one-China Research Articles

China's 'COVID-19 Diplomacy' and Geopolitics in Oceania

China's 'COVID-19 Diplomacy' and Geopolitics in Oceania Tarcisius Kabutaulaka (bio) The COVID-19 pandemic started at a time of intense geopolitical competition; consequently, global powers have used pandemic-related assistances to enhance their influence. This has been dubbed "COVID-19 diplomacy," a variant of global health diplomacy that involves the provision of assistance to address a health crisis while simultaneously enhancing and strengthening a country's geopolitical alliances and influence. The countries at the center of this ongoing geopolitical contest are the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China) and the United States (U.S.) and its allies. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Oceania1 has become an arena where global powers have jostled to assert their influence. This paper discusses how China has used the pandemic to assert its influence in Oceania and the responses from traditional powers in the region, led by the U.S. and Australia. In the past decade-and-a-half, China has become increasingly influential in Oceania. Most Pacific Island governments welcome this, as demonstrated by the fact that ten of the fourteen Pacific Island countries now recognize the one-China policy. This threatens the dominance that the US and its allies have had in the region since World War II, hence triggering the aforementioned geopolitical competition. Since the beginning of the pandemic, metropolitan powers have used COVID-19-related assistance to increase and affirm their influence. But while the US and its allies portray China as a threat, island governments view a relationship with China as an opportunity. Although China's COVID-19-related assistance has so far been smaller in monetary value compared to aid from Australia and the U.S., it has been more visible because of Beijing's concerted efforts in public relations. It is, however, uncertain if this will result in long-term geopolitical gains for Beijing, especially given the fact that Western countries are strengthening their influence. Furthermore, while Pacific Island governments each value their respective relationship with Beijing because they see it as an additional source of assistance to address the economic, social, and health-related impacts of the pandemic, their citizens are more cautious, if not skeptical, about their government's relationship with China. The paper is divided into three parts. First, it provides a broad overview of Beijing's global response to the pandemic, focusing especially on its attempts to create alternative narratives about its handling of the virus and to use its assistance to craft an image of China as a responsible and benevolent country and global leader. Second, it discusses China's response to the pandemic in Oceania and the reactions of traditional development partners and Pacific Islanders. Third, it provides concluding remarks, highlighting the geopolitical implications of China's COVID-19 diplomacy. China's COVID-19 diplomacy The SARS-CoV-2 virus or novel coronavirus, which causes COVID-19, originated in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China in late 2019. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a pandemic. By the end of March 2021, over 2.8 million people world-wide [End Page 254] had died from the virus, with over 128 million infections and rising. The U.S. became the epicenter with 550,000 deaths and over 30 million cases.2 By the beginning of May 2021, the epicenter of the pandemic had shifted to India, which had more than 4,000 daily fatalities and 400,000 daily infections.3 By mid-July 2021, there were over 186 million confirmed cases and over 4 million deaths worldwide.4 The economic, political, and social fallouts were also devastating. China found itself in a negative spotlight as the origin of the virus and for its lack of transparency in sharing information that could have helped contain it. The COVID-19 pandemic and its adverse social and economic impacts tarnished China's image as a global economic power with an increasing geopolitical influence, threatened President Xi Jinping's and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) domestic reputation, and raised questions about the brand of economic development that Beijing exports globally, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).5 Internationally, the U.S...

São Tomé and Príncipe: More than the Land of Cocoa and Coffee

The Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, a small and remote island state, located in the Gulf of Guinea, has long offered little geopolitical and geo-economic interest. This situation is however gradually changing. In fact, since 2016, interest in the country has begun to grow, after the country resumed diplomatic relations with People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) and recognized the “one-China policy”. While the island state and Cabo Verde have followed different development paths in the post-colonial era, both share common features and both have the potential to perform important geopolitical regional roles in the context of the Belt and Road initiative (BRI). This paper discusses São Tomé and Príncipe’s regional engagement in the Gulf of Guinea (GG), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), and in multi-level cooperation in light of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries (FM) as well as bilateral cooperation. We argue that São Tomé and Príncipe is of geopolitical value to China and that the island state will serve Chinese interests in extending the BRI in the Gulf of Guinea. The microstate of São Tomé and Príncipe has the potential to transform itself to function as the “Qatar of the Gulf of Guinea”, and contribute to regional stability by providing regional services for shipping, banking, finance, high-quality education, tourism and as an engaged partner. This paper presents a methodological theoretical-inductive and constructivist perspective, combining qualitative, quantitative and non-participant observation.

