In the mid-2000, with the publication of the Goldsmith and Wu book Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World, the debate over internet exceptionalism rapidly shifted from the “nature” of the Internet as something intrinsically beyond the control of governments to a problem of choice. Intermediaries can control illegal behavior on the Internet and governments can control intermediaries, but should they? And if governments should exert control over intermediaries, how should the global legal order be structured to accommodate their role? The experiences of traditional payment intermediaries in acting to limit internet gambling, child pornography, controlled substances, online tobacco, and online copyright infringement suggest several lessons. First, regardless of the precise legal liabilities, intermediaries have a general responsibility to keep their systems free of illegal transactions and they are taking steps to satisfy that obligation. Second, the decision to impose legal responsibilities on intermediaries should not be based on the least cost avoider principle. Assessments of intermediary liability must take into account market failures, as well as an analysis of costs, benefits, and equities. Third, internet exceptionalism is not the right framework for internet governance because intermediaries should not defer to the judgments of self-governing communities of internet users when these judgments conflict with local law. Fourth, the exceptionalists are right that a “bordered Internet” will not scale well. The experience of traditional payment systems points towards international harmonization. If governments are going to use intermediaries to regulate the Internet, they need to coordinate their laws to make that role possible.