Occupation Of Iran Research Articles

World war II on iranIran's agricultural policy during the occupation of Iran in World War II

ایران در طی دو جنگ جهانی، به­رغم اعلام پیش­دستانۀ بی­طرفی، آسیب­های فراوانی را متحمل شد. در جنگ جهانی دوم، اشغال ایران از سوی دول انگلیس، شوروی و امریکا در شهریور 1320 (سپتامبر 1941) و استعفای رضا شاه منجر به ورود کشور به جنگ ناخواسته‌ای گردید که عوارض گوناگونی در ابعاد سیاسی، اقتصادی و اجتماعی داشت. این پیامدها تأثیر عینی خود را به­سرعت در حوزه­های گوناگون جامعه، از جمله بخش زراعت، نشان داد. پژوهش حاضر تسلط دولت‌های خارجی بر حوزۀ کشاورزی و خواربار را به­عنوان نمونه‌ای از این تبعات ارزیابی می­کند و با کاربست روش تاریخی، مبتنی بر توصیف وقایع و سپس تحلیل آن و با استفاده از اسناد آرشیوی، در پی پاسخ به این پرسش است که پیامدهای حضور متفقین بر اقتصاد کشاورزی ایران چه بود و متفقین چه سیاستی در این حوزه اعمال کردند. براساس یافته‌های پژوهش، متفقین با انعقاد پیمان سه­جانبه، زمینۀ دخالت مستقیم در امور کشاورزی ایران را فراهم کردند. اولویت کمک به شوروی و نقش ایران به­مثابۀ پل پیروزی در جنگ به جای کمک به مردم ایران و پیگیری این راهبرد موجب اختلال در سیستم حمل و نقل محصولات، افزایش قیمت‌ها، کاهش عرضۀ محصولات عمدۀ زراعی و شکل‌گیری بلواهای متعدد نان در داخل ایران گردید.

Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway by Mikiya Koyagi

Reviewed by: Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway by Mikiya Koyagi Samin Rashidbeigi (bio) Iran in Motion: Mobility, Space, and the Trans-Iranian Railway By Mikiya Koyagi. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2021. Pp. 279. Iran in Motion is a welcome addition to our understanding of technological modernization in the Middle East. The book sits at the intersection of the modern history of Iran and mobility studies. Besides giving an account of how the trans-Iranian railway came into being, Koyagi tells us how the railway project impacted the nation's practices and imaginations of mobility. Koyagi is cautious not to frame the subject of his study solely as a state-sponsored modernization project. He thus broadens the scope of his attention from the political elites and state officials, and takes in a wide range of historical actors such as local and foreign laborers, engineers, migrants, and travelers. The book aims to unearth and explain how these actors contributed to the materiality of the railway, and also, how they related to the very idea of movement by and through a new technology. Koyagi especially commits to the category of mobility as an "embodied experience of movement," in addition to physical movement. Accordingly, he argues that the Iranian transnational railway, in myriad concrete and subtle ways, reconstituted Iranian mobilities. The book is divided into seven chapters; whereas some deal more with the history of planning and constructing the railway, the others illustrate debates, aspirations, and anxieties around it. Iran in Motion starts by investigating the railway's pre-history, which includes contestations among the English and Soviet imperial officials, Iranian officials, and foreign investors, and their concerns and aspirations about making Iran a more connected transnational unit (ch. 1). While he elucidates the strategic and commercial objectives that the imperial powers hoped to accomplish through the Iranian railway, Koyagi offers his readers with fresh insight into the ways that a modern infrastructure was desired by Iranian elites. For the political elites, Koyagi argues, the railway constituted an essential component of the nation's progress and demarcated a new era that was detached from its slow-paced past (ch. 2). Further, Koyagi shows how the elites' dream was transformed into a national mission during the interwar period, and how the Iranian railway was destined to be a site of national [End Page 280] pride, and political and economic power (ch. 3). Even before the railway fully operated, Koyagi tells us, the process of building it created new forms of mobility that fit into a capitalist economy. Koyagi elaborates on this claim by masterfully tracking down local and foreign labor flows that concentrated around railway construction sites (ch. 4). The Allies' occupation of Iran in 1941 and their control over the rail routes bring about one of the book's most compelling focal points. Koyagi zooms in on railway accidents to examine how Allies and Iranian officials, each in their own way, interpreted and dealt with speed, danger and the fear of accident. He portrays the refashioning of technical knowledge and the rise of a new generation of technocrats who regulated the production of safe speed. Meanwhile, Koyagi delicately traces the streams of technical expertise at the bottom among the railway workers (ch. 5). Building on that, Koyagi studies railway workers' written correspondences with leading officials to assess their growing political agency and the ways they negotiated their rights to better pay and housing based on their claims to the railway's legacy (ch. 6). Iran in Motion ends by studying the attitudes of ordinary Iranians towards traveling on the train, and the role of the middle-class in fostering accepted modes of travel (ch. 7). It is worth mentioning that while the book proposes to tackle both practices and imaginations of mobility, aiming to weave them together, Koyagi does not, in fact, elaborate on the relationship between the two. The reader does not gather whether the book's identification of "imaginations" is a methodological choice, and if so, how it serves the book's agenda, and finally, what gap in the history of mobility it fills. One way of clarifying this categorization would be to unpack at the...

