Objects Of Attitudes Research Articles

Propositions for Semantics and Propositions for Epistemology

The title is an allusion to the fact that, traditionally, propositions have served at least two distinct functions in philosophy, even though these functions have not usually been distinguished. Propositions have been invoked as the ‘meanings’ or ‘intensions’ of sentences and as the objects of propositional attitudes. Thus the proposition that Socrates is wise is themeaningof the English sentence, ‘Socrates is wise,’ and iswhatCharles believes when he believes that Socrates is wise. ‘Means that’ and ‘believes that’ take the same kind of object. I shall argue, first, that there are two quite different functions here and it takes two quite different kinds of proposition to serve these distinct functions. The second thing I want to do is examine the suggestion that we can treat propositions as sets of possible worlds. There is a serious difficulty here, and so I shall want to turn that idea on its side: I shall define possible worlds as sets of G-propositions (semantical propositions) and then define E-propositions (epistemic propositions) as sets of possible worlds.

A Logical Theory of Objects

Many philosophers have attempted to offer a logical theory of objects, employing different techniques. Thus R. Carnap (1928)1 tried to reconstruct logically the world by using the modern symbolic logic (the theory of relations), while N. Goodman (1951)2 constructed the world with the help of the calculus of individuals or the logic of part-whole relations. W. V. Quine helped to steer the attention toward the question of ontological commitment (to be means to be a value of a bound variable of a system) and toward a theory of objects produced by a logical analysis of natural languages.3 Recently, there have been controversial discussions concerning the metaphysical and logical aspects of objects in actual and possible worlds (based on the acceptance or nonacceptance of modal logics) as well as new contributions to the theory of nonexistent objects, rekindling the old Russell Meinong controversy.4 It seems that even the proposed theories of events, such as that of R. M. Martin,5 maintain the great significance of the notion of an object. Then there is a plethora of the so-called intensional objects, such as the alleged objects of propositional attitudes, the story of which is tied with the names of Frege, Russell, Carnap and many others. Is it possible to give an all-embracing theory of objects which would satisfy all the parties involved? Although such possibility may be very questionable, the instrumental role of logic for the development of the metaphysical (ontological) theories of ob jects is indisputable. Two factors are, however, involved in the constitution of a logical theory of objects: (i) the basis or the given data from which the theory starts; (ii) the logical apparatus employed, i.e., the logical axioms and rules of inference, just as the relevant semantical rules which are formulated in the metalanguage (with regard to the language used). While the logical ap paratus is usually very clear, at least in the case of the formally well construed theories, the given basis of a metaphysical theory ?as we may call it?might contain many tacit assumptions which would need a lot of clarification. It seems that philosophers fight more about the presuppositions and assertions of their systems than about the logic involved.61 would like to discuss the interplay between the above two factors, starting with the realm of the given objects. As to the second factor?the logical apparatus involved? the contributions of first-order predicate logic (PL) and of the calculus of in dividuals (CI) will be considered.

Attitudes De Dicto and De Se

If I hear the patter of little feet around the house, I expect Bruce. What I expect is a cat, a particular cat. If I heard such a patter in another house, I might expect a cat but no particular cat. What I expect then seems to be a Meinongian incomplete cat. I expect winter, expect stormy weather, expect to shovel snow, expect fatigue-a season, a phenomenon, an activity, a state. I expect that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. This time what I expect is a state of affairs. If we let surface grammar be our guide, the objects of expectation seem quite a miscellany. The same goes for belief, since expectation is one kind of belief. The same goes for desire: I could want Bruce, want a cat but no particular cat, want winter, want stormy weather, want to shovel snow, want fatigue, or want that someday mankind will inhabit at least five planets. The same goes for other attitudes to the extent that they consist partly of beliefs or desires or lacks thereof. But the seeming diversity of objects might be an illusion. Perhaps the objects of attitudes are uniform in category, and it is our ways of speaking elliptically about these uniform objects that are diverse. That indeed is our consensus. We mostly think that the attitudes uniformly have propositions as their objects. That is why we speak habitually of attitudes. When I hear a patter and expect Bruce, for instance, there may or may not be some legitimate sense in which Bruce the cat is an object of my attitude. But, be that as it may, according to received opinion my expectation has a propositional object. It is directed upon a proposition to the effect that Bruce is about to turn up. If instead I expect a cat but no particular cat, then the object of my expectation is a different proposition to the effect that some cat or other is about to turn up. Likewise for our other examples. The case of expecting a cat shows one advantage of our policy of uniformly assigning propositional objects. If we do not need a Meinongian incomplete cat as object of this attitude, then

Truth, belief, and vagueness

When Jones believes that Horatio planted petunias in the garden yesterday, and Smith shares this belief, then there is something which both Smith and Jones believe. The most convenient name I can think of for the thing which both believe is 'proposition'. And since I think all of us have many beliefs, I also think there are many propositions, at least some of which are believed by at least one of us. Of course, it is nothing philosophically new to cast propositions in the role of objects of belief, disbelief, and various other socalled 'propositional attitudes'. Moreover, if Jones, or anyone else for that matter, believes that Horatio planted petunias in the garden yesterday, it would be unreasonable for Jones to deny that Horatio planted petunias. It would be unreasonable because obviously Jones' belief logically implies that Horatio planted petunias, even though logicians may dispute about the formalities of this implication. This illustrates the point that the propositions which can serve as the objects of belief (or of propositional attitudes in general) have logical implications, and also are implied by propositions which in turn can be the objects of propositional attitudes. Thus, the very same propositions which serve as the objects for propositional attitudes also serve as subject matter for logic, although the preceding considerations leave open the possibility that the class of propositions dealt with in logic is wider than the class of possible objects for propositional attitudes of people. (Some propositions included in the subject matter of logic, for example, may be too complex to be believed by any person.) Logic, then, has at least the task of providing an account of the implications of and the various other logical relations between our beliefs, our disbeliefs, and the objects of our other propositional attitudes. (In addition, if there are propositions not subject to being objects of such attitudes, logic will also deal with them.) Because the set of propositions which logic must handle includes those propositions which real people actually believe in their day-to-day lives, logic must be prepared to deal with vague propositions, for people often have vague beliefs. This is not to say that in order to fulfill its mission to handle vague propositions logic itself must become vague. (The