Rethinking non-recognition: The EU’s Investment Agreement with Taiwan under the One-China Policy

AbstractThis article re-examines the theories of recognition and non-recognition in the context of the evolving framework of the European Union (EU)’s trade and investment relations with Taiwan from legal and international relations perspectives. Notwithstanding its one-China policy, the EU has developed a pragmatic approach to engaging Taiwan under bilateral consultations and World Trade Organization negotiations that have built the foundation for the bilateral investment agreement (BIA). The article argues that since the 1980s, the EU has accorded diverse forms of recognition to Taiwan and the BIA will buttress the process. To substantiate the contention, the article systemically explores the political and trade policies of European states and EU institutions in line with their strategies toward cross-strait relations.By deciphering the new momentum that has galvanized the European Commission’s strategy towards the EU-Taiwan BIA, the research sheds light on the implications of European Parliament resolutions and the EU’s investment talks with China. The structure and impact of the BIA are also analysed in light of EU investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Hence, the findings contribute to the interdisciplinary study of international law and international relations and enhance the understanding of the EU’s Asia-Pacific trade and investment agreements.

The main traits of the Hungaro-Taiwanese economic relations with special focus on the trade with agricultural products

This paper provides the reader with a thorough insight into the bilateral economic relationship between Hungary and Taiwan. Due to the One-China policy Hungary – and most countries in the world – do not have formal diplomatic or political contacts with Taiwan, however Taiwan as an autonomous economic entity seems to be a promising partner for Hungary and other European countries, even though due to the huge geographic distance and to the relative less-known market environment the amounts of trade turnover and investments have still been modest. Taiwan, due to its natural and social endowments cannot produce enough food for its population, therefore it is merely reliant on imports. Due to the mentioned distance and being closely embedded into the European economic integration, Hungary definitely cannot be among the main food suppliers of Taiwan, but still there are market segments (like chilled poultry) in which Hungarian companies can be successful, if they focus not only on the product quality but also on the marketing promotion. The paper makes mention about some additional ideas of joint co-operation in the food production, like potentials in Mangalica breeding, as it has also started in Taiwan a few years ago.

An Overview of Foreign Relation of Nepal with China

Nepal and China have a long history of foreign relation since ancient time. As a modern state, Nepal established its diplomatic relations with China in 1955. The main objective of this paper is to explore the foreign relation of Nepal with China. This study uses secondary data for the collection of facts and information. It is descriptive and analytical in nature. This study is based on Constitution of Nepal, bilateral treaties, joint statements of high level official visits and different scholarly articles. Basic principles of the foreign policy of Nepal and China is set by mutual trust and the guidelines of Panchasheel. Nepal has always followed and accepted the One-China policy. Also, Nepal has supported the ambitious Chinese initiatives for one belt one road project. Similarly, China has been Nepal's key development partner. China has helped Nepal in different development projects. Nepal has signed a transit treaty with China. Now, Nepal has an alternative for third country transport transit.

Unbalanced deterrence: coercive threat, reassurance and the US-China rivalry in Taiwan strait

After Tsai Ing-wen was elected, both Mainland China and the United States realized that the situation in the Taiwan Strait has undergone fundamental changes. In order to curb Taiwan’s independence policy, the Mainland China has strengthened its coercive threats against Taiwan while the US chose to increase its strategic commitment to Taiwan and revisit the One-China policy. This article argues the current framework between China and US on Taiwan issue is collapsing. The rising of Mainland China is the root cause for this round tension, however, Tsai Ing-wen refused to accept the 92 consensus which was the trigger. This article elaborates the argument that the delicate balance in the Taiwan Strait is declining, which both China and the United Stated have increased their deterrent threats to each other while decreased their reassurances, and regional crisis is emerging. For the leaders of China and the United States, it is urgent to manage the emerging Taiwan Strait crisis and prevent the situation from going out of control.

