one-China Research Articles

Research on the Mechanism of Establishing National Identity: Based on the Analysis of Taiwan’s History from 1895 to 2000

Taiwan’s autonomy and status in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have always been contentious. The visits of numerous Western officials and Taiwan’s steadfast assertion of its national identity have introduced uncertainties in the security of the Indo-Pacific region. Exploring the development of Taiwan’s self-awareness regarding its national identity is crucial for understanding how Taiwan navigates its position in the PRC, paving the way for a practical approach for the mainland to improve cross-strait relations. With a deep analysis of factors contributing to deteriorating Taiwan’s identity recognition, the article will continue to examine Taiwan’s history from 1895 to 2000 and the evolution of its national identity. It concludes that historical factors significantly shape Taiwan’s identity and considers how the mainland can enhance its relationship with Taiwan’s utilizing mechanisms. To promote a Chinese identity in Taiwan, the article suggests strategies such as fostering economic cooperation under the One-China principle, facilitating youth education exchanges, and acknowledging cultural and national identity.

War of Narratives

This paper explores the intricate strategic narratives that China employs in its policy towards Taiwan. Through concentric analyses, it dissects China’s narratives towards Taiwan at three levels: system-level narratives, identity narratives and issue narratives. At the systemic level, China’s narrative aims to position Taiwan’s status under the broader goal of national unity and territorial integrity, emphasising the one-China policy and opposing external intervention. Identity narratives delve into shared history, culture, and nationalism to reinforce claims to Taiwan as part of China’s inherent identity and destiny. Issue narratives, on the other hand, focus on interpreting specific events, portraying reunification with Taiwan as legitimate, inevitable and a matter of national pride. This paper also mentions counter-narratives in Taiwan that emphasise Taiwan’s democratic values, unique identity and the challenges posed by China’s hard-line policies. The analysis reveals how these narratives contribute to increasing China’s international influence, undermining Taiwan’s legitimacy, and fuelling domestic nationalism, while also potentially influencing strategic responses across the region and around the world.

Fit for purpose? ‘One China’ Policy and security in Sino-American relations

Abstract Nominally, the policy of the United States towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan is governed by the ‘One China’ Policy (OCP). However, the conditions under which OCP was originally formulated have long since given way to substantial growth in the economic and military power of the PRC and the democratisation of Taiwan. These changes raise several questions regarding the viability and applicability of OCP. Drawing on securitisation theory, this article examines discourses across three US presidential administrations to assess the trajectory of socio-political constructions of the PRC, Taiwan, and OCP. Three case studies suggest substantial challenges for OCP as a basis for maintaining desecuritised relations between the United States and the PRC. While discourses of ‘engagement’ prominent in the 1990s have lost ground, with presidential administrations increasingly but inconsistently drawing on OCP, in Congress OCP plays no role, while Taiwan is increasingly constructed as akin to the American self, serving as an identity proxy that highlights the otherness of the PRC. Polling supports the idea that OCP is not rooted in general American understandings of the region and consequently cannot serve to ground policy in a crisis.

The CPTPP, cross-strait tensions, and Taiwan’s recognition for survival strategy under the democratic progressive party

Abstract Since coming to power in 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has pledged to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty amidst Beijing’s aggressive imposition of the one-China principle. This article assesses the impact of the DPP’s recognition for survival strategy which involves using free trade agreements (FTAs) to boost Taiwan’s legal standing and recognition in the international community. The strategy entails a two-pronged plan: retaining Taiwan’s status as a vital regional economic player to ultimately advance its de jure sovereignty via regional FTAs. Drawing on Taiwan’s past FTA experiences, we analyze the possible outcomes of the government’s application to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the likely consequences of these outcomes on the country’s sovereign claims and status. We argue that while the DPP’s strategy plays a crucial role in renegotiating Taiwan’s political self as an unrecognized state, failure to mitigate the negative externalities of the one-China principle while negotiating and implementing the CPTPP will further undermine the country’s facto sovereignty.

