Transfer Of Nuclear Technology Research Articles

Strengthening Global Security: Critique on the NPT and NSG Mechanisms of Nuclear Export Control Regime

An export control regime plays a vital tool in the effort to counter the proliferation of traditional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. However, there are new and fundamental challenges with this system. The article emphasizes the importance of understanding and implementing nuclear export control mechanisms to advance international security and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The research will apply descriptive analysis of the mechanisms of nuclear export controls. Critical analysis of the nuclear export control apparatuses will be applied as a technique to review the loopholes in the enforcement mechanisms of these initiatives. The debate covers key aspects of nuclear export control, including legislative frameworks, industry compliance, licensing and authorization procedures, verification and monitoring systems and control scope. Understanding these elements will enable stakeholders to support responsible and peaceful transfers of nuclear technology while ensuring compliance with international commitments and nonproliferation standards. The paper further delves into the context of these regimes, which are constructed in a way that provides cushion to the international community led by the Western states. The article emphasizes the critical role of the mechanisms of nuclear export control in preserving international security by preventing the unauthorized transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. It also emphasizes the need for industry and national collaboration in this regard.

Transfer of Nuclear Technology and Culture to Next Generation through Dialogue

シニアネットワーク連絡会が「学生とシニアの対話事業」を始めて15年になる。この事業はわが国のエネルギー選択に欠かせない原子力について，次世代の原子力技術と文化を託す学生や小中高の教員に伝承するものである。昨今の原子力に対する厳しい風潮にもかかわらず，この対話を通しての研修事業に賛同，参画していただける学生や先生方が少しずつではあるが増えている。2019年度は19回実施，26校・団体に参加いただいた。2020年度はコロナ対応を余儀なくされるが，WEBの活用にも挑戦し，引き続き対話活動を継続してゆく所存である。

Conclusion: Reflections on the Nuclear Order

ABSTRACTThe papers in this special issue examine the nuclear order that began to emerge in the 1970s after the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements in 1972. Several general themes are discussed: the international economy and the nuclear order; strengthening the non-proliferation regime; reactions to US non-proliferation policy; the East–West arms race; the nuclear order in 1980; the international system and nuclear order. The argument is made that the changes in the international system in the 1970s had important effects on the nuclear order, creating a North–South axis alongside the existing East–West axis; provoking disagreements and disputes over the transfer of nuclear technology; and giving greater prominence to nuclear power in a period of energy crises. This is still an order of states in which transnational and international NGOs play a secondary role. There were a variety of responses to the new order: acceptance; resentment; attempts at modification; independence; evasion and circumvention. The constitution of the order was a matter of great interest to a good number of states and the focus of many debates and much political conflict.

The April 1977 Persepolis Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology: A Third World Revolt Against US Non-Proliferation Policy?

ABSTRACTIran under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi embarked on one of the most ambitious nuclear programmes of any state in the 1970s. This decision was in part motivated by the zeitgeist surrounding nuclear energy in the 1970s that envisioned the transition from a petroleum- to plutonium-based economy. This decision, however, was soon followed by the Indian ‘Smiling Buddha’ peaceful nuclear explosion. This led the United States and other nuclear suppliers to strengthen restraints on nuclear exports. Many nuclear recipients, particularly in the Third World, objected to US-led changes to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including the creation of the London Club (later renamed the Nuclear Suppliers Group). To address perceived shortcomings of nuclear suppliers in cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the Iranian nuclear leadership organized the Iran Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology in April 1977. The Persepolis conference, as it came to be known, saw many nuclear suppliers, recipients and industry rally in opposition to US non-proliferation policy under President Jimmy Carter. However, following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran ceased to function as the lynchpin of this opposition to US policy, with the result that the coalition created at the Persepolis conference dissipated.

El desarrollo nuclear de Argentina y el régimen de no proliferación

El desarrollo y la transferencia de tecnología nuclear han sido puestos bajo estrictos controles debidoa su posible derivación hacia el uso bélico, lo que ha llevado a crear un régimen internacionalde no proliferación. Una de las últimas propuestas ha sido la fundación de bancos multilaterales deuranio levemente enriquecido (ule). Este artículo plantea que el objetivo de no proliferación puedecontribuir a acentuar la asimetría en la distribución del poder económico-político mundial, perjudicandoel derecho al desarrollo endógeno de esa tecnología en los países emergentes. Aquí se investigala existencia de márgenes de maniobra en el sistema internacional a partir del estudio del caso deArgentina, una de las pocas naciones emergentes que han conseguido exportar tecnología nuclear,y que ha declarado el desarrollo de la actividad nuclear independiente como política de Estado.

