Ontic Level Research Articles

Le forme dello spirito nell'ontologia critica di Nicolai Hartmann. Per una lettura critico-­genetica de Il problema dell'essere spirituale

The Author critically discusses the theoretical assumptions underlying Nicolai Hartmann's 1933 The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author deals with the main categorial problems involved in the Hartmannian discussion about the spiritual being, also looking at his previous production. In particular, the Author analyzes the position of the ontic level of spiritual being with respect to the previous three real ontic levels (inorganic, organic, psychological) and the mutual relationship between the three fundamental forms of spiritual being identified by Hartmann (personal, objective, objectified). The Author believes that the 1933 volume has been poorly considered in its direct links with the overall project of critical ontology.

The quantitative paradigm and the nature of the human mind. The replication crisis as an epistemological crisis of quantitative psychology in view of the ontic nature of the psyche.

Many suggestions for dealing with the so-called replication crisis in psychology revolve around the idea that better and more complex statistical-mathematical tools or stricter procedures are required in order to obtain reliable findings and prevent cheating or publication biases. While these aspects may play an exacerbating role, we interpret the replication crisis primarily as an epistemological crisis in psychology caused by an inadequate fit between the ontic nature of the psyche and the quantitative approach. On the basis of the philosophers of science Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos we suggest that the replication crisis is therefore a symptom of a fundamental problem in psychology, but at the same time it is also an opportunity to advance psychology as a science. In a first step, against the background of Popper's Critical Rationalism, the replication crisis is interpreted as an opportunity to eliminate inaccurate theories from the pool of theories and to correct problematic developments. Continuing this line of thought, in an interpretation along the lines of Thomas Kuhn, the replication crisis might signify a model drift or even model crisis, thus possibly heralding a new paradigm in psychology. The reasons for this are located in the structure of academic psychology on the basis of Lakatos's assumption about how sciences operate. Accordingly, one hard core that lies at the very basis of psychology may be found in the assumption that the human psyche can and is to be understood in quantitative terms. For this to be possible, the ontic structure of the psyche, i.e., its very nature, must also in some way be quantitatively constituted. Hence, the replication crisis suggests that the ontic structure of the psyche in some way (also) contains a non-quantitative dimension that can only be grasped incompletely or fragmentarily using quantitative research methods. Fluctuating and inconsistent results in psychology could therefore also be the expression of a mismatch between the ontic level of the object of investigation and the epistemic level of the investigation.

Rao-Fisher information geometry and dynamics of the event-universe views distributions

We developed the novel mathematical model for event-universe by representing events as branches of dendrograms (finite trees) expressing the hierarchic relation between events. At the ontic level we operate with infinite trees. Algebraically such mathematical structures are represented as p-adic numbers. We call this kind of event mechanics Dendrogramic Holographic theory (DHT). It can be considered as a fundamental theory generating both GR and QM. In this paper we endower DHT with Rao-Cramer's information geometry. Following Smolin's derivation of QM from the event-universe, we introduce views from one event to others and by using their probability distributions we invent stochastic geometry. The important mathematical result is that all such views' distributions can be parametrized by four real parameters that are a part of the shape complexity measure introduced by Barbour in his particle shape dynamics theory – adapted to DHT. Hence, within DHT all possible event-universes can be embedded in four-dimensional real space. Asin GR, we introduce proper time. This “proper time” depends only on the change between one distribution of an observer to the other. The linkage of time to change is highlighted in the ideology of Rovelli and Barbour's shape dynamics.

The ontology of creation: towards a philosophical account of the creation of World in innovation processes

The starting point of this article is the observation that the emergence of the Anthropocene rehabilitates the need for philosophical reflections on the ontology of technology. In particular, if technological innovations on an ontic level of beings in the world are created, but these innovations at the same time create the Anthropocene World at an ontological level, this raises the question how World creation has to be understood. We first identify four problems with the traditional concept of creation: the anthropocentric, ontic and outcome orientation of traditional concepts of creation, as well as its orientation of material fabrication. We subsequently develop a progressive concept of World creation with four characteristics that move beyond the traditional conceptuality: (1) a materialistic concept of creation that accounts for (2) the ontogenetic process and (3) the ontic and ontological nature of creation, and (4) is conceptualized as semantic creation of the World in which we live and act.