China’s Stadium Diplomacy and its Determinants: A Typological Investigation of Soft Power

Since 1958, China has constructed over 140 sports facilities around the world. Previous research into stadium diplomacy lacks definitional clarity, has not systematically investigated the phenomenon, and crucially, has failed to explain why China employs stadium diplomacy where it does. This article defines the phenomenon and locates all known cases without temporal or geographic restrictions. We create a classification system and typology, permitting a comparison of theoretically-like types to develop and test a multi-determinant theory. We find empirical evidence that China employs stadium diplomacy to secure natural resources and to secure diplomatic recognition in line with the One-China policy. These findings have important implications for scholarship into the use of soft power within interstate rivalry, and the methodology demonstrates that a clear typology of soft power which is mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive can be created and is informative. Keywords: China, stadium diplomacy, soft power, interstate rivalry

Rethinking non-recognition: Taiwan’s new pivot to ASEAN and the one-China policy

The article examines the evolution of Taiwan’s engagement in Southeast Asia since the 1990s as a unique case study in international law and international relations (IR). Under the one-China policy, the evolution of bilateral relations with Taiwan highlights the theoretical concept of recognition premised on identity and status in interstate affairs. The article argues that the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have established diverse forms of recognition of Taiwan in line with a policy of non-recognition. While such recognition has not amounted to recognition of statehood in international law, it demonstrates the IR concept of recognition as a gradual process in state practice. To substantiate the contention, the article examines the diplomatic privileges and immunities that ASEAN countries have accorded to Taiwan. The conclusion of bilateral trade and investment agreements has also galvanized various modes of recognizing Taiwan’s treaty-making capacity and the legitimacy of official cooperation. Hence, the findings not only enrich the study of IR, but also contribute to a broader understanding of the role of China and contemporary Asia–Pacific politics.

Does the One-China Policy Shape the People’s Republic of China’s Foreign Policy?: Soft, Sharp, and Hard Power

This analytical paper asks, does the One-China policy shape the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy? This paper begins by briefly defining the One-China policy and situating it in the respective histories of China and its current incarnation as the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Then, after untangling the often muddled classifications of soft, sharp, and hard power, the question is interrogated in the context of each class of power (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011; Nye, 2018; Raby, 2019; Walker & Ludwig, 2017). This analytical essay concludes that the PRC does employ predominantly sharp and hard power strategies that are heavily influenced by the One-China policy.

Did Thucydides Believe in Thucydides’ Trap? The History of the Peloponnesian War and Its Relevance to U.S.-China Relations

The Peloponnesian War, a conflict between the Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, is held to be a classic example of war between a hegemon and a rising power. Graham Allison has recently coined the term “Thucydides’ Trap” to emphasize how structural forces are leading to instability in U.S.-China relations. This interpretation of history is inaccurate and reflects the influence of misleading translations. Drawing on the original Greek text of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, I argue that the concept of Thucydides’ Trap does not find support even in the case that has given it its name. Thucydides’ famous attribution of the war to “the growth of the power of Athens” actually refers to the expansion of the Athenian Empire rather than a shift in the distribution of capabilities. Structural arguments do offer valuable insights about potential sources of conflict in U.S.-China relations, but the causal mechanism has little to do with the analogy of Athens and Sparta. As exemplified by the flashpoint in the Strait of Taiwan, structural change has aggravated long-standing differences between the United States and the PRC. Beijing’s growing economic and military power has resulted in a growing threat to Taipei, which has led the United States to affirm its commitment to Taiwan’s security in ways that are inconsistent with the One-China policy. If this trend continues, it will raise the potential for a military confrontation between the great powers in East Asia.

