When Edouard Balladur became prime minister of France in 1993 during the second period of Socialist-Gaullist cohabitation, he demanded that President Fran?ois Mitterrand give him power to appoint the CEO of the state-owned oil company Elf Aquitaine. While Elf had always been an instrument of foreign policy, a less well known aspect of its operations was as a source of campaign finance for political par ties, notably the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR). A reasonable conclusion is that Balladur's demand to nominate Elf's CEO represented an effort to wrest control of the RPR from Jacques Chirac, gain control over campaign funds, and boost his probability of winning the presidential elections.1 This intraparty conflict divided the RPR and unraveled a system of campaign finance that for years had funneled cash through Elf to political parties. The appointment of Elf's CEO fit into Balladur's strategy to secure the campaign finance needed to run for the presidency in 1995.2 Hence, when Balladur appointed Philippe Jaf?r? CEO of Elf, he expected that Jaf?r? would expose corruption at Elf under Lo?k Le Floch Prigent's stewardship that could discredit Mitterrand's Socialist Party. Jaf?r?, a highly accomplished product of elite education and a former inspec tor of finance, launched a series of audits that showed malfeasance at Elf. However, investigations spun out of Balladur's control; prosecutors uncovered evidence that a few managers at Elf had embezzled approximately 400 million Euros that they used to finance campaigns, bribe foreign politicians, and enrich themselves.3 In 2003 tri als began for thirty-seven people implicated in the scandal. The scandal embroiled several former ministers and the French constitutional council's president, as well as former German president Helmut Kohl, Gabonese president Omar Bongo, and Congolese president Denis Sassou-Nguesso. Indeed, corruption in France had become so common that many members of the political elite, irrespective of party, were under investigation.4 The Elf scandal attained such proportions because an informal group of dishonest people used networks to conceal corrupt acts, apparently without fear of punishment. These networks formed a crucial element of Franco-African policy and linked offi