Possession Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

ROK–U.S. cooperation in preparation for hostile actions by North Korea in possession of nuclear weapons

Abstract Can the United States' extended deterrence guarantee the security of South Korea against nuclear threats posed by North Korea? North Korea manipulates its nuclear capability not only as a means of deterrence but also as a military leverage to threaten the very existence of South Korea. Considering the current pattern of North Korea's behavior and the geopolitical and strategic implications for the Korean peninsula, the U.S. promise of extended deterrence for South Korea appears to have many limitations. In fact, as demonstrated in the sinking of the ROK naval frigate Cheonan incident, North Korea, with its nuclear capability intact, now threatens South Korean security more openly. Accordingly, measures to increase the credibility of America's extended deterrence become ever more imperative such that it will act as a stronger deterrence against further aggressive actions by North Korea and give greater assurance to South Koreans. The U.S. extended deterrence statement in its Nuclear Posture Review...

The absence of a taboo on the possession of nuclear weapons

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NATO as a Framework for Nuclear Nonproliferation

The following analysis focuses on how the nuclear powers of the west were able to prevent the spread of nuclear weapon possession among their allies within the wider framing of the east-west conflict and by multilateralizing the issue - or the eventual solution - through NATO. Although the article looks into history, away from the grey of today's nonproliferation problems into the clear-cut past of the east -west conflict with its undisputed definition of friends and foes, some of its findings also point to current problems bedevilling NATO policies in this field.In the 1960s, the key challenge to a successful nonproliferation strategy within the western alliance was the question of West German possession of nuclear weapons. East and West Germany provided welcome manpower in the unfolding Cold War within their respective pacts, but the legacies of Hitler's Reich meant that they both remained on constant probation. For West Germany, this meant reliance upon American, British, and (later) French nuclear weapons. However, such dependence, combined with the likely use of nuclear weapons in a future war, brought about profound feelings of vulnerability and exposure in West Germany. This in turn encouraged various West German schemes designed to gain access to nuclear weaponry and nuclear planning so as to have a more central role in, and control over, the deterrence game.In the light of this very real interest, and considering the growing political influence of Bonn within the west, West Germany's financial strength as well as its undisputed technological capability to provide both up-to-date delivery vehicles and enriched nuclear material for warheads, a whole raft of questions arise: why did West Germany never acquire nuclear weapons? What made it possible for this nuclear abstention to be maintained throughout the various stages ofthe east-west conflict until 1989-90 and beyond? And what were the ingredients that made for the sustainability of this arrangement? While the core deal for a non-nuclear West Germany was struck between Washington and Bonn, it was enacted through the nonproliferation treaty and NATO. The framing for the continuation of West Germany's (non)nuclear status proved to be key for the limitation ofthe spread of nuclear weapons within the western alliance - and maintaining it became an ongoing task and even a raison d'etre for NATO itself.While many of these questions may remind the reader of today's dilemmas, the following is a historiographical analysis. As such, it will lead the reader through various - albeit selective - historical stages: the 1950s with the watershed year of 1957; the realization of a meaningful treaty on nonproliferation, including the signature of West Germany, in November 1969; the nuclear threats and dilemmas of 1977-78 leading up to NATO's dual-track decision; and a brief outlook on 1989-90 and Germany's position and choices regarding nuclear weapons today. Finally, the article will try to square some aspects of this particular nuclear history with the stillpreliminary thoughts on sustainable developed by an interdisciplinary research group convened by James Der Derian and Costas Constantinou, which focuses on the virtues and limitations of traditional diplomacy and the necessary wider - regional, economical, ecological, ideological, religious, etc. - framing for long-lasting arrangements.1THE SILENT OPTION: BONN'S NUCLEAR POLICIES IN THE 1950SThroughout the early and mid-1950s both the military and political leadership in West Germany paid little if any attention to nuclear weapons. In the Himmeroder Denkschrift - the founding document of what was to become the Bundeswehr - nuclear weapons were hardly mentioned at all and certainly not as a desirable option for the West Germans. Instead, West German generals busied themselves with rethinking their plans for large tank battles, developed in rather less fortunate times. Meanwhile, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer even seemed to hope that the Soviet Union would develop its own nuclear weaponry as quickly as possible, as this would virtually rule out the possibility of war. …

Nuclear Weapons and India–Pakistan Relations

India–Pakistan relations are best understood as an example of nuclear rivalry, in which nuclear weapons both exacerbate and limit hostility. In all such relationships, the minimal possession of nuclear weapons suffices to deter. Both India and Pakistan have adopted a minimalist posture, yet their strategic thinking tends to be inconsistent, which makes them vulnerable to needless expansion. This essay points to the conceptual basis for an optimal doctrine. It concludes that, while the military equation between India and Pakistan is stable, India has begun to widen the political gap between them.