The Ontology of Technology Beyond Anthropocentrism and Determinism: The Role of Technologies in the Constitution of the (post)Anthropocene World

AbstractBecause climate change can be seen as the blind spot of contemporary philosophy of technology, while the destructive side effects of technological progress are no longer deniable, this article reflects on the role of technologies in the constitution of the (post)Anthropocene world. Our first hypothesis is that humanity is not the primary agent involved in world-production, but concrete technologies. Our second hypothesis is that technological inventions at an ontic level have an ontological impact and constitutes world. As we object to classical philosophers of technology like Ihde and Heidegger, we will sketch the progressive contribution of our conceptuality to understand the role of technology in the Anthropocene world. Our third hypothesis is that technology has emancipatory potential and in this respect, can inaugurate a post-Anthropocene World. We consider these three hypotheses to develop a philosophical account of the ontology of technology beyond an abstract and deterministic understanding. This concept enables us to philosophically reflect on the role of technology in the Anthropocene World in general, and its contribution to the transition to the post-Anthropocene World in particular.

What Is Innovation?

In this article, I reflect on the nature of innovation to lay the groundwork for a philosophy of innovation. First, I contrast the contemporary techno-economic paradigm of innovation with the work of Joseph Schumpeter. It becomes clear that Schumpeter’s work provides good reasons to question the techno-economic paradigm of innovation. Second, I contrast ‘innovation’ with ‘technology’ and identify five differences between the two concepts. Third, I reflect on the process-outcome dimension and the ontic-ontological dimension of innovation to develop four characteristics of the phenomenon of innovation. These four characteristics move beyond the techno-economic paradigm of innovation and highlight, first, the importance of its process dimension understood as ontogenesis, second, the outcome of innovation, and third, the importance of the ontological dimension of innovation, which is considered adjacent to its fourth characteristic, i.e., the ontic level of the outcome of innovation. After drawing conclusions, a research agenda for future research is provided.

The Psilocybin-Telomere Hypothesis: An empirically falsifiable prediction concerning the beneficial neuropsychopharmacological effects of psilocybin on genetic aging

We introduce a novel hypothesis which states that the therapeutic utilisation of psilocybin has beneficial effects on genetic aging. Ex hypothesi, we predict a priori that controlled psilocybin interventions exert quantifiable positive impact on leucocyte telomere length (telomeres are a robust predictor of mortality and multifarious aging-related diseases). Our hypothesising follows the Popperian logic of scientific discovery, viz., bold (and refutable) conjectures form the very foundation of scientific progress. The ‘psilocybin-telomere hypothesis‘ is formalised as a logically valid deductive (syllogistic) argument and we provide substantial evidence to support the underlying premises. Impetus for our theorising derives from a plurality of converging empirical sources indicating that psilocybin has persistent beneficial effects on various aspects of mental health (e.g., in the context of depression, anxiety, PTSD, OCD, addiction, etc.). Additional support is based on a large corpus of studies that establish reliable correlations between mental health and telomere attrition (improved mental health is generally correlated with longer telomeres). Another pertinent component of our argument is based on recent studies which demonstrate that “meditative states of consciousness” provide beneficial effects on genetic aging. Similarly, psilocybin can induce states of consciousness that are neurophysiologically and phenomenologically significantly congruent with meditative states. Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated that a single dose of psilocybin can occasion life-changing transformative experiences (≈ 70% of healthy volunteers rate their experience with psilocybin amongst the five personally most meaningful lifetime events, viz., ranked next to giving birth to a child or losing a loved one). We postulate that these profound psychological events leave quantifiable marks at the molecular genetic/epigenetic level. Given the ubiquitous availability and cost effectiveness of telomere length assays, we suggest that quantitative telomere analysis should be regularly included in future psilocybin studies as an adjunctive biological marker (i.e., to facilitate scientific consilience via methodological triangulation). In order to substantiate the ‘psilocybin-telomere hypothesis’ potential neuropsychopharmacological, endocrinological, and genetic mechanisms of action are discussed (e.g., HPA-axis reactivity, hippocampal neurogenesis, neurotropic growth factors such as BDNF, 5-HT2A receptor agonism, neuroplasticity/synaptoplasticity, brain-wide alterations in neuronal functional connectivity density, involvement of the SLC6A4 serotonin transporter gene, inter alia). The proposed research agenda is thus intrinsically highly interdisciplinary, and it has deep ramifications from a philosophy of science perspective as it connects the epistemic level (qualitative experiential phenomenology) with the ontic level (quantitative molecular genetics) of analysis. In the long term, multidisciplinary and innovative investigations of the ‘psilocybin-telomere hypothesis‘ could contribute to the improvement of senotherapeutic psychological interventions and the identification of novel geroprotective and neuroprotective/restorative pharmaceutical targets to decelerate genetic aging and improve well-being and quality of life during the aging process.

