Aristotle famously claims that there is no time without change. Bill Newton-Smith, in his book The Structure of Time, refers to this claim as 'Aristotle's principle'.1 Sidney Shoemaker begins his article 'Time without Change' with a discussion of Aristotle's argument for this claim.2 But what is Aristotle's argument? Why does he think that there is no time without change? In this paper I shall argue that this is something modern interpreters have misunderstood. In claiming that there is no time without change, Aristotle is standardly taken to be assuming a kind of verificationism about time. On this standard interpretation, Aristotle starts from the premise that it is impossible to know that time has passed without knowing that there has been some change and argues, on the basis of this, that there is no time without change. As Shoemaker puts it, Aristotle's argument 'seems to be that time involves change because the awareness, or realisation, that an interval of time has elapsed necessarily involves the awareness of changes occurring during that interval'.3 Richard Sorabji, endorsing this interpretation, says, 'Aristotle here moves from an epistemological premise (we notice time, when and only when we notice change) to an ontological conclusion (time does not exist without change).'4 He adds that, in order to defend the argument, we need to supply Aristotle with 'some sort of verificationist premise, either that it is meaningless or that it is false to postulate undetectable times'.5 I shall argue that this standard interpretation of Aristotle is mistaken. Aristotle is not making a verificationist assumption at the start of his account of time. Instead,