Rethinking Non-Recognition: Taiwan’s New Pivot to ASEAN and the One-China Policy

The article examines the evolution of Taiwan’s engagement in Southeast Asia since the 1990s as a unique case study in international law and international relations (IR). Under the one-China policy, the evolution of bilateral relations with Taiwan highlights the theoretical concept of recognition premised on identity and status in interstate affairs. The article argues that the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have established diverse forms of recognition of Taiwan in line with a policy of non-recognition. While such recognition has not amounted to recognition of statehood in international law, it demonstrates the IR concept of recognition as a gradual process in state practice. To substantiate the contention, the article examines the diplomatic privileges and immunities that ASEAN countries have accorded to Taiwan. The conclusion of bilateral trade and investment agreements has also galvanized various modes of recognizing Taiwan’s treaty-making capacity and the legitimacy of official cooperation. Hence, the findings not only enrich the study of IR, but also contribute to a broader understanding of the role of China and contemporary Asia-Pacific politics.

A Concise Consideration on the Legal Status of Taiwan for Japan from the perspective of the Customary International Law of Recognition

Taiwan is one of the most important entities for Japan in the international relations and history. Beijing government has emphasized “One-China Policy” and doesn’t recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state until the present. The issue, whether Taiwan is a de jure state, is a legal issue for only Japan based on the international legal systems of recognition and treaty. In those systems, it is evident for Japan that two peace treaties exist until the present with the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China. The existence of two treaties means that two sovereign states who did battle against Japan in World War II exist.

The Japan-Taiwan Relationship: An Unstable Stability

The Japan-Taiwan Relationship:An Unstable Stability June Teufel Dreyer (bio) Japan's relations with Taiwan (Republic of China, or ROC) have been shaped by both countries' relationships with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. Despite President Chiang Kai-shek's adversarial relationship with Japan during World War II, relations between Japan and his ROC (first on the mainland and then on the island of Taiwan) were cordial during the postwar period. Shared opposition to Communism provided a common bond. An estimated twenty thousand Japanese troops under Japanese command wore Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) uniforms and fought against the Chinese Communist troops until 1948.1 Strategic reasons also reinforced ties: the city of Hualien on Taiwan is but 69 miles from Japan's Yonaguni Island. Were Taiwan to be absorbed into the PRC, the territorial waters of Japan and China would be uncomfortably close. This essay argues that strategic calculations, shared democratic values, and generally pleasant memories of colonial history will foster the continued development of Taiwan-Japan relations, although these will remain constrained by each side's fear of unduly angering China. The first section situates the relationship in a historical context, while the second section examines the development of relations under Shinzo Abe and Tsai Ing-wen. The essay concludes by considering the outlook for the Taiwan-Japan relationship. The Past Is Prologue As the PRC began its ambitious industrialization program, Japanese businesses saw lucrative opportunities and pressed for the normalization of diplomatic relations that would facilitate these. Tokyo's 1972 derecognition of the ROC in favor of the PRC dealt a sharp blow to the Taipei government, but economic and other ties continued informally. When Chiang Kai-shek's son and heir Chiang Ching-kuo died in office in 1988, he was succeeded [End Page 161] by his Taiwanese vice president. Born in Taiwan when the island was a Japanese colony, Lee Teng-hui infuriated Beijing by saying, correctly, that he had been a Japanese citizen for most of his life. In deference to Japan's acceptance of Beijing's one-China policy, Lee agreed not to visit Japan officially so long as he was in office, though he was able to use his language fluency to arrange informal meetings with Japanese officials. Under his administration, the ban on Japanese-language media programming was lifted, with the Taiwanese quickly becoming enthusiastic consumers of the latest Japanese television programs as well as Japanese fads and fashions. A new Taiwanese word, harizu (Japan mania), came into being. After a Chinese show of force in the Taiwan Strait ahead of Taiwan's 1996 election, Japanese officials, aware of the implications for their own security, committed to the United States to help defend the shuhen jitai (the waters around Japan), refusing Beijing's demand that Taiwan be explicitly excluded from the definition thereof. By 1999, retired members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces had become frequent visitors to Taiwan. As China became less Communist and more prosperous, formerly anti-PRC elements in Taiwan became attracted by the mainland's nationalistic message. Overwhelmingly composed of those who had come to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek and their descendants, this group tended to identify as Chinese and favored unification with China, albeit under a variety of improbable scenarios (such as the PRC accepting ROC rule or the complete democratization of the PRC). Native-born Taiwanese, by contrast, were more resistant to incorporation into a country they had never been part of. The former became known as the "blues" and the latter as the "greens," with Lee, the first popularly elected president, as the standard bearer of the greens. In 2000, the term-limited Lee was succeeded by another Taiwanese, Chen Shui-bian, who continued his de-Sinification policy and moved still closer to Japan. These developments not only angered China, which from time to time accused Japan of wanting to bring Taiwan back under its control, but also upset the George H.W. Bush administration, which feared that Chen might provoke a war that could involve the United States. Chen's successor, Ma Ying-jeou, born to a family from the mainland, reversed this process, declaring unification...