Anti-interference: redoubled focus of Chinese mainland’s Taiwan policy

International interference in cross-Taiwan Strait relations has accelerated in recent years. This article examines the intensifying, high-level, official interactions in which the US and some of its allies have worked with the Taiwan authorities to hollow out the one-China principle. This article also explores the escalating US–Taiwan military cooperation and the expanding security involvement of some states, which have disregarded Beijing’s heavy opposition and repeated warnings. Finally, this article explains the driving forces behind the internationalization trajectory involving the Taiwan issue and argues that the ever-increasing foreign intervention and involvement, combined with Taipei’s consistent endeavor to “pursue independence by reliance on foreign interference,” has put China on full alert. The internationalization momentum concerning the Taiwan issue has thus resulted in China redoubling the anti-interference focus of its Taiwan policy.

From the “Taiwanese Dream” to an Alien Land: The Mainland Writer Zhang Yiwei’s Literary Narratives of Taiwan

Mainland Chinese writers’ interest in Taiwan surged in the first decade of the twenty-first century after PRC citizens were allowed to travel and study in Taiwan, but Zhang Yiwei is the only writer who continuously published works about Taiwan for several years. Studying in Taiwan from 2010 to 2016, Zhang’s works demonstrate how a post-1980 writer’s cultural identity was informed by the changing cross-Strait relationship from the 1980s to the 2010s. This article examines Zhang Yiwei’s three Taiwan-related works, published in 2013, 2015, and 2016 respectively, arguing that even though Zhang avoids political issues, her narratives of the natural and cultural aspects of Taiwan contest both the PRC’s One-China principle and the young Chinese generation’s “Taiwanese dream.” This article contends that by defining herself as an outsider in Taiwan, her three works present a cross-Strait student migrant’s modification of cultural identity and reterritorialization of the concept of “China.”

“One China” Contention in China–Taiwan Relations: Law, Politics and Identity

AbstractThis article examines the abiding “one China” contention between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan), focusing on their 2008–2016 cooperation and the ensuing political stalemate. It does so by investigating the PRC's and the ROC's respective legal frameworks and the positions of the major political actors, including the Chinese Communist Party and both Taiwan's Kuomintang and its Democratic Progressive Party. While the PRC maintains its “one-China principle,” and the ROC's legal system retains some “one China” elements, the idea of “one China” has been in flux in Taiwan. The traditional conceptualization of “one China” has been increasingly challenged in Taiwan's democratic era by the rise of a countervailing Taiwanese national identity and opposition to the PRC's insistent agenda to absorb the island. These dynamics are rapidly minimizing the appeal and political utility of any “one China” notions in China–Taiwan relations.

“One China” and the Cross-Taiwan Strait Commitment Problem

AbstractFifty years after the current “one China” framework emerged in international politics, the cross-Taiwan Strait “one China” dispute has transformed from its historical nature of indivisible sovereignty. As Taipei has stopped competing internationally to represent “China” since 1991, Beijing now worries that compromising its “one-China principle” in cross-Strait reconciliation would enhance Taiwan's separate statehood internationally and enable the island to push towards de jure independence. In contrast, Taipei worries that any perceived concessions on the question of “one China” would enhance China's sovereignty claim over Taiwan and enable Beijing to push for unification coercively with fewer concerns about international backlash. Improved cross-Strait relations thus rely on circumventing this quintessential commitment problem in international politics.

Japan, Taiwan and the “One China” Framework after 50 Years

AbstractThis study analyses the “one China” framework's significance for Japan–Taiwan relations since Tokyo switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1972. Drawing on Chinese-, Japanese- and English-language sources, it examines developments since the breakthrough Japan–PRC normalization communiqué and the “Japan formula,” which enabled Tokyo to normalize relations – six years before Washington – without recognizing Beijing's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, and while maintaining robust, if unofficial, ties with Taipei thenceforth. Highlighting distinctions between Beijing's self-asserted “one-China principle” and Japan's ambiguous official position and subsequent effective policies, it assesses incremental but practically significant evolutions of Japan–Taiwan relations over the past half-century. In the 21st century, the trend towards incrementally closer ties has proven strikingly resilient to political transitions in Japan and Taiwan, China's growing power, pushback from Beijing and worsening cross-Strait frictions. Beyond Japan–Taiwan relations and theoretical debates on “one China,” this article's findings carry significant implications for Taiwan's international space, cross-Strait dynamics and China–Japan–United States relations.