Tudeh Party and North Oil Score

The Soviet Union and before that, Russia as one of the most powerful neighbors of Iran in history, despite its abundance of oil resources always looked at Iran's oil resources for specific purposes. In examining the impact of oil on the relations between the two countries of Iran and Russia, it turns out that they were trying to reach the Iranian oil resources in some cases, one in 1299/1921and the other in 1920/1941. At the time of Iran's occupation of the Second World War, the Russians, though at every turn did not succeed in their goals, during the occupation of Iran in September 1941 by the Allies they used all the necessary tools. For example, they used the Tudeh Party, the first and most organized Leftist party in Iran, to achieve its oil targets. At this stage, the Russian Foreign Ministry Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergey Kavtaradze came to Iran and formally requested for a license to exploit North Oil. The Tudeh Party, while previously opposed to any transfer of privilege to foreigners, when the Soviet Union- their spiritual and co-professional supporters came out, by providing the Balance Scheme they granted the southern oil share to the British and the North Sea's privilege to the Soviet Union. Because the American companies were set to exploit the oil scorecard in northern Iran, immediately the Soviet Union entered the scene and the Tudeh party also met with them. This oil demand was rejected by the Iranian parliament and the Iranian government opposed any new privilege because of the prevalence of war conditions in the world. In this context, the efforts of the Tudeh Party to satisfy the Iranian government and parliament in order to agree with the Soviet demand for oil in their own way can be considered.

FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)

FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)

Azerbaijani National Identity in Iran, 1921–1946: Roots, Development, and Limits

ABSTRACTThis article examines the roots and development of Azerbaijani identity in Iran. This study aims to demonstrate that the Azerbaijani minority in Iran lacked consciousness of a distinct national identity at the dawn of the twentieth century, and argues that the driving force behind the emergence of the consciousness of Azerbaijani national identity in Iran was the Pahlavi regime’s repressive and exclusivist nationalist policies between 1921 and 1941. Building upon the grievances of the Pahlavi era, the occupation of Iran by Allied forces during the Second World War and the short, Soviet-supported autonomy under the leadership of Sayyed Ja’far Pishevari in 1945–1946 institutionalized and consolidated the Azerbaijani Turkish identity in Iran.

Britain and reza shah, from the Persian coup d’état in 1921 to the occupation of Iran in World War II

Britain and reza shah, from the Persian coup d’état in 1921 to the occupation of Iran in World War II

The British, the Tudeh party and the 1947 World Federation of Trade Unions’ visit: battle for labour reform in Iran

ABSTRACTAfter the British-Soviet occupation of Iran during the Second World War, Iran became the key battleground for the international labour movement. The plight of the workers had become an important political issue with the Iranian government in conflict with the socialist Tudeh party for leadership over the trade unions. The Labour government in Britain was also deeply interested in the matter but regarded the Tudeh as too dangerous and too aligned with the Soviet Union to be supported. Within this climate, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) made an official visit to Iran. With its international delegates, they represented different views over the Tudeh, which caused much conflict during the visit. This article sheds crucial light on this important visit and reveals how international the Labour questions were in Iran and how the WFTU visit brought the various tensions to light. This research will also show how the timing of the visit may have impacted on the removal of the Iranian strong-man Ahmad Qavam by the end of 1947. This work is of particular significance as it looks at the previously understudied role and interest of the British government on the Iranian labour.

