In two recent papers on question in English-Canadian sociology (Curtis and Weir 2002; Weir and Curtis 2003), we argued for advantages of reflexivity as a shared orientation for scholars engaged in investigations of social (also, Curtis 2004). The context of our argument is rapid aging of 800-odd people working in full-time positions in departments of sociology in Canada, ongoing transformations in university funding and university governance, and marked shifts in course-stream selections of undergraduates. We called attention to increased intervention into university sector, whose concomitant demands for accountability, objective performance indicators, and student retention lead to promotion of vocational training. We see transformation of university education into vocational training as something that would impoverish our intellectual and working lives and as something likely to narrow possibilities for a diverse, multi-disciplinary, independent and critical sociology. The period of succession is full of potential for configuration of many different sociologies. We argued for a reflexive sociology, and urged colleagues on hiring committees and on comprehensive examination boards to promote it. Our sense of reflexivity derives from work of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 2005). Here reflexivity means that one works consciously at once to operate concepts and to interrogate grounds of one's conceptual repertoire. As sociologists, we use concepts as instruments with which to grapple with social, while we seek to preserve an awareness of social determination of our own concepts. As well, this version of reflexivity attends to relation between sociologist's personal location in field of scholarly, professional, and political practice, and stances and tactics s/he adopts in debate and in career choices. Every science, in Bourdieu's analysis, is organized around an interest in disinterest (Bourdieu 1975). Disinterest is an orientation to more or less firmly established collective norms that regulate a science's truth claims. Interest refers to striving of those in scientific field for distinction for themselves, their research specialty, or their academic unit in relation to field's valued practices. One of stakes in play in any scientific field is nature of its regulatory norms. We suggest that sociology has (but does not monopolize) a common object of investigation: the social. The social is a surprisingly elusive object, which sociologists often define tautologically. (1) It was invented in eighteenth century Scotland and France. In works of Adam Ferguson and other members of Scottish Enlightenment, it appears as a realm of human bonds that shadowed invention of economic domain as it split off from ancient oikos (the patriarchal productive household) and faced political. The social was invented as a plane of thinking and acting which contrasts with economic and political reasoning. It has continuing utility in normative terms as claim to existence of a terrain outside and capitalist relations. Analytic heterogeneity marks study of social, positioned precariously as it is between natural sciences and humanities; both have striven consistently to annex social sciences. But we would agree with Habermas (1988 [1967]) in arguing that social science has three basic analytic divisions: interpretive study of human action, study of institutions that enable and constrain action, and historical narratives of practical action. It is concurrently subjective, structural and normative, with individual researchers tending for most part to specialize in one of these forms of knowledge production. The relations among these differing forms of social scientific knowledge have been, and continue to be, ones of rivalry. In addition to pointing to possible consequences of security state for sociology, our articles sought to defend integrity of sociological knowledge in midst of of faculties, strife which has worked to render it (in Canadian context at least) without a sense of purpose. …