U.S.–Iran Confrontation in the Post-NIE World: An Analysis of Alternative Policy Options

The United States, Israel, and several European allies have explicitly stated that they will not accept the possession of nuclear weapons by the Islamic fundamentalist regime ruling Iran. Iran has defied several UN Security Council resolutions and continued its uranium enrichment. On December 3, 2007, the U.S. released the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran. If the NIE assessment that Iran could develop nuclear weapons sometimes between 2010 and 2015 is correct, the new American president has twelve options available in dealing with Iran. This study analyzes potential consequences, shortcomings, costs, and benefits of each option.

Nuclear Stability in South Asia

An examination of the onset, evolution, and termination of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises between India and Pakistan suggests that nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Even though the 1999 crisis erupted into a war, its scope and dimensions were carefully circumscribed. Despite its conventional capabilities, India chose not to cross the Line of Control (the de facto international border in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir), and it avoided horizontal escalation of the conflict. India's restraint cannot be attributed either to timely U.S. intervention or to a concern about avoiding a bellicose international image. Instead a highly jingoistic regime, which had defied international public opinion the previous year through a series of nuclear tests, chose to exercise restraint because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. In 2001, despite grave Pakistani provocation through a series of terrorist attacks, India could only respond with a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

The Evolving Face of Nuclear Proliferation: A Challenge to Global and Regional Security

The issue of nuclear proliferation involves both states and non-state actors. This essay, however, goes beyond examining the issue in relation to states, their motivations for producing or acquiring these weapons, how possession of nuclear weapons impact on the relations of certain states, and other related issues. Instead, it focuses on another aspect of nuclear proliferation: the possibility of non-state actors, specifically terrorists, having access to fissile materials and related technology. It argues that the risk of non-state actors having access to nuclear material and technology increases as the demand for nuclear energy as a viable alternative source of energy by states intensifies. This problem is compounded by the presence of black markets, where nuclear materials and technology are clandestinely sold and bought. Institutional infrastructures for addressing nuclear proliferation exist at the global level. Closer coordination among these bodies is needed. In the context of the Asia-Pacific, the development of a regional regime for countering proliferation is essential, with a regional export controls regime serving as the fundamental step. Such a regime would make it difficult for non-state actors to have access to fissile materials and technology.

Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation: The Six Party Talks and the Roh Moo Hyun Government

