The 320-mile oceanfront shoreline of North Carolina, one of the nation's premier vacation destinations, is frequently struck by landfalling hurricanes and extratropical winter storms. In 1996, Hurricane Fran, two months after Hurricane Bertha, inflicted an estimated $7 billion in public and private damage, including 40,000 homes destroyed, 115,000 buildings damaged, and 25 lives lost. Post-storm rebuilding of the North Carolina coastal zone is governed by a complex array of federal, state, and local laws, of which the keystone is the state Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA). This act, as augmented by the National Flood Insurance Program and the federal Coastal Barrier Resources Act, seeks to reduce vulnerability to future coastal hazards through postdisaster adjustments in the horizontal and vertical placement of structures, among other measures. This article reviews experience in rebuilding the North Carolina oceanfront after the 1996 hurricanes to discern the influence, if any, of these laws. The research is based on review of postdisaster assessments, interviews with key personnel, news media reports, and direct observation. We found widespread compliance with vertical elevation and building codes but rather uneven application of minimum setbacks under CAMA, especially where vegetation was removed. Oceanfront structures are being built more strongly to resist wave and wind forces but are vulnerable to ongoing erosion, resulting in beach and dune scour, and possible stranding of structures below the mean high water line. Experience with temporary replacement of dunes and the shore road at North Topsail Beach indicates that political pressure may overwhelm the intent of Congress to limit repetitive loss costs for infrastructure, especially in areas designated under the Coastal Barrier Resources Act.
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