Forum 2: the migrant climate: resilience, adaptation and the ontopolitics of mobility in the Anthropocene

ABSTRACTWhile modernist or ‘top-down’, ‘command-and-control’ approaches to climate and migration worked at the surface or ontic level of the redistribution of entities in time and space, resilience approaches call for a different approach to mobility. These discourses construct mobilities that are more transformative; in fact, ones that question traditional liberal modernist notions of time and space and of entities with fixed essences. These mobilities do not concern moving entities in space but rethinking mobility in relation to space. Mobility then becomes more a matter of changing the understandings and practices relating to spaces and entities than of moving things from one place to another. Becoming ‘mobile’ thus would apply to the development of capabilities or ‘response-abilities’ to sense, adapt, recompose, repurpose and reimagine problems and possibilities; taking responses to crises beyond the static and binary conceptions of mobility and space.

Emergence of Quantum Mechanics from Theory of Random Fields

Our aim in this paper is to enlighten the possibility to treat quantum mechanics as emergent from a kind of classical physical model, in spite of recent remarkable experiments demonstrating a violation of the Bell inequality. To proceed in a rigorous way, we use the methodology of ontic–epistemic modeling of physical phenomena. This methodology is rooted in the old Bild conception about theoretical and observational models in physics. This conception was elaborated in the fundamental works of Hertz, Boltzmann, and Schrodinger. Our ontic model (generating the quantum model) is of the random field type, prequantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT). We present a brief review of its basic features without overloading the presentation by mathematical details. Then we show that the Bell inequality can be violated not only at the epistemic level, i.e., for observed correlations, but even at the ontic level, for classical random fields. We devote the important part of the paper to an analysis of the internal energy structure of prequantum random fields and their coupling with the background field of subquantum fluctuations. Finally, we present a unified picture of the microworld based on the composition of prequantum random fields from elementary fluctuations. Since quantum systems are treated as the symbolic representation of prequantum fields, this picture leads to a unifying treatment of all quantum systems as special blocks of elementary fluctuations carrying negligibly small energies.

Why agonistic planning? Questioning Chantal Mouffe’s thesis of the ontological primacy of the political

The thesis of the ontological primacy of antagonism, thus the political, is central to Chantal Mouffe’s call for taming antagonism into agonism, or agonistic pluralism. Within planning theory, Mouffe’s conflictual ontology that underpins this call has raised questions over the ontological assumption of the presently prominent and consensus-oriented communicative and deliberative planning approaches. This is because these approaches consider consensus formation as a normative ideal and always at least a potential outcome from open and inclusive deliberation, that is, ontological. Yet, the notion that antagonism is also an ever-present possibility for all social relations and therefore an ineradicable risk for consensus-building effort in planning practices appears to be increasingly accepted even by communicative planning theorists. In this article, I trace the origin of Mouffe’s thesis of the ontological primacy of antagonism back to both her original collaborative work with Earnest Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and Carl Schmitt. With Derrida and Laclau, I then argue that this Mouffean thesis does not hold: antagonism operates at the ontic level in the social and it is only but one way of discursively inscribing the experience of exclusion and the use of power. This insight supports a new, post-antagonism approach to politics and the political based on the ontology of radical negativity. Finally, I discuss how this approach can be linked with planning theory by adopting a de-ontologised notion of the political. I conclude by arguing that since agonism is not the only option for dealing with antagonism for the socially established actors, for example, planners, its implementation in planning practice can appear merely as a top-down imposition of a democratic ethos. Sometimes, depoliticisation of agonistic planning might therefore be necessary.