The second North Korean nuclear crisis, which was triggered by controversy over its alleged highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in October 2002, continues. Despite its roller-coaster trajectory, the Six Party Talks (6PT) process has paved the way for a peaceful diplomatic settlement of the nuclear standoff. Since the 6PT process has been primarily a negotiating arena for North Korea and the United States, through the mediation of China, room for South Korea's effective participation has been structurally limited. Nevertheless, the Roh Moo Hyun government played a significant role in suggesting innovative ideas, often defying the American stance to break impasses, and facilitating the overall process of negotiation through proactive diplomacy. This article unravels the Roh government's diplomatic role in the 6PT process by describing its initial perception of and reactions to U.S. positions on contentious issues such as the terms of engagement and exchange, and analyzing its role in linking the 6PT to a peace regime for Korea and a Northeast Asian regional security and peace mechanism. Key words: South Korea, multilateral security - East Asia, North Korea, nuclear weapons Introduction: The Second Nuclear Crisis Controversy over the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in North Korea, which surfaced during U.S. special envoy James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in October 2002, triggered the second nuclear crisis between North Korea and the United States. It was through the Six Party Talks (6PT) process that the nuclear stand-off began to show prospects for a peaceful settlement through diplomatic negotiations. But as with most negotiations with North Korea, the 6PT process, which has been underway since 2003, has been protracted, frustrating, and unpredictable. The first three rounds (2003-2004) of the 6PT did not produce any tangible outcome. The uncompromising attitudes of North Korea and the United States almost derailed the talks, particularly when the North declared its possession of nuclear weapons in February 2005 and refused to attend the talks indefinitely. A major breakthrough came during the fourth round with the adoption of the September 19, 2005 joint statement. However, the freeze of North Korean bank accounts at the Banco Delta Asia on September 20, 2005 and the North's subsequent provocative reactions- such as its missile tests on July 5 and underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006-eroded the very foundation of the 6PT. After a series of direct contacts between the United States and North Korea in early 2007, the 6PT were resumed and began to make concrete progress. The 6PT adopted the February 13 and the October 3 agreements for shutting down and sealing the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, disabling those facilities, identifying nuclear materials and programs, and ultimately, verifiably dismantling all nuclear programs and materials, including nuclear weapons. The first phase of shutting down and sealing has been completed at this writing, and the second phase of disabling and declaration is also coming to an end as the United States removed North Korea from its list of terrorist-sponsoring states. The last phase of verifiable dismantling, however, is encountering formidable challenges. The 6PT process has been a negotiating arena for North Korea and the United States, through the mediation of China. Room for South Korea's participation has been structurally limited. But the South Korean government has played a significant role in suggesting innovative ideas, breaking occasional impasses, and facilitating the overall process of negotiation through proactive diplomacy. A growing body of literature on the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the 6PT process has failed to pay attention to the South Korean role, being preoccupied instead with analyzing negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington.1 This article fills the gap by delineating and explaining South Korea's diplomatic efforts in the 6PT process. …

The Evolving Face of Nuclear Proliferation: A Challenge to Global and Regional Security

The issue of nuclear proliferation involves both states and nonstate actors. This essay, however, goes beyond examining the issue in relation to states, their motivations for producing or acquiring these weapons, how possession of nuclear weapons impact on the relations of certain states, and other related issues. Instead, it focuses on another aspect of nuclear proliferation: the possibility of non-state actors, specifically terrorists, having access to fissile materials and related technology. It argues that the risk of non-state actors having access to nuclear material and technology increases as the demand for nuclear energy as a viable alternative source of energy by states intensifies. This problem is compounded by the presence of black markets, where nuclear materials and technology are clandestinely sold and bought. Institutional infrastructures for addressing nuclear proliferation exist at the global level. Closer coordination among these bodies is needed. In the context of the Asia-Pacific, the development of a regional regime for countering proliferation is essential, with a regional export controls regime serving as the fundamental step. Such a regime would make it difficult for non-state actors to have access to fissile materials and technology.

Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment

Given the apocalyptic nature of nuclear weapons, how can states establish an international order that ensures survival while allowing the weapons to be used in controlled ways to discourage great wars, and while allowing nuclear technology to dif use for civil purposes? How can the possession of nuclear weapons by a few states be reconciled with their renunciation by the majority of states? Which political strategies can best deliver an international nuclear order that is effective, legitimate and durable? These have been central questions in the nuclear age. This article suggests that the effort to construct such an order displayed the characteristics of an enlightenment project, with its emphasis on balance and rationality, the quest for justice and trust among states, the feasibility of instrumental regulation, and the attachment to hope and progress. With the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its heart, it necessarily gave precedence to diplomacy and containment over preventive war. The reasons why this conception of nuclear order was discarded by its erstwhile champion, the United States, in favour of one bearing traits of counter-enlightenment, are explored. Its alternative strategy can now be declared a failure. Avoidance of a greater disorder depends on recognition that the problem of nuclear order is more than the problem of proliferation, or of non-compliance, and on recovery—whatever the difficulties—of the cooperative yet pragmatic sensibility that lay behind the prior approach to order.

Dangerous knowledge: Can nuclear weapons be abolished?

