ABSTRACT In his recent article in this journal, Homa Katouzian has advanced the following arguments regarding proposals by the World Bank and the UK/US to resolve the Iranian oil crisis. First, ‘the 1953 coup in Iran was not inevitable’. Second, ‘by declining the (World) Bank’s offer, Mosaddeq made the greatest mistake of his career’. Third, the latter decision played ‘right into the hands of the coup makers’. Fourth, had Mosaddeq accepted the last Truman–Churchill proposal, ‘there would (not) have been … the 1953 coup’ 1 1 Homa Katouzian, ‘The Anglo-Iranian oil crisis revisited: Iran’s rejection of the World Bank Intervention and the 1953 coup’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, published online on (27 September, 2022): 1. . Documentary evidence from the World Bank’s declassified Archives as well as the latest edition of the diplomatic record of the US supports a different set of arguments. First, Mosaddegh was justified in declining the proposals. Second, the Bank proposal was a de facto Trojan Horse to help return the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in control of Iran’s oil operations under the cover of an international organization. Third, the final Truman–Churchill proposal would have mortgaged Iran for about a century had Iran accepted British demands on compensation. Finally, given the negative pre-disposition of the key British and American officials against Mosaddegh, the 1953 coup was inevitable, regardless of the outcome of negotiations over the two proposals.
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