Nuclear Taboo Research Articles

Jonathan Gorry. Cold War Christians and the Spectre of Nuclear Deterrence, 1945–1959.

Through much of the Cold War, the threat to use nuclear weapons was implicit, and sometimes explicit. And yet those weapons have never been fired in anger since Nagasaki. A so-called nuclear taboo took hold, a habit of nuclear non-use that has, so far, become entrenched and strengthened into a self-imposed prohibition and stigmatization of the use of nuclear weapons. But that was by no means preordained. During much of the period covered by this book, mainstream political figures were insisting that nuclear weapons should be used just like any other weapons of war. Today, the author writes, the use of nuclear weapons has become “practically unthinkable” (p. 1). The explanations for why that has happened vary. Has it been purely a matter of realist self-interest derived from the fear of retaliation? Has morality factored prominently in denuclearization? In Cold War Christians and the Spectre of Nuclear Deterrence, 1945–1959, Jonathan Gorry sets out to examine how Christians reacted to and influenced the nuclear age during the formative years of the nuclear taboo from the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945 through 1959. The book's main aim is “to explore Christian understandings of ethical citizenship in a nuclear context” (p. 12). The opening chapters trace the origins of the Christian presumption against war, the development of the notion of just war, and the forming of international Christian coalitions ready to confront the kind of global challenges raised by the tumult in Europe in the early twentieth century.

Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

How strong are normative prohibitions on state behavior? We examine this question by analyzing anti-nuclear norms, sometimes called the “nuclear taboo,” using an original survey experiment to evaluate American attitudes regarding nuclear use. We find that the public has only a weak aversion to using nuclear weapons and that this aversion has few characteristics of an “unthinkable” behavior or taboo. Instead, public attitudes about whether to use nuclear weapons are driven largely by consequentialist considerations of military utility. Americans’ willingness to use nuclear weapons increases dramatically when nuclear weapons provide advantages over conventional weapons in destroying critical targets. Americans who oppose the use of nuclear weapons seem to do so primarily for fear of setting a negative precedent that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons by other states against the United States or its allies in the future.

The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb (review)

Reviewed by: The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb Emily B. Landau The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb, by Avner Cohen. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 370 pp. $27.99 The added value of Avner Cohen's new book on Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity—or as he prefers to call it, "amimut"—is at the descriptive level: interesting historical and anecdotal evidence and documentation on the birth, development, and supporting features of Israel's bargain with the bomb. But analytically speaking, Cohen's book is largely a disappointment. He is critical of amimut and informs his reader from the outset that the time has come for change. But when he attempts to support his thesis—on both domestic and strategic grounds—the result is weak and unsubstantiated. It is quite clear that the impetus for writing this book was the domestic Israeli front, and the unacceptable costs that Cohen believes that Israel as a society and a state has paid for maintaining secrecy in the nuclear realm and upholding the national nuclear taboo. Intellectually, however, Cohen knows that the case for ending amimut must be anchored in strategic realities. The problem is that his two "strategic" chapters—which appear almost as an afterthought —offer a logic that doesn't stand up to scrutiny, especially for the more informed reader. On the issue of taboo, it seems that Cohen cannot escape the chains of his own past experience—namely, the personal price that he paid with the taboo-keepers [End Page 148] in Israel for writing his previous book on Israel and the Bomb. But this personal aversion to secrecy should not be confused with the strategic dimensions and implications of Israel's policy of ambiguity and/or the discussion of whether the time has come for a change. Cohen's depiction of the taboo's effect on society is troubling. His static portrayal fails to appreciate the reality that has evolved in Israel, especially over the past 10 to 15 years: the quite extensive debate that is carried out on this topic in Israel on a regular basis—in the media, at conferences, and in academic writing. Academics address the nuclear issue frequently and without concern. One of Cohen's mistakes is to reduce "having a debate on the nuclear issue" to the presence of an active protest movement against the bomb—a problematic criterion for assessing whether Israelis discuss their nation's nuclear policy. Cohen has harsh words for the Israeli public—he regards Israelis as willing accomplices in a culture of non-debate of nuclear issues. He derides them and complains that they support the nuclear policy even though they don't understand it. Even the educated, in his view, have little understanding of the "legal and political intricacies of the nonproliferation regime," and blindly support amimut. From their position of ignorance, "Israelis regard compromising amimut as a direct threat to their national security." But Israelis might be smarter than Cohen gives them credit for. Indeed, they most likely well understand the rather straightforward strategic logic of nuclear ambiguity, which gives them an insurance policy at very low cost. They also seem to realize that "coming clean" will be viewed negatively world-wide, and will increase demands for Israel to disarm. Indeed, although Cohen assumes that people are holding on to their positions for the wrong reasons, they are more likely doing so for the right ones. At the end of the day, the strongest advocate for the continuation of a nuclear taboo—in the sense that he will not admit to any erosion of the omnipresent norm—seems to be Avner Cohen himself. The taboo is actually the linchpin of his analysis—without it, his thesis crumbles. On the strategic front—where the logic of amimut is solid and strong—Cohen's attempt to undermine the policy is even more problematic. He provides a superficial and often tautological reasoning for ending amimut that rests on repeated assertions that the policy is anachronistic. But to say that "everybody knows" Israel is nuclear is not a compelling argument—this has been the situation for at least 25 years. And...