The end of the Cold War spurred significant and encouraging steps towards the abolition and eradication of nuclear weapons. After the breakthrough discussions between Gorbachev and Reagan at Reykjavik in 1986, the substantial cut-backs in Russian and American nuclear warheads agreed to under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations, successive initiatives at the United Nations (UN) and the review conferences of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Canberra Commission's report in 1995, the 1996 advisory opinion of the World Court, the New Agenda Coalition, Middle Powers Initiative and other efforts by governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) raised hope that the world may soon be rid of this menace. After 1997 the momentum of progress slowed and then turned from optimism to increasing frustration, pessimism and despair. The possession of nuclear weapons serves not only military and political but economic and social functions, elevating the prestige of the select nuclear group to a special status in world affairs that none will be anxious to relinquish voluntarily. Yet in spite of the setbacks and the obstacles, there is ample scope for constructive action. Most promising is a renewed effort to establish international law prohibiting the use, threat of use or possession of nuclear weapons, along the lines of the Chemical Weapons Convention that has very effectively stopped the use of these weapons in all but one instance since 1925. At the root of the nuclear problem, a Cartesian dualism in our thinking about ourselves and the world fosters a sense of detachment, complacency and inactivity regarding an issue that holds our very lives in the balance. The finite zero-sum game of competitive international security needs to be replaced by an infinite win–win game of global cooperative security like that now unfolding on a model scale in Europe.

Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

Nuclear weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy options to alter proliferation incentives. We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent nuclear weapons production capability and several other variables, while controlling for the conditionality of nuclear weapons possession based on the presence of a nuclear weapons program. We find that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form nuclear weapons programs, while security concerns, economic capabilities, and domestic politics help to explain the possession of nuclear weapons. Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but the NPT has not deterred proliferation at the system level.

Nuclear War and World Citizenship

_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 Reviews 187 NUCLEAR WAR AND WORLD CITIZENSHIP Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa stratoflampsacus@aol.com Robert Hinde and Joseph Rotblat. War No More: Eliminating Conflict in the Nuclear Age. London and Sterling, Va.: Pluto P., 2003. Pp. x, 228. £40.00; us$50.00; isbn 0745321925 (hb). £11.99; us$17.95 (pb). ast year marked the 50th anniversary of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto, Lwhich sought to put the world on guard against the hydrogen bomb’s dangers . The last surviving signatory to the manifesto was Joseph Rotblat, who died on 31 August 2005. In 1995, Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. During World War ii, Joseph Rotblat participated in the Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb. An Encyclopaedia Britannica article on his Nobel prize explains that “Although he was uncomfortable about participating in the creation of an atomic bomb, Rotblat initially believed that the weapon would be used only to deter a German threat. After learning in 1944 that it would be used to contain the Soviet Union, a World War ii ally, he left the project….” Upon returning to England in 1945, Rotblat left defence work for medical research. He served as founding secretary-general and later as president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which began in 1957 and at which key scientists and others from different countries could confer about the peril of nuclear weapons facing the world. As a medical physicist at London University’s St. Bartholomew’s Hospital Medical College (1950–76), Rotblat directed attention toward the biological hazards of nuclear radiation and the severity of fallout from atmospheric testing. He worked closely with Russell in the 1950s and early ’60s and still visited him in his last years. (See his “Personal Reminiscences”, Russell, 18 [1998]: 5–24.) The book’s co-author, Robert Hinde, is the author of numerous books and articles in psychology. The book addresses the planet’s current state in terms of weapons of mass destruction. It features many tables and charts on matters ranging from the varying levels of the super-powers’ nuclear warhead stockpiles to the principal nuclear arms control treaties to estimates of military deaths in individual wars during the last 60 years. Since this book is an earnest endeavour to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction, many of its most fundamental prescriptions sound basic, even _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 188 Reviews somewhat banal. To be sure, the authors acknowledge that “Any attempt to discuss ways of preventing war must address very basic issues, and in so doing lays itself open to accusations of mushy idealism” (pp. 214–15). In War No More the authors opt to err in the direction of moral truisms as a small price to pay if there is a chance of contributing to a discussion eventually compelling the world’s political leaders to heed such moral considerations. In the prevention of conflict, “Often the success of such efforts may be unknown to the wider world just because the criterion of success is simply that nothing happens” (p. 198). Hinde and Rotblat urge their readers to understand the absolute need to abolish war if humanity is to endure in this nuclear age. Their position is that “the very possession of nuclear weapons is immoral. Their enormous destructive power, inflicted on civilians even more than on the military, would make their use unforgiveable” (p. 139). The authors expressly credit Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein with having taken the initiative for international action on this front (p. 189). And as was the view of Russell and Einstein 50 years earlier, Hinde and Rotblat proclaim in their book that “The only solution is international agreement on the total abolition of nuclear weapons” (p. 139). Hinde and Rotblat concede the ease with which people can be pessimistic about the prospects of abolishing war. However, the formidable challenge posed by such a task is deemed “no excuse for inaction”. They cite historic instances in which humanity has...