“But what would they think of us?” Propaganda and the Manipulation of the Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran, 1941‒46

The 1941 Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran is a topic that continues to interest historians. Work on this period has mainly focused on the reasons behind the occupation and its impact on the political situation in the country. This article looks at the psyche of the occupying forces by studying their propaganda tactics during this period. It was through propaganda that both were able to manipulate local players to either further their own interests or damage the reputation of the other. Such tactics were reflective of the dynamic nature of British‒Soviet relations and had a direct consequence on the politics of Iran. A key aspect of this was the British machine’s promotion of the Tudeh Party’s legacy as a tool of the Soviets. The propaganda patterns reveal the reactive nature of the occupying force’s policy in Iran, and reflected their changing interests.

Britain and the abdication of Reza Shah

ABSTRACTOn the eve of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in the Second World War, Sir Reader Bullard, the British minister in Tehran, urged on his government the desirability of removing the Iranian ruler, Reza Shah, from office. Association with the ‘universally detested’ shah, whom he described as a ‘greedy ignorant savage’, was detrimental to Britain's interests and its war effort. In the weeks that followed the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, Bullard continued to press for and to shape the ultimate British decision to force Reza Shah to abdicate and go into exile. Yet, this was not always Bullard's view of Britain's relationship with the Iranian ruler. When he presented his credentials 20 months earlier, Bullard described it as his ‘urgent duty’ to win Reza Shah's favour. Nor did Bullard's insistence that Britain depose the Shah initially find favour with the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, his Middle East staff at the Foreign Office, or with Churchill. This article traces the evolution of Bullard's own view of Reza Shah and the developments that led the Foreign Office, initially eager to win Reza Shah's favour and even ready to offer Reza Shah a ‘substantial bribe’ for his cooperation, to take steps to topple Reza Shah from the throne.

The Pretexts and Reasons for the Allied Invasion of Iran in 1941

During the last 65 years, European, American and Russian historians have often tried to study the reasons which led to the Allied invasion of Iran on 25 August 1941. For a long period, the main obstacle was the limited access to official documentary sources. Gradually, British and Russian archives started to declassify their documents concerning the events of August 1941. That, in turn, caused a new wave of publications on this topic. Unfortunately, even with newly available sources, modern researchers were frequently unable to grasp the whole picture, emphasizing only one reason for the invasion or even exaggerating its importance. This paper attempts to analyze the most common explanations of the reasons for the occupation of Iran offered by different historians and try to find out which of these causes impelled the Allies to invade Iran. The research paid special attention to existing Russian primary and secondary sources on the issue which are less well known to English readers. Important information found in them allows events related to the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941 to be described from a relatively new angle.

The Iranian Economy during the Second World War: The Devaluation Controversy

A hotly debated controversy in Iranian history is the devaluation of the rial immediately after the occupation of Iran by the Allied forces. Dr Mosharraf Naficy, the finance minister who is associated with this devaluation, is criticized severely and even branded a traitor and foreign agent. He, on the other hand, has defended his decision with regard to the exchange rates and claimed that there was no devaluation. The Second World War as an episode in the modem history of Iran has received little attention.' In particular, the economic condition of the country is rarely mentioned let alone studied. The present article aims at making a small contribution to the subject by studying the controversial issue of the devaluation of the rial. Aside from shedding light on the economic history of Iran and contributing to the history of the Second World War in Iran, this article will be of interest for two additional reasons. First, as will be seen, opponents in this controversy played prominent roles in Iran in the years following the war. Naficy was the first head of the Plan Organization in Iran while Dr Mosaddiq, who was most vocal in criticizing Naficy, later on led the oil nationalization movement to a disastrous conclusion for Iran. More generally, they stood for two different types of policy and conduct of public affairs, the first based on rational reasoning and practising the art of the possible, and the second on whipping up people's emotions, making exaggerated claims, and branding every opponent a foreign agent. In the extreme the latter policy rests on demagoguery. Mohammad Ali Forouqi who became prime minister after the invasion of Iran and was able to negotiate favourable terms for his country during a most difficult time, and Ahmad Qavam who single-handedly saved Azerbaijan for Iran practised the first type of policy. A prominent practitioner of the second type of policy was, of course, Dr Mosaddiq. Needless to say, in Iran, and perhaps in the whole of the Middle East, the second group have always been most popular. The investigation of the devaluation controversy sheds light on these policies, the personalities of different players, and their knowledge of economics.

