Nuclear Weapons Capability Research Articles

Assessing Iran's nuclear programme

The many indicators of military involvement in Iran's nuclear programme strongly suggest that Iran seeks more than just a latent nuclear-weapons capability, although not necessarily an all-out Manhattan Project-style effort. Depending on assumptions about technical variables, the earliest Iran might be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon is assessed to fall between the end of 2008 and 2010, a range that might be said to be within the margin of error, given the unknowns about the pro gramme and the inspectors' sharply decreased access. This timetable provides room for diplomacy. There are strong arguments, with universal appeal, for opposing an Iranian nuclear-weapons capability.

China's Grand Strategy, the Korean Nuclear Crisis, and the Six‐Party Talks

North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons capability for about two decades. Many diplomatic efforts have been made to convince or cajole the Northern regime to give up this quest – and all have so far failed. Since 2003, a new multilateral approach – the Six‐Party Talks involving the Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States – has raised hopes anew. These hopes are based largely on China playing an active role. China has the potential both to guarantee North Korea's security, and to impose and enforce a denuclearization agreement. We analyze China's changing grand strategy and its implications for China's Korea goals and policies. To Deng Xiaoping's emphasis on China's national interests, China's third‐ and fourth‐generation leaders have added a greater reliance on foreign and military policies to maintain domestic political support and legitimacy. This discussion indicates that China is currently more concerned to preserve the North Korean regime and prevent a second Korean War than to eliminate the North's nuclear capability. Therefore, the Six‐Party Talks are unlikely to succeed.

Nuclear proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran

Since the mid-1980s, Israel, thGawdat Bahgate United States, and other Western powers have accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons capability. Iranian officials have categorically denied these accusations and claimed that their nuclear program is designed for civilian purposes. This essay examines the history of Iran's nuclear program since the late 1950s and analyzes the forces that shape the country's nuclear policy. These forces include perception of security threats from Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, and the United States; domestic economic and political dynamics; and national pride. The following section will discuss the European and Russian stance on Iran's nuclear ambition as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to reach a compromise that would satisfy the international community's concerns and Tehran's demands. The essay concludes with some predictions on how Iran's nuclear program is likely to evolve in the next few decades.

Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic Republic of Iran

Since the early 2000s considerable attention has been focused on Iran's nuclear ambition. Several Western powers accuse the Islamic Republic of developing nuclear weapons capability. Iran categorically denies these accusations and insists that it seeks nuclear power for peaceful purposes. This essay examines Iran's nuclear program. In the first part the lessons learned from other countries' experiences are analyzed. The literature on nuclear proliferation suggests that countries seek nuclear weapons for security reasons and political leverage and prestige. On the other hand, leaders are persuaded to give up their nuclear ambition as a result of domestic changes, the impact of nonproliferation regime, and U.S. policy. In the second part of this essay these theoretical models are applied to the Iranian case. The study discusses the argument for and against Iran's nuclear ambition. It advocates a multilateral and multi-dimensional approach to deal with the nuclear impasse.

Chapter four: Dismantlement

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Introduction

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Chapter one: Nuclear ‘drivers’

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Conclusion

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Chapter two: Proliferation pathways

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Chapter three: The decision

For over three decades, driven by the core motive of deterring external threats to its security, Libya sought to acquire nuclear weapons. Having attempted but failed to procure them ‘off the shelf’ from several states during the 1970s, by late 2003 it had succeeded in assembling much of the technology required to manufacture them. Nevertheless, following secret negotiations with the UK and US governments, in December 2003 Colonel Muammar Gadhafi resolved to abandon the pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision reflected the regime's radically altered security perceptions during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The pursuit of nuclear weapons had come to be viewed as a strategic liability. This Adelphi Paper examines the motives for Libya's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi's rise to power in 1969 through to late 2003. It assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance and, subsequently, its reliance on the A.Q. Khan network. It examines the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the regime's calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage with the international community and the United States in particular. The process of dismantling the nuclear programme is also addressed, as is the question of whether Libya constitutes a ‘model’ for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

US military options against emerging nuclear threats

As the prospects of Iran developing a nuclear weapon capability become more conceivable, US planners are reported to be examining various military options to deal with this possibility – and there has even been speculation that the US might be willing to use nuclear weapons to eliminate Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is enormously difficult to deny emerging nuclear states – and particularly those that take measures to protect and obscure their nuclear capabilities – the achievement of their military designs. And yet, just such an objective is central to America’s military strategy, as first articulated in the January 2002 Nuclear Posture Review.