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The primary factor driving nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is Israel's unacknowledged possession of nuclear weapons, something that the West, and in particular the United States, often ignores. The impact of Israel's nuclear deterrent on countries in the region, especially Iran and Egypt, is explored. Additionally, Iran's concern that Pakistan's nuclear weapons could one day come under the control of religious extremists is assessed. The possible consequences for the region if Iran acquires a nuclear capability are also examined. Only by acknowledging that countries like Iran fear a nuclear attack by Israel and the United States, and then incorporating this reality into concrete nonproliferation policy actions, can the danger of nuclear weapons in the Middle East be reduced and eventually eliminated.

Nuclear disarmament versus peace in the twenty-first century*

In his analysis of the continuing necessity for Britain to retain its nuclear capability, the author argues that the purpose of the British nuclear deterrent is what it has always been—‘to minimize the prospect of the United Kingdom being attacked by mass destruction weapons’. His discussion ranges from the ethical paradox surrounding the possession of nuclear weapons, the central problem of their predictability, the problem of new threat and, in his view, the Utopian non-proliferation obligations. The possession of the deterrent may be unpleasant, he concludes, but it is necessary, its purpose lying‘not in its actual use but in its nature as the ultimate “stalemate weapon”.’

India's quest for nuclear legitimacy

India first tested a nuclear device in 1974. It waited until May 1998, when it conducted a series of underground nuclear tests and declared itself a nuclear weapons state. The global response to both was widespread and hostile. Since then, successive Indian governments have worked hard to obtain a measure of nuclear legitimacy for the country's possession of nuclear weapons. Against heavy odds and opposition from many states, India is on the threshold of attaining a substantial measure of de facto legitimacy, even if a formal recognition of its status as a nuclear weapons state is unlikely to come about in the foreseeable future. This article examines the manner in which the search for nuclear legitimacy has been brought forward by India.

It's time to scrap the NPT

Due to persisting demand-side factors and crumbling supply-side controls, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will probably be unable to prevent a likely proliferation rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade into the foreseeable future. Beyond being ineffective, I argue that the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous. The NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. However, abandoning the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons.

The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy has long been seen as a viable alternative to war by political decision-makers. There is, however, a long line of credible academic and policy critique—stretching back to the Cold War—that asserts the failures of coercion almost always overwhelm its benefits. Our examination of the 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani crisis supports the overall analytical consensus that coercive methods, under certain circumstances, accomplish little. We discover that India's use of coercive diplomacy was severely hobbled because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, strong Pakistani conventional forces, and other geopolitical realities that strongly favored Pakistan. Despite careful attempts by Indian elites to apply the principles of “forceful persuasion” to end the crisis on terms favorable to India (the stronger power in the dispute), the Indian strategy failed to accomplish most of its objectives. Our analysis thereby exposes the limits of coercion and compellance for solving chronic territorial and ideological disputes between enduring rivals.

British nuclear warhead design 1958–66: how much American help?

With the possible exception of the value of sterling, the possession of nuclear weapons has been the most important manhood issue for post‐war British governments. Politicians, historians, and jour...

Pakistan's nuclear strategy

The debate on the rationale for Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, the concept of nuclear deterrence and the security of Pakistan has been intertwined. Many Pakistani defence analysts see both deterrence and security as synonymous. This paper analyses Pakistan's nuclear strategy in the context of first, its threat perception, second, its plan to achieve parity with India and third, its objective after the tests to portray Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint to persuade the world community's indulgence and intervention to resolve the issue. Pakistan, like India, has maintained nuclear ambiguity and mentioned the deterrence value of its nuclear strategy. This paper also analyses Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy from the perspective of its security and discusses its nuclear doctrine, its nuclear strategy in the context of the Kargil conflict and the recent standoff with India to examine the extent to which it has been able to achieve its objectives of nuclear deterrence. The ambit of the paper further includes the impact that Pakistan's nuclear strategy has had on its Kashmir policy.