Abstract: Welfare internalism holds that "for any intrinsic good φ for a person p , it must be the case that φ 'fits' p, resonates with p, fails to alienate p , and so forth." This "resonance constraint" is often employed in arguments against objectivist theories of well-being. Many philosophers argue that, because objectivist theories ground a person's good in sources other than that person's subjective attitudes, such theories fail to satisfy the resonance constraint. And because welfare internalism and the resonance constraint seem so plausible—at least to these philosophers—they therefore reject objectivist theories. A person's welfare or well-being is, they claim, subjective. I push back against such arguments. I argue that many objectivist theories can (and do) adopt the resonance constraint. Looking to a historical example—Thomas Aquinas—I argue that an objectivist can put forward a theory of value that preserves an affective/motivational link between a person and his good, without sacrificing the objectivity of value. I therefore claim that the argument from internalism, when waged against objectivist theories of well-being, generally fails. Moreover, I argue that this sort of internalist-objectivism can explain things that subjectivism cannot; for example, why we claim that φ is good for p despite p 's beliefs and actions suggesting the opposite, or why valuing is important for humans in the first place. In short, certain objective approaches to welfare—such as Thomas Aquinas'—are more plausible than their subjective counterparts.
Read full abstract