Notes from the Editors, April 2006

» Notes from the EditorsAs we write this in late February, threats of a U.S. military intervention in Iran are intensifying in response to Washington’s claims that Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons capabilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency has voted to take the issue of what it views as Iran’s noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement to the United Nations Security Council in early March. Meanwhile, the Bush administration has repeatedly stated that a military strike against Iran by the United States is now “on the table.” Washington’s waving of its big stick coupled with its feeding of misinformation to a U.S. media system that has not hesitated to pass these distortions on to the general public have already had their effect. A Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg poll taken in January indicated that “57% of Americans favor military intervention if Iran’s Islamic government pursues a program that could enable it to build nuclear arms” (Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2006). A few days later President Bush declared in his State of the Union address that “the Iranian government is defying the world with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons. America will continue to rally the world to confront these threats.”This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China and India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status

South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China. Edited by Lowell Dittmer. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. 296p. 28.95 paper.India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status. By Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 302p. 25.99 paper.The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan caught the attention of international relations theorists as never before. While the earlier analyses of South Asia came primarily from those working on nonproliferation issues and regional conflict-prevention perspectives, the advent of overt nuclear weapon status of India and Pakistan presented IR scholars with the opportunity to explore a range of hypotheses about new nuclear powers. Was South Asia going to be able to take advantage of its backwardness/late entry into the deterrence game and learn from the considerable research and experience of the two superpowers during the Cold War? Were India and Pakistan as rational as the United States and the Soviet Union (if not more), and could they manage their rivalry without resorting to nuclear exchange? Will their overt nuclear weapons capabilities make India and Pakistan more careful in their responses to each other's provocative moves? Is a rivalry based in political ideology (like the U.S.-USSR one) more susceptible to rational decision making than a rivalry based in religious ideology (supposedly the primary basis of the India-Pakistan dispute)? A related set of questions raised by the tests focused primarily on the reasons/motivations behind Indian nuclear tests and their impact on the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Nuclear Proliferation and Global Security: Laying the Groundwork for a New Policy Agenda

A default assumption shared by most observers in government, the academy, and nongovernment organizations is that all efforts should be expended to preserve the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, despite its shortcomings and structural weaknesses. Yet there is little evidence that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its subsidiary instruments have succeeded in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities since the end of the Cold War. And there is no foundation for assuming they will do any better in what will be an even more challenging global strategic environment in the twenty-first century. New arms control arrangements need to be developed that reflect the reality that nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented, only managed. Before reaching this point, however, the international community must lay to rest the myth that nuclear disarmament is achievable and begin to explore the prospects for a multipolar system of nuclear deterrence in the years ahead.

Learning to live with uncertainty: The strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability

This article challenges the popular assumption that North Korea's nuclear weapons capability poses a dire threat to international security. It argues that the adverse impact of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons has been exaggerated and that pessimistic accounts of the strategic implications of this capability have overlooked the strong status quo bias inherent in North Korea's worldview. These accounts have also glossed over the primarily defensive motives underpinning Pyongyang's quest for nuclear weapons. There are dangers attached to North Korea's nuclear capability, especially the possible transfer of fissile material to terrorist groups or rogue states, and the effect it may have in spurring regional neighbours to reassess their non-nuclear status. Contrary to common assumptions, however, the idea that a nuclear-armed North Korea is determined to foment regional instability and challenge the strategic status quo in East Asia is not supported by a close reading of Pyongyang's motives and worldview. The behaviour and statements of the regime suggest that the DPRK is predisposed to accept the logic of deterrence in its relationship with the US. As long as Washington maintains an active and robust posture of extended strategic deterrence on the Korean peninsula, the regime in Pyongyang will continue to be dissuaded from initiating the use of nuclear weapons against other regional states.