Taiwan and the “One-China Principle” in the Age of COVID-19: Assessing the Determinants and Limits of Chinese Influence

AbstractDuring the current global COVID-19 crisis Taiwan has portrayed itself as both an example for other countries to follow and as a country willing to assist others in their own efforts with the virus. Taiwan has also renewed efforts to participate in the World Health Organization (WHO), an organisation from which it is currently excluded. Although some countries have supported Taiwan's efforts to participate in the WHO or have praised its COVID-19 response, others have been silent or even critical, sometimes citing commitments to a “one China policy.” In this paper, we use newly collected data to explore cross-national variation in support for Taiwan during the current pandemic. We find that a country's level of economic development and security ties with the US are strongly correlated with support for Taiwan while a country's economic ties to China is a less consistent predictor.

The “One China” Framework at 50 (1972–2022): The Myth of “Consensus” and Its Evolving Policy Significance

AbstractThis lead article surveys the history and evolving policy legacies of the “one China” framework 50 years after US President Richard Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China. It begins by introducing key concepts and highlighting the crucial difference between Beijing's self-defined “one-China principle” and the US's, Japan's and key other countries’ variable “one China” policies as it relates to Taiwan. It argues that three seminal 1970s developments consolidated the “one China” framework as an informal institution of international politics. The ambiguity baked in by Cold War-era geopolitical necessity provided flexibility sufficient to enable diplomatic breakthroughs between erstwhile adversaries, but also planted seeds for deepening contestation and frictions today. Recent developments – especially Taiwan's democratization and Beijing's increasingly bold and proactive assertion of its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan – have transformed incentive structures in Taipei and for its major international partners. The net effect is that the myth of “consensus” and the ambiguities enabling the framework's half-century of success face unprecedented challenges today.

The cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan in light of international law: not quite a mere domestic affair …

ABSTRACT Taiwan is one of the most critical questions in current international affairs. China’s tough interpretation of the ‘one-China policy’ (there is one China, Taiwan belongs to it and is bound to reunite under the sole legitimate government, i.e. Beijing), is at odds with Taiwan increasingly distancing itself from the mainland. China no longer hides its military plans to gain control of Taiwan, should the latter persist in its determination not to reunite or formally declare its independence. The present article looks at two issues that are crucial and intertwined: the much-debated question concerning the status of Taiwan under international law, and the much … less debated question of whether it would be lawful for China to resort to armed force to establish its rule over Taiwan. Recent state practice highlights a significant trend towards restricting resort to force against stabilised, post-conflict, de facto entities, with Taiwan representing a paradigmatic case.

Is Chinese aid different?

China’s involvement in African countries has been criticized for being guided by self-interest rather than recipient need or merit. For the period 2000–2012, we compare China’s aid allocation behaviour to that of the five largest donor countries globally: France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the USA. We use regression analysis and a rigorous variance decomposition method to measure the importance of various factors in predicting aid commitments. We find that donors differ markedly in how they allocate aid. While Germany, Japan, the USA, and the UK assign high importance to recipient need, France’s and China’s allocation models are, for a large part, driven by variables that relate to self-interest: trade in the case of France, and the adherence to the “One-China policy” in the case of China. However, China is not a purely selfish donor. As most Western donors, China commits more aid to poorer countries. Furthermore, we find no evidence that commercial interests, such as trade or access to natural resources, determine Chinese aid allocation. This latter result contrasts with Western donors, which allocate more aid to their trade partners. France and the UK also commit significantly more aid to their former colonies. In conclusion, the claim that China’s aid allocation is different must be qualified.

Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in the China–Latin American Relations in the Context of the US–China Trade War and the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Bretton Woods institutions have failed to accommodate a rising China, and many authors describe this moment as a crisis of the liberal order, which China is intentionally contesting. The World Trade Organization was incapable of offering a solution to the trade war, and more recently, the World Health Organization was incapable of reducing – and rather partly contributed to – tensions between the US and China in the management of COVID-19 crisis. This Special Issue is made up of six manuscripts that address the most sensitive issues of the China–Latin American relationship amid the challenges of the growing dispute with the United States. The manuscripts assess the four main concerns that are shaping the agenda in China–Latin American relations in times of increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic competition between the United States and China: the Belt and Road Initiative, the One-China policy, the trade war, and the COVID-19 crisis.

The One-China Policy and Implications of U.S. Invariable Support for Taiwan

This paper discusses the concept of the one-China policy and how the United States support of Taiwan poses a challenge to stability in the region. The paper adopted the library descriptive instrument from historical research to come up with the available data in the paper. Findings show that, since 1949, the struggle between the Nationalist Republic of China and the Communist party escalated into a civil war which resulted in the defeat of Kuomintang and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which took control of all mainland China. Only the island of Taiwan remained under the control of the ROC. Since then, both the ROC and the PRC have been claiming to represent all of "China", and both officially claim each other's territory. The paper concludes that China cannot forfeit the strait of Taiwan despite American support to the island. The deteriorating relationship between the U.S and China relationship has seen trade wars to accusations on the origins of the coronavirus to political buffering, to the sovereign of Taiwan and Hongkong, it just seems to be a manifestation of the Sino-American Cold War. The way things appear, the relationship between the U.S and China will further deteriorate largely because democracy and liberal order are being challenged by the political posture of China. The paper recommends that there is the need to maintain the non-interference principle by the two parties, the United States should know that Taiwan is China and therefore not meddle in the affairs of China and vice-versa.

Taiwan: Can a perfect storm be averted?

Tsai Ing-wen’s election as the leader of the Taiwan authorities in 2016 set off a series of negative interactions across the Taiwan Strait. Donald Trump’s election and his efforts to undermine the US “one-China policy” made things worse. While Taipei felt encouraged to challenge Beijing’s red line, Beijing believed it was necessary to exert even more pressure on Taipei. With greater capabilities and under increasing popular pressure, Beijing has taken a more proactive approach to address the perceived challenge of Taiwan independence. The process of vicious interactions between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington resembles the forming of a perfect storm. This paper reviews how this three-way interaction evolved over time, identifies the major factors shaping this situation, and speculates on future developments by analyzing the major factors involved. It argues that while a perfect storm is indeed taking shape, it is still possible to avert it. For this to happen, however, the three sides need to take a rational and pragmatic approach to managing their demands and desires.

Upaya Pemerintahan Tsai Ing-Wen Melawan Tekanan One-China Principle pada Era Xi Jinping

In fact, China used to only focus on the mainland with one identity, namely the Republic of China which was spearheaded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and General Chiang Kai-shek, but all started to change when the communist party at that time began to carry out a revolution. Mao Zedong as the leader of the movement then succeeded in taking over China (mainland) from the Kuomintang and driving them to the island of Taiwan. As a result of this, until now there is a dual identity between China and Taiwan. The One-China Principle policy is China's attempt to bind Taiwan, because China considers that Taiwan is also part of China's territory. However, Taiwan considers that they are a sovereign state since then until now during the reign of Tsai Ing-wen. So here the researcher will try to explain how the efforts made by Taiwan by focusing on the Tsai Ing-wen government towards the One-China Principle policy in the Xi Jinping era. Researchers will also use a qualitative descriptive method to explain more deeply about the efforts made by Tsai Ing-wen, through the concept of small state diplomacy and diplomatic recognition. Based on the discussion, it can be concluded that the efforts made by Tsai Ing-wen were sufficient to defend their sovereignty de facto, but Taiwan still needs the support of the big powers to defend their sovereignty from the pressures exerted by China.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF CHINA IN THEIR ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH THE GAMBIA

