Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

Birth of a norm champion: how South Africa came to support the NPT’s indefinite extension

ABSTRACTIn 1995, South Africa was in a special position. It was: a new party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the first country to voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons, led by a charismatic leader, and seen as a champion of disarmament principles. Yet South Africa’s new leaders were also interested in affirming their position within the Non-Aligned Movement, which was adamantly opposed to the NPT’s indefinite extension. Why, then, did South Africa decide to support the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995? Existing scholarship has ascribed too much credit to pressure from the United States, overlooking domestic debates in South Africa and the bifurcation between professional diplomats and political elites. This article, building on new archival sources and in-depth oral-history interviews with major actors, demonstrates that South African diplomats opposed indefinite extension while South African policy elites allocated little attention to the topic until late in the game. The findings contribute to our understanding of South Africa’s norm entrepreneurship, as well as the politics of global nonproliferation.

The 2020 NPT Review Conference and the Role of the ROK

The purpose of this paper is to assess the strategic environment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and to examine what strategies the ROK will develop ahead of the 2020 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear arms control policy-making is very complex for the ROK because of its specific security dilemma. And the role and strategy of the ROK in international regimes are increasingly important for the ROK’s security and status in the world. Thus, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its review process including the Review Conference and Preparatory Committee are particularly essential to the ROK. In 2020 when the 10th Review Conference will be held, the ROK should present an appropriate strategy. For this, this article first outlines the establishment and development of the NPT and its review process from 1995 to 2015, after the Cold War and the North Korean nuclear issue was raised. And it describes the ROK’s role played in the NPT on the basis of its three pillars and suggests what strategies Korea must retain: Nuclear disarmament and security assurances from Russia and China; Coercing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to rejoin the NPT; Continuing the momentum of the Nuclear Security Summit; and Setting and leading a new agenda. This study concludes with a forecast that the year 2020 will be a major turning point for Korea.

ПРОБЛЕМА НЕРОЗПОВСЮДЖЕННЯ ЯДЕРНОЇ ЗБРОЇ ПІД ЧАС І ПІСЛЯ ЗАВЕРШЕННЯ "ХОЛОДНОЇ ВІЙНИ"

The process of the establishment and development of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons regime is analyzed in the article. The author divides this process into three periods: 1) 1945-1968 – time, when all attempts to halt or slow down the proliferation process had been futile; 2) 1968-1995 – the period of the establishment and functioning of the basic principles of non-proliferation regime as a result of the conclusion of the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” of the 1st of July, 1968; 3) from 1995 – until nowadays, when the new threats and risks for te regime appeared. The author pais attention to the division of the states to “nuclear” and “non-nuclear” states by the Non-Proliferation Treaty after 1995, when it was prolonged to indefinite term. In author’s opinion, such measures further world security and make positive changes in international relations. The author considered the Summary Document, which became a result of few security conferences. The Summary Document names the states, that are not the members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and contains an appeal to India, Israel and Pakistan to join the Treaty as non-nuclear states. 8th conference was being held from 3rd to 28th May, 2010. Summary of this conference contain 64 recommendations, that should have been implemented by 2015 – negligible, but still positive result. The author claims, that NPT, despite its some weaknesses, without exaggeration became the most universal international treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – is the only international organization serving the peaceful usage of nuclear energy. Yet, this organization is not able to give a political evaluation of the activity of any state. The author is concerned of the modern condition of the non-proliferation regime and insists to find ways for the conclusion of new international agreements.