Out of the Ge-stell ?: The Role of the East in Heidegger’s das andere Denken

Heidegger has notoriously named the essence of the technological world the Ge-stell (framework, enframing). Here, we reveal that yet another term, Gestellnis , figures in some of his writings from the 1970s. According to Heidegger, as the essence of the Ge-stell, Gestellnis shows a way toward the fore-garden of Ereignis (appropriating event). In opposing the Ge-stell mode of comportment toward beings, Heidegger glimpses the promise of the other thinking, which seems to be useless from the perspective of traditional metaphysical thinking. In characterizing this mode of thinking, he resorts to Zhuangzi’s parables of uselessness ( wuyong 无用). One way of stepping out of the Ge-stell is to make central the comportment toward beings as embodied in non-metaphysical art. Heidegger designates this as das andere Denken (the other thinking). In charting this course, Heidegger turns toward ancient Asian traditions insofar as they remain uncontaminated by current planetary-interstellar world conditions, which for him epitomize the absence of the dichotomy of appearance and essence. From Heidegger’s standpoint, before the Western tradition gains maturity through its own self-transformation, the allegedly inevitable event of East-West dialogue can only be anticipated. However, at the ontic level East Asian sources have undeniably played a role in his search for ways out of the Ge-stell .

Laclau and Mouffe’s Theory of Discourse and Hegemony: a Possible Approach to Law and its Integrity?

The famous Montesquieu's catachresis wherein judges should be no more than the “mouth that pronounces the words of the law” is actually facing a crisis. I.e. Law has lost its unifying principle, its centre wherein its practices could search for foundation and legitimacy. Therefore, as a decentered reality, I believe Law should get a poststructuralist approach, appropriate for a decentered structure. That is why the aim of my research is to link Law to the poststructuralist theoretical reference of the theory of discourse, as developed in the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Anyway, as Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical works are concentrated on the ontological level, I need to link their ontological reflections and Law manifestations on ontic level, the level of judicial practices. For that, I will use the support of the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. However, as dworkinian theory is situated in a very different philosophical background, when compared to Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse, it will be necessary to rearrange some features of his jurisprudence to make it fits on a different comprehension of Law and its integrity. Especially considering integrity as hegemonic integrity, understanding the principles of justice as promises of justice and substituting judge Hercules for a new mythological character that, instead of searching one right answer in a seamless web, is herself who seams that web: Judge Penelope.

The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger's phenomenological way.

Abstract The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s phenomenological way. Heidegger’s phenomenology of Befindlichkeit and the different kinds of affection was initiated still before Being and Time, and developed in its essential features till the end of the 1930’s. The current paper argues that, since its very origins in a philosophical framework, back to the translation of the affectiones in Augustine, the notion of Befindlichkeit sets the beginning of a structural understanding of existence - displayed both at the ontological levei of Grundstimmungen (such as anguish, boredom or reservedness), and at the ontic level of different factual Stimmungen. Any comprehensive analysis of those affections counts on a tripie background with a Wovor, a Worum and the full-fledged exercise (Vollzug) of such and such affective understanding. In Being and Time this analysis is dedicated to fear, in its different nuances. But this phenomenon was already dealt with in Heidegger’s Lectures on Augustine (1921) and will reoccur in the Beiträge (1936-38). A reading of this conceptual evolution will here ground a defense of the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s way of thinking.

Technology as Skill and Activity

Can we conceive of a philosophy of technology that is not technophobic, yet takes seriously the problem of alienation and human meaning-giving? This paperretrieves the concern with alienation, but brings it into dialogue with more recent philosophy of technology. It defines and responds to the problem of alienation in a way that avoids both old-style human-centered approaches and contemporary thingcentered or hybridity approaches. In contrast to the latter, it proposes to reconcile subject and object not at the ontic level but at the ontological, transcendental level and at the level of skilled activity. Taking inspiration from Dreyfus’s reading of Heidegger and engaging critically with the work of Borgmann and Arendt, it explores a phenomenology and ethics of skill. It is concluded that new and emerging technologies must be evaluated not only as artifacts and their consequences, but also in terms of the skills and activities they involve and require. Do they promote engagement with the world and with others, thus making us into better persons?

Can (Quantum) Information be Sorted Out from Quantum Mechanics?

We shall draw an affirmative answer to the question posed in the title. The key point will be a quantum description of physical reality. Once fixed at ontic level two basic elements, namely the laws of physics and the matter, we argue that the underlying physical reality emerges from the interconnection between these two elements. We consider any physical process, including measurement, modeled by unitary evolution. In this context, we will deduce quantum randomness as a consequence of inclusion of the observer into the quantum system. The global picture of the universe is in a sense deterministic, but from our own local perspective (as part of the system) we perceive quantum mechanical randomness. Then, the notion of information turns out to be a derivative concept.

Dispositions, Laws, and Categories

After a short sketch of Lowe’s account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hos epi to poly statements about what is normally or mostly the case.