A New Organizational Structure for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): A Proposal for the Future

The IAEA is one of the most important international organizations within the United Nations system, with a relevant mandate in the field of international peace, security, and the transfer of nuclear technology for its use with peaceful purposes only. The Peace Nobel Prize won by the organization in 2005 in recognition of its work in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is the confirmation of what has been said before. To accomplish its mandate, the IAEA should carry out its activities in the most efficient and effective manner, taking into account the limited human and financial resources now available in the Secretariat, and the level of the resources that could be available during the coming years. For this reason, the IAEA should periodically revise its internal organizational structure, the management process used by the Secretariat to carry out the supervision of the activities to be implemented, the contents of its programs, the working procedures used to implement the approved programs, enhance the training of its staff, among others things. If an organization wants to succeed in achieving the mission for which was established in the most efficient and effective manner, then it should choose adequately its goals, identify the correct course of actions or the best strategies to fulfil the adopted goals, adopt the most efficient internal organizational structure, and allocate the necessary resources to ensure the full implementation of the approved programs. To make sure that the adopted strategies are working, the organization needs to adopt the correct internal organizational structure. Choosing the correct internal organizational structure entails allocating tasks, responsibilities, and decision-making authority within the organization in the most effective manner. One of the main changes that the Secretariat should introduce in its working procedures during the coming years is the establishment of multidisciplinary working teams. These teams will have the responsibility to implement all IAEA technical programs, including all technical cooperation projects approved by the policy making organs of the organization, in the most effective and economical manner.

Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. In particular, countries that receive peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to initiate weapons programs and successfully develop the bomb, especially when they are also faced with security threats. Statistical analysis based on a new data set of more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed from 1950 to 2000 lends strong support for this argument. Brief case studies of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs provide further evidence of the links between peaceful nuclear assistance and proliferation. The finding that supplier countries inadvertently raise the risks of nuclear proliferation poses challenges to the conventional wisdom. Indeed, the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation is surprisingly broad. Even assistance that is often viewed as innocuous, such as training nuclear scientists or providing research or power reactors, increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will spread. “Proliferation-proof” nuclear assistance does not exist. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs.

Analysis of Soviet Technology Transfer in the Development of China's Nuclear Weapons

Because China built its atomic and hydrogen bombs at a time of resource scarcity and rudimentary industrial development, it is generally believed that it got a great deal of help from Soviet nuclear technology transfer during the late 1950s. In particular, Soviet leaders and scientists asserted that they supplied China with extensive and critical assistance; some even claimed that this transfer of nuclear technology shortened the time needed to develop China's nuclear weapons by at least 15 years. Many non-Soviet researchers have concurred. Yet while Chinese officials, scientists, and historians have always given the Soviets due credit for this help, many have also continued to assert that because the Chinese solved key nuclear technology issues on their own, the effect of Soviet technology transfer was in fact more limited than these other experts claimed. Following a brief review of the history of Soviet nuclear-weapons technology transfer to China, this article addresses the issue by describing the kinds of Soviet nuclear-weapons technology transferred to China, assessing the role this Soviet technology played in China's nuclear-weapons program, and finally comparing and contrasting Soviet and Chinese views on the importance of Soviet technology transfer to the development of China's nuclear-weapons program.

A global overview on nuclear desalination

Nuclear desalination is considered one of the viable sources of producing the fresh water needed in arid areas. Nowadays, several countries have shown interest in the use of nuclear energy for seawater desalination, because recent studies have demonstrated that nuclear desalination is not only feasible but also economical, and this has already been demonstrated in several countries. Although the future requires the effective integration of energy resources to produce power and desalinated water economically with proper consideration for the environment, the significant increase in fuel energy cost and material cost has resulted in a dramatic impact on the capital and operational costs of desalination and power plants. The impact of any increase in the price of fossil fuels (as in the case before mid-2008) and the high demand for raw materials (e.g., steel, copper, nickel) will increase the pressure to develop novel solutions to minimise fossil energy consumption and reduce the capital expenditure of desalination plants. This, in turn, is causing a renewed global interest in nuclear energy. However, nuclear desalination may face some challenges, among which are public perception, financing, the transfer of nuclear technology and considerations for the safety of the coupling options selected.