Argentina and Brazil: from Military Nuclear Programs to National Atomic Energy

Argentina and Brazil were among the first developing countries that have undertaken the development of nuclear energy. In these largest South American States, the interest in atom was born in the depths of the military establishment and was spurred by the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry for leadership in the Latin American region, especially during dictatorial regimes. In those years, in both countries there were plans to develop its own nuclear weapons, determining their negative attitude to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the plans of making Latin America a nuclear-weapons-free zone. With the return to the democratic forms of government the projects to create their own nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the agenda, and the relations between Buenos Aires and Brasilia transformed into strategic cooperation, and engulfed the sphere of peaceful atom. In the international arena, the two countries came to oppose weapons of mass destruction and to support nuclear disarmament. It may be noted that, having passed a long way of mastering the power of the atom, Argentina and Brazil have found their own place in the global nuclear industry. Both countries have built research reactors and nuclear power plants, established enterprises of nuclear fuel cycle, conducted fundamental and applied research in the nuclear field. Argentina has exported nuclear technology and equipment, including modern low-power reactors, Brazil became the world’s only non-nuclear country building a nuclear submarine. To date, nuclear generation occupies but a modest place in the energy balance of these South American countries which, among other things, is due to other rich sources of energy in their possession. But the very logic of scientific and technological development pushes Argentina and Brazil to broader and more diversified use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, encourages to increase their efforts in this regard, deploy national programs and expand the range of international interaction.

Congress and Trump Administration China Policy: Overlapping Priorities, Uneasy Adjustments and Hardening toward Beijing

ABSTRACTRepublican-led congressional interaction with the Donald Trump campaign and administration on China-related matters during the 2016 US election campaign and the first year of the new administration involved often grudging adjustments on both sides. Major controversy was avoided partly because China issues often were overshadowed by other policy priorities and partly because congressional Republicans feared retribution from their mercurial leader who was very popular with the party rank-and-file and often harshly punished opponents. Moreover, Donald Trump’s adjustments in 2017 saw him come into line with conventional Republican congressional views on the importance of Asian allies and partners, nuclear weapons nonproliferation and greater US pressure on North Korea and on China to influence North Korea.

Features of light-water reactor fuel made of reprocessed uranium in terms of IAEA safeguards implementation

One of the main priorities of nuclear power development is Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. So, the possibility of nuclear materials illicit diversion must be ruled out. This study aims to assess the chance of producing significant quantity of Highly enriched uranium (HEU) in case of covert diversion of fresh fuel. Analysis is carried out on the assumption that stolen reactor-grade Low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel was made of reprocessed uranium and got to be enriched to 90% 235U in gas centrifuges. As its isotopic composition contains a set of even-numbered minors 232,234,236U, such operation for producing the main component of nuclear explosive device is harder comparing to one when fuel was made of natural uranium. Despite the higher proliferation resistance of reused fuel, there is a chance that it could be used in undeclared nuclear weapons programs. So, we are highlighting the importance of timely detection of nuclear materials diversion, especially for the LEU, which is the most sensitive to proliferation. Fortunately, due to unique physical properties of reprocessed uranium, such detection is possible with a quick NDA test even in case of a single fuel rod replacement.

Position of Romania on the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (1955–1968)

Position of Romania on the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (1955–1968)

Rising powers and the global nuclear order: a structural study of India’s integration

The global nuclear order has been built around the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), primarily aimed at addressing the challenges of nuclear non-proliferation. In the last two decades, this order has faced growing challenges from the demands of emerging nuclear powers which it has been unable to meet effectively. These powers have either been outside the order, like India, Israel and Pakistan, or withdrawn from it, like North Korea, or could leave in future due to arguably compelling security concerns, like Iran, Japan and South Korea. These nations and the challenges they pose to the global nuclear order are mostly considered unique and are treated as exceptional. This paper examines the case of India which has found partial acceptance into the extant order from being a pariah nuclear state outside the NPT to a de facto nuclear weapon state designated by the US–India civil nuclear cooperation pact of 2008. It explicates the ongoing process of its integration into the order, underlining why this task remains daunting. Other than factors unique to India, the case of its rise in the global nuclear order captures the structural shortcomings of the extant order. While these underlying shortcomings remain, new nuclear powers, with or without support from the established ones, are likely to challenge the order in future.

