With the collapse of central authority in the wake of the Cold War's end, Somalia became a prime example of a failed state. One of the symptoms of this state's failure has been the emergence of piracy off the Somali Coast. Sporadic incidents of piracy appeared almost immediately following Somalia's implosion in 1991. By 2006, however, a new and more organized piracy group emerged, (1) As a criminal start-up based in Somalia's Puntland region, the pirates have created a flourishing enterprise. (2) From a total of 18 incidents in 2006, there has been substantial growth in the number of piracy attacks on international shipping. In 2011, approximately 130 incidents were recorded. Another 68 assaults were committed beyond Somali territorial waters but widely ascribed to Somali piracy. (3) By any measure such figures demonstrate a serious and growing security problem off the East African Coast. Piracy, of course, presents itself as an essentially maritime problem. What, then, might be considered the relevance of this article for a journal that is ostensibly devoted to matters related to land warfare and broader security issues on terra ferma? More than might be imagined, because security problems at sea are invariably reflections of political problems on land. Perceiving an issue like Somali piracy solely in maritime terms, to be dealt with by navies or coast guards, is seeing the symptoms rather than the essence of the problem. Contemporary commentary tends to analyze Somali piracy in a nautical fashion, primarily as a discrete maritime problem. For example, author Stig Hansen looks at the issue in terms of whether or not the Somali pirates constituted a putative coast guard force? Such arguments, and others like them, focus on piracy with little mention of Somalia's internal situation, particularly its political economy, which provides a more effective framework for counterpiracy recommendations. It is this factor, as much as how to deal with the symptoms, that needs to be understood. Thus, while piracy is clearly a criminal act, a lack of appreciation within operational and planning assumptions of the domestic factors that give rise to Somali piracy risk exacerbating, rather than remedying the problem. To establish this argument, British Army doctrine--developed in Afghanistan--will be extended to an analysis and understanding of piracy. This framework will be discussed in relation to Somalia using a political economy analysis. It will, thereby, be possible to examine the broader efficacy of counterpiracy operations. Current Counterpiracy Operations The long-term success of counterpiracy operations should start with the assumption that piracy is a symptom of instability? Somali piracy is inextricably linked to the nation's long-standing conflict. Unique to Somalia is a problem of sanctuary; it is the only place where vessels and hostages are often held in situ for long periods allowing for lengthy ransom negotiations. (6) Therefore, while naval boarding operations and the capture and deportation of pirates to foreign courts can have a short-term effect, (7) clearly they are unlikely to reduce the threat of piracy in the long-term. Naval interventions against the pirates might contain the number of assaults but ultimately they have little durable deterrent value. Equally problematic are military interventions on land whether by use of Special Operations Forces raids (8) or airborne drones. (9) These operations might achieve a desired tactical impact, but experience from other conflicts, notably Afghanistan, suggests that unintended consequences in terms of collateral damage on civilian centers are always a hazard. Although land-based military interventions and maritime boarding operations may be legal, they are just as likely to be seen as illegitimate in the view of the local populace and thus be of declining utility over the longer-term. British Army Influence Operations in Afghanistan In current NATO military operations in Afghanistan, the notion of influence is a burgeoning sphere of thought. …
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