Containing the Atom

Immediately following the first and only uses of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President Truman described nuclear stewardship as “an awful responsibility that has fallen to us.” The decision to use the bombs did clearly demonstrate the operational effectiveness of a new and awesome weapon, as the atomic bomb was generally accepted to have been critical in bringing about the Japanese surrender. Moreover, new weapon technologies have consistently been used in subsequent warfare throughout human history. Policy-makers in the post-1945 period, therefore, would have had to work energetically against that precedent if they sought to meet Truman’s “responsibility” and establish a tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons. This paper will defend the proposition that this is exactly what key American policy-makers sought and accomplished. 
 In the narrative that follows, the key dates to be examined are between 1945 and 1950—a transformative period in American foreign affairs when Paul Nitze and other key US policy-makers were setting the stage for the Cold War. The key to this study is not in episodically assessing why the United States repeatedly stepped back from the brink of the nuclear abyss, but rather in seeking to discern the development of a tradition of policy considerations concluding in the practice of nonuse. This policy evolution is tracked through three key debates of the early Cold War: establishing the uniqueness of nuclear weapons, creating the hydrogen bomb, and the writing of NSC-68. 
 Scholars have proposed two key explanations for the widely unexpected legacy of atomic weapons: the tradition of non-use and the nuclear taboo. The taboo explanation stems from a constructivist appreciation of the role of ideas and social action in state behavior, while the tradition of non-use comes from an assessment of the material and reputational factors considered by rational and strategically-oriented policy-makers. Both of these explanations need to be taken into account when assessing the non-use of nuclear weapons. Overall, I argue in this paper that US nuclear policy, with the early support of policy-makers like Paul Nitze, developed in a way that allowed for the emergence of a tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons. Evolving practices in the early years of the Cold War contributed substantially to a strategic commitment that helped prevent the use of nuclear weapons and prepare the ground for later struggles against proliferation.

The Evolution of Restraint: The Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. By T. V. Paul, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 336 pp., $29.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-6132-1). In the 64 years since the development of nuclear weapons, large and vibrant debates over the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and war-fighting (for example, Brodie 1978; Gray 1979; Howard 1981; McNamara 1983) and the impact of nuclear proliferation (for example, Waltz 1990; Sagan 1994; Sagan and Waltz 2003) have dominated the academic discourse on nuclear weapons. Largely obscured by these debates is an empirical question: why has no one used nuclear weapons since the Nagasaki bombing? This is the puzzle T. V. Paul addresses with The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons . Using a series of case studies, Paul provides a convincing solution to this puzzle, and in the process provides interesting insights for the analysis of nuclear deterrence and proliferation. T. V. Paul focuses on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), since the non-use of nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon states (NWS) can be adequately explained through deterrence (2009:1). Prior research on this issue has argued that the non-use of nuclear weapons is the result of a “nuclear taboo” (Tannenwald 1999, 2005, 2007), but as Paul notes the norm against nuclear use does not …

A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence

This article predicts that the nuclear weapon states may opt sooner for nuclear elimination than generally expected. This delegitimation of nuclear weapons is due to five factors whose importance has grown since the mid-1990s: nuclear proliferation, the risk of nuclear terrorism, the nuclear taboo, missile defence, and the increased importance of international law. The article starts with categorizing nuclear weapons policies: nuclear primacy, maximum deterrence, minimum deterrence, existential deterrence, and post-existential deterrence. The nuclear weapon states will probably shift their policies from nuclear primacy (US), maximum deterrence (Russia), minimum or existential deterrence (UK, France, Israel, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea) to post-existential deterrence (or elimination), taking one step at a time.