This paper aims at finding out the national interest of China in conducting economic cooperation with the Gambia from 2016. Relying on qualitative inquiry, this research is informed by the theoretical concepts from national interest. In terms of national interest, the political aspect of the national interest of Morgenthau and the economic aspect of Donald E. Nuechterlein is used to analyze the national interest of China in the Gambia. To answer the research question: What is China’s national interest in their economic cooperation with the Gambia? The research finds out that China has political and economic interests in the Gambia. Politically, China’s interest in the Gambia is clearly stated in the joint communique signed between China and the Gambia when they were resuming their diplomatic relations in 2016. As a form of this agreement, the Gambia is supporting the One-China principle by not opening official relations with Taiwan. Finally, China retains an economic interest to secure the Gambian market for Chinese products and natural resources for Chinese manufacturing industries. Most importantly, is the port of the Gambia which has a strategic location in the west Africa region and is crucial to the China’s belt and road initiative. China has become one of the major sources of financial support for the Gambia since resuming economic cooperation in 2016. This financial support includes giving loans, grants, aid, and trade. As can be seen from the analysis of the dependency perspective, this research shows that China uses its loans and grants to monopolized the Gambia market for Chinese goods and Chinese investment which likely creates contracts for Chinese companies and provide job opportunities for Chinese citizens.
 Keywords: national interest, China, The Gambia, economic cooperation, one-china principle.

China’s Official Development Assistance: An Implication of the Transport Infrastructure Development in Cambodia

China’s ODA in Cambodia had been executed since the 1950s with the remarkable evidence of the four factories’ construction in Cambodia during the 1960s, while the United States of America had also experienced providing funds to build roads and bridges and other humanitarian reliefs in Cambodia during the 1950s and 1960s. After the national election in 1993, foreign assistance was given to Cambodia to support the economic infrastructure and to fill the gap of government expenditure budgets of each year, since there was a huge amount of the trade balance deficit. China has been the largest donor and investor in Cambodia in exchange for high commitment of the country to support the “One-China Policy” and the Belt and Road initiative right after its commencement in 2013. Since then, Cambodia has received huge amounts of ODA from China in several sectors, especially the transportation infrastructure sector. This research focuses mainly on China’s ODA for transportation infrastructure development contributed to the GDP growth of Cambodia by focusing mainly on the public sector foreign aid and ignoring the private sectors (investment scheme). The researcher used a mixed-method to analyze the data collected by using Eviews 10 with the least-squares’ method to analyze the data. The research result showed that China’s ODA for the transportation infrastructure development in Cambodia significantly contributed to the GDP growth of Cambodia, with the scientific evident chance of occurrence of 99.81 percent, with only a 0.19 percent-chance of error.

China at the UN: Choking Civil Society

The Chinese government’s crackdown on freedom of expression, independent thought, and civil society now extends beyond its borders. In the United Nations, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) misuses its seat on the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s Committee on Non-governmental Organizations (NGO Committee) to block applications from civil society organizations seeking UN consultative status. Consultative status enables NGOs to participate in UN activities, including hosting side events, gaining access to sessions, speaking at UN events and delivering statements. While the NGO Committee was originally created to facilitate civil society’s participation within the UN, China (along with other authoritarian countries) have instead used it to restrict NGO access to the UN. Chinese diplomats not only block applications from NGOs working on human rights issues (including those focused on North Korea) but also enforce the one-China policy by asking applicants to explicitly recognize Tibet and Taiwan as integral parts of Chinese territory and resisting groups engaged in advocacy on Uyghur issues. In UN reports on the NGO Committee’s deliberations and interviews with diplomats, UN officials and NGO representatives provide compelling evidence that Beijing seeks to contain NGOs and has worked with the Like-Minded Group (LMG), a coalition of authoritarian countries, to cap the role of civil society in the UN and bar many organizations from participation in this global body.