Preventing State-Led Cyberattacks Using the Bright Internet and Internet Peace Principles

The Internet has engendered serious cybersecurity problems due to its anonymity, transnationality, and technical shortcomings. This paper addresses state-led cyberattacks (SLCAs) as a particular source of threats. Recently, the concept of the Bright Internet was proposed as a means of shifting the cybersecurity paradigm from self-defensive protection to the preventive identification of malevolent origins through adopting five cohesive principles. To design a preventive solution against SLCAs, we distinguish the nature of SLCAs from that of private-led cyberattacks (PLCAs). We then analyze what can and cannot be prevented according to the principles of the Bright Internet. For this research, we collected seven typical SLCA cases and selected three illustrative PLCA cases with eleven factors. Our analysis demonstrated that Bright Internet principles alone are insufficient for preventing threats from the cyberterror of noncompliant countries. Thus, we propose a complementary measure referred to here as the Internet Peace Principles, which define that the Internet should be used only for peaceful purposes in accordance with international laws and norms. We derive these principles using an approach that combines the extension of physical conventions to cyberspace, the expansion of international cybersecurity conventions to global member countries, and analogical international norms. Based on this framework, we adopt the Charter of the United Nations, the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Recommendations by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, the Tallinn Manual, and Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and others as reference norms that we use to derive the consistent international order embodied by the Internet Peace Principles.

Parsing objections to the ban treaty: a legal viewpoint

ABSTRACTThe Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) rejects the argument of those opposed to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that the treaty undermines the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This viewpoint is based upon Ambassador Soares’s statement to the conference, “Regional Consultations on the NPT: Towards the 2018 PrepCom,” held in Mexico City, February 15, 2018.

All hands on deck: advancing safeguards for naval nuclear materials

ABSTRACTWith the continued use of unsafeguarded naval nuclear-propulsion programs in all nuclear-weapon states, the commissioning of an Indian nuclear submarine, and the potential investment in such programs by non-nuclear-weapon states including Brazil and South Korea, movement toward a regulatory regime for nuclear material in the naval sector has become imperative. Such a framework faces a recurring debate on adequately protecting sensitive military technology while delivering assurances that naval nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear-weapon programs. In this viewpoint, we examine various prospective mechanisms to regulate naval nuclear stocks and assess them in terms of their effectiveness and scope. Drawing on lessons from the drafting, negotiation, and implementation of the Model Additional Protocol, we recommend a safeguards regime for naval nuclear material via a protocol that supplements the existing global nuclear-governance system. This protocol provides a standardized yet flexible approach to naval nuclear-material safeguards across all states (whether nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear-weapon states, or outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) to handle variations among naval nuclear fuel cycles and technologies.

Nuclear Turbulence in the Age of Trump

ABSTRACTThe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has served as the normative anchor of global nuclear orders since 1968. Remarkably successful with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation, it has failed to achieve nuclear disarmament. In 2017, geopolitical tensions had intensified in several regions across the world; there were no nuclear arms control negotiations between any of the nuclear-armed states and two of the leaders of countries with nuclear weapons appeared volatile and unpredictable. With fewer warheads but spread amongst more countries, some in conflict-prone regions, nuclear risks and threats have grown, as has the realisation that the world lacks the capacity to cope with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear war. Like-minded states and civil society advocates teamed up to heighten the consciousness of nuclear dangers and convened a United Nations-mandated conference to negotiate a prohibition treaty adopted on 7 July. In the ensuing bifurcated global nuclear order, it has become necessary to reconcile latent tensions between the two nuclear regimes, for example with regard to safeguards standards, institutional linkages, and enforcement agencies.

Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia

The election of Donald J. Trump challenged some long-held core tenets of U.S. foreign policy. For decades, U.S. administrations have valued the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons among their most ...

The role of Brazil in multilateral disarmament efforts

Abstract This article examines Brazil’s motivations, objectives, and action in international instances related to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control, particularly the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The paper describes the evolution of Brazilian attitudes and decisions and discusses prospects for nuclear disarmament opened by the proposal of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.Keywords: Nuclear disarmament; multilateral institutions; Brazilian foreign policy; non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Received: May 23, 2017 Accepted: August 28, 2017 Introduction Brazil in the world A former colony of a Southern European metropolis, Brazil achieved independence with comparatively little strife. It has a large landmass and a diversified population with a culture based on Western European values and indigenous, African, and Asian elements. Brazil thinks of itself as a significant world player whose influence in international affairs has not been commensurate with its size and resources. Located in an area of the world which is relatively undisturbed by the main geopolitical interests and rivalries of the major powers, the external action of Brazil seeks to ensure that the activities of states are governed by the prevalence of international norms and institutions rather than by the economic and political clout of those powers. Thus, the Brazilian view of global security privileges multilateral rules over unilateral action. Lasting peace is to be achieved through investment in institutions that will promote peace and the rule of law. For Brazil, the United Nations is the primary organization in charge of global security