Iran‐Pakistan relations: Political and strategic dimensions

Iran‐Pakistan relations have had a distinct characteristic over the past five decades and Islamabad's clandestine transfer of nuclear technology and materials to Iran underlines its significance. Political and strategic imperatives have formed the basis of their close relationship despite divergence of interests and political outlook on regional and global issues. Both the countries have tried to reconcile differences and consolidate their ties. Iran's concerns regarding the perceived dangers of containment by the US, the challenges flowing from developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to ensure balance of power with Saudi Arabia and earlier Iraq, and its concerns about the sectarian violence in Pakistan have deeply influenced the vitality of Iran‐Pakistan relationship. This paper traces the evolution of Iran‐Pakistan relations and argues that the politico‐strategic contours of the South‐West Asian region will be shaped as a result of divergent developments in Iran and Pakistan ‐ Iran's improvements in ties with India and Pakistan's relations with the US.

Balancing safety and economics

The safety requirements of NPPs have always aimed at limiting societal risks. This risk approach initially resulted in deterministic design criteria and concepts. In the 1980s the paradigm ‘safety at all costs’ arose and often led to questionable backfitting measures. Conflicts between new requirements, classical design concepts and operational demands were often ignored. The design requirements for advanced reactors ensure enhanced protection against severe accidents. Still, it is questionable whether the ‘no-damage-outside-the-fence’ criteria can be achieved deterministically and at competitive costs. Market deregulation and utility privatisation call for a balance between safety and costs, without jeopardising basic safety concepts. An ideal approach must be risk-based and imply modern PSAs and new methods for cost–benefit and ALARA analyses, embed nuclear risks in a wider risk spectrum, but also make benefits transparent within the context of a broader life experience. Governments should define basic requirements, minimum standards and consistent comparison criteria, and strengthen operator responsibility. Internationally sufficient and binding safety requirements must be established and nuclear technology transfer handled in a responsible way, while existing plants, with their continuous backfitting investments, should receive particular attention.

Exporting large capital equipment: A case study of nuclear technology transfer

The purpose of this article is to examine the marketing variables affecting the exportation of nuclear power plants by U.S. manufacturers. It is stated that with the demise of the nuclear industry within the United States following the TMI-2 accident in 1979, U.S. nuclear power plant suppliers have been forced to look externally to expand their market. Currently, U.S. suppliers of nuclear power plants are concentrating their export marketing efforts in developing countries and newly emerging Asian countries. However, the United States faces stiff competition from other industrialized nations such as Canada and France in the nuclear power plant export markets. The paper analyzes the marketing variables involved in exporting nuclear power plants, including the site selection process, legal variables, and financing. It is noted that during the early 1970s, the export market for nuclear power was essentially a seller's market. In recent years, marked with the increasing debt repayment problems facing developing countries and a lack of nuclear power plant orders in the United States, the export market has become a buyer's market. The paper also evaluates what changes are needed in the U.S. nuclear power industry in order to remain competitive in the exporting of nuclear power abroad. Changes are recommended in reactor design, the licensing process, adaptation to legal and political environments, and joint financing in cooperation with the host country.

The view from the United States

Although there will be challenges and problems, the United States has developed a sound and strong long-term approach to the transfer of nuclear technology to Asia under appropriate nonproliferation assurances and guarantees. The U.S. has played a leading role in the development of peaceful nuclear programs in several Asian nations. The United States looks forward to continued close peaceful nuclear cooperation with Japan and South Korea, as well as expanded relations with China. We support efforts by the American Institute in Taiwan to build a strong unofficial relationship with Taiwan in the civil nuclear energy field. But where there is serious concern about the potential for proliferation. U.S. policy and law have severely circumscribed peaceful nuclear cooperation. In such cases, we shall continue to work to lessen the capabilities and motivations for development of nuclear weapons. That is the essential counterpoint to our commitment to making available the benefits of the peaceful atom and serves the security of all countries.