Storming the Castle: A Constructivist Attack on Realism’s Home Turf

The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Edited by Nina Tannenwald. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 449 pp., $34.99 paper (ISBN-13: 978-0521524285). Nina Tannenwald's provocative book, The Nuclear Taboo , issues a direct, well reasoned, richly detailed and forcefully argued challenge to the domain of international relations on which realism has long had exclusive claim. That domain is explanations for the non-use of nuclear weapons. The core argument of The Nuclear Taboo is that the non-use of nuclear weapons by the United States since the end of World War II is not attributable to deterrence, as realists, particularly structural realists, have traditionally argued, but rather to the existence of a taboo against their use. In identifying a social norm against the use of nuclear weapons as the causal variable, and not the material considerations of anticipated loss which lie at the heart of deterrence theory, Tannenwald challenges the primacy of realism as the most powerful paradigm for understanding the so-called “High Politics” of security. Tannenwald's conclusions on the existence of a powerful social norm that controls the use of nuclear arms are reached by researching a key puzzle of modern history: Why have nuclear weapons not been used in situations where acute forms of deterrence, like the Cold War's Mutual Assured Destruction, did not apply (pp. 1, 3). According to Tannenwald, a careful search of the historical record, including both archival primary documents and secondary sources, shows that the policy discourse within the inner sanctum of power on whether to use nuclear weapons during the crisis situations where their use might be anticipated was not centered on questions of the military utility of the weapons. Rather it tended to focus on the inhumanity inherent in their …

The nuclear taboo: the United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945

Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.

Breaking the Nuclear Taboo in Iran

Breaking the Nuclear Taboo in Iran

Book reviews

Book reviewed in this articles. Human rights and ethics Terrorism, human rights and the case for world government. By Louis P. Pojman. International law and organization After anarchy: legitimacy and power in the United Nations Security Council. By Ian Hurd. Foreign policy US policy toward Israel: the role of political culture in defining the ‘special relationship’. By Elizabeth Stephens. China in Africa. By Chris Alden. Conflict, security and armed forces Getting in: mediators’ entry into the settlement of African conflicts. By Mohammed O. Maundi, I. William Zartman, Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Kwaku Nuamah. Arguing the just war in Islam. By John Kelsay. The nuclear taboo: the United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945. By Nina Tannenwald. Koran, Kalashnikov and laptop: the neo-Taleban insurgency in Afghanistan. By Antonio Giustozzi. Political economy, economics and development The WTO after Hong Kong: progress in, and prospects for, the Doha Development Agenda. Edited by Donna Lee and Rorden Wilkinson. Global outlaws: crime, money and power in the contemporary world. By Carolyn Nordstrom. Capitalism without democracy: the private sector in contemporary China. By Kellee S. Tsai. Ethnicity and cultural politics The politics of the veil. By Joan Wallach Scott. History Summits: six meetings that shaped the twentieth century. By David Reynolds. Fateful choices: ten decisions that changed the world, 1940–1941. By Ian Kershaw. The great partition: the making of India and Pakistan. By Yasmin Khan. Napoleon in Egypt: the greatest glory. By Paul Strathern. Napoleon's Egypt: invading the Middle East. By Juan Cole. Triumph forsaken: the Vietnam War, 1954–1965. By Mark Moyar. Before the killing fields: witness to Cambodia and the Vietnam War. By Leslie Fielding. The history of the PRC, 1949–76. Edited by Julia Strauss. Europe Fianna Fáil, Irish republicanism and the Northern Ireland troubles, 1968–2005. By Catherine O'Donnell. Middle East and North Africa Les Palestiniens: peuple de réfugiés? By Aude Signoles. Algeria: anger of the dispossessed. By Martin Evans and John Phillips. Sub-Saharan Africa Liberals, Marxists and Nationalists: competing interpretations of South African history. By Merle Lipton. Asia and Pacific Ethnic warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN crisis. By William Clarance. Japan rising: the resurgence of Japanese power and purpose. By Kenneth B. Pyle. China: fragile superpower. By Susan L. Shirk. East Asian visions: perspectives on economic development. Edited by Indermit Gill, Yukon Huang and Homi Kharas. India after Gandhi: the history of the world's largest democracy. By Ramachandra Guha. North America Freedom's power: the true force of liberalism. By Paul Starr. Winning the right war: the path to security for America and the world. By Philip H. Gordon. A pact with the devil: Washington's bid for world supremacy and the betrayal of the American promise. By Tony Smith. Latin America and Caribbean Puerto Rico in the American century: a history since 1898. By César J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabe.

Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making

Throughout history, nuclear weapons have been considered to be the ultimate weapons. This understanding largely detached them from the portfolio of conventional military means and assigned them a symbolic meaning that influenced the identity and norms creation of nations. In most countries today, the development of nuclear weapons is considered morally prohibitive, incompatible with a country's identity and international outlook. In some states, however, these negative norms are overridden by a positive set of norms, causing nuclear weapons to become either symbols of invulnerability to perceived threats or the regalia of major power status. Main purpose of this paper is to explore on the conditions that cause most states to develop a moral aversion to nuclear weapons, yet effectively lead to their glorification in others. Many studies on the normative understanding of nuclear weapons consider the existence of a negative normative predisposition, often referred to as 'nuclear taboo', as a major factor in preventing their acquisition and use. Other studies acknowledge the existence of a nuclear taboo inhibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but point to the existence of the opposing effect of norms, frequently referred to as the 'nuclear myth', when it comes to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This myth emerges when certain symbolic meanings are attached to nuclear weapons, such as a state's identity, self-image, and its desired position in the international system. With 180 odd countries in the world abstaining from the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 8 countries in possession of them (with two further countries assumed to have pursued their acquisition), one might consider the dominance of the nuclear taboo over the nuclear myth to be the rule. The core question is thus why and how this relationship reversed in the case of defectors.

Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo

April 01 2005 Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo Nina Tannenwald Nina Tannenwald Director of the International Relations Program and Joukowsky Family Research Assistant Professor at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Nina Tannenwald Director of the International Relations Program and Joukowsky Family Research Assistant Professor at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Online Issn: 1531-4804 Print Issn: 0162-2889 © 2005 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2005 International Security (2005) 29 (4): 5–49. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.5 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Nina Tannenwald; Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo. International Security 2005; 29 (4): 5–49. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.5 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsInternational Security Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2005 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2005 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics

From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics

From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics

From Winning Weapon to Destroyer of Worlds: The Nuclear Taboo in International Politics

Nuclear Taboo And War Initiation in Regional Conflicts

This article addresses the role of nuclear taboo or the tradition of nonuse of nuclear weapons in limited wars involving a nuclear- and a nonnuclear-weapon state and the importance of this prohibitionary norm to deterrence theory. It explores nonnuclear states' strategic calculations before launching wars against nuclear-armed states. It discusses the historical, moral, normative, and rational bases of the taboo and explains why nuclear states have refrained from using their capability vis-à-vis nonnuclear challengers. Two cases of nonnuclear states initiating wars—the 1973 Egyptian offensive against Israel and the 1982 Argentine invasion of the British Falkland Islands—and the calculations of these states' decision makers on their adversaries' nuclear capability are addressed. The article concludes by discussing the implications of nuclear taboo for deterrence theory and regional conflicts, the conditions under which it could be broken, and the likely consequences of its infraction.

Beyond Psychic Numbing: Child Art Therapy and the Nuclear Taboo

The existence of nuclear weapons and its effect on the pyschological development of children present art therapists, and indeed all those who have any contact with the young, with an unprecedented challenge. Do we as mental health professionals explore openly and sensitively this frightening issue (as we have been trained to do with other previously held taboos such as sexuality) or do we retreat, ignoring the signs, misinterpreting the graphic message, remaining focused only on more tangible distress? This article presents the school age child's dilemma: being aware of the risk of nuclear annihilation but lacking the psychological defenses with which to protect him/ herself. Studies are cited demonstrating this knowledge and a framework is presented in which to view the psychological and behavioral ramifications. Art therapy is presented as a preventative intervention and the inclusion of examples of children's art work illustrates both early awareness and concern. The author concludes by addressing the implications for the therapist in meeting this societal taboo both professionally and personally.