Nuclear Energy for Everyone, Nuclear Weapons for No-One

The article explores the complicated nature of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons even though from the military, ethical and legal perspective, the destructiveness, immorality and illegality of the current situation cannot be perpetuated. Some of the nuclear-weapon states, however, have consistently refused to agree to any approach under multilateral auspices for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Rather, attention has been deflected to the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, while the equally urgent task of complying with the legal obligation of implementing Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) concerning nuclear disarmament has been marginalized. I argue, no form of warfare would confront humanity with dangers even remotely comparable with the danger of nuclear warfare. Such disaster would affect the world economy and other vital aspects of the global infrastructure. The sudden collapse of many of the world’s leading trading nations as well as the mechanisms for international transactions would lead to profound disorganization and leave other nation. In addition to the human cost, the ecology of the world would be severely affected and the infrastructure of civilization would be shattered.

/ India's Position on the Key Legal Documents Relating to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a Challenge to the International Nuclear Security

/ India's Position on the Key Legal Documents Relating to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a Challenge to the International Nuclear Security

The World Court's Jurisdictional Formalism and its Lost Market Share: TheMarshall IslandsDecisions and the Quest for a Suitable Dispute Settlement Forum for Multilateral Disputes

AbstractOn 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, the Court) rendered three judgments declining to take jurisdiction in theMarshall Islandscases, in which that state alleged that India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom violated their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and customary international law. In declining to take jurisdiction, the Court further confirmed its recent shift to jurisdictional formalism, initiated inGeorgiav.Russiaand confirmed in bothBelgiumv.Senegaland theAlleged Violations (Nicaraguav.Colombia)judgment. What is more, the Court heightened the burden of proving the existence of a dispute by incorporating an ‘objective awareness’ requirement in its analysis. The present contribution critically situates the Court's judgments within the context of the law of state responsibility and global security, with particular emphasis on the broader implications going forward. It first explores the principal features of the Court's formalistic shift on jurisdictional matters in the cases, setting the stage for the subsequent discussion. The article then turns to the broader implications of these decisions for state responsibility, taking into consideration that the ‘disputes’ submitted to the Court are not strictly bilateral in nature. My ambition is also to highlight the nexus between jurisdictional issues, state responsibility law, and broader questions of access to justice in multilateral disputes. By way of conclusion, the article highlights the importance of identifying creative solutions in a post-Marshall Islandsworld, suggesting the UN General Assembly as a law-making facilitator and the UN Security Council as an alternate – albeit imperfect – dispute settlement forum to tackle multilateral disputes with global security implications.

The strategic elimination of nuclear weapons: an alternative global agenda for nuclear disarmament

ABSTRACTGlobal nuclear dangers have jumped since President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech affirmed the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Today’s nuclear dangers range from growing US–Russian political–military confrontation and the virtual collapse of bilateral nuclear arms control through the greatest divisions ever within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to North Korea’s coming capability to attack the United States with nuclear-armed missiles. The Donald J. Trump administration has maintained that nuclear weapons are essential to US security, though it has also affirmed the US commitment to the goal of nuclear abolition. Frustrated by lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and energized by concerns about the risk of use of nuclear weapons, nearly 125 countries have now negotiated a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It was signed by fifty countries when it opened for signature in September 2017. None of the nuclear-weapon states will adhere to the treaty and it will not reduce today’s nuclear dangers. The interests of all of the key protagonists—the United States and its allies, the other NPT nuclear-weapon states, and the supporters of the new Prohibition Treaty—would best be served by rebuilding habits of cooperation among them to reduce global nuclear dangers and advance the NPT’s nuclear disarmament goal. One possible rallying point would be a vision of the strategic elimination of nuclear weapons as instruments of strategy, power, and security—not their complete physical elimination—by 2045, one hundred years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Strategic elimination would have specific dimensions in terms of policy, operations, numbers, institutions and planning, and transparency verification. Priorities for action now stand out both to reduce today’s global nuclear dangers and to put in place the building blocks for strategic elimination.