Do Nuclear Weapons Stabilize South Asian Militarized Crises? Evidence from the 1990 Case

Scholars have claimed that nuclear weapons help to stabilize South Asia by preventing Indo-Pakistani militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. This article argues that while nuclear weapons have had cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation also has played a role in fomenting some of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, nuclear deterrence was not always essential to preventing these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. The article illustrates its argument with evidence from the Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis of 1990. Leading scholars and analysts have argued that nuclear weapons help to prevent South Asian militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war.1 This claim has important implications for the regional security environment and beyond. Given the volatile nature of Indo-Pakistani relations, reducing the likelihood of crisis escalation would make the subcontinent significantly safer. The claim also suggests that nuclear weapons could lower the probability of war in crisis-prone conflict dyads elsewhere in the world. This article takes a less sanguine view of nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian militarized crises. It argues that while nuclear weapons have at times had important cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation has played a role in fomenting a number of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, it is not clear that nuclear deterrence was essential to preventing some of these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. I illustrate my argument with evidence from the period when India and Pakistan were acquiring nascent nuclear weapons capabilities. I show that during the late 1980s, Pakistan’s emerging nuclear capacity emboldened Pakistani decision makers to provide extensive support to the emerging insurgency against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. In early 1990, India responded with large-scale force deployments along the Line of Control and International Border, in an attempt to stem militant infiltration into Indian territory, and potentially to intimidate Pakistan into abandoning its Kashmir policy. Pakistan countered with large deployments of its own, and the result was a major Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. Although scholars have credited Pakistani nuclear weapons with deterring India from attacking Pakistan during this crisis, the preponderance of available evidence suggests that Indian leaders never seriously considered striking Pakistan, and therefore were not in fact deterred from launching a war in 1990. Thus nuclear weapons played an important role in fomenting a major Indo-Pakistani crisis during this period, but probably were not instrumental in preventing the crisis from escalating to the level of outright war. Below, I briefly describe the emergence of the Kashmir insurgency. I then explain how Pakistan’s nuclear capacity encouraged it to support the uprising. Next, I show how conflict between Pakistan-supported guerillas and Indian security forces in Kashmir drove a spiral of tension between the two countries, which led to a stand-off between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in early 1990. Finally, I discuss the end of the 1990 crisis, and address the role that nuclear weapons played in its peaceful deescalation.

Nuclear Material Loopholes

Readers of Science should be grateful to L. Palmer and G. Milhollin for describing Brazil's intention to operate a new uranium enrichment plant, and the proliferation concerns this action arouses (“Brazil's nuclear puzzle,” Policy Forum, 22 Oct., p. [617][1]). If apprehension about global warming causes an expansion of nuclear power deployment during the next half century ([1][2]), it is vital to limit the spread of dangerous fuel cycle activities—enrichment and reprocessing—that can lead to nuclear weapons. Palmer and Milhollin suggest that if Brazil cooperates with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and presumably accepts the “additional protocol” for challenge inspections, Brazil will be a “good nuclear citizen,” and the United States and the rest of the world should accept Brazil's enrichment activity. We disagree. As we ([2][3]), and others, have argued, the proper policy is to avoid all new enrichment and reprocessing activity in non-nuclear weapons states and for nuclear supplier states to provide recipient states with internationally assured enrichment and spent fuel disposal services at attractive prices. This would begin with a “stay-put” period of 10 to 15 years, after which nations could reevaluate in light of nuclear power and nonproliferation developments. We should not adopt a policy toward Brazil that we are unwilling to accept for Iran and North Korea. The latter have brought to a head the shortcomings of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) implementation regime—these states employ the regime to move to the brink of a weapons capability within the treaty framework. Closing NPT loopholes needs urgent attention, and Brazil will jeapordize the possibilities for successful resolution if they move forward with their uranium enrichment plant. The argument that Brazil is not seeking a weapons capability has not always been true, and IAEA inspections are not an adequate safeguard against states that are seeking nuclear capability, such as Iran and North Korea. IAEA inspections are not sufficient for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons capability, and the United States will not be successful with a policy based on a chosen few—the United States and other nuclear weapons states—deciding which other nations can safely develop fuel cycle activities and which cannot. The United States should vigorously oppose the Brazilian enrichment plant and offer Brazil concrete incentives to abandon this dangerous course of action. Brazil faces a choice of being a spoiler in modernizing the NPT implementation regime or of being a leader in accomplishing that important end. 1. 1.[↵][4] The Future of Nuclear Power-An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2003) (available at ). 2. 2.[↵][5] 1. J. Deutch, 2. A. Kanter, 3. E. Moniz, 4. D. Ponoman , SURVIVAL , in press. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.1104209 [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #ref-2 [4]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1. in text [5]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2. in text

