Nuclear Umbrella Research Articles

Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation

There are two very different kinds of incentives to nuclear proliferation. We are used to seeing nations deter potential enemies and win political concessions with such weapons. A newer, very different, kind of incentive stems from the economic overlap between peaceful electric power reactors and the production of weapons-grade plutonium or enriched uranium; there may now be an economic cost to steering away from the bomb, rather than a cost to making it. Reducing the political-military incentives to proliferation will require a case-by-case approach. Some of these incen tives can be decreased by extending the American nuclear umbrella, as for Europe and Japan. But a serious problem can then emerge in preventing proliferation by such "outlaw states" as South Africa, Israel, and Taiwan. For much of the world, moreover, the bomb will be more of a political- prestige item than a military tool, so that a superpower nuclear umbrella would be redundant or counter-productive. Reducing the economic incentives will also require a case-by- case approach. This cannot be achieved by simply cutting off technological assistance in the nuclear field. Rather, it must be done by using such assistance as a subtle "carrot" or "stick," to persuade the leaders of countries like Brazil and Japan to stay away from bombs.

Why States Go—And Don't Go—Nuclear

The incentives and disincentives for countries to go nuclear comprise a combination of military, political, and economic concerns and motivations. These vary over time for different countries. For countries allied to one of the two nuclear superpowers, concern about their military security is not a predominant factor, while it is the decisive one for the non-nuclear countries who are not under the nuclear umbrella of a superpower and who perceive serious threats to their security. For countries without acute security problems, the political and economic motivations are the predominant ones and these include such incentives as strengthening their independence and increasing their status and prestige in the world. The disincentives are largely potential, ranging from effective security guarantees through adequate supplies of conventional armaments to assurances concerning future supplies of fissile materials. Incentives to go nuclear appear to outweigh the disincentives. Only drastic measures by the nuclear powers in the way of security assurances, nuclear disarmament, and the creation of a more just political and economic world order can serve to prevent the emergence of a proliferated world.

Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy: The Problem of the NPT

JAPAN'S STANDING AS one of the world's great economic powers, the advanced state of its scientific and nuclear technology, and the deepening complexity of its position in the world have given rise over the past decade to the question of whether or not it will someday decide to flex its industrial sinews for the production of nuclear weapons. The specter of a nuclear-armed Japan seems to have aroused considerable concern around the world. While apprehensions are to be expected, given Japan's strategic importance and the continuing turmoil in Asia, some of the fears expressed appear to extend beyond the bounds of objective inference if current indicators such as public opinion, legal restraints, political constraints, and other factors are to be given credence. What is striking about these forecasts is the contrast they pose to nearly all of the public pronouncements made by the Japanese government since the question of nuclear weapons first came up. It has stated explicitly, and reiterated before the world on numerous occasions, the basic objectives to which it is firmly committed. Speaking before the Diet in January 1968, former Prime Minister Sat6 articulated what has come to be regarded as the four principles of Japan's nuclear policy: (1) to develop atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes; (2) to promote nuclear disarmament around the world; (3) to refrain from possessing, producing, or bringing nuclear weapons into Japan; and (4) to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for deterrence against all forms of nuclear attack.' Although criticisms have been focused on the last principle, this broad orientation has won widespread support from diverse segments of the public. Indeed, there are not many issues in Japanese foreign policy today over which so clear a consensus exists as the question of nuclearization. It appears that Japan has foresworn

A Theory of Bounded Deterrence

According to this analysis, the deterrent relationship is bounded by two concepts, the nuclear threshold and the level of unacceptable damage, each of which is a function of the utility of the threatened objective to both deterrer and aggressor. The crucial assumption of the theory, that the utility of foreign policy objectives varies with the objective, is tested empirically regarding American attitudes toward security commitments. Five variables loading on three dimensions predict the utility of these commitments. A consequence of the theory is that it calls into doubt government assertions that the nuclear umbrella provides as much security to allies as to the deterrer.

India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee

Now and then in the affairs of nations there comes a moment when the basic assumptions underlying its foreign policy are put the test of proof. For India such a moment was China's first nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964. The moment was all the more agonizing for the fact that in the two years preceding, India had been re-thinking those assumptions. Already Mr. Nehru had said: is no nonalignment vis-a-vis China. There is no Panchshil vis-a-vis China.' However, nonalignment was retained between the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, Lop Nor did more than pose the question whether the country should manufacture a bomb. It raised vital questions affecting the fundamentals of the long-cherished concept of nonalignment whenever the alternative a bomb-i.e., a guarantee against a nuclear attack from China-arose for consideration. In a U.N. Day (October 25) broadcast on All India Radio in 1964, Dr. H. J. Bhabha, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission stated: One must remember that it is not any object that is intrinsically good or bad, but the use that is made of it. A minimum supply of nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery system confers on a State the capacity destroy more or less totally the important cities and industrial centres in another State. There appears be no means of totally intercepting such an attack, and if even a small fraction of it gets through, entire cities and regions may be totally devastated. The only defence against such an attack appears be a capability and threat of retaliation.... Capability of retaliation appears be the most powerful deterrence.2 Soon, thereafter, the inevitable clamor arose for an Indian bomb. The reaction of India's leaders this situation makes interesting study. The Defence Minister, Y. B. Chavan, was asked whether India would seek a U.S. nuclear umbrella, presumably a reference President Johnson's offer immediately after China's nuclear explosion to respond requests from the Asian nations help in dealing with Communist China's aggression. Mr. Chavan replied is no question of asking for such a thing. In the present day world, if a country attacks another country with a nuclear bomb, it will also receive one.'3 This view, apparently, was also shared by the