A Moral Argument for the Mass Defection of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Regime

DESPITE THE LONG SUCCESS OF THE 1968 TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime in preventing new nuclear weapons proliferation, some commentators believe it might collapse if a nuclear breakout by a revolutionary power (e.g., Iran) leads to a proliferation cascade in the Middle East or East Asia. (1) It is feared that such a proliferation cascade would exacerbate regional insecurities and might possibly lead to regional nuclear conflict. To prevent such collapse, these commentators call for intensified diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military action to enforce the NPT's nonproliferation norm such as in the recently concluded (and still somewhat controversial) Iran nuclear deal. In contrast, many nuclear abolition advocates contend that the NPT regime is facing a legitimation crisis portending a different kind of regime collapse. (2) This collapse consists in the gradual and subversive capture of the NPT by its nuclear weapon states (NWS) parties, which has led to the strict and narrow enforcement of nonproliferation requirements while permitting the NWS to avoid their nuclear disarmament commitments. This capture not only reinforces the division between nuclear haves and have-nots, but it prevents an effective nuclear abolition and it undermines the view that nuclear global governance is truly characterized by the rule of international law. Under such conditions, non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) parties are ensnared in a variety of political, security, and moral dilemmas, none of which are resolved by accommodating the capture of regime governance mechanisms by the NPT NWS. In this essay, I argue that NPT regime subversion of this latter kind is legally and morally intolerable and, accordingly, the NNWS should defect en masse from the NPT. In what follows, I briefly advance the case for NPT subversion and then make a more detailed defense of the regime defection argument. The Subversion of the NPT Generally, international regimes are subverted if there is gross noncompliance of states parties that undercuts an effective implementation of regime rules, or if the states parties' common interests as expressed in treaty documents are sublimated to those of a few powerful members. Undoubtedly, the powerful few will dispute any charge of regime subversion, especially if significant disagreement persists over the meaning of controversial treaty provisions or statements. Even so, such denials alone do not rule out the possibility of regime subversion and, accordingly, such a possibility deserves to be explored. Let us note first that, alongside the NPT's nonproliferation provisions, the Preamble and Article VI express a common interest in realizing nuclear abolition. (3) Indeed, both parts suggest that nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are not expected to happen simultaneously. Rather, nonproliferation policies arc confidence-building measures necessary for nuclear disarmament measures to succeed. (4) Second, recall that in the 1995 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)--the first one held after the Cold War's end-many NNWS demanded that the NWS reaffirm Article VI disarmament commitments in exchange for their vote to renew the NPT indefinitely. The NWS reaffirmed their commitments, but then in the next three years failed to act accordingly. In a 1998 response to this inaction, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) of NNWS published a manifesto expressing grave alann. Then, at the 2000 NPT RevCon, the NAC secured the commitment of the NWS to a list of 13 Steps detailed as essential preconditions of nuclear abolition. (5) Tragically, after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the George W. Bush administration abandoned the 13 Steps, reasserted the relevance of preventive nuclear strikes in counterterrorism operations, and began the push to modernize the US nuclear arsenal. By early 2008, one might have been forgiven for thinking that the NPT had been utterly subverted by the Bush administration. …

The Policy of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: History and Modernity

The article provides an overview of Ukrainian and foreign sources on the non-proliferation studies and interconnected with it problems of nuclear disarmament and the use of “peaceful” atom. We give little-known facts from the history of non-proliferation, attempts to put nuclear energy under effective international control and reasons why this could not be done. The main content of the article is an analysis of the NPT, IAEA and related international regimes and organizations, successes and failures in implementing the policy of non-proliferation. It is noted, on the one hand, maintaining a fairly steady non- proliferation regime since the entry into force of the NPT in 1970 – now there are only nine states with nuclear weapons, and this number remains unchanged over the past 25 years. NPT regime is almost universal – it includes 190 States Parties and only five remain outside (India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan). However, according to some forecasts, increasing threat is likelihood of becoming world “widespread nuclear proliferation” in 2030. Features of positions of the US and Russia in matters of nonproliferation policy are studied.