coherent and useful view for understanding debates about the ontological commitments warranted by science. To do so, I first engage in a defensive move: I rescue stance voluntarism from what I take to be the most pressing objection to have emerged in recent literature, which I call the ‘irrationality objection’. According to this objection, an agent courts irrationality by simultaneously holding an epistemic stance and believing that stance voluntarism is true. I argue that this objection is based on a misunderstanding of stance voluntarism and the kinds of reasons that agents take themselves to have for their adopted stances. I then make the positive contention that we can expect the idea of stance voluntarism, thus saved, to not only be a defensible, but also a useful framework for understanding ontological disputes within science. I do this by presenting a case study from contemporary cosmology in which it is so. Combining these two claims, I argue that stance voluntarism is a coherent and useful view for understanding some ongoing disputes about ontology within scientific contexts.

Ontological disputes between Indigenous communities and the state in Bolivia

ABSTRACTA broad consensus exists among scholars about the contributions of culture to both state formation and the legitimation of state rule. Historically, cultural homogeneity became the language of the state, couching ways of world making in a discourse of cultural diversity. Focusing on the disputes about territory in Bolivia, this article illustrates how the universalisation of modern territorial practises left no part for Indigenous practises of territory-making. Inspired by the work of Marisol de la Cadena, this article argues that the legitimation of state rule is ‘not only’ a cultural effect but is also associated with the partition of the sensible into a universal nature and culturally diversified humanity. Despite this, because Indigenous practises of territory making ‘exceed’ the limit of what the state recognises as legitimate, they challenge the limits imposed upon them, undoing the state and pluriversalising society. Some of these transformations were enshrined in the 2009 Political Constitution, whose preface reads that Bolivia ‘left the colonial, republican and neo-liberal state in the past’. Others, including the call to depatriarchalisation, did not have a place in the Constitution.

Dennett on Consciousness: Realism Without the Hysterics

Dennett’s theory of consciousness is often misread as broadly anti-realist. His aversion to ontology encourages readers to form their own interpretations, and the rhetoric he employs often seems to support the anti-realist reading. Dennett does offer defenses against the anti-realist charge, but these are piecemeal and diffuse. This paper examines Dennett’s most current expression (From Bacteria to Bach and Back: the Evolution of Minds, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2017), which proves insufficient on its own as a resolution to the ontological dispute. Drawing on related discussions in an attempt to find a resolution leads to a further challenge from Schwitzgebel. Crucial distinctions between inner and outer, cause and effect, and reporting and expressing, unite in a general characterization of how a realist explanation of consciousness should bottom out. Dennett’s form of realism depends upon distinguishing the explananda of consciousness from their doomed explanans; anti-realism about the latter makes room for genuine explanation of how things (really) seem to us.

Realism, Relativism, Adverbialism: How Different are they? Comments on Mazviita Chirimuuta's Outside Color

Mazviita Chirimuuta proposes a new “adverbialist” ontology of color. I argue that ontological disputes in the philosophy of color are uniformly terminological. Chirimuuta's proposal too is a terminological variant on others, though it has some hortatory value in directing attention to aspects of color science that have hitherto been neglected. On a side note, I also take issue with Chirimuuta's laudatory take on early modern theories of color (such as Descartes').

Verbalism and metalinguistic negotiation in ontological disputes

The aim of this paper is to explore the view that some ontological disputes are “metalinguistic negotiations” (to employ a recent term coined by David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell), and to make sense of the significance of these controversies in a way that is still compatible with a broadly deflationist approach. I start by considering the view advocated by Eli Hirsch to the effect that some ontological disputes are verbal. I take the Endurantism–Perdurantusm dispute as a case-study and argue that, while it can be conceded that the dispute is verbal at the object-level, this does not rule out the possibility of a non-verbal disagreement at the metalinguistic level. I then explore the metalinguistic dispute hypothesis by seeing how it can be defended from a first objection playing on the idea of inter-translatability, as well as a second objection raising the question of equal theoretical virtues.

Précis zu <I>Talking About Numbers. Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism</I>

For thousands of years philosophers have discussed the question of whether numbers exist. Surprisingly, there are very easy arguments from commonly accepted truths that seem to decide the question. For instance, it is a commonly accepted truth that Obama has two hands. If Obama has two hands, then the number of Obama’s hands is two, and, thus, numbers exist. If such arguments were convincing, ontological disputes about the existence of numbers could be decided simply by pointing to Obama’s hands! The book offers a defense of the profoundness of traditional onto­logical questions by showing that the easy arguments in question are based on false linguistic assumptions. To do so it engages with recent linguistic research and develops analyses of the pertinent sentences that are of interest far beyond the metaontological question at hand.