Hail to Heydarbaba: a comparative view of popular Turkish & classical Persian poetical languages

Muhammad Husayn Shahriyar (1906-1988) is one of the most famous contemporary poets in both the Persian and the Azerbaijani Turkish (Azeri)l languages. He was born in Tabriz, his mother-tongue being Turkish, and received his preliminary religious training in Arabic at a traditional madrasa. As part of the policy of eradication of the spirit of resistance and rebellion repeatedly welling up in Azerbaijan-further intensified after the reform movement of the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) had been extinguished-the Azerbaijani population of Iran was at this time discouraged and estranged from its identity, culture and language. The Pahlavi regime that came to power in 1925 was founded on an extreme Persian nationalism: no Azerbaijani was allowed to speak his native Turkish tongue in schools, government offices or other premises, or at any official meeting. These measures were to be partially relaxed only at times of national catastrophe or political crisis. Following the Allied occupation of Iran and the abdication of Riza Shah Pahlavi in 1940, this oppression temporarily disappeared along with its chief instigators. The Soviet forces occupying Iranian Azerbaijan made use of the native people's yearning for their mother tongue to win that people to their own political cause. Exploiting the Azerbaijanis' native but hitherto inhibited urge to express themselves in their own language, the Soviets tolerated and even encouraged publication in Turkish. Since the people of northern Azerbaijan (then a part of the USSR) speak the same Turkish dialect as those of the southern, Iranian, part, theatrical works by famous playwrights from the north, along with other cultural performances, could be staged and fully appreciated. Meanwhile in the political arena the Azerbaijani Democratic Party won control over the local government of the province in 1945 and Turkish became the language of all official transactions. The contents of publications permitted by the Soviet military authorities could naturally not be allowed to contradict the occupying forces' ideology and policy. Under these conditions, leftist tendencies were understandably predominant in Turkish-language writing and poetry. This peculiarity later served as an excuse for re-establishing the old ethno-linguistic suppression. The USSR finally evacuated Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946. In the wake of their withdrawal, the Tehran government staged a punitive expedition. Both during and after this professedly anti-communist witch-hunt, the Turkish language was incriminated as the essential instrument of the 'red devil'.

Shawhar Ahu Khanum: passion, polygamy and tragedy

The book Shawhar Ahu Khanum (The Husband of Ahu Khanum) appeared in Iran in 1961. Initially its author Ali Muhammad Afghani, an ex-army officer, published it at his own experise. But it caused such a sensation in literary circles that a year later the publishing house of Amir Kabir brought out a second edition of this voluminous work of 8 87 pages an unprecedented event in the literary history of the Persian novel. The main theme of the work is the plight of Persian women under the Islamic Shari'ah and is an unqualified attack on polygamy. The novel is set in Kermanshah, a town in western Iran and spans a period of seven years beginning in 1934 and ending with the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941. During this period the women of Iran were officially unveiled by Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1936. The book is dedicated by Afghani to his mother and the dedication reads:

The immediate aftermath of Anglo‐Soviet occupation of Iran in August 1941

(1984). The immediate aftermath of Anglo‐Soviet occupation of Iran in August 1941. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 324-351.

Anglo‐Soviet occupation of Iran in August 1941

(1984). Anglo‐Soviet occupation of Iran in August 1941. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 27-52.