The quest for recognition: Taiwan’s military and trade agreements with Singapore under the one-China policy

The article examines the evolution of Taiwan’s relationship with Singapore since the 1960s as a unique case study in the Asia-Pacific. The theoretical concept of recognition in international relations (IR) and its nexus with international law are used to analyze the conclusion of the bilateral military and trade agreements absent diplomatic relations. The article argues that beyond security dimensions, the two states’ struggles for recognition exhibit the formation of national identities, which invigorate the claims for sovereign state status in global politics. First, this article explores the emerging notion of recognition in IR and sheds light on the significance of Taiwan’s presidential visit to Singapore under its one-China policy. Second, it explains Singapore’s pursuit of external sovereignty that led to substantive defense cooperation with Taiwan, as well as the role of Lee Kuan Yew in facilitating Beijing-Taipei negotiations. Finally, it assesses contemporary developments such as the inking of the Taiwan-Singapore free trade agreement and the first-ever summit between the presidents of China and Taiwan in Singapore. Hence, the political and legal analysis of Singapore-Taiwan relations enriches the study of IR and contributes to the understanding of the foreign policy of China and Southeast Asia.

Was the Shift of the PRC’s One-China Policy in 2002 Temporal?: Tracing an Asymmetrical Power Balance with Taiwan

본 연구는 2002년 이후 중국이 ‘하나의 중국 원칙’에 대한 해석을 변경한 원인을 탐구한다. 하나의 중국 원칙은 중화인민공화국의 설립 이후부터 줄곧 중국의 대 대만 정책의 기조로 작용했다. 1980년대 이후 1990년대까지 하나의 중국 원칙은 중국 중심의 평화통일을 의미했다. 그러나 2002년 16차 중국 공산당 전국대표대회에서 중국은 하나의 중국이 중국을 의미한다는 기존의 해석을 버리고, 중국과 대만이 동등하게 하나의 중국에 속한다는 대만 측의 해석을 받아들이게 된다. 대만 국내적으로 대만 독립론이 우세해 지고, 독립 노선의 민진당 소속 천수이볜이 총통으로 당선되었으며, 대만과 중국 간 경제적, 군사적 힘의 격차가 강화되던 상황에서 중국은 왜 하나의 중국에 대한 해석을 유화적으로 변경하였는가? 본 연구에서는 하비브의 ‘비대칭적 협상’에 관한 논의를 적용하여, 하나의 중국이라는 이슈에 대한 협상력이 재구성되었으며, 이것이 하나의 중국 원칙에 대한 중국의 해석을 변화시켰다고 주장한다.