A Hedging Strategy is Needed Toward North Korea

Abstract The U.S.-led campaign to pressure North Korea into abandoning its quest for nuclear weapons has encountered numerous difficulties. One reason for the lack of progress is that it is unclear why Pyongyang repudiated the 1994 Agreed Framework and is seeking a nuclear weapons capability. It is possible that the DPRK regime is merely using its program as bargaining leverage to obtain concessions from the United States and the nations of East Asia and would be willing to remain non-nuclear in exchange for such concessions. But it is equally possible that North Korea, for reasons of both prestige and security, is deadly serious about becoming a nuclear weapons state. The first scenario means that the crisis probably can be resolved through diplomacy; the second suggests that the crisis will intensify. In any case, Washington's strategy of forging a common front among Pyongyang's neighbors to pressure the regime has not yet produced meaningful results. That is especially true of the reliance on China to exert the necessary diplomatic and economic pressure. Although the PRC is in the best position to influence North Korea, the Beijing government is reluctant to use that leverage. The United States needs a hedging strategy in the event that the DPRK will not relinquish its nuclear ambitions. Preemptive military action is not a realistic option, since it would likely trigger a disastrous war on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, America's fallback strategy should be to deter North Korea by making it clear that any transfer of nuclear weapons or technology to terrorist organizations or rogue states would mean war.

East Asia's Awakening from Strategic Hibernation and the Role of Air Power

Abstract In sharp contrast to land-dominant forces with only limited technological capabilities, key armed forces such as the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA), Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF), and the South and North Korean militaries have built up significant power projection capabilities since the 1980s. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and assets (including a potential nuclear weapons capability) have surfaced as key security concerns since the early 1990s and for its part, China has begun to implement its own revolution in military affairs (RMA) strategies that may enable the PRC to have very robust power projection capabilities by 2020 or 2030. If one includes Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs into the broader strategic equation, Asia may well face an increasingly volatile arms race over the next 20–30 years. Seen within this context, the role of air power is likely to assume growing importance in East Asia's projected force modernization programs, given the commensurate decline in the relative utility of ground forces. Thus, this paper emphasizes the continuing relevance of air power-combat aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, air-delivered precision munitions, and strategic intelligence-even in the midst of the global war against terrorism. If this trend continues, it is likely to have a significant impact not only on the regional security template, but also with respect to determining future roles and missions between US forces and key allies.

The nuclear issue: Where do we go from here?*

The drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons is going badly and there is currently little support from the general public. The United States Nuclear Posture Review incorporates nuclear capability into conventional war planning. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to maintain nuclear weapon capability. The US is planning an essentially new earth‐penetrating nuclear weapon and is prepared to test this in the national interest if thought necessary. These policies could stimulate nuclear proliferation by others, do nothing to deter terrorism, promote persisting polarization of the world, are a clear breach of the Non‐Proliferation Treaty and rest world security on a continued balance of terror. A renewed mass campaign to counteract all this, on legal and moral grounds in particular, is urgently needed. IPPNW and kindred organizations must restore sanity in our policies and humanity to our actions.