International nuclear technology transfer: dilemmas of dissemination and control

International nuclear technology transfer: dilemmas of dissemination and control

The politics of transfer of nuclear technology: A case study of the Tarapur agreement

The politics of transfer of nuclear technology: A case study of the Tarapur agreement

JAERI Nuclear Engineering School and Technology Transfer

A method is introduced to evaluate the degree of nuclear technology transfer; that is, the output powers of Japanese nuclear reactors constructed in these 20 years are chronologically plotted in a semi-log figure. All reactors plotted are classified into imported and domestic ones according to a value of domestication factor. A space between two historical trajectories of reactor construction may be interpreted as one of the measures indicating the degree of nuclear technology transfer. In connection with this method, historical change of educational and training courses in Nuclear Engineering School of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is reviewed in this report.

Transfer of nuclear technology

Transfer of nuclear technology

Politics of technology transfer (with special reference to the transfer of nuclear technology)

The object of this paper is to present a critical analysis of the issues associated with the transfer of technology in general, and nuclear technology in particular, from a socio-political perspective. As such, it somewhat differs, both in content and approach, from other presentations of this conference. Nevertheless, it is my strong belief that an analysis of this nature is not only appropriate, but is significant for every nation that aspires to a sizeable transfer of technology, notably nuclear technology. 1 1 Technology, and the resulting technological diffusion, have been conceptualized in varying forms using different theoretical and historical approaches. The crudest approach defines technology as involving only changes in artifacts. The economic approach, being more sophisticated, adds labor and managerial inputs to the physical artifacts. This approach is susceptible to aggregate analysis, and economists and historians have made wide use of it. A third approach views technology as a ‘socio-cultural’ phenomenon, that is, besides involving material and artifact improvements, technology is considered to incorporate a cultural, social and psychic dimension as well. The definition utilized here is complementary to the third approach, in the sense that it adds relevant political attributes, as a significant denominator, to it.

Owner's quality assurance as a tool for technology transfer

Participation in the implementation of the QA program for building a nuclear power plant provides and excellent opportunity for ensuring the transfer of nuclear technology to the owners' personnel, within the various phases involved in the engineering, permitting the gradual build-up of knowledge on the owner's side simultaneously with the development of the project. Participation in the QA program also ensures that the owner has a large say in the application of the QA concept to those parts of the plant which are critical from an overall plant availability and efficiency aspect and not only to those which are related to nuclear safety. Strong owner's participation in quality assurance implementation provides the following main benefits: familiarization with the project and with the most important realization steps; the training of personnel in view of many functions of plant operation; providing means for developing the capability to implement the owner's responsibilities for licensing, take-over and operation; realizing a plant with a high quality level ensuring high safety, reliability and efficiency; possibility of the owner to intimately keep track of all phases and schedules, as well as any special problems during project realization.

Utilization of plant operating experience in new plant designs: A consultant's viewpoint

One specific area which should be considered in the transfer of nuclear technology to countries beginning development of a nuclear industry is the utilization and transfer of existing operating plant experience. No other single area can assist in developing a level of useful knowledge more rapidly than the systematic comparison of existing new plant designs with older plants and their associated performance data. With the advent of the Rasmussen Study (WASH-1400, 1975), a methodology now exists that can provide the systematic review of the plant design and quantify its probability of being an optimum system. Generally, the most important criteria for definition of the optimum system would be initial capital cost, projected maintenance costs, and plant availability. The fault tree analysis methodology used on the Rasmussen study allows system availability to be placed on a firm numerical footing. The area of each plant system contributing most to its unavailability is readily identifiable. Once identified, various methods for system improvement can be analyzed to determine which will provide the best results at lowest cost. The actual costs of the improvements vs the resultant savings from improved plant availability can be calculated, thus optimizing the solution (Lintner, 1976). Simple financial considerations of initial capital costs, escalation, and overall nuclear plans provide the final loop in the iteration to establish the optimum plant design. Since the most unfamiliar and most difficult part of the solution is the fault-tree construction and utilization, most attention will be paid to its discussion.