U.S. AND ITS “ONE CHINA” POLICY

Amongst top national goals of the contemporary China’s leadership, the Taiwan issue occupies a particular place. This issue bears a fundamental significance since it deals with national pride, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity of the PRC. Its resolution has also an applied significance – it promotes the legitimacy of the ruling China’s Communist Party and resolves some geopolitical difficulties China faces. Currently relying on the creation of island’s all-pervading economic dependency on China, yet not excluding military invasion as an option, Beijing expects to resolve the Taiwan issue by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC. By using economic statecraft and exerting pressure on the world’s countries and international organizations, Beijing has succeeded in narrowing Taiwan’s international space, thus coming close to the desired goal of bringing back the island. Still, a crucial impediment to the resolution of the Taiwan issue is the US’ support of Taiwan. The article reveals specifics of the so-called “One China” policy, a policy that the US pursues towards the Taiwan issue ever since 1970s. By analyzing in details the provisions of the documents that lay the basis of “One China” policy, the author identifies its enduring principles. The author emphasizes the dual character of the US’ “One China” policy, which is its simultaneous orientation to promote relations with the PRC and to support Taiwan. The author further explains the motivation of the American support of Taiwan. The nature of the China-Taiwan relations – either confrontational (which has been the case with a few exceptions) or peaceful (like in the beginning of the 1990s and 2008–2016) – is seen in the article as a major determinant of the formulation of the US’ Taiwan policy. Beijing’s readiness to return the island with the use of force and China’s rapid military power accumulation determine the US-Taiwan close military ties, including arms sales to the island. By analyzing the development of the situation in the Taiwan Strait through the examples of three Taiwan administrations (the ones of Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen), the author shows that in the 21st century Taiwan leadership’s policy towards mainland China and the independence issue plays the defining role in the Taiwan-China-US triangle relations. It concludes that changes in the basics of the US’s “One China” policy and the termination of Washington’s support of Taiwan are highly unlikely.

U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations under the Trump Administration

U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations under the Trump Administration Joseph Chinyong Liow (bio) The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States has occasioned intense discussion over the likely shape of his administration's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. Two broad views have emerged in this regard. The first contends that the political neophyte will attempt to make good on his campaign promises to reconsider U.S. commitments to friends and allies, and this will lead him to depart from prevailing policy toward East Asia and upend the order that has undergirded the region's prosperity and economic dynamism. A second view maintains that, after an initial period of bluster, good sense will prevail and policy toward Asia will fall back into a more familiar pattern as a result of geostrategic realities, combined with the appointment of cabinet members who by most measures are of the order of previous incumbents. Needless to say, the dust has yet to settle on this debate, and it continues to be followed with great interest—not to mention a fair amount of trepidation—around the world, not least in Southeast Asia. The first part of this essay highlights the key differences that have emerged in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia under the Obama and Trump administrations. The essay then concludes by discussing the outlook for U.S.–Southeast Asia relations and identifying several reasons for concern. Differences between the Obama and Trump Administrations' Policies toward Asia The Barack Obama years were heady days for Southeast Asia. Not since the ill-fated Vietnam War era had the United States paid as much attention and devoted as many resources to the region. Obama's Asia policy, christened the "pivot" and later the "rebalance," saw the United States initiate the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the way to joining the East Asia Summit. During his presidency, Obama visited all Southeast Asian countries except for Brunei (which he would have visited in October 2013 if [End Page 53] not for the U.S. government shutdown). To demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the rebalance, the Obama administration joined—and eventually led—discussions for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was pitched as the "gold standard" for global trade and involved twelve Pacific Rim countries, including four from Southeast Asia. At the time, the hope and ambition surrounding the TPP also held out the prospect of other regional states coming on board in the future. With the inauguration of the Trump administration in January, Southeast Asian countries found themselves staring at the prospect of a considerable rollback of U.S. interest in the region. In nursing these fears, they were not alone. U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia shared similar concerns. Candidate Trump's decision to adopt a cantankerous line toward China is hardly unusual for U.S. presidential campaigns. What caused greater consternation was his suggestion that he would withdraw the United States from the TPP and review the country's security commitments to regional allies South Korea and Japan. Trump did little to dispel these concerns following his electoral victory in November. He chose to break with tradition and receive a phone call from the independence-leaning Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen. This was followed by capricious comments about possibly reviewing Washington's long-standing one-China policy. Days after assuming office, Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP by means of executive order. The appointment of China hawks to key positions on trade did little to dampen the growing adversarial climate. Meanwhile, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that efforts should be made to prevent China from having access to the artificial islands it had built in the South China Sea, raising concerns that Sino-U.S. relations were headed for conflict. Four and a half months since his inauguration, President Trump's approach to East Asia appears to be more considered than many pundits and observers were expecting. Visits by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary Tillerson, and Vice President Mike Pence to...

Taiwan in Trump's Perspective: A Bargaining Chip?

Many countries in Asia have experienced significant political transitions in the last couple of years. In Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen won a landslide victory for the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan's independence-leaning party, in the January 2016 presidential election. In her inauguration speech, Tsai to preserve the status quo in relations with China, adding Beijing must respect Taiwan's democracy and both sides must ensure there are no provocations.1 However, the status quo has in fact undergone a sea change since Tsai was sworn in as president-cross-strait relations have sharply cooled with the cessation of official communication channels.Besieged by Taiwan's diplomatic isolation and domestically fierce partisan struggles, particularly over intense relations with China, Tsai's administration, even more than its predecessors, needs satisfactory relations with the United States for Taiwan's economic prosperity and national security. While the United States does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, it maintains commitments to the island based on the Relations Act passed in April 1979. This essay will examine the early contacts between the Tsai government and the Trump administration, the Tsai government's broader policy goals, and the role of the China factor in U.S.-Taiwan relations.Relations between the Trump Administration and TaiwanThe United States witnessed an epochal political transition with the election of Donald Trump as president in November 2016. Trump campaigned on a foreign policy that prioritized the interests of the American people and national security above all else. His foreign policy ideas were clear-revive U.S. competitiveness and security, while requiring a reasonable amount of burden-sharing from U.S. allies to make America great again.Tsai called Trump on December 2, 2016, to congratulate him on winning the presidency, and Trump responded by congratulating Tsai on her electoral victory earlier in the year. They talked for over ten minutes and discussed economic and security issues. Their conversation alarmed some observers in the United States and especially China because of the policy signals it sent to China. A phone call between the leader of and a U.S. president-elect was unprecedented, given that Washington switched its diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing in 1979. Against this backdrop of suspicion and criticism, Trump retorted, Interesting how the U.S. sells billions of dollars of military equipment but I should not accept a congratulatory call.2 In an interview ahead of his inauguration, Trump further heightened the sense of uncertainty when he stated that everything is under negotiation including One China.2 Beijing's resentment coincided with an earlier expression of concern regarding the annual U.S. defense policy bill, which included a plan to conduct high-level military exchanges with Taiwan.4 Tsai also congratulated Trump upon his inauguration over Twitter. According to her office, she vowed to deepen the bilateral ties between the two countries, since Taiwan is the most important international ally of the United States based on the shared values of freedom, democracy and human rights.5Initially, what wanted was to secure a solid communication channel with the incoming president. While acknowledging that the call did not signal any major policy shift by Washington in terms of the Sino-U.S.-Taiwan triangle, Taiwan's officials still thought the conversation with Trump could give the Tsai administration more room to maneuver in improving substantive ties with Washington.6 Many, however, have noted that the call further strained relations between Taipei and Beijing. It also could have proved costly for Tsai by prompting Chinese pushback against both and the United States. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Geng Shuang said that Beijing had urged Washington to honor its commitment to the one-China policy. …

The quest for recognition: Taiwan’s military and trade agreements with Singapore under the one-China policy

The article examines the evolution of Taiwan’s relationship with Singapore since the 1960s as a unique case study in the Asia-Pacific. The theoretical concept of recognition in international relations (IR) and its nexus with international law are used to analyze the conclusion of the bilateral military and trade agreements absent diplomatic relations. The article argues that beyond security dimensions, the two states’ struggles for recognition exhibit the formation of national identities, which invigorate the claims for sovereign state status in global politics. First, this article explores the emerging notion of recognition in IR and sheds light on the significance of Taiwan’s presidential visit to Singapore under its one-China policy. Second, it explains Singapore’s pursuit of external sovereignty that led to substantive defense cooperation with Taiwan, as well as the role of Lee Kuan Yew in facilitating Beijing-Taipei negotiations. Finally, it assesses contemporary developments such as the inking of the Taiwan-Singapore free trade agreement and the first-ever summit between the presidents of China and Taiwan in Singapore. Hence, the political and legal analysis of Singapore-Taiwan relations enriches the study of IR and contributes to the understanding of the foreign policy of China and Southeast Asia.

Japan’s Struggle for Recognition and Sino–Japanese Diplomatic Normalization : A Recognitive Approach to the One-China Principle

Japan’s Struggle for Recognition and Sino–Japanese Diplomatic Normalization : A Recognitive Approach to the One-China Principle